Alexander von Rospatt

THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS

A Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of this Doctrine up to Vasubandhu

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47

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To my Beloved Parents

Preface

The contents of the present study has been summarized chapter by chapter in the introduction. Together with the detailed topical index at the end this should facilitate the orientation and aid those readers who may consult this book only casually. With a few exceptions, I have translated all passages cited. I did this in order to document my understanding — often the wording is ambiguous and allows for more than one interpretation — and in order to help those less specialized readers who may not know Sanskrit or Chinese or Tibetan. This study is composed in English for the sake of those readers who may not know German. I have used English as a *lingua franca*, with no stylistic or literary ambitions but that of clarity.

The present study has been accepted as a Ph.D. thesis by the University of Hamburg. Its completion would have been impossible without the generous support and help of teachers, friends and fellow students. In particular, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. L. Schmithausen. With meticulous care, he read through all my thesis, gave many valuable suggestions and corrected mistakes which had slipped into my work. Over all the years at the University of Hamburg it was a great privilege to study under the guidance of such an outstanding scholar and such a warm-hearted and kind person. I am also very grateful to Prof. Dr. C. Oetke who generously gave of his valuable time, reading and discussing most of the proofs of momentariness in the Yogācāra sources with me. My understanding of these proofs owes a great deal to his penetrating analysis. As many other students and scholars in Hamburg, I am also much obliged to the acting librarian Dr. F. Erb who was always ready to help and share his vast knowledge on Buddhological matters. With great patience, my friend Dr. Y. Muroji helped me to cope with the pertinent modern Japanese literature, notably with the important essays by Prof. O. Hayashima. I was very fortunate that Prof. Hayashima himself came to visit Hamburg in sommer 1992 and at that occasion kindly spent many hours with me, exchanging his stimulating (and often deviating) views on the doctrine of momentariness with mine. I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. A. Wezler who not only made some valuable suggestions but also supported me in various other ways. Prof. Dr. D. P. Jackson was so kind as to check my English. To Prof. E. Steinkellner I am obliged for his encouragement at an early stage and for providing me with a copy of his unpublished PhD-thesis ("Augenblicklichkeitsbeweise und Gottesbeweis bei Śaṅkarasvāmin." Wien 1963). Though not immediately connected with this thesis, I also like to thank Dr. A. Piatigorsky from the School of Oriental and African Studies (London University) who aroused my interest in Buddhism and set me on the path I pursued at the universities in London and Hamburg. Besides putting up with me and my "*kṣaṇas*," my friends and fellow students B. Quessel, M. Maithri Murthi, R. Langer and M. Pahlke all contributed in one or another way towards this study. Likewise, I like to thank my dear wife Julia Gonnella for her patience and help at various stages of my work. Moreover, I gratefully acknowledge the financial and idealistic support of the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes which (once again) granted me a scholarship and thus financed this study. Last but not least, I like to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for funding this publication.

Table of Content

Introduction

The object of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is not the nature of time but existence within time. Rather than atomizing time into moments, it atomizes phenomena temporally by dissecting them into a succession of discrete momentary entities. Its fundamental proposition is that all phenomena — more precisely, all conditioned entities (*saṃskṛta*, *saṃskāra*), that is, everything but those special entities which have not been caused (hence their designation as *asaṃskṛta*, "unconditioned"), but which have always existed in the past and which always will exist in the future — pass out of existence as soon as they have originated and in this sense are momentary. As an entity vanishes, it gives rise to a new entity of almost the same nature which originates immediately afterwards. Thus there is an uninterrupted flow of causally connected momentary entities of the same kind, the so-called *santāna*. Because these entities succeed upon each other so fast that this process cannot be discerned by means of ordinary perception, and because earlier and later entities within one *santāna* are almost exactly alike, we come to conceive of something as a temporally extended entity even though it is in truth nothing but a series of causally connected momentary entities. According to this doctrine, the world (including the sentient beings inhabiting it) is at every moment distinct from the world in the previous or next moment. It is, however, linked to the past and future by the law of causality, insofar as a phenomenon usually engenders a phenomenon of its kind when it perishes, so that the world originating in the next moment reflects the world in the preceding moment.

This doctrine of momentariness entails that change is not constituted by the transmutation of persisting entities, but by the qualitative difference between earlier and later entities within a series. Though entities usually generate entities of the same kind, they differ qualitatively if an external agent affects the process of reproduction. If exposed to fire, for instance, a wood-entity does not give rise to an identical wood-entity when it perishes, but to a wood entity which bears the mark of impairment by fire, i.e. is slightly charred. Also the cessation of a series (i.e. what is ordinarily conceived of as the utter annihilation of atemporally extended object) is caused by the external agent which affects the process of reproduction of the object exposed to it in such a way that this process comes to a standstill.

Independent from this doctrine of momentariness, the Buddhists also dissected — as many other Indian schools of thought did — everything spatially into atoms. Thus the world in the final analysis is made up of momentary atoms which by their spatial arrangement and by their concatenation with earlier and later atoms of the same kind give rise to the illusion of persisting compact things. This analysis of existence can be illustrated by referring, rather anachronistically, to cinematography. Just as the rapid projection of distinct pictures evokes the illusion of continuous action on the screen, so the fast succession of distinct momentary entities gives rise to the erroneous impression that the world around us (and also we ourselves) exist continuously without undergoing destruction and being created anew at every moment. And just as the change of events on the screen is caused by the qualitative difference between earlier and later pictures on the film reel, so the change in the world — this includes

the change of spatial location, i.e. movement[1] — is brought about by the qualitative difference between earlier and later entities. Moreover, just as each projected picture only consists of differently shaded points which by their specific arrangement give rise to the perception of composite shapes, so the world around us consists of nothing but distinct atoms which are arranged in such a way that they convey the impression of compact bodies.

This outline of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness may suffice to introduce the reader to the subject matter of the present study. It is not surprising that such a doctrine which is so fundamentally at odds with ordinary experience met with great opposition. When it first appeared, it was rejected by large sections of the Buddhist community. Later, when it had gained ground among Buddhists, it was fervently opposed by the Brahmanical schools, because it contradicted their postulation of eternal entities of one sort or another (atoms, primary matter, a supreme deity etc.). Thus Śāntarakṣita introduces his treatment of the doctrine of momentariness with the remark that "by establishing momentariness alone, *prakṛti* (i.e. primary substance) and so on (i.e. the permanent entities imagined by the Brahmanical schools) are refuted" (Tattvasaṅgraha 350ab: *kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyaiva prakṛtyādi nirākṛtam//*). Because of this fundamental importance of the issue of momentariness, many of the debates between the Buddhists on the one side and the Brahmanical schools on the other focus on this point.

The rejection of the doctrine of momentariness by other Buddhists and later by the proponents of the Brahmanical schools made it necessary for the partisans of this doctrine to defend their stance by argumentation. It is this defence of the doctrine (as well as the treatment of other issues that reflect the notion of momentariness), rather than a straight-forward exposition, that is recorded in the sources which have come down to us. The oldest transmitted proofs of momentariness are recorded in the early Yogācāra sources. They are still directed primarily against other Buddhists[2] and derive the momentariness of all phenomena in various ways. Commencing with the Abhidharmakośa (henceforth: AK) and the auto-commentary thereon (i.e. the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya; henceforth: AKBh), momentariness is deduced mainly on the grounds that things perish spontaneously (and hence immediately after origination) independent from an external cause. This argument, the so-called *vināśitvānumāna*, and in particular the denial of external causes of destruction which it entails, dominated the controversy between the Buddhists and the Brahmanical schools over the issue of momentariness up to the time of Dharmakīrti (7th cent.) and, to a lesser extent, also thereafter. Dharmakīrti, who devoted much of his energy to the issue of momentariness, developed a new type of proof, the so-called *sattvānumāna*, that derives the momentariness of all entities

[1] Since all phenomena pass out of existence as soon as they have originated, their existence is tied to one spatial point. Their spatial location may, however, differ from that of the entity preceding or succeeding it. In this case the series (i.e. what is ordinarily conceived of as a temporally extended object) changes its location. Thus, what is ordinarily conceived of as movement is the destruction at one and the re-origination at another, adjacent point.

[2] This follows from the structure of the argumentation which presupposes a Buddhist stance. Cf., for instance, the argument that is based on the concept of *ekayogakṣematā* (§ II.B.2.2) or on the conception of *anityatā* as a mark of the conditioned (appendix § 2.3.3).

(without presupposing their impermanence) directly from the fact that they are existing (cf. STEINKELLNER 1968/69). On the basis of the premise that existence entails causal efficiency, he demonstrates that all existing things have to be momentary, because it is impossible for non-momentary entities to function as efficient causes. This impossibility is derived in the following way: If the entities already produce their effect in the first moment, they also have to produce it again and again at all subsequent moments of their existence (a situation which is clearly absurd), because their nature then does not differ from their nature in the first moment. Nor is it possible for them to discharge their causal efficiency gradually. For if they were not able to produce their effect completely at the beginning, they should neither be able to do so later, because this would entail a change of nature — something precluded from the outset (cf. ch. II.C). This proof became more prominent than the deduction of momentariness on the basis of the spontaneity of destruction though it never superseded it completely.[3]

Frequently, as a corollary of the proofs of momentariness, the Brahmanical arguments against this doctrine are refuted (*sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*; cf. MIMAKI 1976). The most prominent argument, namely that the recognition of phenomena disproves their contended momentariness, is (among other reasons) invalidated by the contention that recognition is a mixture of perception and memory and hence does not qualify as a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The related argument that the mind cannot be a mere stream of momentary mental entities because memory, the discernment of causal relationships etc. presuppose an enduring subject is rejected on the ground that the knowledge of the past is, by the principle of causal concatenation, passed on from one mental entity to the next and thus transmitted down to the present moment in a way which we may compare to the transmission of historic data from generation to generation.

Over the centuries the proof and defense of the doctrine of momentariness was further perfected by such notable Buddhist masters as Śāntarakṣita (Tattvasaṅgraha; henceforth: TS), his commentator Kamalaśīla (Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā; henceforth: TSP), Dharmottara (Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi), Jñānaśrīmitra (Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya), Ratnākaraśānti (Antarvyāptisamarthana) and Mokṣākaragupta (Tarkabhāṣā). The debate developed to such an extent that Ratnakīrti (11th century, Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi and Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa) even felt the need to deal with the *vināśitvānumāna*, the *sattvānumāna* and the *sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* each in a separate treatise.

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[3] Parts of the *sattvānumāna*'s prominence can be explained by the logical peculiarity of this proof which gave rise to an epistemological debate about the correct form of a valid syllogism (*anumāna*): Since momentariness is to be proved for everything, there are no entities that are not the subject of inference (*pakṣa*). Thus the *sattvānumāna* fails to fulfill two of the three classical conditions (*trairūpya*) for a valid syllogism, namely a positive and negative exemplification of the logical nexus (*vyāpti*) between the reason (to be existent) and the argued property (to be momentary) *outside* the *pakṣa*. Among other responses, this problem led to the modification of the conditions of a syllogism in such a way that also those *vyāptis* became accepted as valid where the logical relation between reason and argued property is not induced from other cases. This solution was already developed by Dharmakīrti himself — but neglected until Ratnākaraśānti (11th cent.) — who argued that in those syllogisms where the proving property is intrinsic to the subject (*svabhāvahetu*), the logical nexus is to be established by demonstrating that the proving property cannot inhere in a locus that is lacking the argued property (*sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇa*).

In accordance with the developments of the proof of momentariness, the doctrine of momentariness can conveniently be subdivided into an earlier and a later phase. In the earlier phase, the debate on momentariness is still confined to Buddhism. Besides the aforementioned early Yogācāra sources, also the Abhidharmic texts of the Hīnayāna schools pertain to this phase. To the later phase as I define it, all those sources belong in which the Buddhists confront the Brahmanical schools. These two phases overlap (cf. n. 8), though it may roughly be said that the former ends and the latter commences in the fifth century A.D. The transition between these phases can be witnessed in the AKBh. Here, the proof of momentariness is formally still directed against the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas, but, as far as the substance of the discussion is concerned, it is primarily directed against proponents of the Brahmanical schools (notably the Vaiśeṣikas). Thus the AKBh marks the beginning of the second phase, and yet it still pertains — the same applies also to the *Nyāyānusāra (henceforth: NA) — to the first phase in a certain sense. This second phase may in turn be subdivided into two periods, viz. the time up to Dharmakīrti when the *vināśitvānumāna* dominated the controversy, and the time from Dharmakīrti onwards when the *vināśitvānumāna* came to be superseded by the *sattvānumāna*.

So far, research by modern scholars has focussed on the later, much better documented phase commencing with the Abhidharmakośa, when the issue of momentariness started to become one of the most important points of dissent between the Buddhists and their Brahmanical rivals. Systematic research on the doctrine of momentariness began in the 1930s with Stcherbatsky (1930: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 79-118) and Mookerjee (1935: *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*; particularly pp. 1-86), who were the first to deal extensively with this aspect of Buddhism. Both scholars base their exposition on sources pertaining to the later period, in particular on the Tattvasaṅgraha (chapter 8, Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā) by Śāntarakṣita and the commentary by Kamalaśīla. (Stcherbatsky also refers extensively to Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu and Dharmottara's commentary as well as to Brahmanical texts, notably to Vācaspatimiśra's Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā). The elaborate proof and defense of the doctrine of momentariness by these Buddhist masters records accurately the manifold aspects of the controversy on this point between the Buddhists and the Brahmanical proponents up to the time of Kamalaśīla. It is the most detailed and at the same time most comprehensive treatment of the conception of momentariness found in any single Buddhist text. Therefore, the studies by Mookerjee and Stcherbatsky contributed much to making known the most salient features of the doctrine of momentariness. Both studies, however, only reproduce a picture of the final form which the doctrine of momentariness assumed in the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra school and do not refer to the earlier phase of this doctrine. To be sure, Stcherbatsky also considers the historic dimension (pp. 108-118), but as far as the development of the doctrine that all conditioned entities are momentary is concerned, his treatment is of little help.[4]

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[4] Stcherbatsky does not differentiate clearly between the conception that mental entities and that all forms of conditioned entities are momentary. Thus it is not entirely clear whether his central contention, namely that "as soon as Buddhism made its appearance as a theory of elements, it was already a theory of instantaneous elements" (Buddhist Logic, Vol. I p. 109), also refers to the stance that matter is

The first scholar to examine also earlier material was Louis de La Vallée Poussin (henceforth: LVP). As part of his study on the Abhidharmic "Controverse du Temps," he translated or paraphrased most of the pertinent material pertaining to the Abhidharmic tradition of the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, and also provided information about the stance taken by other Buddhist schools on the issue of momentariness ("Notes sur le moment (kṣaṇa) des Vaibhāṣikas et des Sautrāntikas," 1937). LVP's survey is reliable and well-informed and as such has so far been the most important contribution to the study of the early phase of the doctrine of momentariness. LVP does not, however, do more than present the textual material of the Abhidharmic tradition in a systematic form. Nor does he refer to the partly earlier material in the Yogācāra sources, or does he attempt to trace the origins of the doctrine of momentariness. In her study *Instant et Cause* (1955), Silburn, too, deals with the early phase of the doctrine of momentariness. She bases her exposition on LVP's aforementioned survey and on Masuda's translation of the doxographical account by Vasumitra (viz. the Samayabhedoparacanacakra). As regards the issue of momentariness, her study adds little to the treatment of this topic by LVP. She, too, does not address the question as to how the doctrine of momentariness may have originated. In his monography (written in Sanskrit!) on the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas (*Sautrāntikadarśana*), R.S. Tripathi devotes an entire chapter to the treatment of the doctrine of momentariness (pp. 325-350). He bases his exposition on the AKBh, the TS(P), Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, but also draws on two important Yogācāra sources, namely on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (henceforth: MSA) with the commentary ascribed to Vasubandhu (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya; henceforth: MSABh) and on the Abhidharmasamuccaya (henceforth: AS) with the commentary (Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (henceforth: ASBh). Though his study is well-informed and deals with various aspects of the Sautrāntikas' conception of momentariness, it does not always analyze the textual material critically (in fact, some portions of the study are little more than paraphrases of the Sanskrit original in the author's Sanskrit) and, in particular, it does not examine the origins and development of this conception.

Besides these aforementioned accounts, research has concentrated almost exclusively on the argumentations advanced in order to prove or refute the doctrine of momentariness. It shall suffice here to mention the most prominent examples: E. Frauwallner (1935) translated Dharmottara's (8th to 9th cent.) treatise on momentariness (*Dharmottaras Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*). Then, in an unpublished Ph.D. thesis (1963: *Augenblicklichkeitsbeweise und Gottesbeweis bei Śaṅkarasvāmin*), E. Steinkellner dealt with the refutation of the doctrine of momentariness and with the closely related proof of the permanence of things by the Naiyāyika Śaṅkarasvāmin (8th cent.). In a further study (1968/69: *Die Entwicklung des Kṣaṇikatvānumāna*), he studied the various proofs of momentariness advanced by Dharmakīrti. He shows how Dharmakīrti developed the aforementioned deduction of momentariness from existence (*sattvānumāna*) after he had proved momentariness in earlier

momentary. If it does, it is unfounded and erroneous, because, as I demonstrate in ch. I.A, the doctrine of momentariness is only a post-canonical and "sectarian" development. If Stcherbatsky's contention only refers to mental entities, then it does not address the question as to how the full-fledged doctrine of momentariness arose. Cf. n. 9 where Stcherbatsky's position is again taken up.

works on the basis of their spontaneous destruction. K. Mimaki (1976: *La Refutation Bouddhique de la Permanence des Choses [sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa] et la Preuve de la Momentanéité des Choses [kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi]*) studies closely the debate on momentariness between the Buddhists and their Brahmanical rivals in the TS(P) and in Ratnakīrti's (11th cent.) Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa, which he translates in the appendix. In his extensive bibliography, he lists all the important contributions to the study of the later phase of the doctrine of momentariness (that is of course, up to 1976). In a more recent essay (1984: *Setsunametsu-Ronshō*), the same scholar summarizes conveniently all aspects of the debate on momentariness beginning with the time of Dharmakīrti. Ratnakīrti's Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi Vyatirekātimikā has been translated by A.C. Senape McDermott (1969: *An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of 'Exists'*). C. Oetke (1993: *Bemerkungen zur buddhistischen Doktrin der Momentanheit des Seienden. Dharmakīrtis Sattvānumāna*) analyzes in great detail the structure of the *sattvānumāna* and its philosophical peculiarities.

While these studies have done much to make the later phase of the doctrine of momentariness well known, hardly any progress has been made on the early phase of this doctrine since the presentation of the Abhidharmic material by LVP. In particular, the textual material transmitted in the early Yogācāra tradition associated with Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga has been largely ignored. This material is not only much richer (both in terms of quantity and in terms of information it yields), but on the whole also older than the Abhidharmic sources presented by LVP. Thus, it is no doubt the most important source for the early phase of the doctrine of momentariness. Therefore, in my M.A. thesis (February 1988) I decided to focus on these sources. I confined myself to the examination — that is, translation and analysis — of the various proofs of momentariness in the Śrāvakabhūmi (henceforth:: ŚrBh), the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (henceforth: VinSg) of the Yogācārabhūmi (henceforth: Y), the MSA(Bh) and the AS(Bh), as well as in Vasubandhu's AKBh — the matching passages in his Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (henceforth: KSi) were also included. In the course of my study, I realized that many of these arguments highlight aspects of the doctrine of momentariness which in the later literature fade into the background or do not feature at all. At times, these arguments even seem to reflect the motives and reasoning that possibly may have underlain the development of this doctrine. It thus became clear that by a systematic evaluation of these proofs and of all other pertinent material of the early phase, it would be possible a) to shed much light on the conception of momentariness (or, more precisely, conceptions, given the substantial "sectarian" differences on this point) at this stage of development, and b) to identify at least tentatively some of the doctrinal reasons and motives that may originally have given rise to the conviction that all things are momentary. I, therefore, decided to pursue my studies on this topic within the framework of a Ph.D. dissertation.

Shortly after the completion of my M.A. thesis, the Japanese scholar O. Hayashima started to publish a series of articles dealing with the doctrine of momentariness in the Yogācāra school. Leaving aside my M.A. thesis, this was (to my knowledge) for the first time that the textual material from the Yogācāra tradition associated with Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga had been studied and evaluated systematically. Like previous scholars, Hayashima does not consider the historical dimension of the doctrine of momentariness, though he does allude to

the doctrinal differences on this issue between the various Buddhist schools. The main point Hayashima is making in these articles is that within the Yogācāra school, the doctrine of momentariness is based on the scheme of the "three natures" (*trisvabhāva*; cf. § I.D.2.3.1) which is characteristic for this school. This interpretation differed significantly (and still does) from my own understanding. The difference of understanding and the fact that Hayashima does not deal with the development of the doctrine of momentariness confirmed my impression that it was of great importance to continue research on the doctrine of momentariness in the early Yogācāra school.

Accordingly, I set out to examine all texts of the early Yogācāra school and in particular the Hsien-yang shêng-chiao lun (henceforth: Hsien-yang; this text, which is ascribed to Asaṅga, is only transmitted in a Chinese translation) which I had not dealt with in my M.A. thesis.[5] In order to trace the doctrine of momentariness back as far as possible and in order to explore which stance the various Hīnayāna schools had taken on the issue of momentariness, I, furthermore, began to survey the literature pertaining to these schools. Though much of this literature is lost, it is still far too vast to allow for a systematic investigation. Since my cursory examination of the canonical (including the Abhidharmapiṭaka) sources suggested that there is hardly any evidence for the conception of momentariness, I have focussed on the post-canonical literature and in particular on the (Mahā-)Vibhāṣa (henceforth: Vi), where the doctrine of momentariness is already frequently presupposed, as well as on the AKBh and the Nyāyānusāra by Saṃghabhadra. In addition, I have consulted the doxographies by Vasumitra and Bhavya which relate (in the case of some schools) whether they espoused the momentariness of all things or not. Besides, I have considered later sources than the AKBh, including Brahmanical repudiations of the doctrine of momentariness, insofar as they were of importance for the earlier phase studied by me. As regards the Mādhyamikas, their categoric denial of the discrete existence of conditioned entities entails that if they turn to the issue of momentariness at all, then they usually do so only to combat it insofar as it is taken to affirm the existence of momentary entities. Therefore, I have refrained from a detailed and systematic study of how precisely the Mādhyamikas deal with the issue of momentariness.[6] I have, however, sporadically referred to texts of this tradition and in particular to the

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[5] The evaluation of matching passages in the early Yogācāra sources has allowed for some observations (recorded in the notes 168, 189 and 340) regarding their relative chronology. Similarly, my treatment of the MSABh and the AKBh gave me the opportunity to touch upon the Vasubandhu question (see notes 408 and 410).

[6] Reference may be made to the series of articles published by J. May on Āryadeva's and Cardakīrti's treatment of permanence:
— "Āryadeva et Candrakīrti sur la permanence I." In: *Indianisme et Bouddhisme. Mélanges offerts à Mgr Etienne Lamotte.* Louvain-la-Neuve 1980, pp. 215-232.
— "Āryadeva et Candrakīrti sur la permanence II." In: *Bulletin français de l'École française de'Extrême Orient,* vol. LXIX. Paris 1981, pp. 75-96.
— "Āryadeva et Candrakīrti sur la permanence III." In: *Études Asiatique,* vol. XXXV, 2, Bern 1981, pp. 47-76.
— "Āryadeva et Candrakīrti sur la permanence IV." In: *Études de Lettres.* Vol. 3, Lausanne 1982, pp. 45-76.
— "Āryadeva et Candrakīrti sur la permanence V." In: *Acta Indologica,* vol. VI, Narita 1984, pp. 115-144.

Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (henceforth: MPPU) which contains much material which is Abhidharmic in character.[7] In contrast to my M.A. thesis, I did not restrict my inquiry to proofs of momentariness, but also utilized other, only indirectly relevant, passages, such as those treating the so-called marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*, cf. chapter I.C) or classifying the various forms and meanings of *anityatā*. In a word, I tried to take into account all textual material that promised to be of relevance for the exploration of the early phase of the doctrine of momentariness. In this, I have been guided by the conviction that research on the Buddhist history of thoughts is — at least with my limited means — best advanced by a close and careful study of the original sources.

The textual material potentially relevant for my study is so vast that it would have been illusory to strive for completeness. As mentioned above, in particular the immense body of Abhidharmic literature transmitted in Chinese translation has not been surveyed thoroughly. Therefore, further research is required to check more systematically for traces of the conception of momentariness in these (and also in other) sources. I think it is hardly likely, however, that the material uncovered in this way — at least in the case of the canonical literature, this should not be much — will radically alter the results of the present study.

The present study consists of two parts (of five chapters each) and an appendix. In the first part, I deal with the different aspects of the early phase of the doctrine of momentariness. In particular, I examine which schools subscribed in which way to the doctrine of momentariness. In the second, more hypothetical part, I attempt to identify the doctrinal factors that led to the development of the theory of momentariness.

The first part commences with a survey of the earliest textual evidence for the doctrine of momentariness (chapter I.A). This survey is based on what had to be a cursory examination of the canonical and early post-canonical Abhidharmic literature. I demonstrate that the doctrine of momentariness is a post-canonical development — this is confirmed by the dissent of the various schools on this point — which may date back to the first century A.D. and possibly even beyond.

In the following chapter, I examine which of the Hīnayāna schools subscribed to the doctrine of momentariness. It is shown that the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas only accepted the momentariness of mental entities, whereas the schools pertaining to the fold of the Sarvāstivādins (Sautrāntikas, Dārṣṭāntikas, Mahīśāsakas, Kāśyapīyas) regarded all conditioned entities as momentary. Furthermore, the Theravādins' position that matter lasts as long as seventeen mind-moments is documented. It is argued that this position may reflect that the doctrine of momentariness was introduced from outside (possibly by Buddhaghosa). In addition, the conflicting positions attributed to the Mahāsāṅghikas and some "sub-sects" are documented.

Thereafter (chapter I.C), the treatment of the so-called marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) by the various Hīnayāna schools and the Yogācāras is examined. It is shown that by

[7] According to Lamotte, the author of the MPPU was first a Sarvāstivādin and only later became a Mādhyamika (cf. n. 441).

correlating the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* (viz. origination, duration, change and destruction) to discrete entities, the Sarvāstivādins conceptualized the momentary existence of conditioned entities in much the same way as they had previously conceived of their existence when they had still regarded them as persisting for a certain period. Thus they held that they first originate, then persist and change and only thereafter vanish. This is contrasted with the approach of the Sautrāntikas, Dārṣṭāntikas and Yogācāras, who adapted the treatment of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to their radical conception of momentariness according to which things are infinitesimal, perishing in the very instant they appear.

In chapter I.D, I focus on the early Yogācāra-school, and examine the wider context in which the doctrine of momentariness was placed. It is shown that the Yogācāras of the tradition associated with Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga — the approaches of other Buddhist traditions are also documented — resolved the contradiction between the postulation of momentary entities and their Mahāyāna stance that all phenomenal things are ultimately unreal, by positing that the doctrine of momentariness only refers to the dependent character of conditioned entities (*paratantrasvabhāva*) and not to their true nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*). In this context, I examine Hayashima's contention that the doctrine of momentariness in the Yogācāra school is based on the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine and attempt to prove that this is not the case. Furthermore, it is documented how momentariness is in the Yogācāra sources classified as one of many forms of *anityatā*, so that it supplements (rather than replaces) *anityatā* in the traditional understanding of ordinary impermanence.

The first part of my study is concluded by an examination of the various definitions and usages of the term *kṣaṇa*, i.e. "moment," (chapter I.E). First, it is documented how, as the smallest segment of time, the *kṣaṇa* was in the Abhidharmic tradition dealt with as a definite unit of time (viz. 0.014 seconds) when its duration was computed by correlating it to larger units of time. Then I argue that the conception of the *kṣaṇa* as infinitesimal (as it is documented in some of the similes circumscribing its duration) resulted from the identification of the duration of the *kṣaṇa* with the duration of mental (and other equally transient) entities as the briefest conceivable events. Furthermore, I try to show how this identification entailed that the characterization of the *kṣaṇa* came to be intrinsically bound up with the definition of momentary existence — a development which culminated in the identification of the *kṣaṇa* with the nature of momentary entities and even with these entities themselves.

In the second part, I attempt to identify the doctrinal constellation that underlay the development of the doctrine of momentariness. As a starting point I take the three most prominent types of proof of momentariness in the Yogācāra sources and investigate whether they yield any clue as to the origination of this doctrine. To be sure, these proofs are advanced to substantiate the preconceived position of momentariness, and in the form in which they are recorded they are certainly retrospectively devised. This does not exclude, however, that they may reflect some of the doctrinal reasons or motives that led to, or at least contributed towards, the formation of the doctrine of momentariness. They are the oldest textual material that aim to establish the momentariness of all phenomena. In contrast to later proofs, they have hardly been streamlined, and they reflect a variety of functions and

purposes of the doctrine of momentariness. If any textual material at all can provide a clue as to the origination of the doctrine of momentariness, it should be this body of proofs. Of course, any attempt to determine to which extent the reasoning recorded in these proofs may also have underlain the formative process of the doctrine of momentariness has to remain speculative. But in a realm where no certainty is possible, a well founded hypothesis (as I attempt to advance in this study) should be better than nothing. Besides, the fact that these proofs are much more diverse than the proofs of the later phase means that they highlight many, otherwise ignored, aspects of the doctrine of momentariness. Therefore, the study of these proofs can be pursued as an end in itself. Thus, the extensive documentation of the proofs of momentariness undertaken in the second part does not only serve as a textual basis for my attempt to identify the doctrinal constellation underlying the theory of momentariness, but at the same time it is meant to shed more light on the nature and function of this doctrine in the early phase. Apart from this, a sound knowledge of the early proofs of momentariness, as I try to convey in the second part, is extremely useful for a better understanding of the proofs in later sources (in particular as they are recorded in the *pūrvapakṣas* of Brahmanical sources).

I commence my inquiry (chapter II.A) by an examination of how the Buddhists arrived at the position that all mental entities are momentary. As I argue, the denial of a permanent Self led to the conception of the mind as a flow of mental events which were conceived of as entities in their own right. The conception of these entities as momentary will have followed from introspection. The stance that invariably all mental entities are momentary required, as I try to demonstrate, that this "self-evident" momentariness was in a further step also projected onto those mental states where this was not obvious.

Thereafter, I investigate the possibility that the momentariness of material entities was deduced from the preconceived momentariness of mental entities (chapter II.B). Such a course of development is suggested by numerous arguments in the Yogācāra sources which in various ways reason that the interaction between mind and matter requires that matter is equally momentary. These arguments are at the beginning of the chapter arranged in a table according to the precise relationship between mind and matter to which they refer. In the following, they are discussed one by one. In the case of most arguments, it is obvious they do not reflect the reasons that gave rise to the doctrine of momentariness but, by contrast, were retrospectively devised in order to prove this doctrine. This does not apply, however, to the deduction of the momentariness of the sense organs from their simultaneity with the cognitions they generate. For, there is evidence that independently from the issue of momentariness this simultaneity was understood in the pregnant sense of arising and perishing at the same time. This raises the possibility that on the basis of such a pregnant understanding, sensory organs and, in a further step, matter in general came to be regarded as momentary. I argue, however, that there is on the whole too little evidence to confirm such a possibility. Though I arrive at the conclusion that the momentariness of matter was not inferred directly from the momentariness of the mind, I maintain that the presupposed momentariness of mental entities must have paved the ground for the conviction that all forms of conditioned entities are momentary.

In the next chapter (II.C), I examine the numerous proofs deducing the momentariness from change. It is shown that these proofs rest on two premisses, namely 1) on the premise that entities cannot change without losing their identity so that any change implies the destruction of the old and the orignation of a new entity, and 2) on the premise that things change at every moment. Then it is shown that the first premise is the logical consequence of the anti-substantialist tendency in Buddhism which denies a persisting substratum undergoing change so that the entity is nothing but the sum of its properties. Thereafter, it is demonstrated that the second premise follows naturally from the Buddhist stress on impermanence and in particular from reflections on the process of ageing. Since both premises can in this way be derived from characteristic Buddhist tendencies, there is no reason to assume that they have only been established retrospectively in order to prove the preconceived momentariness. I, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that these proofs indeed reflect the constellation underlying the formation of the doctrine of momentariness. Thus I maintain that just as the momentariness of mental entities follows from the denial of a permanent Self and from the observation of the fleeting nature of mental events, so the momentariness of all forms of entities follows from the denial of a substance underlying change and from the conviction that things always change. However, with this hypothesis I do not want to exclude that further factors will have contributed towards the formative process.

In order to complete my study of the proofs of momentariness, I turn in the following towards the proofs which deduce the momentariness from destruction (chapter II.D). First, I sketch the development of this proof up to the AKBh. It is shown that the old version of this proof as it is transmitted in the MSA(Bh) precludes that things may persist beyond origination. By contrast, it is established by the developed version (AS, AKBh — Hsien-yang and VinSg present an intermediate state) that things perish on account of their own-being and hence as soon as they have originated. I examine how the underlying premise that destruction cannot be caused by an external agent is reconciled with the observation that fire burns wood etc. Then I present the argument introduced — so my contention — by Vasubandhu that destruction is not caused because, as mere non-existence, it does not qualify as an effect. In the second part of this chapter, I discuss to which extent the type of proof examined here reflects some of the doctrinal considerations underlying the formation of the doctrine of momentariness. While I concede that reflections about the logical impossibility to persist beyond origination may have contributed towards the formation of the doctrine of momentariness, I do not give up my contention that in the main this doctrine results from a) the stance that things are always in flux and changing, and b) from the analysis of this change in terms of substitution.

After I have examined the doctrinal factors that may, to a bigger or lesser extent, have underlain the formative process of the doctrine of momentariness, I discuss the possibility that the driving force behind the process was a particularly radical type of spiritual experience of the transitoriness of existence (chapter II.E). This possibility is raised by the numerous passages testifying to the direct observation of the momentary rise and fall of not only mental, but also material entities. The sources suggest that this experience was induced either by the willful reduction of the time-span over which the rise and fall of phenomena (notably mind

and body) is envisaged, or by the application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) to the body. Though in both cases good arguments can be adduced to substantiate the claim that the momentariness may have been "discovered" in this way, I argue that the acceptance of these experiences as true can only be explained on the basis of the doctrinal considerations discussed in the preceding chapters. Hence, I come to the conclusion that a particularly acute experience of the evanescence of existence may at best have acted as a catalyst, prompting the Buddhists to work out the doctrinal implications of their denial of a persisting substance underlying change.

My approach to isolate the different aspects of the early phase of the doctrine of momentariness and to deal with them separately entails that the pertinent textual material is only presented in bits and pieces. It, therefore, seemed desirable to conclude the study with the continuous translation of a representative text. For this purpose, the aforementioned Hsien-yang attributed to Asaṅga is ideally suited. Of all Yogācāra texts (and indeed of all Buddhist texts up to the TS), it offers the most comprehensive treatment of the doctrine of momentariness, dealing with all important aspects of this doctrine in the early phase. Thus, the translation of the pertinent section of this text (viz. the first part of the fourth chapter)[8] which I offer in the appendix may serve as a convenient summary of, or — in case of the reader who decides to skip over this or that chapter of the present study — introduction to, the treatment of the doctrine of momentariness in the early Yogācāra school. In order to make this text, which is only transmitted in Chinese translation, more accessible, I document my translation with parallel passages from other Yogācāra sources (ŚrBh, VinSg, MSABh, ASBh). Besides, I have commented upon the translated text where this was felt useful. Particular attention has been paid to the enigmatic argumentation which proves that the mark of destruction cannot, as the Sarvāstivādins and others contend, effect destruction.

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[8] The better portion of the second part (viz. 549b12-550b13) of the fourth chapter focusses on the debate with the proponents of the Brahmanical schools and in particular on the refutation of the permanent entities they postulate. Thus this material pertains to what I have defined as the later phase of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. I have, therefore, refrained from translating it here. The fact that material of the earlier and later phase are presented side by side shows that the two phases overlap. Part of this textual material has been dealt with by Hayashima: The refutation of a permanent Soul (549b22-c1) is dealt with in Hayashima 1989b, pp. 25-27, the refutation of a supreme deity (*īśvara*) (Hsien-yang: 549c1-23) in Hayashima 1990, and the refutation of permanent atoms (Hsien-yang 550a9-b6) in Hayashima 1989c, p. 27f.

The second part of the fourth chapter of the Hsien-yang also deals with the ignorance of *anityatā* and the removal of this ignorance. This topic is only of indirect interest for the present study, and therefore has not been translated in the appendix. A discussion of this passage (or, more precisely, of an extract thereof, viz. Hsien-yang 550c24-551a9) can be found, however, in § II.E.2.1. Besides, reference may be made to Hayashima 1990, p. 27f where it is examined how the Hsien-yang (550b27-c15) accounts for the ignorance of *anityatā* and for the phenomenon of recognition.

In addition, the marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) are dealt with in this second part. This passage (550c16-20) has been translated in n. 141 and, therefore, has not been reproduced in the appendix.

I. Exposition of the Early Phase of the Doctrine of Momentariness

I.A The Earliest Textual Evidence for the Doctrine of Momentariness

§ 1 **1.1** There can be no doubt that the theory of momentariness cannot be traced back to the beginnings of Buddhism or even the Buddha himself.[9] It does not fit the practically orientated teachings of early Buddhism and clearly bears the mark of later doctrinal elaboration. Thus in the Nikāyas/Āgamas there are many passages which attribute duration to material[10] and even mental entities,[11] whereas there is, at least to my knowledge, no passage which testifies to the stance that all conditioned entities are momentary. That there was indeed no such passage is indirectly confirmed by the MSABh[12] and by NA[13] where the passages, which

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[9] Stcherbatsky does not substantiate his claim that "as soon as Buddhism made its appearance as a theory of elements, it was already a theory of instantaneous elements" (*Buddhist Logic* Vol. I p. 109). I do not see, why the Buddhists should initially not have held that at least material elements last longer than a bare instant. A case in point are the Abhidharmapiṭakas, which do not presuppose the momentariness of all elements they deal with (see below). Neither does Stcherbatsky specify to which sources he is referring when he claims that "the initial form of the doctrine" (i.e. before "a series of deviations and fluctuations in the schools of Hīnayāna") "was laid down with considerable precision" (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I p. 108). I know of no textual evidence that would lend substance to Stcherbatsky's contention that the doctrine of momentariness had been accepted by all Buddhists before these sectarian deviations and fluctuations. By contrast, as I argue in this chapter, the little evidence we have suggests that the doctrine of momentariness is only a post-canonical and "sectarian" development.

It has to be conceded, however, that it is not entirely clear whether Stcherbatsky's contention only refers to the conception that mental entities are momentary (in this case, too, his contention is problematic since the momentariness of mental events had not always been self-evident in Buddhism; cf. n. 250), or whether it refers to the full-fledged doctrine of momentariness which also comprises material entities. The latter is suggested by the more moderate approach which Stcherbatsky seems to adopt in his *The Central Conception of Buddhism* when he concedes that it is uncertain "when this theory was definitely framed" (p. 38).

[10] Cf. SN II 190-193 where the duration of mount Vepulla is contrasted with the brevity of human life, or the Markaṭasūtra (see § II.A.2.3.2) where the transitoriness of the mind is contrasted with the relative stability of the body which is said to last up to one hundred years and more.

[11] Saṃghabhadra (NA 534c14-17; = LVP 1937, p. 139) explains the attribution of duration in the sūtras as metaphorical, arguing that it refers to series made up of momentary entities and not to those momentary entities themselves: "As for the talk of duration [in some sūtras], it only refers to homogeneous series of conditioned factors (i.e. series where earlier and later segments do not differ qualitatively) [and is thus only] uttered figuratively so that there is no contradiction [with the momentariness of all conditioned entities]. [Such a metaphorical use of language in the sūtras is well attested as] there are even *sūtras* which say that the mind has duration (cf. n. 250). As it is said: 'The mind is fixed and cannot fluctuate'. And the *sūtra* teaches: 'From the first *dhyāna* the mind moves on to enter the second *dhyāna* and so on.' And it is taught: 'Once the mind has been tamed it can be fixed.'"

[12] MSABh 149,27-150,3 (cf. n. 424 where part of the text missing here is cited): "But that the arisen [entity] perishes later after a period of time [and] not immediately after it has arisen ... [is impossible], furthermore, because of the contradiction of this very [concept of] destruction after a period of time. Because of the contradiction with what? ... And [because of the contradiction] with the canonical tradition (*āgama*). As has been taught by the Lord: 'All conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*), oh Monk, are like an illusion; they are coming and going, they are temporary, they are [only] briefly present.'" (" ... *utpannaṃ tu kālāntareṇa paścān nirudhyate, notpannamātram eve" ti. ... kālāntaranirodhasyaiva ca*

are adduced to prove the theory of momentariness on the basis of the canonical tradition (*āgama*), only drive vaguely at the transience of conditioned existence, and do not explicitly testify to the theory of momentariness — a fact that can only be accounted for by the non-existence of such passages (or at most by the ignorance of their existence on part of the concerned authors). The same reasoning can be applied to Hsien-yang which, in the context of the proof of momentariness, does not adduce canonical quotations in order to prove that all conditioned entities are momentary, but only in order to substantiate the claim that they are derived from the mind (548c24-549a7; cf. appendix, § 2.2). Furthermore, the fact that the theory of momentariness was a controversial issue among the various schools of the so-called Hīnayāna (see below) indicates that it is not canonical. This is also borne out by the Abhidhammapiṭaka of the Theravādins, where the teaching that all conditioned factors are as momentary as mental entities is even refuted (see below).

1.2 On the other hand, there are at least some isolated occurrences where the Buddha is cited as teaching the momentariness of all conditioned factors. Thus the frequently quoted[14] Paramārthagāthā (henceforth: PG) 5 which explicitly teaches that "all *saṃskāras* are momentary" (*kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ*)[15] is adduced in the Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā

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virodhāt. kena virodhāt? ... āgamena ca. yad uktam bhagavatā: "māyopamās te bhikṣo saṃskārā <āy> āpāyikās[a] *tāvatkālikā itvarapratyupasthāyina" iti.*)

[a] *āpāyika* (BHSD s.v.: "pertaining or leading to an evil fate") must be wrong because all attributes clearly drive at the evanescence and not at the suffering of existence. The emendation is confirmed by the Tibetan translation (P. phi 255a8-b1). Cf. n. 486 for further textual material regarding this reading.

[13] In NA 534c7-14 (LVP 1937, p. 138f), in order to show that the body is as momentary as mental entities, a citation driving at the evanescence of mental events is juxtaposed to a similar quotation stressing the transitoriness of the body. In this context further quotations are adduced to substantiate more generally the claim that all conditioned factors are momentary: "And [the body is momentary] because [the Buddha] has taught on the body as he has taught on the mind. This is to say, a sūtra proclaims: 'This *citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna* [at each] hour (*muhūrta*), minute (*lava*), moment (*kṣaṇa*) arises as another and passes away as another,'[a] while [another] sūtra teaches: 'At the occasion of every single moment the body ages, becomes decrepit, decays, exhausts itself.' Furthermore a sūtra teaches: 'Oh monks, the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) do not abide; quickly they fall back to destruction.' And [yet another] sūtra teaches: 'The conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*), oh Monk, are like an illusion, they increase and decrease, they are [only] briefly present, then they perish.'[b] And [yet another] sūtra teaches: 'Beginning with the night of his conception up to old age, man constantly runs ahead without abiding or turning around.'[c] On the basis of these and further quotations the law is known that all conditioned factors are momentary and do not abide for a long time."

[a] Cf. n. 449 where this quotation is dealt with extensively.

[b] Cf. n. 12 where the citation of this passage in the MSABh is reproduced.

[c] Cf. Udānavarga I.6: *yām eva prathamāṃ rātriṃ garbhe vasati mānavaḥ/ aviṣṭhitaḥ sa vrajati gataś ca na nivartate//* Cf. Udānavarga I.15, 32 and 33 cited in n. 378.

[14] $BCAP_P$ p. 376,1f (on IX.6), TSP 11,5f (14,1f in the edition by Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series 1.2, Varanasi 1968), Bhāmati on Brahmasūtra 2,2,20, Nyāyamakaranada (Benares 1907) 35,5, Hetubinduṭīkāloka (Baroda 1949) 375,1. Cf. Schmithausen 1987, n. 1394.

[15] PG 5: "All conditioned factors are momentary. How [could these] non-persisting [factors] have action? Precisely that what is their existence[a] is called 'action' (commentary: because it is an effect)[b] and

(henceforth: BCAP) and in the TSP as an utterance of the Buddha. Moreover, *Piṅgala in his commentary on MKK (translated into Chinese in the fourth century) cites the Buddha as teaching the following: "All conditioned entities (*saṃskṛta*) are momentary; there is not a moment for which they persist"(T 1564 3a23f).

Since the teaching that all conditioned factors are momentary is not recorded in the Nikāyas/Āgamas, it must have been attributed to the Buddha after their compilation or within a tradition which was not incorporated into the canon. This is corroborated by the citation of the Maraṇasmṛtisūtra (i.e. the Northern/Sanskrit equivalent of the Maraṇasatisutta) in MPPU, which ends thus: "O Bhikṣus, all conditioned entities arise and perish from moment to moment. Their time of duration is extremely short. They are like an illusion deceiving the ignorant yogins" (MPPU 228b5f; $MPPU_L$ p. 1425; this sūtra is discussed in § II.E.3.5). This utterance by the Buddha must have been added to the *sūtra* after its final redaction in the Nikāyas/Āgamas since it is missing both in the Aṅguttaranikāya and in the Ekottarāgama version.[16] Thus it is documented here that the tradition that the Buddha had explicitly taught the momentariness of all conditioned entities was not current at the time of the compilation of the Nikāyas/Āgamas, but later gained ground as witnessed in the supplementation of the Maraṇasatisutta in MPPU.

1.3 In the face of this evidence, the question poses itself when precisely between the final redaction of the Nikāyas/Āgamas and the composition of the texts recording this tradition, did the teaching that all conditioned factors are momentary become so current that it was attributed specifically to the Buddha? The only hint seems to be provided by PG 5, where the reading *yeṣāṃ* in the c-pāda indicates that the *gāthā* existed before in a Middle Indian version (cf. n. 15), so that it could date back as far as the first century B.C. when the Buddhist literature was still exclusively composed in Prakrits (cf. Lamotte 1958 [repr. 1976], p. 645). In this case the theory of momentariness could arguably be dated back even further, insofar as it must have taken some time for it to become so established that it was considered to have been taught explicitly by the Buddha. However, it is not certain that the *gāthā* was already in its Middle Indian version considered to be canonical and did not only acquire this status after its incorporation in the PGs.[17] Nor can it be excluded that the *gāthā* only

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precisely that is called 'doer' (commentary: because it is a cause)[b]." (*kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā, asthirāṇāṃ kutaḥ kriyā/ bhūtir yeṣāṃ*[c] *kriyā saiva kārakaḥ saiva cocyate //5//*; corrections of the edition by Wayman (1984, p. 336) according to Schmithausen 1987, n. 1394.)

[a] *bhūti* is ambiguous and may, as in the Chinese and Tibetan translation, also be rendered by "origination" instead of "existence." Both renderings are factually equivalent insofar as the *saṃskāras* are held not to exist beyond origination. Thus the ambiguity of *bhūti* fits into the context perfectly.

[b] The commentary on this *gāthā* is cited in n. 143.

[c] Schmithausen (ibid.) suggests that Middle Indian *y'eṣaṃ* was mechanically sanskritized to *yeṣāṃ*, which was later corrected to *yaiṣāṃ*.

[16] Aṅguttaranikāya (henceforth: AN) III 303-306, AN IV 316-319; Ekottarāgama: T 125 741c27-742b2; the whole sūtra is cited in MPPU 228a3-b7; $MPPU_L$ pp. 1422-1425; cf. $MPPU_L$ p. 1424 n. 1.

[17] On the other hand, given that at least some Paramārthagāthās can be traced back to a canonical

originated after the first century B.C. in the transitional period when some of the Buddhist literature was still composed in Prakrits and some already in Sanskrit. Hence, also PG 5 does not provide a conclusive clue as to the time when the doctrine of momentariness had become current.

1.4 To sum up, on the whole the examination of the Nikāyas/Āgamas and of alleged quotations of the Buddha yields little concrete information on the development of the theory of momentariness. Besides the vague possibility that already by the first century B.C. the theory may have been current (possibly even as the teaching of the Buddha), it reveals only that if the theory had existed at all by the time of the final redaction of the canon, then only without acquiring a canonical status — possibly because it would have been confined to certain circles of Buddhists. This calls for an examination of the Abhidharmapiṭakas of the various schools, which vary considerably from each other and record much of the doctrinal development that is not attested in the Nikāyas/Āgamas. Regrettably, such an investigation is impeded by the loss of almost all the texts of the old schools (that is, provided they had existed at all in the first place) with the exception of the Pāli Abhidhammapiṭaka, the Chinese translation of the seven canonical Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivādins and the Chinese translation of the Śāriputrābhidharma which Bareau (1950) and Frauwallner (1972, p.133) ascribe to the Dharmaguptakas.

§ 2 **2.1** It was impossible within the framework of the present study to scrutinize these Abhidharmic sources systematically. My cursory examination suggests, however, that there is hardly any pertinent material to be found. As for the Pāli Abhidhammapiṭaka, the only immediately relevant, and hence all the more important, passage known to me — and possibly the oldest testimony whatsoever to the theory of momentariness — is the Khaṇikakathā of the Kathāvatthu (henceforth: Kv) where the doctrine is refuted that "all phenomena (*dhamma*) are as momentary as a single mental entity (*ekacittakkhaṇika*)."[18] The Kv forms part of the Abhidhammapiṭaka of the Theravādins even though tradition ascribes it to the Thera Tissa. It is *buddhabhāsita* (i.e. uttered by the Buddha and hence canonical) because its content-matter and method is said to go back to the Buddha so that Tissa is not considered to be the author. It is uncertain whether at least the core of the Kv was composed at the occasion of the third council at the time of Aśoka (i.e. 3rd century B.C.) as tradition has it, or whether

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source (cf. Schmithausen 1987, n. 1401), and more importantly, given the testimony of later Yogācāra sources (ibid.) that PG 39 was adopted from a *muktakasūtra* (i.e. a sūtra not comprised in the Nikāyas/Āgamas), it is certainly possible that already the Middle Indian version of PG 5 had enjoyed a canonical status of some form. Judging from the textual evidence — I, for one, know of no more instances where the Buddha is cited as teaching explicitly the momentariness of all conditioned entities than the ones adduced here — this would have been within rather limited circles. On the other hand, this does not necessarily imply that this tradition was utterly unknown in other Buddhist circles. Rather, texts like the MSABh, the NA and Hsien-yang, which substantiate the doctrine of momentariness by canonical citations (see above), may have ignored this tradition deliberately, because its authenticity was not accepted.

[18] Kv XXII.8, p. 620,5: *ekacittakkhaṇikā sabbe dhammā ti.*

it was only composed sometime later.[19] Moreover, the Khaṇikakathā is among the last sections of the Kv and, therefore, must have been added well after the composition of the core of the Kv. According to Norman's treatment of the Kv (1983, p. 104), the Khaṇikakathā probably had been incorporated into the Kv by the first century B.C. when the canon (Norman 1983, p. 10f) and the commentary upon which Buddhaghosa's Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā (henceforth: Kv-a) is based (Norman 1983, p. 119) were committed to writing. The latest conceivable date for its inclusion seems to be, again according to Norman (ibid.), the first century A.D. after which no more additions were made to the commentaries. Thus, if we follow Norman, the doctrine of momentariness cannot have originated later than the first century A.D., while it could well be older.[20] On the other hand, given the problems involved in dating the Kv in its final form, its testimony certainly does not provide a sufficient textual basis to secure that the theory of momentariness had been current by the first century A.D.

Though not directly testifying to the doctrine of momentariness, there is another important section in the Kv, namely the Cittaṭṭhitikathā (Kv II.7). Here the position is refuted that certain mental states (*citta*) can last for an entire day (*ekaṃ cittaṃ divasaṃ tiṭṭhatīti*, p. 204,17). As argued below (§ II.A.2.5), the refutation reflects that the Theravādins had already taken one important step towards the theory of momentariness by generalizing the perceived momentariness of mental entities into a rule applicable indiscriminately to all mental entities. Thus it can be witnessed that the momentariness of all mental entities had already become a "doctrine" by the time of the Cittaṭṭhitikathā, which — given its early position within the Kv — should be considerably older than the Khaṇikakathā.

The refutation of the doctrine that all phenomena are as transient as mental entities in the Kv suggests that the Theravādins at this stage had not yet accepted the momentariness of all conditioned entities,[21] and that hence no textual evidence of the theory of momentariness is to be found in those sections of the Abhidhammapiṭaka which do not deal with the doctrines of the Theravādins' opponents. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that the refutation in Khaṇikakathā is not generally directed against the doctrine that material entities are momentary, but only specifically against the position that mental and material entities are equally short-lived. This leaves open, at least in principle, the possibility that the Theravādins already at the time of the Khaṇikakathā had developed their peculiar doctrine of momentariness according to which material entities are also very shortlived, though they are not quite as transient as mental entities are (cf. § I.B.3). However, given that there is to my knowledge no canonical evidence to this effect and considering the nature of the arguments employed in

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[19] Cf. the remarks by Schmithausen (1992, p. 144) and by Hirakawa (1991, p. 284) in their respective contribution to H. Bechert, ed., *The Dating of the Historical Buddha* (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV.2).

[20] An older date would also be suggested by the fact that it must have taken some time for the doctrine of the momentariness of all phenomena to become current enough to be refuted in the Kv.

[21] In his table on p. 287, Bareau (1955), too, evaluates the Khaṇikakathā as testifying to the non-acceptance of the momentariness of all conditioned entities on the part of the Theravādins.

the Khaṇikakathā, this seems little likely.[22] All the same, such a possibility may not be dismissed altogether, since a closer scrutiny of the Pāli Abhidhammapiṭaka than was possible here may reveal pertinent material. Besides, such a scrutiny may uncover more passages in the Pāli Abhidhamma which are (like the Cittaṭṭhitikathā discussed above) indirectly relevant.

2.2 No relevant material was identified by my cursory examination in the canonical Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivādins,[23] with the exception of a couple of passages in the Jñānaprasthāna (T 1544 and T 1543, henceforth: JP), the latest of these works, which is in fact not accepted as canonical by the entire Sarvāstivāda tradition (cf. Frauwallner 1971, p. 71f). By contrast, in the (Mahā-)Vibhāṣā, a huge compendium of Sarvāstivāda doctrine which is formally a commentary on the JP, there is clear evidence for the theory of momentariness. It is not treated as a topic in its own right,[24] but is, when dealing with other subject matters, frequently presupposed.[25] Rather surprisingly, the momentariness of all conditioned entities

[22] The first argument (Kv 620,5-10) seems to urge that the earth, oceans, mount Sineru, the elements and plants (i.e. inanimate matter) do not have the same duration as mental units.[a] The formulation, however, is not altogether clear and possibly the locative *citte* is to be construed literally.

The second argument (Kv 620,11-621,14) rejects that all conditioned entities have the same duration as mental entities on the ground that sense organs and objects cannot be simultaneous (*sahabhū*) with perception, as is apparently held to be implied by the thesis that they are as momentary as a single mental entity (*ekacittakkhaṇika*), because this stands in contradiction to the process of perception.[b] How precisely the argument is to be understood depends upon the interpretation of what exactly is meant by *sahabhū*. It may either be contended that it is unacceptable that material entities also exist when they are not currently perceived, because at that time they are not simultaneous with mental entities. This would presuppose a pregnant understanding of *sahabhū* that precludes a partial overlapping. Alternatively, it may be argued that object and sense organ can only underlie the perceptive process if they exist longer than the single mental entities which together form the succession of mental events that constitutes one unit of perception. In the latter case, the argument could reflect the later Theravādins' stance that the duration of matter corresponds to one unit of perception which is made up of seventeen mental entities (cf. § I.B.3). This, however, would stand in opposition to the first argument which quite clearly testifies to the belief that at least some forms of matter endure for a long time.

[a] Kv 620,7-10: *citte mahāpaṭhavī saṇṭhāti, mahāsamuddo saṇṭhāti, sineru pabbatarājā saṇṭhāti, āpo saṇṭhāti, tejo saṇṭhāti, vāyo saṇṭhāti, tiṇakaṭṭhavanappatiyo saṇṭhantīti? na h' evam vatabbe ...*

[b] Kv 620,17-30: *nanu āyasmā Sāriputto etad avoya: "ajjhattikañ c' eva āvuso cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā na āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, no ca tajjo samannāhāro hoti, n' eva tāva tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti; ajjhattikañ c' eva āvuso cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, no ca tajjo samannāhāro hoti, n' eva tāva tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti; yato ca kho āvuso ajjhattikañ c' eva cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti, evaṃ tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hotī"ti. atth' eva suttanto tī? āmantā. tena hi na vattabbaṃ "cakkhāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇena sahajātan" ti.*

[23] I.e. the Saṅgītiparyāya (T 1536), the Dharmaskandha (T 1537), the Prajñaptiśāstra (T 1538), the Vijñānakāya (T 1539), the Dhātukāya (T 1540), the Prakaraṇapāda (T 1541, 1542) and the Jñānaprasthāna (T 1543, 1544).

[24] Arguably, the passage Vi 787c17-788a21 (see below) constitutes an exception to this rule. In this passage it is set forth that the doctrine that sense organs and cognitions are simultaneous is taught in the JP in order to explicate that not only mental but also material entities are momentary.

[25] The treatment of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in chapter 1.6, for instance, is clearly based on the doctrine

seems to be taken for granted (i.e. is treated as a fact) and there is with one exception[26] no evidence in the Vi from which it could be deduced that it was or had earlier been a controversial issue. Accordingly there is (with this one exception) no explanation, justification or even less proof of momentariness. These only appear at a later stage — to my knowledge for the first time in the AKBh — probably when required by the confrontation with other schools.

These findings suggest that within the Abhidharma tradition of the Sarvāstivādins the theory of momentariness came to the forefront sometime between the conclusion of their Abhidharmapiṭaka and the redaction of the commentaries (notably the Vi) upon it. This has to be qualified insofar as there are already traces of the conception of momentariness in the aforementioned passages in the JP. In one passage it is asserted that the gross elements constituting the sense organs (*indriyamahābhūta*) arise and perish together with the perceptions (*citta*) they generate.[27] If it is presumed that the *citta*s in this context were

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of momentariness. See e.g. Vi 198b4f, Vi 199b1f, Vi 199b9f (= Vi_2 149a1), Vi 200a2-12 (= Vi_2 149c1-14; cf. the citations in n. 99, n. 101, and n. 136), Vi 201c4f (=Vi_2 150c20-22; cited in n. 221). Also chapter 7.3.1 (Vi 836c23-841b10) which deals with the ten notions (*saṃjñā*) presupposes the momentariness of all conditioned entities (cf. the citation of Vi 840c21-841a11 in § II.E.3.2). This can be illustrated by the following passage (Vi 838a18f) among others: "If one contemplates that the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are without permanence for [even] a moment (*kṣaṇānityatā*), then this notion is called the notion of *anityatā*." (for *kṣaṇānityatā* cf. Vi 503a14-16 [=Vi_2 369b4f] cited in n. 196).

As further examples, the following passages may also be cited:
— Vi_2 151c7f (Vi 202c7-9): "A complete night and day consist of 6.480.000 *kṣaṇas* in each of which there are the five groups [of factors constituting the living being] (*skandha*) originating and perishing" (cf. n. 218 where the deviating translation by Hsüan-tsang is discussed).
— Vi 701b12f (cf. the citation of Vi 701b8-12 in n. 218): "Arising and perishing so many times (i.e. as indicated in the preceding sentence, viz. 6.480.000 times) in the course of one night and day, the person [constituted by] the five *skandhas* is impermanent."
— Vi 711c6f (same explanation in Vi 310a14 =Vi_2 233c22f): "As for the continuum of moments (*kṣaṇasantāna*), immediately after the *skandhas* of the initial moment, the *skandhas* of the second moment become present. That the later moment succeeds (*saṃ√tan*) the earlier moment is called succession of moments (*kṣaṇasantāna*)."
— Vi 975c20-22: " ... the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) which are swallowed by *anityatā* have, once they have arisen, no power to persist for a short while and perish immediately after one moment." (cf. the formulation *anityatāvyāghrīmukhaṃ praviśati* in the commentary on the Abhidharmadīpa [henceforth: AD], i.e. in Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti 106,18 [henceforth: ADV], cited in n. 124).

Besides, reference may also be made to Vi 902c11-22, where it is presumed that non-mental entities are as short-lived as mental ones, and to Vi 237a26-b1 (= Vi_2 182c22-24 translated in n. 420).

[26] Part of the passage Vi 787c17-788a21 (extracts cited in n. 61 and in n. 296) is presented as a proof of momentariness (cf. § II.B.2.1). The argumentation is, however, directed against the view that matter lasts three moments and not one. Since this view may be understood as a peculiar form of the doctrine of momentariness, the controversy is really not so much about whether things are momentary or not, as about how precisely their momentariness is to be understood.

[27] JP (T 1544 998c20-24 = T 1543 876b18-22): "Those dharmas which originate together with the *citta* and not without it, do they endure together, do they perish together and not without the *citta*? Answer: As for sentient beings of the realms of desire and of matter (*kāma-* and *rūpadhātu*), if they do

conceived of as momentary events (rather than as mental states that have a certain duration), then this implies that they have to be momentary, too.[28] This will only have entailed that all matter is invariably momentary, if it is presumed in addition that the Buddhist tendency to generalize properties had precluded that some material entities may be momentary while others are not. Given that the Yogācāras derive the momentariness of all conditioned entities on the basis of the proof that the sense organs (and objects) are momentary, it is feasible that, on the stage recorded in the JP, the Sarvāstivādins had come to regard the gross elements of sense organs and, in a further step, matter in general as momentary. This possibility is confirmed by the explanation in the Vi that the passage under consideration is taught to demonstrate that matter in general is momentary.[29] On the other hand, leaving aside the second passage in the JP which is to be discussed subsequently, I know of no other passage in the entire Sarvāstivāda Abhidharmapiṭaka where any allusion to the momentariness of non-mental entities is made.[30] Thus it has to remain dubious whether the passage under consideration really testifies to the stance that the sense organs and, by extension, matter in general are momentary.

There is one further passage in the JP which, in the version translated by Hsüan-tsang and commented on by the Vi, attests to the doctrine of momentariness. Chapter 1.6. of the JP (926a1-b22) deals with the so-called marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*), i.e. the forces which — themselves hypostatized to entities in their own right — operate on

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not abide in the *asaṃjñi(/jñā)samāpatti* (i.e. the absorption into [the state of] an unconscious [being]) or in the *nirodhasamāpatti* (i.e. the absorption of the suppression [of consciousness and feeling]), then the gross elements constituting the sensory organs (*indriyamahābhūta*) arise together with the *citta* and not without it, and abide and perish together with the *citta* and not without it. If [the sentient beings] abide in the *asaṃjñāsamāpatti* or the *nirodhasamāpatti*, then they (i.e. the *indriyamahābhūtas*) [originate, abide and perish] without the *citta*."

[28] Strictly speaking, this follows only if it is presumed that the mode of existence of the gross elements of the sense organs does not differ, when the flow of mental entities comes to a halt in the *asaṃjñi(/jñā)samāpatti* or *nirodhasamāpatti*.

[29] Vi 787c17-23: "'Those dharmas which originate together with the *citta* and not without it, do they endure together, do they perish together and not without the *citta*?' and so on.[a] Why is this discussion made? Though it was taught in an earlier chapter that *citta* and *caittas* are momentary[b], this was not yet explicated for matter. In order to explicate this now, this discussion is made."

[a] The passage commented upon is cited in n. 27.

[b] Presumably the Vi refers back to the beginning of ch. 6.4 where the doctrine that "the *cittas* of all sentient beings arise together, endure together and perish together" (JP 997b23) is explicated thus: "All those [*cittas*] arise and perish in one moment, because they all perish immediately after they have arisen from [their respective] conditions" (Vi 769c11f).

[30] That there are no other passages to this effect in the JP is also suggested by the explanation in the Vi that the passage presently discussed is taught in order to elucidate that not only mental but also material entities are momentary, while in fact it only teaches that the gross elements making up the sense organs have the same duration as the perceptions they give rise to. The fact that this passage, which at best testifies indirectly to the theory of momentariness, is identified in the Vi as the passage where the momentariness of matter is demonstrated implies that there are no other passages which testify more directly to this momentariness.

conditioned entities causing their origination, modification and destruction (see below). In the last section of this chapter (JP 926b20f) the Trilakṣaṇasūtra, on which this doctrine is based, is cited in the following form:

> "Conditioned entities have three marks which [characterize them as] conditioned. On the one hand, the origination of conditioned entities can be observed; on the other hand, [their] destruction and [their] change-while-enduring can be observed."[31]

In the version of the JP translated by Hsüan-tsang (T 1544 926b20-22) and recorded by both Vi (199c23f) and Vi_2,[32] the sūtra is commented on in the following manner:

> "With respect to one moment (*ekasmin kṣaṇe*) what is origination? Answer: Birth. What is cessation? Answer: Impermanence (*anityatā*). What is change-while-enduring? Answer: Old age."

The Vi (Vi 200a2-8, Vi_2 149c1-11) understands this passage in the JP to teach that the three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* all occur in one moment, and explicates that this is taught in order to stop the view of others, notably the Dārṣṭāntikas, that the three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* cannot exist in one moment. That origination, change and destruction all happen in one moment implies that the qualified entity is momentary. Given that by definition all conditioned entities are qualified by *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, the explication of the sūtra in the JP reveals according to the Vi the acceptance of the doctrine of momentariness.

There is, however, another version of the explication in the JP, which is recorded in the translation by Gautama Saṃghadeva (T 1543 780c23-781a1) and in a quotation in the AKBh (77,19f, cited in n. 35), that reads *ekasmiṃś citte* (i.e. in or with respect to one mind) instead of *ekasmin kṣaṇe* (i.e. in or with respect to one moment). The correlation of the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas* with a single *citta* instead of a *kṣaṇa* no longer allows for an interpretation of the passage in terms of the momentariness of all conditioned entities. For with the reading *ekasmiṃś citte* the passage only refers to mental entities and, leaving aside the problem whether they are here conceived of as momentary or not, does not refer to conditioned entities in general.

It is difficult to settle which of the two readings is original, because in both cases it is not easy to understand the precise import of the explanation in the JP. The equation of "origination" with "birth," of "change-while-enduring" with "age," and of "destruction" with "impermanence" (*anityatā*) accords with the standard terminology of the Sarvāstivādins, who

[31] The quotation is taken from the Trilakṣaṇasūtra (AN I 152 = T 125 607c15, SN III 36 = T 99 12a29-b1, Nidānasaṃyukta p. 139,7-12 = T 99 83c16, cf. $MPPU_L$ III 1163, n.1). Vasubandhu (AKBh 77,1f) refers to this sūtra, and Yaśomitra quotes the passage concerned in full: *trīṇīmāni bhikṣavaḥ saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni. katamāni trīṇi. saṃskṛtasya bhikṣavaḥ utpādo 'pi prajñāyate, vyayo 'pi prajñāyate, sthityanyathātvam api.* (AKVy 171,26-28; almost identical wording in the quotation in Pr 145,4f). For the translation of *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa* as "marks which [characterize as] conditioned," see AKBh 77,3-6)

[32] Here the JP is not quoted, but the reading *ekasmin kṣaṇe* is clearly presupposed by the commentary.

generally (so already in the Pañcavastuka; see n. 81) designate the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* as *jāti* (birth), *sthiti* (duration), *jarā* (age), and *anityatā* (impermanence). Thus it seems that, as in other Sarvāstivāda sources,[33] the expressions in the *sūtra* are in the JP matched with the technical terms used within the Abhidharmic tradition (cf. n. 81). It is difficult to see, however, why this explanation is correlated by the locative construction to a single *kṣaṇa* or *citta*.[34] Possibly, the passage tries to resolve the problem how origination, cessation and change-while-enduring can all occur in one moment by equating these terms with the technical expressions employed in the Abhidharma tradition, viz. birth (*jāti*), impermanence (*anityatā*) and age (*jarā*). In this case, the problem would be solved by showing that *sthityanyathātva*, as the only problematic mark, does not imply modification of a persisting entity but only the loss of energy, as entailed by age. This would match the explanation by the Sarvāstivādins that age does not imply transformation, but only the loss of energy (cf. § I.C.3.2.3 and particularly n. 118). In such a case, *citte* would have been the original reading, which will later have been substituted by *kṣaṇe*, when the scope of momentariness, which had formerly been restricted to mental entities, had been extended to encompass material entities, too. Thus, the fact that *citte* will have been read originally would corroborate my impression that the all-encompassing doctrine of momentariness is still absent in the original version of the JP.

It has to be conceded, however, that the passage in the JP under review also allows for other interpretations.[35] But as long as it cannot be shown conclusively that the reading *ekasmiṃś*

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[33] Vi 200a17-19: "There [in the sūtra], 'change-while-enduring' is another name for 'age' and does not signify 'transformation.' As birth is called 'origination' and as *anityatā* is called 'destruction,' so one should know that 'age' is called 'change-while-enduring.'"

Cf. also AKBh 75,24f cited in n. 78 and Vi 787b19f.

[34] Given that the Abhidharmic terms for the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* relate both to material and mental entities (cf. e.g. JP 926a4f), it is hardly possible that *ekasmiṃś citte* is meant to indicate that the terminological explication refers specifically to mental entities. Besides, in such a case the alternative reading *kṣaṇe* could no longer make any sense.

[35] Vasubandhu, who reads *ekasmiṃś citte* (see above), contends (AKBh 77,20f: *tatrāpi nikāyasabhāgacittaṃ yujyate.*) that *citte* is used in the sense of *nikāyasabhāgacitta* (i.e. the mind of an entire existence). He also reads *maraṇa* instead of *anityatā* (cf. the preceding explanation in the JP [T 1543 780c14-16, T 1544 926b10-13] that death, in contrast to *anityatā*, refers to the end of an existence), a reading to my knowledge not attested elsewhere and in all likelihood secondary,[a] and thus can maintain that the JP renders the general expressions (i.e. "origination" and so on), which the Buddha used with respect to all conditioned entities, in terms of sentient existence:

> "With respect to one mind (*ekasmiṃś citte*, that is, according to Vasubandhu, with respect to the mind of one existence), what is origination? Answer: Birth. What is destruction? Answer: Death. What is change-while-enduring? Answer: Age." (AKBh 77,19f: *yad api ca Jñānaprasthāna uktam: "ekasmiṃś citte ka utpādaḥ. āha: jātiḥ. ko vyayo, maraṇam. kiṃ sthityanyathātvaṃ, jare"ti.*)

While this interpretation accounts both for the locative and the explication of the canonical terms for the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, it is problematic on account of its interpretation of *citta*. Given that *citta* is generally used to refer to specific mental events or states, it is not probable that *ekasmiṃś citte* in the JP should, despite the lack of any specification to this effect, not refer to a discrete mental state, but to the mind viewed as a unit extending over the entire span of an existence. By contrast, it is very likely that

citte is secondary, this passage in the JP may not be taken as an unambiguous testimony to the doctrine of momentariness. Given the uncertainties of the other passage of the JP discussed before, it must, therefore, on the whole remain doubtful whether the theory of momentariness is attested in the JP. My findings suggest that, if at all, it only played a marginal role and had not yet come to the forefront by the time of the compilation of the JP, which marks the conclusion of the Abhidharmapiṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins.[36] Of course, this needs to be verified by a more systematic investigation than was possible here, since it cannot be excluded completely that the momentariness of all conditioned entities is presupposed in some other portions of the JP or even in one of the other (exclusively earlier) canonical Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivādins.

Unless all passages in the Vi testifying to the theory of momentariness were added after the compilation of this text,[37] the doctrine of momentariness can be dated back to at least the second century A.D., that is, provided the account that it was compiled at the time of Kaniṣka is accepted.[38] Given that the Vi is a vast compilation of the various doctrinal positions

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Vasubandhu interpreted *ekasmiṃś citte* in this way because it supports his claim that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* should be correlated to series of momentary entities, rather than to these entities themselves. This motivation is also borne out by Yaśomitra's argumentation that *ekasmiṃś citte* has to refer to the mind as viewed over the entire span of an existence and not to a discrete mental unit, because "how should a single momentary mental entity (lit. mind-moment, *cittakṣaṇa*) have birth, death and modification [as would follow] otherwise (i.e. if *citta* was understood in its usual meaning)." (AKVy 176,5f: *anyathā hi katham ekasyaiva cittakṣaṇasya jātiś ca maraṇaṃ cānyathātvaṃ ca syāt.*).

[a] The alteration may have been inspired by the association of "birth" (*jāti*) and "old age" (*jarā*) with "death" (*maraṇa*) on account of the terminology of the final clause of the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), namely that "depending upon birth (*jāti*) there is old age (*jarā*) and death (*maraṇa*)" (*jātipratyayaṃ jarāmaraṇam*; cf. n. 81). Note that while *jāti* and *jarā* are the standard Abhidharmic expressions of the Sarvāstivādins for the mark of origination and age, in *Tattvasiddhi (henceforth: TSi) 289a18-20 (cf. n. 81) *maraṇa* is listed side by side with destruction (*vyaya*?) as a *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*.

[36] That the doctrine of momentariness had not yet come to the forefront in the JP is also suggested by my, again rather cursory, examination of the Abhidharmasāra (or Abhidharmahṛdaya, i.e. T 1550), where no evidence of the conception that all conditioned entities are momentary was found. Though the non-canonical Abhidharmasāra may be older than the canonical JP (so Frauwallner 1971, p. 72f), there does not seem to have been much of a gap between the composition of two works (so again Frauwallner ibid., cf. also Armelin 1978, pp. 7-12).

[37] As suggested by a comparison of the older translation by Buddhavarman (T 1543, fifth cent.) with the later translation by Hsüan-tsang (T 1544, seventh cent.) — the possibility that from the beginning there were two different versions, viz. a shorter and a larger one, should be borne in mind, however —, further material probably came to be incorporated after the initial composition of the Vi.

[38] On the basis of Hsüan-tsang's report (T 2087, 887a) that Kaniṣka (according to Lamotte [1958, p. 648] he ruled from 128 to 151, according to Hirakawa [*Indo Bukkyōshi* Tokyo 1974, p. 185] from 132 to 152) convened the council of monks who composed the Vi, the text is generally dated back to the 2nd cent. A.D. (Lamotte 1958, p. 303; Kato 1989, p. 120, where the second half of the cent. up to the third cent. is singled out). However, this dating can only be accepted with certain reservations. On the one hand, Kaniṣka may, as Basham concludes in his introduction to the *Papers on the Date of Kaniṣka* (Leiden 1968: p. x f), also be dated back some further fifty years to 78 A.D. On the other hand, in one

current at the time of its composition, parts of the material incorporated — and this may include also some of those passages where the theory of momentariness is presupposed — could date back beyond the second century A.D. Moreover, considering that the momentariness of all conditioned entities is accepted as a matter of fact, and given that the doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* and the contemplation of the ten notions (*saṃjñā*) are already adapted to the theory of momentariness, it can be safely assumed that the origination of the theory of momentariness must be earlier than the respective passages in the Vi, in order to allow for a period during which the momentariness of all conditioned entities could have been conceived, systematized into a coherent doctrine and become so current that it was not subject to doubt and no need was felt to substantiate it by argumentation. This, too, raises the possibility that the theory of momentariness may be dated back even beyond the second century A.D.[39]

On the other hand, my examination of the relevant sources suggests that there is no clear evidence of the theory of momentariness either in the canonical Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivādins or in Dharmaśrī's Abhidharmasāra. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the doctrine of momentariness cannot date back to the second century A.D. or even earlier. Beside the fact that a close scrutiny of all relevant sources may actually reveal textual material to this effect, this is not compelling because the theory of momentariness may well have originated outside the Abhidharmic current of the Sarvāstivāda (indeed even within an altogether different school) so that it would for that reason not have found entry into the aforementioned Abhidharma works, but may later have gained so much ground that it came to be presupposed at a later time when the JP was commented upon.

A further problem in dating the doctrine of momentariness back to at least the second century A.D. on the basis of the Vi is raised by my examination of the Amṛtarasa by Ghoṣaka (T

passage in the Vi (Vi 593a15; cf. p. 387 of E. Zürcher's contribution "The Yüeh-chih and Kaniṣka in the Chinese Sources" [pp. 346-390] in the aforementioned *Papers on the Date of Kaniṣka*) Kaniṣka is depicted as a "king of old" so that the Vi can only be dated back to the time of Kaniṣka if it is held that this passage was added later. P. Demiéville (*L'Inde Classique*. Edited by L. Renou and J. Filliozat. Paris 1953. Vol II § 2133), by contrast, argues that the composition of the Vi was only retrospectively associated with king Kaniṣka — such a possibility had already been raised envisaged earlier by E. Frauwallner ("Die buddhistischen Konzile." In: *ZDMG* vol. 102, 1952: p. 256) — and suggests that the Vi originated in the third century A.D.

[39] In this context, mention may be made of the refutation in the Ratnāvalī (I. 63-69, henceforth: RA) of the marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) where the momentariness also of matter is clearly presupposed (cf. I. 69-70ab quoted in n. 217). If it is accepted — as it is done by Lindtner (1987, p. 11) and Frauwallner (together with the Mūla-Madhyamaka-kārikā [henceforth: MKK] and the Vigrahavyavartanī, Frauwallner presents the RA in his *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus* [pp. 204-217] as a characteristic work of Nāgārjuna) — that the RA is an authentic work by Nāgārjuna, who is variously dated back to the first three centuries A.D. (cf. Ruegg 1982, p.4 n.11), then the theory of momentariness must have been current when he flourished. On the other hand, the doctrine of momentariness is to my knowledge not presupposed in the MKK — a systematic survey of the MKK is required in order to investigate whether any traces of the conception of momentariness can be identified — so that it is possible that the RA (or at least the pertinent portion) may not be attributed to Nāgārjuna, the author of the MKK.

1553) which suggests that there is no evidence of the conception that all conditioned entities are momentary in this text. Since it is unlikely that the Amṛtarasa is older than the Vi (cf. van den Broek 1977, p. 81), this poses the question why the doctrine of momentariness is attested in the Vi and not in the treatise by Ghoṣaka. Therefore, in addition to a systematic investigation of all canonical and early post-canonical abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, a more thorough examination of all pertinent passages in the Vi (considering all three translations) is required in order to settle (provided this is possible at all) whether all references to the doctrine of momentariness will have been added after the initial compilation of the Vi, so that the doctrine of momentariness would have only (at least among the Sarvāstivādins) become current after the second century A.D., or whether at least some of the references pertain to the core of the Vi compiled in the second century A.D. In the latter (in my eyes more probable) case, the lack of any reference to the doctrine of momentariness in the Abhidharmāmṛtarasa by Ghoṣaka — the same explanation could be applied to the Abhidharmasāra by Dharmaśrī if it was not accepted that it is earlier than the Vi — could reflect that this text originated in a different milieu than the Vi[40] where the notion of momentariness had either not yet become current at all or, more likely, where for one reason or other it only played a marginal role. In support of such an explanation reference could be made to other post-canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivāda tradition where the doctrine of momentariness hardly features at all, though there can be little doubt that it was known and not rejected. In the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya[śāstra](?) (henceforth: SAH) ascribed to Dharmatrāta and in the Abhidharmāvatāraśāstra by Skandhila, for instance, the doctrine of momentariness, though presupposed in at least one passage in each text, seems to be ignored for the most part.[41] This is particularly stunning in the case of Skandhila who is contemporaneous with Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra (M. van Velthem 1977, p. xi) and hence must have been acquainted with the debates on momentariness as they are recorded in the AK and in the NA.[42] Therefore, the lack of any testimony to the notion of momentariness in the Abhidharmāmṛtarasa does not necessarily imply that all passages in the the Vi testifying to the doctrine of momentariness were added after the initial compilation. By contrast, it is well possible that among Sarvāstivādins the doctrine of momentariness first gained ground in a milieu that is closely connected to the tradition recorded in the Vi, but far removed from the commentary tradition associated with Dharmaśrī and Ghoṣaka. This, however, is not more than an assumption. As mentioned before, without a closer examination of the pertinent material, it cannot be ruled out that all passages testifying to the notion of

[40] A comparative study of the Amṛtarasa with the Vi could shed some light on this issue.

[41] I have only identified one passage where Skandhila alludes to the notion of momentariness, namely when setting forth the functioning of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, more precisely, of the mark of age (*jarā*; T 1554 987c1f, P. thu 412b7f, van Velthem 1977 p. 67f). In the SAH the notion of momentariness is attested when it is taught that the application of mindfulness entails that the body (as well as the other objects of *smṛtyupasthāna*) is to be viewed as impermanent "because it perishes from moment to moment" (T 1552 909b13f).

[42] The fact that the notion of momentariness only played an important role among certain strands of the Abhidharmic tradition of the Sarvāstivādins, corroborates my impression that this notion originated outside the mainstream Abhidharmic tradition.

momentariness in the Vi were only added after its compilation in (probably) the second century A.D.

2.3 In the Śāriputrābhidharma it is taught at least three times (T 1548 591b8-11, 698a5-7, 715a20-23; cf. Bareau 1955, p. 197) that the mind (*citta*) absorbed in the "diamond-like contemplation" (*vajropamasamādhi*) persists for immeasurable time. This stands in clear contradiction to the doctrine that all conditioned entities are without exception momentary and suggests that the theory of momentariness is not subscribed to by the tradition of the Śāriputrābhidharma. This impression is also conveyed by Bareau's (Bareau 1955, pp. 193-197, Bareau 1950, p. 69ff) and Frauwallner's (1972, pp. 133-152) summary studies of the Śāriputrābhidharma where no indication of the theory of momentariness is to be found. It cannot be excluded, however, that a systematic examination of the Śāriputrābhidharma — a task exceeding the scope of this study — would disclose (if only, as the erroneous view of opponents) material testifying to the theory of momentariness.

3 The cursory examination of the still-extant Abhidharmapiṭakas undertaken in this chapter suggests that in them, as in the Nikāyas/Āgamas, the theory of momentariness is not postulated as a canonical doctrine and is only attested, if at all, as a sectarian stance to be refuted. This implies that the theory developed after the schism of the sects within certain schools and is in that sense a post-canonical development which, judging from the little evidence reviewed here, may date back as far as the first century A.D. and possibly even beyond.

I.B The Doctrine of Momentariness in the Hīnayāna Schools

1 The cursory examination of the Nikāyas/Āgamas and the various Abhidharmapiṭakas in the preceding chapter suggests that the doctrine of momentariness is post-canonical and originated among a certain section of Buddhists. This calls for a survey of which of the early Hīnayāna schools subscribed to this theory and in which form. Again, the loss of most of their works (or their non-existence in written form, to start with) hampers such a survey so that relevant information has to be gathered from other sources. Of particular importance is the doxographical account by Vasumitra (second century A.D.?, cf. Lamotte 1958, p. 574 n.3), the *Saṁayabhedoparacanacakra (T 2031, T 2032, T 2033; P. 5638 u 159a3-168b7; henceforth: SBhC), which reports — regrettably without any accompanying explanations — the stance taken by the various Hīnayāna schools on controversial issues. This information can be supplemented by the doxographical account in the fourth chapter (*prakaraṇa*) of the Tarkajvālā by Bhāvaviveka (6th century) which is also transmitted in the Tibetan Tanjur as a separate text ascribed to Bhavya (Śramaṇapañcāśatkārikāpadābhismaraṇa P. 5630 u 35b1-54b6).[43] Also useful is the Kathāvatthu, referred to above, even though the commentary's ascriptions of the refuted doctrines to specific schools are retrospective and hence not to be trusted (cf. Norman 1983, p. 104).[44]

2 To start with, the Mahāsāṅghikas, who split from the Sthaviras (first schism) sometime during the Mauryan period (324-187 B.C.; Lamotte 1958, p. 572),[45] and their sub-sects will be examined. Which stance the Mahāsāṅghikas themselves took on the issue of momentariness is, to my knowledge, not explicitly recorded.[46] They are, however, credited by Vasumitra (SBhC 16a8, $SBhC_M$ Ib.6 and 7) with the following position:

> "The seed becomes the sprout. The four gross elements constituting the matter of the sense organs (i.e. the entire body insofar as all corporal matter is at least endowed with the tactile sense?) are subject to change. The mind and the factors associated with the mind (*caitasika dharma*) are not subject to change."

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[43] Since there are no significant discrepancies between the two versions (cf. Walleser 1927, p. 77), I am citing here only from the independently transmitted version ascribed to Bhavya, i.e. the Śramaṇapañcāśatkārikāpadābhismaraṇa.

As for the correct name of the author, cf. C. Lindtner (p. 59 in: "On the Date of Dharmakīrti etc." In: *The Adyar Library Bulletin.* Vol. 56, 1992, pp. 56-62) where he argues that Bhāvaviveka is a corrupt form of the name.

[44] Vinītadeva's (8th cent.) Samayabhedoparacanacakranikāyabhedopadarsanasaṃgraha (translated by A. Bareau in JA, vol. CCXLIV 1956, pp. 167-191) and Paramārtha's account (cf. P. Demiéville "L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'après Paramārtha." In: *MCB.* Vol. I 1931-2, pp. 15-64) do not make any mention of the theory of momentariness at all.

[45] The precise dating of the schism depends on the dating of the Buddha and is also beset with other difficulties which are too complex to be entered into here.

[46] I do not see on which grounds Silburn (1955, p. 236) advances her (undocumented) claim that the Mahāsāṃghikas subscribed "en tous points au dogme de l'instantanéité."

It could be thought that this doctrine of the Mahāsāṅghikas reflects their particular theory of momentariness insofar as mental entities are held not to change because they are too short-lived to do so, while matter (or at least some forms of matter)[47] is held to be subject to change because it is said to possess some duration. This line of thinking would presuppose that the susceptibility to transformation depends upon the duration of the concerned entity, insofar as any change entails a "before" and an "after" and hence requires existence at at least two different points of time.

It is more likely, however, that the susceptibility to change is derived differently. Change implies that there is a persisting factor — material substance may for instance be regarded in this way — underlying the alteration, on account of which the changed entity is identical with the entity before it changed. As for the mind, the denial of a Self (*anātmavāda*) entails that such an enduring element cannot be accepted lest it be identified with an eternal soul. Thus the *anātmavāda's* denial of a lasting Self underlying the fluctuations of the mind excludes that the mind can be subject to change (cf. see § II.A.2.1). With regard to matter, the Mahāsāṅghikas were apparently not so radical and, contrary to other schools, admitted (at least with regard to some forms of matter) an enduring substance underlying transformation. Thus they interpreted change as the mutation of a persisting entity and not as the destruction of an old and the origination of a new entity.[48]

Therefore, the doctrinal stance reported by Vasumitra does not depend upon the Mahāsāṅghikas' acceptance of the momentariness of mental entities and the denial with regard to matter. It only allows one to infer that the Mahāsāṅghikas can hardly have considered material entities (at least not in general) to be momentary since the very susceptibility to change presupposes existence beyond a bare moment.[49] As for mental entities, the position that they cannot change only implies that they are momentary if it is assumed that they do

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[47] It is conceivable that the transformation of the seed is representative for external (i.e. non-corporeal) matter in general. Similarly, the susceptibility to change of the gross elements of the sense organs may refer to the entire body. In support of this, it could be argued that all corporeal matter is at least endowed with the tactile sense. On the other hand, if the doctrine of the Mahāsāṅghikas thus related to corporeal and non-corporeal matter in general, the question poses itself why mention is made only of specific forms of matter. Moreover, the teaching in JP that the gross elements of the sense organs are simultaneous with mental acts (cited in n. 27), suggests that this form of matter may also be addressed specifically by the Mahāsāṅghikas (and not because it stands for all corporeal matter). Furthermore, it is possible that at least fire and sound, though material, were held by the Mahāsāṅghikas not to be subject to change. Cf. the position of the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas that fire and sound are, in contrast to all other forms of matter, momentary.

[48] Cf. Vi 996c11-14 (= LVP 1937, p. 137): "The supporters of the doctrine of transformation (i.e. the Sāṃkhyas?) have this opinion: Milk turns into sour milk, seeds into sprouts, wood into ashes and so on. If one [entity] exists in continuation of another [entity], then this [entity] is the product of transformation of that other [entity] and it is not the case that that other entity (*dharma*) perishes and this entity originates. Therefore, the essence of all *dharmas* persists eternally."

[49] Silburn (1955, p. 240) interprets the passage under discussion in the same way, but maintains (without substantiating this claim) that the stance expressed here is "heretical" and does not accord with the general opinions of the Mahāsāṅghikas.

change every moment. To presuppose this for all mental entities requires that the self-evident transitoriness of most mental events had been developed into a general doctrine about the nature of all mental entities (cf. § II.A.2.5). On the basis of Vasumitra's report it cannot be decided whether such a development can be surmised in the case of the Mahāsāṅghikas or whether they held — as the Śāriputrābhidharma and the partisans refuted in the Cittaṭṭhitikathā of the Kv (see above) did — certain mental states to last for a long time. The latter is suggested by the fact that Vasumitra (SBhC 17a24, $SBhC_M$ p. 65) correlates (despite their differing Vinaya affiliation) the doctrines of the Dharmaguptakas, to whom the Śāriputrābhidharma is attributed (see above), with those of the Mahāsāṅghikas. Moreover, the Kv-a attributes the refuted doctrine in the Cittaṭṭhitikathā to the Andhakas who belong, again according to the Kv-a (p. 57), to the fold of the Mahāsāṅghikas (cf. Bareau 1955, p. 89).

At any rate, the fact that mention is only made of the mental and material entities' susceptibility to change and not, as in the case of other schools in Vasumitra's account, of their duration suggests that the theory of momentariness was, at least on the stage recorded by Vasumitra, of no importance to the Mahāsāṅghikas — possibly because it had not yet originated at all or, at least, had not yet penetrated their circles.[50]

The stance in the aforementioned Khaṇikakathā that all conditioned entities are as momentary as mental entities is ascribed by the Kv-a (p. 195f) to the Aparaseliyas (Sanskrit: Aparaśailas) and to the Pubbaseliyas (Sanskrit: Pūrva- or Uttaraśailas), both sub-sects of the Mahāsāṅghikas. If this attribution is correct the theory of momentariness will eventually have been espoused at least by certain sections within the Mahāsāṅghika fold of Buddhism. On the other hand, the attribution of the Kv-a is not only dubious to start with, but also incoherent insofar as the Aparaśailas and Uttaraśailas are elsewhere in the Kv-a (see above) said to belong to the Andhakas who, as we have seen, are credited with the view that certain states of consciousness are not momentary. Moreover, Vasumitra does not report that the Aparaśailas and Uttaraśailas held all conditioned entities to be momentary but, by contrast, specifies (16a24, p. 38) that their doctrines — excepting those listed by him — generally accord with those of the Mahāsāṅghikas, which suggests that they, too, did not subscribe to the theory of momentariness. This also applies to the Prajñaptivādins (T 2032 16a20f, p. 38) and Caityaśailas (16a24, p. 38), both of which were also Mahāsāṅghika sub-sects.

From this it does not follow, however, that there were no Mahāsāṅghika sects at all that professed the momentariness of all phenomena. Thus the doctrines of the Bahuśrutīyas, probably a further sub-sect of the Mahāsāṅghikas,[51] are said by Vasumitra (SBhC 16a15f, $SBhC_M$ p. 36) to generally agree with those of the Sarvāstivādins, which indicates, given that

[50] Such an explanation is problematic, however, insofar as the stance under discussion would be attributed to the "late" Mahāsāṅghikas, if 末 and 本 in the stock phrase 末/本宗異義 was understood temporally. On the other hand, such an understanding is not compelling. Instead, Vasumitra's qualification may just as well be understood as referring to "secondary" differences among the Mahāsāṅghikas.

[51] Cf. the literature cited in Schmithausen 1987a, p. 370, n. 304.

no specific opinion of the Bahuśrutīyas to the contrary is reported, that they accordingly held all conditioned entities to be momentary. This is indeed confirmed by Harivarman's Tattvasiddhi — provided it pertains to the Bahuśrutīya tradition, as has been variously claimed (among others by Paramārtha)[52] — where it is asserted several times that all conditioned entities are momentary.[53]

It seems that as in the case of the Bahuśrutīyas so in the case of the Dharmaguptakas, the doctrinal conformity is not matched by the sectarian affiliation.[54] While the Dharmaguptakas are closely related to the Mahīśāsakas from which they reportedly seceded (cf. Bareau 1955, p. 190), their doctrines are said by Vasumitra (SBhC 17a26f, $SBhC_M$ p. 65) to concur generally with those of the Mahāsāṅghikas. This leaves one to gather that, unlike the Mahīśāsakas (or at least some sections thereof), the Dharmaguptakas did not subscribe to the theory of momentariness — an assumption supported by the claim in the Śāriputrābhidharma that some mental entities last immeasurably long (see above).

3 With respect to the Sthaviras, the sources reveal that they generally held mental entities to be momentary, but that the Sarvāstivādins and closely related sects, as well as the later Theravādins, the Kāśyapīyas[55] and at least some sections of the Mahīśāsakas[56] and possibly

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[52] Cf. Demiéville MCB I 1931-2, p. 22 and 47. See also Bareau 1955, p. 81 n.2

[53] E.g. TSi 264b25, 266c17f, 273b2f, 279b24f, 283c18, 317b16-18, 359a17.

[54] Cf. Schmithausen 1987a (p. 370f) where it is likewise suggested that the sectarian affiliation of the TSi (namely with the Bahuśrutīyas and thus with the Mahāsāṅghikas) does not conform with its philosophical accordance with the Sautrāntikas.

[55] SBhC 17b1, $SBhC_M$ XI.4: "[The Kāśyapīyas]: All conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are momentary."
According to Bareau (1955, p. 201f) it seems that the Kāśyapīyas shared the Sūtrapiṭaka (or at least had a very similar version) and probably also the Abhidharmapiṭaka (i.e. the Śāriputrābhidharma) with the Dharmaguptakas. Vasumitra (SBhC 17a27-b2, $SBhC_M$ p. 65f) confirms that the issue of momentariness was one of only a few doctrinal points that separated the Kāśyapīyas doctrinally from the Dharmaguptakas (cf. also Bhavya: P. u 182b4f, Walleser 1927, p. 87).

[56] It is difficult to ascertain which stance the Mahīśāsakas took on the issue of momentariness because there is conflicting evidence. On the one hand, Vasumitra reports (SBhC 17a13f, $SBhC_M$ IXa.23) that the fundamental doctrines of the Mahīśāsakas include the stance that "all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are momentary." This report is confirmed by Bhavya who relates that the Mahīśāsakas held all conditioned entities (*saṃskṛta*) to be momentary (P. u 182a7: *ḥdus byas thams cad ni skad cig maḥo//*). On the other hand, the attribution of this stance is problematic, because Vasumitra (SBhC 17a10-12, $SBhC_M$ IXa.20) credits the same Mahīśāsakas with the view that the gross elements constituting the sense organs as well as the mind and mental factors are subject to change, which suggests — so also the interpretation by the Chinese commentator K'uei-chi (cf. Bareau 1955, p.185) — that they cannot be momentary. Moreover, among the "secondary positions" of the Mahīśāsakas reported by Vasumitra there is the view that "the great earth lasts for eons (*kalpa*) (SBhC 17a17f, $SBhC_M$ IXb.6).

Since Bhavya does not attribute any position to the Mahīśāsakas which is at odds with their adherence to the doctrine of momentariness, it has to be investigated whether Vasumitra's testimony may be interpreted in such a way that it does not conflict with the doctrine of momentariness. As I will show presently this is indeed possible. To start with, the endurance of the world may have been taught by the secondary Mahīśāsakas with reference to the series (or more precisely to the complex of series) of

the Haimavatas[57] propounded (in contrast to the Vātsīputrīyas and the schools derived therefrom) also the momentariness of material entities.

As for the Theravādins, it was argued before (§ I.A.2.1) that the refutation in the Kv (Khaṇikakathā) of the doctrine that all conditioned entities have the duration of a single mental event (*ekacittakkhaṇika*) indicates that the early Theravādins had not yet espoused the theory of momentariness. As argued below (§ II.A.2.5), the refutation in the same text (Cittaṭṭhiti-kathā) of the position that there are mental states which are not momentary, points to the doctrine that all mental entities are invariably momentary. It may thus be gathered that, like the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas (see below), the early Theravādins regarded mental entities as momentary while they held material entities to endure for a stretch of time.[58]

In their post-canonical literature, by contrast, the duration of material entities, too, is drastically reduced. Unlike the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, however, the Theravādins did not give up the old conception that mental entities are briefer then material ones. They

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momentary entities which is commonly conceptualized as the earth, so that this teaching would be completely dissociated from the question of the momentariness of existence. Besides, it is also conceivable that the secondary doctrines refer to such doctrines which were not common to all Mahīśāsakas, but only held by certain factions, so that the secondary view of the duration of the earth would not alter the fact that the mainstream Mahīśāsakas adhered to the theory of momentariness. Such a possibility is in fact confirmed by the case of the existence of past and future entities which is said to have been accepted by the fundamental Mahīśāsakas ($SBhC_M$ IXa.1) but denied by the secondary Mahīśāsakas ($SBhC_M$ IXb.1). Moreover, such a doctrinal deviation of some sections of the Mahīśāsakas would be in accordance with the fact that the Dharmaguptakas, who are closely associated with the Mahīśāsakas (cf. § I.B.2), did not accept the momentariness of all conditioned entities (in fact, they probably did not even hold all mental entities to be momentary). Likewise, it is also possible to explain how the mainstream Mahīśāsakas could have taught that sense organs and mind are subject to change if they held them to be momentary. Since it is unlikey that they should — as seemingly implied by Vasumitra's testimony — have held **ordinary** mental entities (i.e. not only special mental states as those attained to in meditation) to be non-momentary, it may be argued that the susceptibility to change reported by Vasumitra does not refer to discrete entities but to the sensory organs and the mind viewed as series. Such a possibility is indeed confirmed by the report (cf. Si_P p. 180) that the Mahīśāsakas differentiated between the *skandhas* viewed as momentary, viewed as lasting for one life-time and viewed as lasting for the entire existence within *saṃsāra*.

Thus it is possible to account not only for the attribution of the stance that the earth endures but also for the position that the sensory organs as well as the mind are subject to change in such a way that it does not conflict with the doctrine of momentariness. Given Bhavya's report, which lends substance to such an interpretation of Vasumitra's testimony, I, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that at least certain sections of the Mahīśāsakas will have subscribed to the doctrine of momentariness.

[57] There is no further evidence than Vasumitra's testimony (SBhC 16c13f, $SBhC_M$ p. 53) that those teachings of the Haimavatas which are not specified generally accord with those of the Sarvāstivādins.

[58] Stcherbatsky (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 112) asserts that the Theravādins had from the beginning espoused the doctrine of momentariness and that only later they introduced the differentiation between the duration of material and mental entities. This hypothesis reflects Stcherbatsky's bias to regard the doctrine of momentariness as an integral part of early Buddhism (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 108; but see also Stcherbatsky 1979, p. 38, where he seems to adopt a more moderate approach) and is not substantiated by any textual evidence (cf. n. 9).

advanced the peculiar doctrine that material entities last seventeen times as long as mental entities do.[59] My cursory examination of some of the pertinent sources suggests that, despite this reduction of their duration, the material entities were not regarded as momentary, or at any rate not referred to as such (i.e. as *khaṇika*). All the same, this teaching presupposes that material entities are extremely brief and that they form series which constitute the temporally extended units which we experience in ordinary life. As such, their teaching may be considered as a peculiar form of the theory of momentariness.

This raises the question whether this teaching originated within the Theravāda school, or whether it resulted from the adoption of the theory of momentariness from some other Buddhist school on the Indian mainland. Given that momentariness is on the whole dealt with as a marginal issue of little consequence, I am inclined to believe that the theory of momentariness was adopted from outside and was possibly even introduced by Buddhaghosa himself.[60] The peculiar form it acquired may have resulted from the reluctance on the part of the Theravāda tradition to give up the old distinction between the life time of mental and material entities. It is, however, also feasible that the doctrine of momentariness had already differentiated between the duration of mental and material entities before it was adopted by

[59] Cf.: — VisM XX.24: "While matter abides, the subliminal mind (*bhavaṅgacitta*) arises and perishes sixteen times. In the case of mind (*citta*), the moment of origination, of duration and of destruction are all fully alike [as to their length]. But in the case of matter, only the moment of origination and of destruction pass quickly. For they are [in the case of matter and mind] alike; the moment of duration, however, is long. It lasts as long as it takes sixteen mental events to arise and perish." (*rūpe dharante yeva hi soḷasavāre bhavaṅgacittaṃ uppajjitvā nirujjhati. cittassa uppādakkhaṇo pi ṭhitikkhaṇo pi bhaṅgakkhaṇo pi ekasadisā. rūpassa pana uppādabhaṅgakkhaṇā yeva lahukā; te hi sadisā. ṭhitikkaṇo pana mahā; yāva soḷasa cittāni uppajjitvā nirujjhanti, tāva vattati.*)
— Vibhaṅga-aṭṭhakathā p. 25f: "While matter abides, sixteen mental events (*citta*) arise and perish. Together with the seventeenth *citta* it undergoes destruction." (*rūpe dhārante yeva soḷasa cittāni uppajjitvā nirujjhanti. tam pana sattarasamena cittena saddhiṃ nirujjhati.*)
— Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha by Anuruddha (11th/12th century according to Norman 1983, p. 151) ch. 4, paragraph 3: "The three moments [required] on account of origination, duration and destruction are called 'the moment of (i.e. taken by) one mental event' (*citta*).The lifetime of material entities is seventeen of these moments of a *citta*." (*uppādaṭṭhitibhaṅgavasena khaṇattayaṃ ekacittakkhaṇaṃ nāma. tāni pana sattarasa cittakkhaṇāni rūpadhammānam āyu.*)

From these three extracts the following position can be gathered. The material and mental entity arise simultaneously. While the material entity persists, the mental entity perishes and a new entity originates. This occurs sixteen times until the material entity vanishes simultaneously with the seventeenth mental entity. Since the phases of origination and destruction of material and mental entities are identical, the phase of duration of the material entity must encompass also the phases of duration and destruction of the first mental entity (= ⅔ *cittakkhaṇas*) as well as the phases of origination and duration of the last mental entity (= ⅔ *cittakkhaṇas*). Thus a material entity consists of a phase of origination corresponding to ⅓ *cittakkhaṇa* (i.e. it has one third of the duration of a *citta*), of a phase of duration corresponding to 16⅓ *cittakkhaṇas* (viz. ⅔+15+⅔ *cittakkhaṇas*) and of a phase of destruction corresponding to a further ⅓ *cittakkhaṇa*. Cf. also the treatment of this topic by Sarathcandra (1958, pp. 44-46).

[60] This is also suggested by Kv-a XXII.7 where the stance that all phenomena are momentary (*sabbe dhammā khaṇikā*) is ascribed to Uttarapathakas, that is, to people from Northern India, from where Buddhaghosa himself hailed.

the Theravādins.

In this context, reference may be made to the so called "Three-Moments"-doctrine which is known from its refutation in Vi (787c20-788a9). According to this doctrine, "material entities endure for three moments" while "mental states (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitas*) perish immediately in the moment [they have originated]" (Vi 787c21f). Teaching that three units of consciousness arise and perish while one sense organ does, this tradition computes the duration of the material entities, like the Theravādins, by correlating them to mental entities. It is not clear which reasoning underlies this teaching, but the correlation of the sense organs with their respective acts of perception suggests that the analysis of the process of cognition may have played an important role (cf. § II.B.2.1). This doctrine, of which two versions are reported in Vi,[61] is not ascribed to a particular school (it is only said to have been espoused

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[61] Vi 787c22-788a9: "That [Three-Moments-doctrine] is of two kinds, namely 1) the doctrine of mixed origination) and 2) the doctrine of succession.
The supporters of the doctrine of mixed origination give this explanation: On the basis of an initial *cakṣurindriya* (i.e. organ of vision), an initial *cakṣurvijñāna* (i.e. visual consciousness) arises. Having arisen together, the *cakṣurindriya* abides, while the *cakṣurvijñāna* perishes. On the basis of a second *cakṣurindriya*, a second *cakṣurvijñāna* arises. Having arisen together, the *cakṣurindriya* abides, while the *cakṣurvijñāna* perishes. On the basis of a third *cakṣurindriya*, a third *cakṣurvijñāna* arises. Having arisen together, the *cakṣurindriya* abides, while the *cakṣurvijñāna* perishes. One should know that it (i.e. the third *cakṣurvijñāna*) perishes precisely together with the initial *cakṣurindriya*.
Question: What is wrong with this?
Answer: The initial *cakṣurvijñāna* meets with (lit.: 'has') the origination of its base, but it does not meet with the destruction of its base. The same holds good for the second *cakṣurvijñāna*. The third *cakṣurvijñāna* meets with the origination of its base. Though it also meets with the destruction of a base, this is [not its base, but] the base of another[, namely the first, *cakṣurvijñāna*]. One calls this (i.e. the fact that the *cakṣurvijñānas* do not meet with the destruction of their bases) the fault of their [doctrine], because [rightly] the *vijñāna* has [both] origination and destruction in accordance with its base (i.e. arises and perishes when its base does).
The supporters of the doctrine of succession make this explanation: On the basis of an initial *cakṣurindriya*, an initial *cakṣurvijñāna* arises. Having arisen together, the *cakṣurindriya* abides, while the *cakṣurvijñāna* perishes. Then, again on the basis of [that initial *cakṣurindriya*], a second *cakṣurvijñāna* arises. The [initial] *cakṣurindriya* abides, the [second] *cakṣurvijñāna* perishes. Thereafter, again on the basis of [that initial *cakṣurindriya*], a third *cakṣurvijñāna* arises. This [*cakṣur*]*vijñāna* perishes at the same time as the [initial] *cakṣur*[*indriya*].
Question: What is wrong with this?
Answer: The initial *cakṣurvijñāna* meets with (lit.: 'has') the origination of its base, but it does not meet with the destruction of its base. The second *cakṣurvijñāna* meets neither with the origination of its base nor with the destruction of its base. The third *cakṣurvijñāna* does not meet with the origination of its base, but it meets with the destruction of the base. One calls this (i.e. the fact that the *cakṣurvijñānas* do not meet with both the origination and the destruction of their base) the fault of their [doctrine], because [rightly] the *vijñāna* has [both] origination and destruction in accordance with its base (i.e. it arises and perishes when its base does)."

The doctrine of mixed origination seems to entail that not one but three sense organs of one type exist simultaneously. It is noteworthy that the destructions of the first and second *vijñāna* (i.e. consciousness) are not correlated to the destructions of the second and third *indriya* (i.e. sense-organ) of the preceding set of three *vijñānas*, though they should take place at the same time. This suggests that every three acts of consciousness form a unit (that possibly differs as to its nature from the preceding

by some *śramaṇas*, i.e religious mendicants) and with the exception of the later Theravādins' teaching, does not resemble any doctrine known to me.[62]

The hypothesis that the doctrine of momentariness was adopted by the Theravādins from outside needs to be verified by a systematic examination of the early post-canonical sources. In particular, it has to be investigated whether pertinent material can be found in Buddhaghosa's commentaries on the Nikāyas, and if so, whether this can be identified as his personal contribution or whether it may be traced back to the Singhalese commentary used by him. If textual evidence can be disclosed from which it follows that the doctrine of momentariness was adopted from outside, it may also be possible to decide whether the distinction between the duration of material and mental entities was already inherent in the adopted doctrine, or whether the distinction was only introduced by the Theravādins.

4 As for the Vātsīputrīyas and the four schools evolving from them, namely the Saṃmatīyas (or Sāṃmitīya following Pr 148,1, 192,8, 276,2), Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrāyaṇīyas and Ṣaṇṇagarikas, the only extant work pertaining to this tradition, the Chinese translation of the Saṃmatīyanikāyaśāstra (T 1649), does not provide any information from which it could be inferred which stance they took towards the issue of momentariness. The doxographies by Bhavya[63] and Vasumitra,[64] however, report that the Vātsīputrīyas did not subscribe to the theory of momentariness, but held some entities to be momentary and others not. Since they

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and subsequent unit, e.g. *śrotravijñāna* after *cakṣurvijñāna*) and lends substance to the assumption that the differentiation between the lifetime of matter and mind results from the underlying theory of perception. Without further textual evidence, however, it is impossible to arrive at a reliable understanding of this bizarre doctrine.

The refutation on the basis of the presupposed simultaneity of sense organ and consciousness will be examined in § II.B.2.1. Vi concludes its refutation by a further argument (Vi 788a9-13 cited in n. 296) which will be dealt with in § II.B.2.2.

[62] The refutation of this doctrine in Vi (Vi 788a9-13 cited in n. 296) presupposes that the first moment after death already pertains to the new existence and thus denies an intermediate state (*antarābhava*) between death and rebirth. Given that the Sarvāstivādins postulate an intermediate state, Vi may argue here on the basis of the opponents' doctrine. Thus there would be a further agreement between the doctrine of the three moments and the Theravādins who (beside the Mahāsāṅghikas, Mahīśāsakas and the tradition of the Śāriputrābhidharma; cf. Bareau 1955, p. 291) also denied the existence of an intermediate state.

[63] Śramaṇapañcāśatkārikāpadābhismaraṇa (P. u 182a8 and 182b3; Walleser 1927, p. 87, forth point of the Vātsīputrīyas): "The fundamental doctrines of the Vātsīputrīyas: ... As for conditioned entities, there are momentary and non-momentary [entities]." (*yaṅ gnas maḥi*[a] *ḥbuḥi dam tshig ni ... ḥdus byas ni skad cig ma daṅ skad cig ma ma yin pa yod do//*)

[a] P.: *miḥi*

[64] SBhC 16c14-16 ($SBhC_M$ VII.2): "The main doctrines held in common by the Vātsīputrīyas: ... There are some conditioned factors which endure for a while; there are also some which are momentary."

Bareau (1955, p. 116) cites this passage in order to document that the Vātsīputrīyas held that "tous les composés (*saṃskṛta*) ne durent qu'un seul instant (*ekakṣaṇika*)." This is clearly not correct, and the table on p. 287 summarizing the doctrines of the various schools should be emended accordingly.

do not attribute to the four secondary schools a doctrine that conflicts with this position, they imply that on this point there were no doctrinal differences between the Vātsīputrīyas and these secondary schools. While for the Saṃmatīyas this is confirmed by the reports of other sources (see below), in the case of the Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrāyanīyas and Ṣaṇṇagarikas there is no corroborating evidence (but also no evidence to the contrary) for the assumption that they, too, only held some entities to be momentary.

The sparse information of the doxographies can be supplemented by those sources where the Vātsīputrīyas or Saṃmatīyas feature as opponents to the theory of momentariness. From the positions attributed in these sources, no doctrinal difference can be inferred between the Vātsīputrīyas and Saṃmatīyas. By contrast, it seems that they were held to propound the same doctrine, that is, if they were not even identified altogether. Hence I refer to them in the following jointly as "Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas."

As perilous as it is to construe a position from the writings of their opponents, there can be little doubt that the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas held all and only those entities to be momentary where it was, at least for them, self-evident that their mode of existence implied their momentariness.[65] Thus they took all mental entities to be momentary and all material entities (excepting flames and sounds) to be non-momentary. The momentariness of flames and sound, which was regarded as a self-evident fact, is not specified in all sources,[66] but reported by Kamalaśīla[67] and P'u-kuang.[68] It is also presupposed in Vasubandhu's

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[65] This statement has to be qualified insofar as there are some mental states where the momentariness is not self-evident (cf. § II.A.2.5).

That the momentariness of some material entities is self-evident is arguably also confirmed indirectly by ŚrBh 485,7-10, namely if the relative clause qualifying *rūpiṇām saṃskārāṇām* is in the following way understood to specify to which kind of material conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) the following proof refers:

> "Of those material *saṃskāra* of which the origination, destruction and disappearance in one moment, albeit a matter of fact, cannot be perceived, [the yogin] deduces [the momentariness] on the basis of considerations (*manaskāra*) which relate to perception."[a]

According to this understanding, it would be implied that there must be other kinds of material *saṃskāras*, namely those where the momentariness can be perceived, and does not have to be inferred. However, it cannot be ruled out that the qualification of *rūpiṇām saṃskārāṇām* is not meant to single out specific forms of material *saṃskāras*, but instead is meant as a general characterization applying invariably to all material *saṃskāras* (if so, in contradistinction to mental entities).

[a] ŚrBh 485,7-10: *yeṣāṃ rūpiṇāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ satī saṃvidyamānā kṣaṇotpannabhagnavilīnatā nopalabhyate, tatra pratyakṣādhipateyaṃ manaskāraṃ niśrityānumānaṃ karoti.*

[66] AKVy 179,10f: "According to him (viz. the Ārya Saṃmatīya), matter abides for some time, [while] mental events (*citta*) and factors (*caitta*) are momentary." (*kālāntarāvasthāyi hi tasya (= āryasaṃmatīyasya) rūpam. cittacaittānāṃ tu kṣaṇikatvam.*)
Cf. *cittacaittānāṃ ca kṣaṇikatvābhyupagamāt* in the quotation of AKBh 79,11-15 (cited in n. 113) to which Yaśomitra's explication refers.

I do not think that by this Yaśomitra wanted to exclude the momentariness of flames and sound. Rather, he will have been less precise in his rendering of the Saṃmatīyas' position than Kamalaśīla, concentrating on the rule that only mental entities are momentary, while neglecting the exceptional cases of flames and sound.

[67] TS 352: "Some hold that there is a two-fold division of things (*bhāva*) according to whether they

refutation of the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas'[69] position in the AKBh[70] and the KSi. As will

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are produced or not; others believe that [this division] is according to whether they are momentary or not." (*kṛtākṛtakatvena dvairāśyaṃ kaiścid iṣyate/ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvena bhāvānām aparair matam//*) TSP hereon (132,6-8): " ... But others as the Vātsīputrīyas and so on hold that there is a two-fold division of things (*bhāva*) also according to whether they are momentary or not. Thus cognition (*buddhi*), sound, the flame and so on are according to their opinion momentary whereas the earth, the sky and so on are not momentary." (*aparais tu vātsīputrīyādibhiḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvenāpi bhāvānāṃ dvairāśyam iṣyate. tathāhi buddhiśabdārciḥprabhṛtayas tanmatena kṣaṇikāḥ, kṣitivyomādayas tv akṣaṇikā iti.*)

[68] Chü-shê-lun-chi (T 1821) 201b22-24: "The Saṃmatīyas believe that among the conditioned entities, mental events (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*), sound, flame etc. are momentary. Therefore, they are necessarily without movement. The conditioned factors dissociated [from the mind] (*viprayuktasaṃskāra*), the karmic matter of manifest corporeal actions (*kāyavijñaptirūpa*), the body, mountains, wood and so on are not momentary (*kṣaṇika*), [but] abide for a long time."

As indicated by the use of "and so on", Kamalaśīla's and P'u-kuang's enumeration of momentary entities are not exhaustive. This is problematic because there are to my knowledge no material entities beyond sounds and flames which are, within the Buddhist tradition, considered to be obviously momentary. It could be held that "and so on" was added with reference to the frequently adduced examples of the flowing water and the blowing wind (e.g. Laṅkāvatārasūtra VI.9 [= X.116], MPPU 229b15f [quoted in n. 425] and 222b2-5 [= MPPU_L 1370], TSi 279a26f). These examples are, however, usually cited to illustrate that something perceived as a unity (river, breeze) is actually made up of ever new particles (water, dust). Thus it is the formation of series by conditioned entities and not their momentariness that is exemplified. Accordingly, in both examples it is not, as in the case of sound and flames,[a] presupposed that the particles themselves are evidently momentary (the water and dust move on beyond the observer).[b] It may, therefore, be that "and so on" merely indicates that the list is in principle not exhaustive, that there could be, at least theoretically speaking, further entities than those listed which are momentary.

[a] The momentariness of sounds and flames is only self-evident if it is assumed that they do not exist before or after they become manifest (i.e are heard or seen). This assumption was not shared by the Mīmāṃsakas who denied that sounds and flames are momentary (cf. Ślokavārttika: Sabdanityatādhikaraṇa kā 434-438). Also in the Yuktidīpika (p. 57,16-22 [*pūrvapakṣa*], p. 57,29-58,7 [*uttarapakṣa*]), a relatively early (circa 700 A.D.?) commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikās, the Buddhist argumentation that flames are momentary is repudiated. Even if it is accepted that flames only exist when they are observed, it is still not self-evident that flames are as short-lived as mental events. The Naiyāyikas (Nyāyavārttika 833,2-9, ad 3.2.14), for instance, held that during the existence of a flame several mental entities arise and perish.

[b] In one passage in the TSi (280a24), however, the actions of wind are said to be momentary: "Also the actions belonging to wind [are], even though perishing from moment to moment, [causally efficient insofar as they] move things."

[69] That the opponents in the debate concerned are the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas is reported by Yaśomitra (AKVy 345,16: ***gatir ity apare iti. Vātsīputrīyāḥ***) and by P'u-kuang, who in this context explicates their position (T 1821 201b22-24, cited in n. 68). Also Sumatiśīla in his Karmasiddhiṭīkā identifies the opponents as the Saṃmatīyas (P. ku 74b8: ***gźan dag na re źes bya ba ni 'Phags pa maṅ pos bkur ba'i sde pa rnams so//*** cf. Muroji p. 6, note d).

[70] It has to be conceded, however, that in the AKBh the arguments, which presuppose the opponent's acceptance of the momentariness of mental events, sound and flames, do not seem to be directed primarily against the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas, but against the Brahmanical schools, notably the Vaiśeṣikas, who feature (side by side with the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas) as opponents in the course of the proof of momentariness in the AKBh (cf. AKVy 346,29). This is borne out by the terminology (*buddhi* instead of *citta*) and by the fact that Vasubandhu does not envisage the mark of destruction as

§ I.C.2.4, the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas taught, similarly to the Sarvāstivādins, that each conditioned entity is, irrespective of its duration, qualified by a set of forces (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) which determine its existence.

5 As for the Sarvāstivādins, it has been seen that already in Vi the theory of momentariness is presupposed (cf. § I.A.2.2). As will will be seen below, also the Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas, who evolved from the Sarvāstivādins, accepted, albeit in a different form, the momentariness of all conditioned entities.

The extensive corpus of Sarvāstivāda literature transmitted in Chinese translation and, to a lesser extent, in Tibetan translation and in the Sanskrit original allows for a detailed reconstruction of the Sarvāstivādins' conception of momentariness. Particularly instructive is the well-documented treatment of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* and the controversy on this point between the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas. This will be dealt with in the next chapter. Here it may be pointed out that the Sarvāstivādins' theory of momentariness has to be viewed against the background of their doctrine that things also exist when they are still future or already past. Thus, the Sarvāstivādins do not contend that all conditioned entities only **exist** for a moment, but merely that they are only **present** for a moment, namely when they are causally efficient.[71] Before this moment they exist in the future and thereafter in the past so that they are not momentary in the sense that they only exist for a moment. This doctrine that also future and past entities exist does not seem to be intrinsically linked up with the doctrine that their existence in the present is limited to a moment. Rather, both doctrines seem to have been developed independently on different grounds and are propounded side by side because they do not conflict with each other.[72]

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a possible cause for the destruction of mental events, sounds and flames, but instead refutes (AKBh 193,20-17) that destruction may be effected by the immediately succeeding entity, by the absence of a cause of destruction or by the functioning of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*). That the mark of destruction can neither effect destruction on its own nor in conjunction with external causes is, by contrast, established in another context, namely when dealing with the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* (cf. § I.C.3.2.2).

[71] Hence the discharge of causal efficiency became eventually (that is, when the positions developed by Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva were superseded; cf. Frauwallner 1973, pp. 101-106) the generally accepted criterion for differentiating between the future, present and past states of conditioned entities. When they have not yet discharged their causal efficiency they are future, when they are in the process of doing so they are present, and when they have already been causally efficient they are past.

[72] This is not the place to examine the origins of the doctrine that entities not only exist in the present but also in the past and in the future (for this consult e.g. Frauwallner 1973). It may be pointed out in passing that this doctrine reflects the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṃkhyās, according to which the effect (i.e. a particular state of the permanent material cause) exists latently in the material cause before and after it has manifested itself. Cf. also the instructive argumentation by Saṃghabhadra (NA ch. 5.6-9, 620c25-636b16, translated by LVP [1937, pp. 25-128]) which reveals some of the functions of the doctrine that entities in the past and future exist — it explains, for instance, how past and future things can be the object of knowledge and accounts for the causal efficiency of past acts (*karman*).

I.C The *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*

1 In the preceding chapter, I have attempted to survey which of the various Hīnayāna schools held either all or at least some kinds of conditioned entities to be momentary. No attention was paid, however, to the question how precisely those schools that accepted the momentariness of some or even all entities conceived of their momentary existence. It is the purpose of the present chapter to shed some light on this question. Given that the conception of momentariness is — at least to my knowledge — not set forth explicitly in any of the pertinent sources, it will be necessary to turn for further information to the treatment of related concepts (cf. also the examination of the various definitions and usages of *kṣaṇa* in ch. I.E), notably to the teaching of the so-called characteristic marks of the conditioned entities (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*).

As mentioned in § I.A.2.2, already in the Nikāyas/Āgamas (namely in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra), the origination, destruction and modification of conditioned entities were taught to be the specific marks that characterize these entities, i.e. *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*. These *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* were not only taken up in the Abhidharmapiṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins, but can also be found in the Abhidharmic tradition of various other schools. The doctrinal treatment of these *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* varies significantly from school to school. Since this treatment reflects how precisely the existence of the conditioned entities was conceptualized, it also conveys how their momentariness was conceived of (if at all). Hence, I like to examine in the following pages how the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are dealt with in the various schools. The most comprehensive treatment of the doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* can be found in the sources of the Sarvāstivādins. This chapter will focus on this treatment and — because of the particular relevance for the issue of momentariness — on the critique of this treatment by the Dārṣṭāntikas, Sautrāntikas and early Yogācāras.[73]

2 **2.1** As we have seen (cf. n. 31), in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra the conditioned entities were taught to be characterized by three marks, namely by origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and change-while-enduring (*sthityanyathātva*) — or in the Pāli form, change-of-the-enduring, that is, change-of-something-[while-it-is]-enduring (*ṭhitassa aññathatta*). Whereas the characterization by origination and destruction posed no problems, the attribution of the third mark was interpreted in various ways. In the Theravāda tradition,[74] the mark of change-of-the-enduring (*ṭhitassa aññathatta*) is equated with age (*jaratā*), which in turn is identified with the phase of duration (*ṭhitikkhaṇa*). According to this interpretation, the phase between origination and

[73] A comprehensive treatment of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* is not aimed at here. In particular, the beginnings of this doctrine which predate the theory of momentariness will be neglected, as they are of no immediate interest for the present study. These and other aspects not dealt with here will possibly be treated by Colette Cox who is currently conducting research on the *cittaviprayukta saṃskāras* (i.e. the conditioned factors dissociated from the mind, which include among others the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*; see below).

[74] Cf. the commentary on AN I 152, viz. Aṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā II 252.

destruction is referred to as "duration" (*ṭhiti*) but only the process occurring during this phase, viz. decay (*jaratā*), qualifies as a mark of the conditioned (*saṅkhatalakkhaṇa*).[75] There is evidence that this approach, which conforms with the wording of the sūtra, was also adopted by at least some Dārṣṭāntikas (cf. n. 136). Unlike the mainstream Theravādins, the Abhayagirivāsins seem to have held that things are only characterized by two marks, namely by origination and by destruction.[76] A further position is attested in the Saṃskṛtaparīkṣā

[75] In the Abhidhamma of the Theravādins four entities similar to the *saṅkhatalakkhaṇas* are taught, namely accumulation (*ācaya*), continuity (*santati*), age (*jaratā*) and impermanence (*aniccatā*). As Karunadasa (1989, pp. 78-81) shows, they refer originally to sentient existence: *ācaya* and *santati* refer to growth (cf. also Dhammasaṅgaṇi 642-643 and the Visuddhimagga [henceforth: VisM] XIV.66), the former to the development of the senses, the latter to the corporeal growth in general, age refers to the decay brought about by old age and impermanence to death. In later times they are identified with the *saṅkhatalakkhaṇas* (*ācaya* and *santati* with *jāti*, *jaratā* with *jaratā* and *aniccatā* with *vyaya*). It may also be mentioned that in Paṭisambhidāmagga I.54-57 and in VisM XX.97 yet again a different terminology is employed. There it is the so-called mark of coming-forth (*nibbattilakkhaṇa*) that is correlated to the process of origination, while destruction is, rather surprisingly, connected with the so-called mark of transformation (*vipariṇāmalakkhaṇa*). This terminology is derived from SN V 184 (cf. n. 433) and points to yet another strand in the development of the marks qualifying conditioned existence. A detailed examination of these different strands and their interdependence was impossible within the framework of the present study. Reference may be made to Karunadasa 1989 (pp. 78-91) where this topic is dealt with. It has to be mentioned, however, that Karunadasa's claim (p. 81 and 88) that the four aforementioned entities from the Abhidhamma (viz. *ācaya* etc.) are based on the three *saṅkhatalakkhaṇas* from the Trilakṣaṇasūtra is not substantiated by textual material. As far as I can see, there is no reason why these four entities should not have been conceived of independently so that their correlation with the *saṅkhatalakkhaṇas* would have occurred only later in a phase of systematization. As argued in n. 81, in the case of the Sarvāstivādins the differing terminology employed for the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* suggests that two different strands can be distinguished, one going back to the Trilakṣaṇasūtra and one to the *pratītyasamutpāda*.

[76] As testified in the Abhidharmamūlaṭīkā (cf. Norman 1983, p. 148) adduced by Jaini in his edition of ADV (p. 104, n. 3),[a] the Abhayagirivāsins did not accept a phase of duration. Similarly, Sumaṅgala, who himself takes great pains to explain that the treatment of age as a *saṅkhatalakkhaṇa* does not imply the mutability of the qualified entity (cf. Karunadasa 1989, pp. 86-88), reports in his Abhidhammattha-vikāsinī (p. 305, cited in Karundasa 1989, p. 88, n. 2) that a certain Ānanda held that things only undergo two phases, viz. origination and destruction. The stance that phenomena do not undergo a phase of duration also seems to be presupposed in a canonical work of the Theravādins, namely when in the Kathāvatthu (vaggo II.7; p. 204,17-205,16) the position is refuted that mental states (*citta*) may last for a day (or more). It is argued that in this case the moment of origination (*upādakkhaṇa*) and the moment of destruction (*vayakkhaṇa*) would each last half a day. This reasoning clearly presupposes that mental entities are only qualified by the marks of origination and of destruction, each of which make up half of the entity's total existence. It could be held that this position was only assumed for the sake of the argument — the unacceptable consequence only follows if a phase of duration is precluded from the outset — and does not correspond to the doctrine of the early Theravādins. This indeed seems to be surmised by the explanation in Kv-a (57,13-16) that the phase of duration is not taken into account because the argument is based on the canonical saying that conditioned entities are subject to origination and destruction (*uppādavayadhammin*) and not — one may add — on the Trilakṣaṇasūtra. On the other hand, it is also possible that the argumentation in Kv genuinely reflects a position like that of the Abhayagirivāsins.

As witnessed in the argumentation in Kv, the denial of a phase of stability still allows for the

(chapter 7) of the (Mūla-)Madhyamaka-kārikā (henceforth: MKK) where the argumentation is directed against a stance that ignores the attribution of change and takes duration (*sthiti*) only to be the third mark beside origination and destruction.[77] The dominant stance, however, was that of the Sarvāstivādins and Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas. They understood that conditioned entities are characterized both by a mark of duration and a mark of transformation, thus teaching that there is — not reckoning the secondary marks — a total of four and not (as in the sūtra) three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*. In order to account for the discrepancy between this position and the wording of the Trilakṣaṇasūtra, the Sarvāstivādins either took the stance that the sūtra does not mention duration as a mark at all — change-while-enduring is understood as a synonym of age (*jarā*)[78] — and adduce various reasons why it is ignored;[79] or, alternatively,[80] they argued that the sūtra teaches duration only in conjunction with transformation and not as a distinct mark, because by this conjunction duration is qualified negatively so that the danger of attachment, entailed by the attribution of duration, is counteracted.[81] Without assenting to the hypostatization of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to entities

differentiation of the period of existence into a phase of origination and a phase of destruction. Thus the stance of the Abhayagirivāsins differs from the approach adopted by the Sautrāntikas, Dārṣṭāntikas and Yogācāras who reduced the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to existence and non-existence which precludes the differentiation of existence into any phases (see below). Hence, their conception of momentariness is more radical than that of the Abhayagirivāsins.

[a] Abhidharmamūlaṭīkā (Vidyodaya Ṭīkā Publication Vol. II, Colombo 1938) p. 140: *kecīti abhayagirisvāmino ... te pana cittassa ṭṭhitikkhaṇaṃ na icchanti.*

[77] This also holds good for Piṅgala's commentary (but not for the commentarial tradition referred to in n. 93) which, commenting on MKK VII.4, presumes that change and duration are two distinct *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*.

[78] AKBh 75,24f: *jarāyā eṣa (= sthityanyathātvaṃ) paryāyas tadyathā jāter utpāda ity anityatāyāś ca vyaya iti.*

[79] The AKBh takes over two of the arguments advanced in the Vi (Vi 201a29-b22, Vi_2 150b29-c15). First it is argued (AKBh 75,24 -76,5, AK_P II, 223f; Vi 201b13-16 Vi_2 159c1-4) that duration (*sthiti*) is not mentioned, because — in contrast to the mark of origination which moves things from the future to the present, and in contrast to the marks of change and impermanence (*anityatā*) which move them from the present to the past — it does not effect a change of the temporal localization of the qualified entity. Then it is added (AKBh 76,6; Vi 201a29-30(!), Vi_2 150b29f) that duration is also the characteristic feature of unconditioned entities (*asaṃskṛta*) and hence not mentioned as a mark of conditioned entities, lest unconditioned entities come to be regarded as conditioned (AKVy 172,13-16).

[80] This position is adopted in ADV 104,3-105,2. In AKBh 76,6-9 and in Vi 150b18-22 (not in Vi_2) it features as yet a further alternative to explain the deviation of the Abhidharmic doctrine of four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* from the sūtra.

[81] The discrepancy between the number of *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in the sūtra and in the Abhidharma suggests that the doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* cannot be traced back solely to the Trilakṣaṇasūtra. This impression is confirmed by the fact that the standard terms used for the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in the Abhidharma tradition of the Sarvāstivādins differ significantly from those employed in the sūtra. *jāti* (= birth) is used instead of *utpāda* (= origination), *jarā* (= age) instead of *anyathātva* (= change), *anityatā* (= impermanence) instead of *vyaya* (= disappearance). The terms *jāti* and *jarā* suggest that the marks only qualify sentient existence and not conditioned entities in general as is the case in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra. This impression is confirmed by the explanation in the Pañcavastuka (T 1556 and T 1557) — and thus

(see below), the Sautrāntikas (and Yogācāras) took over the Sarvāstivādins' position that in addition to origination and destruction there are the marks of duration and change.

On a doctrinally more advanced level, however, their radical conception of momentariness according to which conditioned entities do not exist beyond origination and thus do not endure or change (see below), prompted the position that conditioned entities are only characterized by non-existence and an existence (or: origination) which allows for no further differentiation. This existence and non-existence are usually not identified with the canonical *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, but are instead taught to underlie them. This is explicitly stated in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (henceforth: BoBh)[82] and clearly also the case in Vasubandhu's explication of how

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in the Prakaraṇa (T 1542, T 1541) the first chapter of which is identical with the Pañcavastuka — that they operate on *skandhas* (i.e., at least originally, the groups of factors constituting sentient beings; cf. § I.C.2.3) and not, as *sthiti* ("duration causes the arisen conditioned factors [*saṃskāra*] not to perish"; T 1542 694a26f; cf. T 1556 997c26f, T 1557 1001a27f) and *anityatā* do ("impermanence causes the arisen conditioned factors to get destroyed"; T 1542 694a27f; cf. T 1556 997c27, T 1557 1001a28), on conditioned entities in general. Moreover, reference may be made to the correlation of the aformentioned (n. 75) four "marks" taught in the Theravāda Abhidhamma (viz. *ācaya*, *santati*, *jaratā* and *aniccatā*) with sentient existence.

It may then be assumed that the terminology of the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* reflects two different currents, one relating them — in accordance with the Trilakṣaṇasūtra — to all conditioned entities, the other grasping them exclusively in terms of sentient life. This seems to be confirmed by the testimony of TSi 289a18-20 which considers in addition to origination (*utpāda* or *jāti*?), destruction (*vyaya?*) and change-while-enduring (*sthityanyathātva*) also age (*jarā*) and death (*maraṇa*) as non-material factors dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta saṃskāra*). Whereas there can be no doubt that the current relating to conditioned entities in general has its root in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra, it is likely that the current referring to sentient existence can be traced back to the final clause of the causal nexus (*pratītyasamutpāda*), namely that "depending upon birth (*jāti*) there is old age (*jarā*) and death (*maraṇa*)" (*jātipratyayaṃ jarāmaraṇam*).

A more detailed examination than was possible here will be required to study these two strands closely and examine how they have been merged. Such an examination will also have to take into account the complicated situation in case of the Theravādins (cf. n. 75). For the present purposes it has to suffice that, at least by the time of the adoption of the doctrine of momentariness, the different strands had become unified and all conditioned entities were, irrespective of the terminology employed, held to be qualified invariably by the same set of four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*.

[82] $\mathrm{BoBh_W}$ 278,25-279,6; $\mathrm{BoBh_D}$ 189,11-16: "Being taken together (*abhisam√as*), all (*api*) these four marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) are summarily (*samāsato*) characterized (*prabhāvita*) by two kinds of states of the conditioned factors (*saṃskāras*), [namely] characterized (*prabhāvita*)[a] by existence (*bhāva*) and characterized by non-existence (*abhāva*). With regard to this, the Lord established coming to be (*bhāva*) as one *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*; he established non-existence (*abhāva*) as the second *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*; and he established existence (*bhāva*) as the third *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa* in the sense (*iti kṛtvā*) that it (i.e. existence) is characterized by 'change-while-enduring' (*sthityanyathātva*) of the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*)." (*tāny etāni catvāry api saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāny abhisamasya saṃskārāṇāṃ samāsato dvayāvasthāprabhāvitāni, bhāvaprabhāvitāny abhāvaprabhāvitāni ca. tatra bhagavatā yo bhāvas, tad ekam saṃskṛtalakṣaṇaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ. yas tv abhāvas, tad dvitīyaṃ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ. sa ca bhāvas teṣāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ sthityanyathātvaprabhāvita iti kṛtvā tṛtīyaṃ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ.*)

The four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* taught by the Sarvāstivādins and others — clearly also the starting point for the Yogācāras — are reduced to *bhāva* and *abhāva* so that there are really only two *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*

the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* may be attributed to individual momentary entities (cf. n. 134). It is, moreover, borne out by the approach of the Dārṣṭāntikas who, following the account by Saṃghabhadra (cf. n. 138), arrived at their stance that there are only two *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, namely origination and non-existence, by reducing the marks of change and of destruction to non-existence, rather than by dismissing them from the outset.

2.2 The various schools not only differed as to the processes which were regarded as *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, but, as the controversy reported in the Vi reflects,[83] also on the question which function and ontological status to attribute to these *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*. The Sarvāstivādins took the stance that in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra origination and so on are treated as objects of knowledge (*utpādo 'pi prajñāyate*) and thus — compare their argument that past and future objects have to exist because they can be thought of[84] — must be really existing entities.[85]

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left, namely *bhāva* and *abhāva*. The three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, taught by the Buddha in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra, are accounted for by differentiating *bhāva* into two marks, namely coming-to-be and change-while-enduring. This reasoning exploits the ambiguity of *bhāva* which denotes both "coming-to-be" and "existence."

[a] For the meaning of *prabhāvita*, cf. Schmithausen 1969, pp. 109-111.

[83] In the Vi the ontological status of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* is discussed at the beginning of chapter I.6 which deals with the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*. As the Sautrāntikas in the AKBh (cf. n. 130), the Dārṣṭāntikas (cf. n. 137) opine that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are not real entities in their own rights but only conceptually given, just like all other entities which are classified by the Sarvāstivādins as non-material factors dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta saṃskāra*). To the Vibhajyavādins (Vi 198a18-22, = Vi_2 148b8-12), by contrast, the position is attributed that all *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) because only as unconditioned entities can they be potent enough to effect their function. The Dharmaguptakas (Vi 198a22-26, = Vi_2 148b12-15, Vi 977b15-19) held the same view with regard to the mark of destruction but considered the marks of origination and duration as conditioned. According to yet another stance reported in Vi 198a26-b1 (Vi_2 148b18-21, Vi 977b19f), the nature of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* depends upon the entity they qualify. If they are attached to a material entity they are material, if to an entity of consciousness they have the nature of consciousness and so on.

The Theravādins (Dhammasaṅgani 596, VisM XIV.36 = PTS p. 444) classified the four aformentioned (cf. n. 75) marks, viz. accumulation (*ācaya*), continuity (*santati*), age (*jaratā*) and impermanence (*aniyatā*) in their Abhidhamma, as derived matter (*upādārūpa*)[a] — an approach they also adopted with regard to other entities, which were classified by the Sarvāstivādins as non-material factors dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta saṃskāras*). Insofar, as these four entities came to be identified with the *saṅkhatalakkhaṇas* from the Aṅguttaranikāya, it can be deduced that the ontological status of the *saṅkhatalakkaṇas* in the Theravāda tradition correponds to that of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in the Sarvāstivāda tradition. Though the Theravādins did thus regard the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* as entities in their own right, they appear not to have attributed them causal efficiency as the Sarvāstivādins did (see the characterisation in Dhammasaṅgani 642-645 and in VisM XIV.66-69 (= PTS p. 449f). In the Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā (cf. the references in n. 433) the *nibbattilakkhaṇa* and the *vipariṇāmalakkhaṇa*, which in this context correpond to the mark of origination and of destruction, are enumerated alongside with the conditions of origination and destruction (viz. ignorance and its cessation etc.), but are themselves not treated as conditions.

[a] I do not see on which grounds Silburn (1955, p. 241) maintains that the Theravādins regard the entities "impermanence," "death," "decline" (i.e. age) and "duration" as mere concepts (*paññatti*).

[84] Likewise, reference may be made to Saṃghbhadra's argument (NA 533c13-15) that non-existence

This was also suggested by the use of the genitive ("the origination etc. of the conditioned entity" etc.), which was taken to entail that origination etc. are something apart from the entity they refer to.[86] It followed, moreover, from their understanding that marks (i.e. origination etc.) can only characterize their respective object (*lakṣya*, i.e. the conditioned entities) if they are distinct from them.[87] Thus the Sarvāstivādins — in accordance with their tendency to hypostatize conceptual terms to real entities (cf. the other *cittaviprayukta saṃskāras*) — conceived of origination, endurance, transformation and destruction as entities in their own rights which (partly in conjunction with external causes) respectively originate, stabilize, transform and destroy the conditioned factor they qualify.[88]

Like other hypostatized entities, the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* were classified by the Sarvāstivādins as *cittaviprayukta saṃskāras*, that is, as non-material factors which are dissociated from the mind.[89] As such they were themselves considered to be conditioned entities and — given that the Trilakṣaṇasūtra implies that all conditioned entities are invariably characterized by origination etc. — had to possess their own *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*. The infinite regress which seems to be entailed by this (these secondary *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* require their own origination in turn, and so on) was avoided by teaching that the primary and secondary *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* qualify each other mutually. According to this teaching, the secondary mark of origination engenders the primary mark of origination which at the same time engenders the other three primary marks as well as all four secondary marks (among them the very secondary mark of origination by which it is engendered itself) and, most importantly, the principle entity, to which all these marks are attached. The same applies to duration, transformation and destruction. Thus the origination of a conditioned entity always entails the origination of nine entities,[90] viz. the entity itself and the four primary and secondary marks of the conditioned.

does, contary to Vasubandhu's claim, qualify as an effect, because it causes the perception of itself and as such functions as a cause, which for the Buddhist implies that in turn it itself also must have a cause.

[85] E.g. AKBh 79,22: *jātam ity eva tu na syād asatyāṃ jātau.*
Cf. NĀ 533c11-15 where Saṃghbhadra argues on the basis of the Trilakṣaṇasūtra that non-existence does, contary to Vasubandhu's claim, qualify as an effect, because it causes the cognition of itself — this is witnessed by the canonical depiction of destruction (= non-existence) as an object of knowledge — and as such functions as a cause, which for the Buddhist implies that it itself also must have a cause.

[86] AKBh 79,23f: *ṣaṣṭhīvacanaṃ ca rūpasyotpādaḥ iti yathā rūpasya rūpam iti. evaṃ yāvad anityatā yathāyogam vaktavyā.* (see also Si 5c21f, Si_P p. 64; cf. § I.E.2.3)

[87] Cf. AKBh 78,5: *katham idānīṃ*[a] *sa eva dharmo lakṣyas tasyaiva lakṣaṇaṃ yokṣyate.*
[a] I.e. if the marks of origination and so on are not distinct entities; cf. also Si 5c22-24, Si_P p. 64.

[88] If my contention is right that one strand underlying the doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* is based on the causal nexus (*pratītyasamutpāda*) (cf. n. 81), then the hypostatization of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* may also have followed from the status of *jāti* (i.e. birth), *jarā* (i.e. age) and *maraṇa* (i.e. death) as causes and effects within the *pratītyasamutpāda*.

[89] This is already the case in the Pañcavastuka (T 1556 995c18-23, 997c25-27, T 1557 1001a27-29) and thus in the Prakaraṇa (T 1542 694a25-28, T 1541 628c21-23).

[90] That all nine entities arise at the same time seems to be implied by the fact that they are (with the partial exception of the primary marks) all qualified by the same sets of *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*. That their

2.3 This, in brief, is the doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* as postulated by the Sarvāstivādins. It is in all these details already to be found in the Abhidharmasāra by Dharmaśrī (T 1550 811b17-28) and reproduced among others in the Abhidharmāmṛtarasaśāstra by Ghoṣaka (T 1553 970a5-9).[91] In this classic form there is no trace of the conception that the conditioned entities are momentary. By contrast, the very fact that they are said to endure and to undergo change presupposes that they exist for a stretch of time.[92] Moreover, the terminology chosen by the Sarvāstivādins (viz. birth [*jāti*] for origination and age [*jarā*] for change) leaves no doubt that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* originally referred to the entire span of one existence. This is confirmed by the definition in the Pañcavastuka that "birth causes the origination of the *skandhas*" (i.e. the groups of factors constituting a sentient being) and that "age causes the transformation (lit. maturation) of the *skandhas*" (T 1542 694a25f; cf. T 1556 995c25f, T 1557 1001a27). That the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* were originally correlated to existence over a span of time follows, furthermore, from the fact that the Vi not only treats the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in terms of momentariness but also in terms of extended existence, though with the qualification that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in this context are only conceptually given and not to be identified with the causally efficient *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* which qualify momentary conditioned entities (cf. n. 131).

2.4 In order to demonstrate that the doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* is not intrinsically connected with the doctrine of momentariness, reference may also be made to the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas, who did not follow the Sarvāstivādins in their acceptance of the momentariness of all conditioned entities, but shared with them the doctrine that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are causally efficient factors which determine the existence of the entity they are correlated with, and which in turn are qualified by secondary marks. As in the case of the Sarvāstivādins, the number of entities tied by the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas to mental entities was not limited to those forces governing the course of the entity's existence, but included also a number of factors which determine the entity's quality. Thus they taught according to a commentarial tradition on MKK VII,4[93] that *dharmas* — this precludes

simultaneity was, all the same, not accepted universally is indicated by the Vi where the stance is reported that "at the time when an entity arises, three entities arise together, namely 1) the [principal] entity, 2) the [mark of] origination, [and] 3) the [mark of] origination of [the mark of] origination" (200c20f), and not, as in the following (200c25-28), that nine entities arise.

[91] The secondary *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are not yet taught in the Pañcavastuka; nor are they, to my knowledge, recorded in the JP. Thus, they may not feature in the canonical Abhidharma works at all. While the non-canonical Abhidharmasāra is clearly later than the Pañcavastuka, it may antedate the canonical JP as Frauwallner contends (cf. n. 36).
For an exposition of the doctrine of the secondary marks, see also Vi 200c12-201a17 (= Vi_2 150b8-21) and AKBh 76,9-22.

[92] This is clearly documented by the explication in the Abhidharmasāra (T 1550, 811b18-20): "All conditioned entities have each four marks, [namely] origination, duration, transformation and destruction. Because it arises in the world(?): origination; because having arisen its essence is established: duration; because having endured it decays: change; because having been transformed it perishes: destruction."

[93] This position is reported in Buddhapālita's commentary, the Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti (P. 5242 tsa

material entities[94] — are accompanied by seven entities, namely by origination, duration, age and impermanence, as well as by an entity "possession" (*samanvāgama*) correlating the qualified entity with a particular *santāna*,[95] and by two further entities that determine its spiritual status (*mithyāvimukti* or *samyagvimukti* and *nairyāṇikatā* or *anairyāṇikatā*).[96] In

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212b1-312a1; in Walleser's edition p. 96,5-97,9) as well as in the almost identical *Akutobhayā (i.e. the alleged auto-commentary; P. 5229 tsa 52a4-53a1) on MKK VII.4. In Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa (P. 5253 tsha 125b8-126a6, T 1566 75c1-12) and in Prasannapadā (henceforth: Pr) 148,1-149,2 (cited in n. 97) this passage is reproduced and attributed respectively to the Vātsīputrīyas and to the (Saṃmatīyas (lit.: Sāṃmitīyas). In the *kārikā* commented on, Nāgārjuna's accusation that the doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* entails an infinite regress is rejected by the opponent on the grounds that the primary and secondary marks operate mutually on each other (see above).

LVP (Pr p. 148, n.1) claims that in Pr "les Sāṃmitīyas représentent le Petit Véhicule" so that the ascription could not be taken literally. May (1959, p. 111, n. 278) and Schayer (1931 p. 84, n. 58; cf. p. 77, n. 53) have shown that this is not correct. This is also suggested by the passage under consideration. Whereas the MKK itself only refers to the doctrine of the secondary marks (*anulakṣaṇa*) and may thus refer to the Sarvāstivādins as well, the stance reported by Buddhapālita cannot — according to our present knowledge — be ascribed to the Sarvāstivādins (cf. their deviating treatment of *prāpti* and *anuprāpti* in AKBh 66,25-67,12). Nor do I know of any other Hīnayāna school which could be identified with this stance. Therefore, the ascription to the Saṃmatīyas in Pr should, in accordance with May and Schayer and as confirmed by Bhāvaviveka, be taken to refer to the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas and not to the Hīnayāna in general.

In the commentary by *Piṅgala on MKK VII.4 (T 1564 9c13-18), the opponent (who is not identified) contends — in contrast to the commentaries mentioned above and in accordance with the stance repudiated in the MKK — that there are only three primary marks, namely origination, duration and destruction, so that seven entities originate when a phenomenon arises, namely the principle entity and the three primary and secondary marks (cf. Walleser 1970, p. 39).

[94] The commentaries on the MKK do not expressly state such a restriction and only refer to the qualified entity as *dharma* (i.e. entity). The *Akutobhayā, however, mentions that this entity may be "consciousness (*vijñāna*), feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*samjñā*) and so on" (P. 5229 tsa 52a4), while Buddhapālita specifies that the qualified entity "arises from among the entities of consciousness and so on" (P. 5242 tsa 212b1f: *ḥdi la rnam par śes pa la sogs pa chos rnams las chos gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba źig skye ba na de bdag ñid daṅ bco lṅa ste/*). Furthermore, Avalokitavrata explains in his sub-commentary (Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā P. 5259 źa 134a7-b5 [*pratīka*], 134b5-135a8 [*explanation*]) that the principle entity occurs together with its primary and secondary marks **in one moment,** which confirms, given the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas' opposition to the all-encompassing doctrine of momentariness, that material entities are not in view in the passage under consideration. This situation raises the question why the report of the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas' doctrine at this point does not, as called for by the context, refer to conditioned entities in general.

[95] This entity corresponds to the *prāpti* (lit.: acquisition) of the Sarvāstivādins which is said to be constituted by the acquiration (*lābha*) and by the possession (*samanvāgama*) of what has been acquired before (AKBh 62,17 [ad AK II.36b]: *dvividhā hi prāptir aprāptavihīnasya ca lābhaḥ pratilabdhena ca samanvāgamaḥ*).

[96] May (1959, p. 111, n. 279) has pointed out that there is no indication[a] that also these additional three factors qualifying the principle entity are considered as marks (*lakṣaṇa*). Since they may only be attributed to mental entities, and certainly not to non-sentient matter (*bāhyarūpa*), they cannot characterize invariably all conditioned entities, as the marks of origination, duration, change and destruction are held to do. Accordingly, they may hardly be considered as characteristic marks of conditioned entities in general and thus do not, at least not in the true sense of the word, qualify as

accordance with the Sarvāstivāda doctrine, these seven accompanying entities are qualified by a set of further seven entities, so that always fifteen entities arise at a time, viz. the principle entity and seven primary and seven secondary accompanying entities.[97]

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saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas. This is also borne out by the fact that they do not feature in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra or the Pratītyasamutpāda.

On the other hand, *samanvāgamaḥ*, *mithyāvimuktiḥ/samyagvimukti* and *nairyāṇikatā/anairyāṇikatā* are treated in exactly the same way as the marks of origination, duration, age and impermanence (*anityatā*), from which they are not even kept apart in Pr (*samanvāgama* follows origination and precedes duration, age and destruction) and in the *Akutobhayā (*samanvāgama* follows destruction and precedes age). They characterize the principle entity and in turn derive their quality from the respective secondary mark — in the case of *samanvāgama* from the secondary *samanvāgama*, the so-called *samanvāgamasamanvāgama*. Thus they and the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are closely related concepts.

[a] In the passage under consideration, the set of primary and secondary entities qualifying the principle entity (*dharma*) is referred to respectively as *parivāra* and as *parivāraparivāra* (or *anuparivāra*) and not as *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* and *anulakṣaṇas*. On the other hand, the explanation "this does not entail an infinite regress because the [primary] marks (*lakṣaṇa*) and secondary marks (*anulakṣaṇa*) effect each other mutually" may not only refer to origination, duration, age and *anityatā*, but also to the other factors enumerated in the following.

[97] Pr 148,1-149,2: "The Sāṃmitīyas object at this point: 'The [marks of] origination and so on have [each their respective marks of] origination and so on, and yet this does not entail an infinite regress because the [primary] marks (*lakṣaṇa*) and secondary marks (*anulakṣaṇa*) effect each other mutually. For an originating conditioned entity, be it good or polluted, is originating as the fifteenth entity (i.e. together with fourteen other entities), [viz.] [1] this entity (i.e. the principle entity itself) and its [2] origination, [3] possession (*samanvāgama*), [4] duration, [5] age, [6] impermanence, [7] its wrong delivery (*mithyāvimukti*) if the entity is soiled [by passion], its correct delivery (*samyagvimukti*), if it is good, [8] its emancipation (*nairyāṇikatā*) if it is conducive to emancipation, [or] its non-emancipation (*anairyāṇikatā*), if it is not conducive. This (i.e. the entities 2 to 8) is the set of the [primary] concomitants [of the principle entity]. Now origination has [9] another origination and so on up to non-emancipation has [15] another non-emancipation. This (i.e. the secondary marks 9-15) is the set of concomitants of the concomitants [of the principle entity].
The [entity] that is the principle origination, leaving out itself, produces the fourteen other entities, while the origination which is a secondary mark (*anulakṣaṇa*) known as 'the origination of origination' (*utpādotpāda*) produces only the primary origination. And so on until: the [primary] non-emancipation does not emancipate fourteen entities, that is, does not secure for them extinction (i.e. ensures that they do not attain to *nirvāṇa*), while the non-emancipation of non-emancipation (i.e. the secondary non-emancipation) secures the non-emancipation only for the [primary] non-emancipation." (*atrāhuḥ Sāṃmitīyāḥ: 'santi cotpādādīnām utpādāyo, na cānavasthāprasaṅgo lakṣaṇānulakṣaṇānāṃ parasparaniṣpādakatvāt. yasmād iha saṃskṛto dharmaḥ kuśalaḥ kliṣṭo vā utpadyamāna ātmanāpañcadaśa utpadya[n]te. sa dharmas tasya cotpādaḥ samanvāgamaḥ sthitir jarānityatā. yady asau dharmaḥ kliṣṭo bhavati, tasya mithyāvimuktiḥ; atha śubhas, tasya samyagvimukti. yadi nairyāṇiko bhavati, tasya nairyāṇikatā; athānairyāṇikas, tasyānairyāṇikatety eṣa parivāraḥ. idānīm utpādasyāpara utpādaḥ yāvad anairyāṇikatāyā anairyāṇikatety*[a] *eṣa* <*parivāra(-)/(sya)*>[b] *parivāraḥ. tatra yo 'yaṃ maula utpādaḥ, sa ātmānaṃ vihāyānyān caturdaśa dharmān janayati. utpādotpādasaṃjñakas tv anulakṣaṇabhūta utpādo maulam evotpādaṃ janayati. evaṃ yāvad anairyāṇikatā caturdaśa dharmān na niryāṇayati, na t*<*ā*>*n*[c] *nirvāṇaṃ prāpayati ity arthaḥ. anairyāṇikatānairyāṇikatā tu prāpayati anairyāṇikatām anairyāṇikatām eveti.*[d]).

As far as can be gathered from this report of the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas' position, there is, leaving aside the question of momentariness, no principal difference between their treatment of the marks of the conditioned (*saṃkṛtalakṣaṇa*) and that of the Sarvāstivādins. They both differentiate between

3 The Sarvāstivādins did not give up their doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* when they came to view all conditioned entities as momentary.[98] This was impossible because the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* had become the indispensable corollary of each conditioned entity, once they had been hypostatized to causally efficient factors which account for the origination, duration, decay and annihilation of these entities. Thus the Sarvāstivādins had to carry on attributing the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to discrete conditioned entities even after the duration of these entities had been reduced to a bare moment. This meant that the operation of the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* which really requires a certain stretch of time had to be squeezed into a moment once the momentariness of all conditioned entities was espoused. If the reading *ekasmin kṣaṇe* in the JP is secondary in the way suggested above (§ I.A.2.2), the alteration of the reading would testify to this change.

3.1 The teaching of the Sarvāstivādins that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* of one entity all pertain to one and the same moment was already repudiated by the Dārṣṭāntikas in the Vi[99] on the grounds that these marks are incompatible with each other.[100] This criticism was in turn

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duration and age as two distinct entities and, more importantly, they both expound the doctrine of the secondary marks which ensures that the primary marks (and also the secondary marks) are in turn qualified themselves and are thus correctly considered conditioned entities in their own right without construing an infinite regress. Note that also the Sarvāstivādins taught (AKBh 66,25-67,12) that the *prāpti* (corresponding to the *samanvāgama* of the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas, cf. n. 95) is in turn qualified by a secondary *prāpti*, the *anuprāpti* or *prāptiprāpti*.

[a] Reading confirmed by de Jong 1978.

[b] Addition confirmed by Tib. P. ḥa 57a8.

[c] Emendation suggested by the Tibetan translation (P. ḥa 57b1 ... *de dag gis mya ṅan las ḥdas pa thob par byed par mi byed do*). The instrumental construction with *thob pa* is attested in Jäschke's *Tibetan-English Dictionary* (s.v. *thob pa*).

[d] The Tibetan (P. ḥa 57b1, D. ḥa 20b7): *ṅes par ḥbyuṅ ba ma yin paḥi ṅes par ḥbyuṅ ba ma yin pa ñid °kyis ni ṅes par ḥbyuṅ ba ma yin pa de?° kho na ṅes par ḥbyuṅ ba mi byed do.*; ° ... ° is missing in P.) seems to be based on the reading *anairyāṇikatānairyāṇikatā (tv) anairyāṇikatām eva na niryāṇayatīti*.

[98] As follows from their allocation of primary and secondary marks to discrete mental entities (cf. § I.C.2.4; see also AKVy 79,11-15 cited in n. 113), the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas, too, attributed the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* also to those entities which they regarded as momentary.

[99] Vi 200a4-6 (Vi_2 149c3f): "The Dārṣṭāntikas make this explanation: "If the three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*[a] did exist in one moment, then the qualified entity (*dharma*) would have to originate and decay and perish at one time. This, however, is not reasonable, because [these activities] are mutually exclusive."

[a] This passage here comments on the treatment of the Trilakṣaṇasūtra in the JP. Therefore both here and in the rejoinder by the Sarvāstivādins (cf. n. 101), the three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* of the sūtra (rather than the four Abhidharmic *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*) are referred to. Cf., however, the remarks below in n. 136).

[100] Strictly speaking, this incompatibility poses itself as a problem also when the qualified entity is not momentary, insofar as all *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are taken to arise simultaneously with the principle entity. Thus the absurd situation that all the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* should discharge their function at the same time is in one passage in the AKBh[a] and in Si (5c24-6a1; Si_P p. 65) said to result from their simultaneity (*sahabhūtvāt*) and not from the momentariness of conditioned entities. I know of no text, however, prior

rejected by the Sarvāstivādins who held that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are, despite their simultaneity, not causally efficient at the same time. The mark of origination, so the line of reasoning, discharges its function when the qualified entity arises, whereas the marks of transformation and destruction — the mark of duration is not envisaged because the discussion refers to the Trilakṣaṇasūtra where this mark does not feature — operate simultaneously at the time when the entity concerned undergoes destruction. Thus it was ensured that the marks of origination and destruction do not function at the same time and, to accommodate the doctrine of momentariness, that the qualified entity does not exist at any other time but that of its origination and destruction. This still invited the charge that the qualified entity is all the same no longer momentary as it thus exists at two necessarily distinct points of time. In order to preclude this, the moment was defined as the time taken by the completion of origination and destruction.[101]

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to the adoption of the doctrine of momentariness, where the simultaneity of the principle entity with its primary and secondary marks is criticized. Beside the paucity of relevant textual material, this may be accounted for in the following way: The solution that the marks are despite their simultaneity successively active is only hard to accept against the background of the doctrine of momentariness where it is difficult to explain why they should become causally active at different times (see below). By contrast, if the marks are not related to momentary existence, they may be held to be dependent upon the advent of according external causes so that this dependence can explain why the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* discharge their activity at different times. That this indeed was the position before the adoption of the theory of momentariness is supported by the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas' stance that the mark of destruction does, in case of non-momentary entities, not operate until the fitting external causes are encountered (see n. 113). This dependence upon external causes continued to be given in the case of the mark of origination after the functioning of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* had been adapted to the doctrine of momentariness (see below).

[a] AKBh 78,12-14: "Furthermore, even if birth (*jāti*) and so on were distinct entities, why would this nevertheless be impossible? [Because] one entity (*dharma*) would have to be born, supported, transformed and destroyed at one and the same time since these [marks] arise simultaneously." (*athāpi nāma dravyāntarāṇy eva jātyādīni bhaveyuḥ. kim ayuktaṃ syāt. eko dharmaḥ ekasminn eva kāle jātaḥ sthito jīrṇo naṣṭaḥ syād eṣāṃ sahabhūtvāt.* AKVy 178,2: ***eṣām sahabhūtvāt.*** *jātyādīnāṃ samānakālotpādatvāt.*)

Cf. AKBh 79,14f (*... sthityanityate kāritram abhinnakālaṃ kuryātām ity ekasyaikatra kāle sthitivinaṣṭatā samprasajyeta.*) which is quoted in full and translated in n. 113.

[101] Vi 200a7-12 (Vi_2 149c10-14): "So as to stop this opinion (viz. the position of the Dārṣṭāntikas that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* refer to existence over a stretch of time, Vi 200a6f cited in n. 136) it is explicated (namely in the version of the JP commented upon by the Vi, viz. T 1544 926b20-22 cited in § I.A.2.2) that the three marks co-exist in one moment.

Question: If so, then one qualified entity (*dharma*) would have to originate and decay and perish at one time.

Answer: Because the time of their activity differs, [these marks] are not mutually exclusive. That is to say, when the *dharma* originates, the [mark of] origination has its activity. When the *dharma* undergoes destruction, then the [marks of] age and destruction have their activity. Even though [as] entities [they exist] simultaneously, their activity is sooner or later. That the operations of origination and destruction of one *dharma* have been completed is called 'one moment.'[a] Therefore, there is no mistake [in our teaching]."

[a] This definition is taken up in AKBh 78,24 cited in n. 236.

This definition of the *kṣaṇa* is difficult to reconcile with the conception of the moment as the shortest conceivable unit of time, and possibly because of this the Sarvāstivādins argue somehow differently in the AKBh. In contrast to the Vi where it is taken for granted that the mark of origination is causally efficient at the time when the qualified entity originates (this time is considered to pertain already to the entity's existence in the present), it is held in the AKBh that the mark of origination discharges its function the moment before the qualified entity exists, so that it is causally efficient one moment earlier than the marks of duration, change and destruction are.[102] The difficulty that the mark of origination has to be simultaneous with the entity it qualifies was solved on the basis of the doctrine that things also exist in the future and past, namely by postulating that the mark of origination is causally efficient before it itself has passed from the future to the present.[103] Thus the mark of origination is not causally efficient at the same time as the other three marks, and yet during the moment at which the qualified entity and hence its marks exist in the present, there is only one point of time (and not two as in the Vi) at which the marks discharge their activity.[104]

This solution was still problematic insofar as it restricts the incompatibility among the four marks to the relationship between origination and the other marks, thereby presupposing that

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[102] AKBh 78,14-16: "Because of the [temporal] difference of [the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas'*] operation, [the *dharma* (i.e. the qualified entity) would] not[a] [endure, decay and perish at the same time if the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* were distinct entities]. For the [mark of] origination discharges its activity [when it is still] future, because [if it did so when it was already present, the *dharma* to which it is linked would be so, too, and] something having [already] originated is not originated [again]. But when the *dharma* has originated, the [marks of] duration etc., being present themselves, discharge their activity. Therefore, it is not the case that the *dharma* endures or decays or perishes when it originates." (*na[a] kāritrakāla-bhedāt. anāgatā hi jātiḥ kāritraṃ [hi][b] karoti, yasmān na jātaṃ janyate. janite tu dharme varttamānāḥ <sth>[c]ityādayaḥ kāritraṃ kurvantīti na yadā jāyate, tadā tiṣṭhati jīryati vinaśyati vā.*)

[a] *na* is missing in the reprint of Pradhan's edition. It is attested in the Tibetan (P. gu 94a7) and Chinese translation (T 1559 186b27).

[b] The second *hi* has been elided in accordance with the AKVy 178,4f.

[c] Both Pradhan and Shastri (p. 263) read *kṣity*°.

[103] This functioning in the future was criticized by the Sautrāntikas (AKBh 78,17-20) on the grounds that it contradicts the definition of the future as the time at which the causal efficiency has not yet been discharged.
Though this is not explicated, the reciprocal relationship between the primary and secondary mark of origination implies that also the secondary mark should function when it is still future.

[104] In addition to the aforementioned explanation (see n. 101) of how the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* may co-exist in one moment without the qualified entity originating, decaying and perishing all at once, the following alternative explanation is offered in Vi 200a12f (missing in Vi_2):

> "The states of origination and destruction do not occur in one moment, and yet the own-beings of the three [*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*] exist simultaneously in one moment."

It seems that the mark of destruction is here meant to exist before its effect, viz. the state of destruction. This temporal separation between the existence of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa* and the corresponding action or state is reminiscent of the stance in the AKBh reviewed here. The fact that the argumentation advanced in Vi 200a12f is missing in the Vi_2 indicates that it must have been conceived of at a later age and thus seems to corroborate the impression that it is akin to the position in the AKBh. It has to be conceded, however, that the cryptic wording in Vi allows here for more than one interpretation.

duration, transformation and destruction may occur all at once. The Sautrāntikas did not accept this and argued that, leaving origination aside, the simultaneity of duration, transformation and destruction is impossible, too.[105] That, alternatively, these marks operate successively implies that the qualified entity undergoes several phases and as such is no longer momentary.[106] Vasubandhu concedes that this criticism could be countered by the definition of the moment as the time taken for the completion of the discharging of all four operations (AKBh 78,24 cited in n. 236). Of course, this definition is (at least if based on the assumption that this discharge takes place successively as in the given context) even more at odds with the conception of the moment as the shortest conceivable unit of time than the corresponding definition in the Vi (see n. 101) to which Vasubandhu seems to refer here.[107]

Leaving this problem aside, the Sarvāstivādins face the further difficulty of why the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas* should discharge their causal efficiency one after another rather than at the same time, even though they are simultaneous entities which are qualified by the same set of *lakṣaṇas*, and notably by the same mark of duration, which effects that the entity qualified by it discharges its causal efficiency (AKBh 78,21-79,3).[108] It would go beyond the scope of the present study to follow the debate on this point any further and examine the lengthy vindication of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine in the Abhidharmadīpa (103,12-108,15) and Saṃghabhadra's NA (405c1-412c27).[109]

3.2 The difficulties, which the Sarvāstivādins had to cope with as a consequence of their compression of all *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* into one moment, are also reflected by their treatment of the individual *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* and in particular, by the opponents' (notably Vasubandhu's) attempts to demonstrate that their functioning as causally efficient factors cannot be accounted for coherently. The debate on this point contributed in turn to the further refinement of the Sarvāstivādins' position and sheds much light on their (and also the

[105] AKBh 78,20-23: "And also the [marks of] duration etc., which are simultaneously present at [the time of their] activity, entail [an unacceptable consequence, namely] that the qualified entity (*dharma*) has endured, decayed and perished in a sole moment. For precisely when the [mark of] duration sustains it, the [mark of] change changes it and the [mark of] impermanence (*anityatā*) destroys it. Should this one at this time endure or change or perish?" (*sthityādayo 'pi ca yugapat kāritre varttamānā ekakṣaṇa eva dharmasya sthitajīrṇavinaṣṭatāṃ prasañj<ay>eyuḥ. yadaiva hy enaṃ sthitiḥ sthāpayati, tadaiva jarā jarayati anityatā vināśayatīti. kim ayaṃ tatra kāle tiṣṭhatv āhosvij jīryatu vinaśyatu vā.*).

[106] AKBh 78,23f: "Clearly (*hi*), also he who maintains that also (i.e. as in the case of the mark of origination; cf. AKBh 78,14-16 cited in n. 102) the [marks of] duration etc. discharge their activity successively, [is wrong because] this infringes upon the momentariness [of the qualified entity]." (*yo 'pi hi brūyat sthityādīnām api kāritraṃ krameṇeti, tasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ bādhyate.*).

[107] Saṃghabhadra (NA 409c) passes over the definition in silence and does not offer it later when he presents several definitions of *kṣaṇa* (533b, cf. n. 211). Nor do I know of any other source than the Vi where a definition of this type is brought forward.

[108] Cf. MPPU 171b6-8.

[109] Saṃghabhadra's lengthy defense of the orthodox system against Vasubandhu's attacks is shortly referred to by LVP (1937, 154f) and will possibly be dealt with in detail by C. Cox.

Sautrāntikas') conception of momentariness.

3.2.1 As for origination, the Sarvāstivādins taught that the mark of origination does not produce the qualified entity until it is united with the corresponding external causes.[110] Thus they could explain why the mark, which, as we have seen, has always existed together with the qualified entity in the future and which operates while still in the future state, does not discharge its activity earlier.[111] The Sautrāntikas criticize that in this case the causal efficiency should be attributed solely to those external causes, since there is no basis for the assumption that the mark of origination is causally efficient, too.[112]

3.2.2 With regard to destruction, the situation is more complicated. In the NA it is explicitly taught that the mark of destruction destroys on its own without being dependent upon external causes. This stance corresponds to the position held by the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras that conditioned entities are not destroyed by a cause, but perish spontaneously because it is their nature to do so (cf. § II.D.2.1). Accordingly, Saṃghabhadra (NA 533c28-534a18) adopts parts of Vasubandhu's argumentation for his proof that destruction does not depend upon an **external** cause. In order to allow for the operation of the mark of destruction, Saṃghabhadra (NA 533c9-29) has to reject, however, Vasubandhu's central argument that destruction as non-existence does not require any cause whatsoever. Before the momentariness of the qualified entity was presupposed, the operation of the mark of destruction must, as in the case of the mark of origination, have been dependent upon the advent of external causes. For how else could the delay between the origination of the qualified entity, when the mark of destruction becomes present, and between its destruction have been accounted for? This is confirmed by the testimony of the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas who taught with regard to non-momentary entities that the mark of destruction (*anityatā*) operates in combination with an external cause of destruction which actualizes its latent efficiency, whereas they held the

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110 Cf. Vi 201a4-17 (=Vi_2 150a22-b8).

111 AKBh 79,17-19: "And also, if the future [mark of] origination engenders the entity to be produced, why does not everything future arise simultaneously? Because: **The [mark of] origination does not engender the entity to be produced without [the corresponding] causes and conditions.** For without [the corresponding] complex of causes and conditions, the [mark of] origination does not become productive." (*api ca yady anāgatā jātir janyasya janikā, kimarthaṃ sarvam anāgatam yugapan notpadyate. yasmāt:* ***janyasya janikā jātir na hetupratyayair vinā*** *//II 46cd// na hi vinā hetupratyaya-sāmagryā jātir janikā bhavati.*)

112 AKBh 79,19-21: "In that case (i.e. if it is contended that the mark of origination only brings forth when united with causes and conditions [AK II.36cd]), we see the causal efficiency only of causes and conditions. [We do not see the causal efficiency of the mark] of origination, because when the [causal] complex is given, there is existence, and when not there is non-existence. Hence, only the causes and conditions are bringing forth." (*hetupratyayānām eva tarhi sāmarthyaṃ paśyāmaḥ, sati sāmagrye bhāvād asati cābhavān na jāter iti hetupratyayā eva janakāḥ santi.*)

AKVy 179,18f explicates that the mark of origination does not qualify as a cause because no correlation between its existence and that of the effect can be established: "For it is not the case that even when the complex of causes and conditions is given, at times the entity to be produced comes into being and at times not." (*na hi hetupratyayasāmagrye 'pi taj janyaṃ kadācid bhavati, kadācin na bhavati.*)

destruction of momentary entities not to depend upon any further cause beyond the mark of destruction.[113]

The refutation of the causal efficiency of the mark of destruction in the AKBh is directed primarily against this position of the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas. As in the case of the mark of origination, Vasubandhu objects that there is no basis for the assumption that the mark of destruction participates in the process of destruction. He likens this position to the stance that, when a laxative is taken, it is not that laxative, but a goddess having come into contact with it that loosens the bowels (see n. 113). While the same argument is urged in the Hsien-yang, it is demonstrated in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī section (henceforth: VinSg) of the Yogācārabhūmi and in Vasubandhu's KSi that the joint functioning of the mark of destruction and an external cause of destruction is impossible. In all these three sources this issue is not dealt with as part of the treatment of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* (as in the AKBh), but as part of the proof of momentariness (in the KSi, as part of the proof of the impossibility of movement) on the basis of the spontaneity of destruction.

The VinSg and the Hsien-yang take great pains to demonstrate that it is also impossible for the mark of destruction to destroy on its own (see appendix, § 2.3.3). For all I know, this position, which is in the context of the treatment of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* also refuted in the AKBh[114] and in the BoBh,[115] was postulated by the Sarvāstivādins and Vātsīputrīyas-

[113] AKBh 79,11-15: "A follower of another school (according to AKVy 179,9 an Ārya Saṃmatīya) contends that the [mark of] *anityatā* destroys once it has encountered a cause of destruction. For him an unacceptable situation has resulted, [a situation that is analogous to the situation of someone maintaining] that when a laxative is taken (lit.: encountered) the goddess loosens the bowels. What is the point of imagining the *anityatā* (= goddess)[, rather than the cause of destruction (= laxative) to be the factor effecting destruction]? [Because there is no point,] destruction should [accordingly under the terms of the advanced thesis] be brought about by that cause of destruction alone [and not by the mark of *anityatā*]. And because the momentariness of mental events (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) is acknowledged, the [mark of] *anityatā* of these [entities] would not depend upon a cause of destruction so that the [marks of] duration and *anityatā* would discharge their causal efficiency at the same time. This would entail that one [entity] would be enduring and undergoing destruction at one place and [one] time." (*yo 'py āha nikāyāntarīyo: "vināśakāraṇaṃ prāpyānityatā vināśayatī"ti, tasya "harītakīṃ prāpya devatā virecayatī"ty āpannaṃ bhavati. kim punas tāṃ kalpayitvā? tata evāstu vināśakāraṇād vināśaḥ. cittacaittānāṃ ca kṣaṇikatvābhyupagamāt tadanityatāyā vināśakāraṇānapekṣatvāt sthityanityate kāritram abhinnakālaṃ kuryātām ity ekasyaikatra kāle sthitavinaṣṭatā saṃprasajyeta.*)

[114] Vasubandhu (AKBh 79,13-15; translated in n. 113) argues that the mark of destruction cannot destroy on its own, because, not being dependent upon an outer cause, it would have to do so as soon as it has originated — a consequence the opponent cannot accept, because he contends that the mark of duration discharges its activity first.

[115] $BoBh_W$ 279,25-280,6; $BoBh_D$ 190,2-8): "If the so-called destruction (*vināśa*) was an entity (*dharma*) really existing by its own nature (*svabhāvataḥ pariniṣpanna*), it would originate and perish. And when the destruction would have originated, all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) ought to be destroyed. Thus, with little effort there would be the discontinuation of the mental events (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitasika dharma*) as in the case of someone having entered the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpanna*). And again, after the cessation of this destruction even the previously destroyed *saṃskāras* ought to — considering (*iti kṛtvā*) that their destruction would no longer exist — become

Saṃmatīyas only with respect to momentary entities (cf. n. 113). It had to be refuted by the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, all the same, because it contradicted one of the most important aspects of their conception of momentariness, namely that destruction is spontaneous and does not depend upon any cause whatsoever. Conversely, the proof of the non-existence of a cause of destruction in the AKBh is refuted in AD kā 142 and, as mentioned above, by Saṃghabhadra in order to establish the causal efficiency of the mark of destruction (and of the mark of age).

3.2.3 A further problem the Sarvāstivādins had to face was how to reconcile the attribution of the mark of change-while-enduring to discrete conditioned entities (rather than to a series thereof) with their stance that these entities cannot be subject to change because beyond their properties there is no underlying substance which could account for the identity of the entity concerned before and after its change (cf. § II.C.2.1).[116] Vasubandhu adduces a *śloka* where this problem is clearly stated:

> "In the case of being thus (i.e. as always), there is no ageing; in the case of difference, this one is but another [thing]. Therefore, the so-called age is not reasonable [as referring] to a single entity."[117]

This position that qualitative change implies numeric difference (i.e. the substitution of the old by a new entity) was not only held by the Sautrāntikas who brought forward this charge, but also by the Sarvāstivādins themselves. Hence, already in the Vi numerous solutions are offered to reconcile the attribution of the mark of change to individual momentary entities with the stance that they cannot change without losing their identity. The first solution offered argues that they are not subject to change and that the attribution of change-while-enduring

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existent again.[a] It is, therefore, impossible that the destruction originates and perishes." (*saced vināśo nāma svabhāvato dharmaḥ pariniṣpannaḥ syāt, so 'py*[b] *utpadyeta nirudhyeta ca*[c]. *yadā ca vināśa utpannaḥ syāt, tadā sarvasaṃskārair niruddhair bhavitavyaṃ syāt. evam sati alpakṛcchrena nirodhasamāpannasyeva cittacaitasikānāṃ dharmānām apravṛttiḥ syāt. tasya ca punar vināśasya nirodhān niruddhair api taiḥ saṃskāraiḥ punar eva bhavitavyaṃ syād — vināśa eṣāṃ nāstīti kṛtvā. ato vināśa utpadyate nirudhyate ceti na yujyate.*

[a] Cf. Nyāyavārttika 835,7f (***vinaṣṭānāṃ punar anutpatter*** *cet, atha manyase yadi vināśo vinaśyeta, vinaṣṭaḥ punar utpadyeta.*) and Yuktidīpikā 59,3f (*yadi tarhy abhāvo 'pi hetumān parikalpyate, prāptam asyāpi vināśitvam. aniṣṭaṃ caitat. tasmād ahetuko vināśa iti.*).

[b] In accordance with the Tibetan and Chinese translation, I have followed Dutt's reading, rather than that of Wogihara (viz. *pariniṣpanno 'syātmotpadyeta*).

[c] I emend the text and read *ca* instead of *vā* which is confirmed by the reading on p. 280,6; the Chinese (544c4) reads neither *ca* nor *vā*, whereas the Tibetan (147b3f) translates with *ḥam* which can be understood both as disjunctive and as copulative.

[116] Of course, before this stance was adopted by the Sarvāstivādins no such dilemma posed itself.

[117] AKBh 79,9f (the manuscript has a lacunae here [P. 5591 gu 95a5, T 1558 26b25f] so that Pradhan took over the wording from ADV 106,10f where this *śloka* is also cited):
tathātve na jarāsiddhir, anyathātve 'nya eva saḥ/
tasmān naikasya bhāvasya jarā nāmopapadyate//
Cf. Vi 200a14f (Vi_2 149c19f) cited in n. 118.

(*sthityanyathātva*) in the sūtra only refers to age (*jarā*).[118] This of course raises the question in what precisely the difference between change and age consists, or, to put it differently, why the operation of age should not imply qualitative difference. It seems that the next solution offered in the Vi (Vi 200a19-29, Vi_2 149c23-29), even though it is formally an alternative solution which does not supplement the first one, answers this question. According to it, the own-being of the entities remains unaltered, and yet their energy — numerous attributes are listed which are all in one form or another expressions of energy — which is not conceived of as a property, differs at the time of origination and destruction.[119] Similarly, it is argued that they change insofar as they only have causal efficiency when they are present, but not before or afterwards (Vi 200a29-b12).[120] Though not explicitly stated, these explanations point to the conception of the mark of change as the factor which causes the loss of their energy.

This implication is clearly worked out in the AD. Here the numerous attributes (i.e. the various expressions of energy), which the conditioned entities are said in the Vi to lose because of age, are narrowed down to causal efficiency so that the mark of age becomes the factor which deprives the qualified entity of its power to be causally efficient:

> "Because of the loss of the power (*śakti*) [to be causally efficient] 'old age' is established."[121]

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[118] Vi 200a14-19 (Vi_2 149c19-23): "Question: Is the own-nature of conditioned factors subject to transformation or not? In either case (lit.: if so), what is the problem? If it is subject to transformation, why do the entities (*dharma*) not give up their own-being (i.e. lose their identity)? If it is not subject to transformation, why is change-while-enduring attributed to them in this [sūtra]?
Answer: One should say that the own-nature of the conditioned factors is not subject to transformation.
Question: If so, why is it said that in this [sūtra] they have change-while-enduring?
Answer: In this [sūtra] 'change-while-enduring' is another name for 'age' and does not signify transformation. As birth is called 'origination' and as *anityatā* is called 'destruction,' so one should know, age is called 'change-while-enduring.'"

[119] This may be documented by the following extract from the relevant passage: Vi_2 149c23-27: "Because the own-being does not change, [entities] are said not to change. Insofar as their activity changes, they are said to change. How that? The activity of the entity differs when it originates from when it is destroyed. How does it differ? When the entity originates it has power, it has causal efficiency, it has activity. When it is destroyed, it is weak, dwindles, decays and perishes. In this sense there is said to be transformation."

[120] This definition corresponds to the Sarvāstivāda doctrine that entities are identical in the future, present and past and that the only alteration they are subject to is the acquisition and subsequent loss of causal efficiency. This correspondence may have led to the last solution offered in Vi 200b11-14 (= Vi_2 149c29-150a1), which explains the attribution of the mark of change directly by the alteration of their temporal location (i.e. whether they exist in the future, present or past). This solution hardly takes into account that the change it defines is meant to be brought about by the mark of change. For the only operation this mark can be credited with under the terms of this solution is the transference of the qualified entity from the presence to the past. Since it cannot modify the entity before it perishes, it is difficult to see how it would participate in this process without taking over the function of the mark of destruction.

[121] AD 140ab: *śaktihāner jarāsiddhiḥ/*

The commentary explicates that this function ensures that the entity does not discharge its function more than once:

> "With opened eyes the *dharma* (i.e. the qualified entity) arises happily and projects its fruit (i.e. is causally efficient). Hence (?, for *iti*),[122] if its power [to be causally efficient] (*śakti*) was not lost due to old age, it would also project a second fruit (i.e. become once again causally efficient); but it is not able to do so. Therefore, it is understood that there is some enemy called 'age' who causes the [entity] to age and who, having taken away its capability (to be causally efficient), hands it over to the demon *anityatā*."[123]

Insofar as *śakti* (i.e. power) not only refers to the capacity to be causally efficient but also to the strength of the entity as such, its suppression by the mark of age not only ensures that the entity projects its fruit only once, but — as witnessed in its function to hand over the *dharma* to *anityatā* — also prepares the ground for destruction. This is clearly explicated thus:

> "The loss of causal efficiency is given, because [an entity only] acts once and because it is destroyed." (AD kā 140cd)
> "If the entity (*dharma*) [continued] to be endowed with just that strength on account of which it has projected one fruit, then it would also project a second [fruit] and *anityatā* would not destroy it [as long as it] was endowed with [this] power. Therefore, it is understood that having been modified (that is, by the mark of age), the [entity] enters the jaws of the tigress *anityatā*." (ADV thereon)[124]

Though this characterization of the mark of age does — as long as energy is not regarded as a property — solve the dilemma that the mark of change is attributed to immutable entities, it poses the problem that the mark of age operates after the mark of duration and before the mark of destruction and thus does not comply with the above-mentioned attempts to reconcile momentariness with the operation of all four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*.

3.2.4 As mentioned above, duration was not taught as a separate mark in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra, and the Sarvāstivādins took great pains to explain that it is, all the same, to be understood as

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[122] Alternatively, the first phrase could be understood as a citation that is terminated by *iti*.

[123] ADV 106,3-6: *unmiṣito hi dharmo jāyate hṛṣitaḥ phalam ākṣipatīti(.)*[a] *tasya yadi jarasā śaktir na vihanyeta, sa dvitīyam api phalam ākṣipet, na ca śaknoty ākṣeptum. tasmād gamyate: kaścij jarākhyaḥ śatrus taṃ jarjarīkṛty<ā>pahṛtasāmarthyam anityatāpiśācyāḥ samarpayatīti.*

[a] Depending on the interpretation of *iti* (cf. n. 122), the clause either terminates with *iti* or does not.

[124] AD 140cd: *ekakāritranāśābhyāṃ śaktihāniḥ prasidhyati//*
ADV 106,16-18: *yena khalu dārḍhyeṇopeto 'yam ekaṃ phalam ākṣipate, yadi tenaiva yuktaḥ syād, dvitīyam apy ākṣipet. na cainaṃ śaktimantam anityatā hiṃsyāt. tasmād gamyate: 'nyathībhūto 'yam anityatāvyāghrīmukhaṃ praviśatīti.*[a]

[a] I understand that *iti* marks the end of the phrase introduced by *gamyata* (cf. 106,5f), though it cannot be excluded that it functions also (or instead, as Jaini takes it to do) as a causal particle introducing the next sentence.

a distinct *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*. As the factor which ensures that the conditioned entities do not perish immediately after origination, it enables them to become causally efficient.[125] It is thus indispensable because by definition (see above) every entity existing in the present acts as a cause. This doctrinal position is clearly stated in the Vi but missing in the Vi_2.[126] In both translations, however, there is the further argument that without the mark of duration mental events and factors could not grasp their object.[127] This argument probably reflects

[125] AD 139cd: "There are four [and not three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*], because if there were not the [mark of] duration, it would not be established that [the conditioned entities] are causes and so on." (*catvāri sthityan<a>stitve*[a] *hetutvādyaprasiddhitaḥ//*).
ADV 105,4-7: "If the [qualified] entity (*dharma*) did not have the [mark of] duration, the entity, not abiding in its self, would not have the special power called 'causality.' And something devoured by *anityatā* (rather than being supported by the mark of duration) has no power with regard to the origination [of something else] and hence would not commit an action. Because of the non-existence of an action, there would be non-existence of a fruit. But this undertaking (i.e. actions in general and the Buddhist striving for emancipation in particular?) has as its object the result. Therefore, having done away with the position of those who deny the existence [of the yonder-world, the law of retribution etc.] (*nāstika*), the [mark of] duration is accepted by those affirming the existence of [the yonder-world etc.] (*āstika*).[b] Thus [duration] is established [as a *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*]." (*yadi hi dharmasya sthitir na syāt, tasyātmany <an>avasthitasya het<ut>vākhyaḥ śaktiprabhāvaviśeṣo na syāt. anityatāgrastasya ca notpattiśaktir ity ataś ca kriyām na kuryāt. kriyābhāvāt phalābhāvaḥ. phalārthaś cāyam ārambhaḥ. tasmād āstikair nāstikapakṣaṃ vikṣipya sthitiḥ pratigṛhyata iti siddham.*).

[a] The text reads °*anāstitve* which, for all I can see, could only mean non-non-existence (*a-nāstitva*) which does not fit the context. I, therefore, suggest to emend the text and read °*an-astitve* (i.e. non-existence).

[b] For *āstika* and *nāstika*, cf. Pr 329,10-12.

[126] Vi 201c16-19: "By force of the mark of duration, the conditioned factors are, once they have originated, able to grasp their fruit (i.e. project an effect)[a] and [in case of mental entities] able to grasp their object. By force of [the marks of] transformation and of destruction, they no longer have causal efficiency one moment later. If there were no mark of duration, the conditioned factors would be without causal concatenation (i.e. they would not form series of causes and effects) and mental states (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitasika dharma*) would be without object. Therefore, there is necessarily the [mark of] duration."
Vi_2 151a3f: "If the conditioned factors did not have the mark of duration, they would not be able to have an object. Because it is desirable to avoid such a mistake, it is said that the conditioned factors have the mark of duration."

[a] For the expression "to grasp the fruit" cf. AKVy 226,12f: "'They grasp [the fruit]'(AK II.59ab) means they project [their fruit], i.e. are present as [the fruit's] cause." (***pratigṛhṇantī*** *ti. ākṣipanti, hetubhāvenāvatiṣṭhanta ity arthaḥ.*).

[127] This argument reflects the stance of the Sarvāstivādins that the object and the perception of it occur simultaneously (*sahabhū*), and not successively as the Sautrāntikas (among others) maintained, according to whom the mind arises as the perception of something (cf. § II.B.2.1.4). I do not see how the doctrine that the perception only grasps the object after it has originated can be reconciled with the momentariness of mental entities and with the doctrine of the Sarvāstivadins expressed in AKBh 145,15-17 (cited in n. 288) that the cognition of an object is caused by the simultaneously originating object and sense organ. Probably (cf. § II.B.2.1.4), the latter doctrine has been introduced to replace the earlier one, once cognitive acts had come to be viewed as momentary entities. In this case, the question poses itself whether this doctrinal development is later than the argument which is advanced (i.e. probably reproduced) at this point in the Vi, or whether it refers — for the sake of the argument — back to an

an earlier stage at which present existence had not yet been defined exclusively in terms of causal efficiency.

The Sautrāntikas not only disagreed with the postulation of a causally efficient entity "duration," but denied categorically that the conditioned factors have any duration beyond origination at all, no matter how it is accounted for. Thus the arguments brought forward against the mark of duration match in parts those employed in MSA(Bh) 149,27-30 and 150,5-11 (cited in n. 393) and Hsien-yang 549a7-17 (cited in § 2.3.1) against a hypothetical cause of duration (*sthitihetu*) when proving the doctrine of momentariness. It is argued (AKBh 78,28-79,1) that a mark of duration would have to go on functioning for ever, because, in contrast to the mark of production which can only beget once since there is nothing more it could do once it has transferred the entity from the future to the present, there is no reason why the mark of duration should on its own account stop supporting the entity. As witnessed in AD 140cd (cited in n. 124), the Sarvāstivādins argue that the mark of age causes the qualified entity to lose its power and thus terminates, together with the mark of destruction, the operation of the mark of duration (AKBh 79,1), thereby ensuring that the entity does not endure longer than is necessary to discharge its causal function. This, however, entails the problem that it cannot be explained why the marks of age and destruction should only have the ability to override the mark of duration after that one has discharged its function and not before (AKBh 78,25-27, 79,1f). Moreover, age and destruction are qualified by the very mark of duration that qualifies the principle entity and should hence become causally efficient when the mark of duration operates and not afterwards (AKBh 79,2f).

3.2.5 The treatment of the individual marks by the Sarvāstivādins reflects that they did not radically alter their conception of conditioned entities when they came to regard them as momentary, but, by contrast, continued to look upon many aspects of their existence in much the same way as they had done before, when they had still considered them to be temporally extended. This tendency is particularly evident in the case of the above-cited argument in the Vi (see n. 126) where the mind (*citta*) is, despite the presupposed conception of it as a momentary mental event, characterized as a grasping subject which points to an earlier understanding of the *citta* as an underlying mind of some sort (or, at the very least, to the conception of the *citta* as lasting for several phases).

It has already been seen that the attempt to reconcile the attribution of origination, duration, age and destruction to conditioned entities with their momentariness raised many problems. Also the conceptualization of the individual marks which entails that the entities arise, then undergo a phase of stability which allows them to discharge their causal efficiency, and thereafter perish, once their efficacy has been taken away from them, confirms the impression that the Sarvāstivādins ultimately did not solve the conflict between their conception of the existence of conditioned entities, their conviction that this existence lasts but a moment (*kṣaṇa*), and their understanding that the *kṣaṇa* is an indivisible unit of time.[128]

earlier stance, which at the time of the argument's conception had already been (largely) superseded.

[128] This is also reflected by Haribhadra's doxographical account (Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya p. 46,14f)

4 Like the Sarvāstivādins, the Theravādins attributed the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to momentary entities and not to series thereof and explicitly taught that each entity undergoes origination, duration and destruction. They did not have to face the predicament of the Sarvāstivādins, however, because they did not share their conception of the *kṣaṇa* as a definite unit of time which allows for no further subdivision (see § I.E.1.2). Instead they used *khaṇa* (i.e. *kṣaṇa*) as the expression for a short while, the dimension of which is not fixed, but may be determined by the context and in particular by prefixing an according noun to *khaṇa*; the *khaṇa* in *cittakkhaṇa* (lit.: mind-moment), for instance, refers to the instant taken by one mental event. Thus, it was possible for them to admit that a momentary entity is made up of a phase of origination, a phase of duration and a phase of destruction which in turn they could even refer to as *khaṇas* (*uppādakkhaṇa, ṭhitikkhaṇo, bhaṅgakkhaṇo* = the moment of origination etc.; cf. § I.E.1.1).

5 The Sautrāntikas shared the Sarvāstivādins' conception of the *kṣaṇa* as the smallest, indivisible unit of time, but, in contrast to the latter, solved the problem of how to squeeze a conditioned entity into an indivisible moment by adapting the mode of existence of conditioned entities to the theory of momentariness. The characteristic features, which were attributed to conditioned entities when they were still regarded as temporally extended, were not retained when their duration was reduced to a moment, but became instead assigned to chains of moments (*santāna*). This included the assignment of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, so that origination, duration, transformation and destruction were — in accordance with the original import of the sūtra — related to existence over a span of time and not crammed into a moment.[129] To do so was possible because, unlike the Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas did

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of the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas (whom Haribhadra identifies at this point with the Saṃmatīyas) according to which "things have [a duration of] four moments: [The mark of] birth originates, [the mark of] duration stabilizes, [the mark of] age causes ageing [and the mark of] destruction destroys" (*catuḥkṣaṇikaṃ vastu. jātir janayati, sthitiḥ sthāpayati, jarā jarjarayati, vināśo vināśayati*).

[129] TSi 289b18-20: "As for origination, that the five groups of factors [constituting a person] (*skandha*) exist in the present world is called 'origination' (*utpāda* or *jāti*?). That they abandon this present world is called 'destruction' (*vyaya*?). By [forming] series they endure. Because of the transformation of these enduring [series], one says 'change-while-enduring' (*sthityanyathātva*)."

AKBh 77,6-14: "The beginning of the series is 'origination' (*utpāda*), its cessation is 'destruction' (*vyaya*). The very series in so far as it continues is 'duration' (*sthiti*). Its [qualitative] difference between earlier and later is 'change-while-enduring' (*sthityanyathātva*). And in this respect it is said:

> 'The beginning of the series is birth (*jāti*); its termination is destruction (*vyaya*); duration (*sthiti*) is this [series itself]. Change-while-enduring (*sthityanyathātva*) is its [qualitative] difference between earlier and later.'
>
> 'Birth (*jāti*) is existence which is not preceded [by earlier existence], duration is the series, destruction is its termination; change-while-enduring (*sthityanyathātva*) is held to be the [qualitative] difference of the series between earlier and later.'"

(*tatra pravāhasyādir utpādo, nivṛttir vyayaḥ. sa eva pravāho 'nuvarttamānaḥ sthitiḥ. tasya pūrvāparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathātvam. ... āha cātra: jātir ādiḥ pravāhasya vyayaś chedaḥ, sthitis tu saḥ/ sthityanyathātvaṃ tasyaiva pūrvāparaviśiṣṭatā// jātir apūrvo bhāvaḥ, sthitiḥ prabandho, vyayas taducchedaḥ/ sthityanyathātvam iṣṭaṃ prabandhapūrvāparaviśeṣa iti//*).

Vi 198b1-5 (missing in Vi_2 [should have followed after 148b21] and in Vi 977b, and hence must have

not accept that origination etc. are causally efficient entities in their own right that exist apart from the thing that originates etc.[130] Rather than considering the marks of origination etc. as the indispensable cause of origination etc., they looked upon them as only conceptually given terms (*prajñaptimātra*, AKBh 79,28) which express the fact that something has originated etc. (cf. the quotations below in n. 129). Thus the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* were not needed to account for the origination etc. of the conditioned entities and could be correlated to series of momentary entities rather than to these entities themselves.

This correlation of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to temporally extended phenomena accords with the original position of the Sarvāstivādins before they adopted the doctrine of momentariness. In the Vi, this is still admitted of as a possibility, though with the qualification that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* which are correlated to existence over a span of time are only conceptually given, while in truth the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are causally efficient entities that operate on discrete conditioned entities.[131] Thus, at the stage recorded by the Vi, the Sarvāstivādins do not dismiss the approach of the Sautrāntikas as outright wrong, but do not accept that the

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been added later): "Or there is this opinion: 'When the five groups of factors [constituting a person] (*skandha*), i.e. matter (*rūpa*) and so on, come forth from the womb, one says 'birth' (*jāti*). When they perpetuate (*saṃ √tan*) themselves, one says 'duration' (*sthiti*). When they decay one says 'change' (*anyathātva*?). At the end of the life one says 'destruction' (*vyāya*).' So the Sautrāntikācārya(s)."
Instead of referring to the time when the *skandhas* originate etc., it is also possible to understand that *jāti* etc. designate the *skandhas* when they originate etc., so that the *skandhas* at the time of origination etc. would be called "birth" (*jāti*) etc. This would accord with the definition of *jāti* as it is attested in AKBh (132,23) in the context of *pratītyasamutpāda* (i.e. when defining its penultimate member, viz. *jāti*).

130 — TSi 289b20f: "It is not the case that there are separately existing phenomena (*dharma*) called 'origination,' 'duration' or 'destruction.'"
— AKBh 76,22-25: "'This [doctrine of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* espoused by the Sarvāstivādins] is tearing asunder empty space (i.e. analyzing something not really existing[a]).' So the Sautrāntikas. [They maintain]: 'The phenomena birth and so on do not exist as substantial entities (*dravyatas*) as they are differentiated [from the originating etc. entity by the Sarvāstivādins]. Why is that? Because there are no means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) [testifying to their substantial existence]. For there is no means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) whatsoever, be it perception, inference or reliable tradition, which, as in the case of material phenomena and so on, [testifies] to their substantial existence.'" (*tad etad ākāśaṃ pāṭyata iti Sautrāntikāḥ. na hy ete jātyādayo dharmā dravyataḥ saṃvidyante yathā vibhajyante*[b]*. kiṃ kāraṇam. pramāṇābhāvāt. na hy eṣāṃ dravyato 'stitve kiṃcid api pramāṇam asti pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamo vā, yathā rūpādīnāṃ dharmāṇām iti.*)
Cf. the discussion between the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas on this point in AKBh 79,22-80,11.
[a] Empty space is merely the absence of a corporeal entity (AKVy 173,22f: *sapratighadravyābhāvamātram ākāśam*).
[b] I follow the reading recorded in AKVy and confirmed by the Tibetan translation, and do not adopt the reading *abhivyajyante* as Pradhan does.

131 Cf. Vi_2 148c15f: "Before the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* were dealt with according to the highest truth; now they are going to be dealt with as conceptual. Or this is said: Before the impermanence of moments (i.e. referring to the destruction at every moment) was dealt with. Now the impermanence over a period of time is going to be dealt with." (Vi 199a2: "Before [the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*] were dealt with with regard to moments. Now they are dealt with with regard to series.").

saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas of the Sautrāntikas' definition are the real *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* which are taught in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra.[132] This line of reasoning is repudiated by the Sautrāntikas who argue in the AKBh that the origination etc., as they define them, qualify as true *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* because the conditioned entities which the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are meant to qualify in the Trilakṣaṇasūtra are not discrete momentary entities, but series formed by them.[133]

However, Vasubandhu also shows that it is possible to attribute the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to individual conditioned entities without accepting that these entities persist beyond origination and are subject to change. According to this reasoning, which is again based on the stance that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are merely conceptual constructs and not causally efficient entities, their origination refers to the fact that they exist after not having existed before (*abhūtvā bhāva*); their duration consists in the origination of consecutive entities in the same continuum; their transformation is established by the qualitative difference between earlier and later entities within that continuum, while their destruction is nothing but their non-existence after existence.[134] This characterization retains the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* only nominally (i.e. without associating with them four different states or phases), while it reduces the states of conditioned entities factually to that of existence and non-existence (cf. § I.C.2.1). It thus reflects a more radical (that is, more radical than that of the Sarvāstivādins) conception of momentariness, according to which the discrete conditioned entities neither undergo a phase of duration nor of transformation, but perish immediately after their origination. Since this

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[132] Vi 198b3-5: "In order to repudiate this opinion (i.e. the opinion of the Sautrāntikācārya, Vi 198b1-5, cited in n. 129), it is explicated that [the origination etc. of this definition] are the marks of a span of existence (*nikāyasabhāga*) and not the marks of conditioned entities. As for the marks of conditioned entities, [they are] the four marks with [which] all conditioned entities are endowed in every single moment."

[133] AKBh 76,29-77,3: " ... the Lord taught: 'The conditioned entities have three marks [which characterize them as] conditioned entities' in order to elucidate that the series of conditioned factors are conditioned, [i.e.] dependently originated, and not [in order to teach this] for moments (i.e. the momentary entity). For the origination etc. of moments are not cognized; and not being cognized, they cannot function as characteristic marks[a] (*lakṣaṇa*)." (... *bhagavāṃs tasya saṃskārapravāhasya saṃskṛtatvaṃ pratītyasamutpannatāṃ dyotayitukāma idam āha: "trīṇīmāni saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni," na tu kṣaṇasya. na hi kṣaṇasyotpādādayaḥ prajñāyante. na cāprajñāyamānā ete lakṣaṇaṃ bhavitum arhanti.*).

[a] In the Trilakṣaṇasūtra (cf. n. 31), the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are set forth as objects of knowledge (*utpādo 'pi prajñāyate* etc.). Hence, so the argument, they cannot refer to momentary entities, because the origination etc. of these entities cannot be observed.

[134] AKBh 77,21-24: "These marks may also be attributed to conditioned entities in each single moment, though without imagining [them to be] distinct entities. How is that? For every moment, existence after not having existed is origination; non-existence after having existed is destruction; that later and later moments follows upon earlier and earlier ones is duration; the dissimilarity of this [duration] (i.e. of the later moment with respect to the earlier one) is change-while-enduring." (*pratikṣaṇaṃ cāpi saṃskṛtasyaitāni lakṣaṇāni yujyante vināpi dravyāntarakalpanayā. katham iti. pratikṣaṇam abhūtvā bhāva utpādaḥ, bhutvābhāvo vyayaḥ, pūrvasya pūrvasyottar<ottar>[a]akṣaṇānubandhaḥ sthitiḥ, tasyā visadṛśatvaṃ sthityanyathātvam iti.*)

[a] Emendation in accordance with the Chinese (T 1558 28a1f) and Tibetan translation (P. 5591 gu 93b2f: *sṅa ma sṅa ma daṅ phyi ma phyi maḥi skad cig ma rjes su ḥbrel ba ni gnas paḥo//*).

destruction was not viewed as a time-demanding process, but as the simple fact that something having existed before has stopped to do so (*bhūtvābhāva*), existence was reduced by the Sautrāntikas to mere acts of originating (to flashes into existence, one might say) which do not allow for a temporal subdivision — a conception which accords with the understanding that the moment (*kṣaṇa*) is infinitesimal.

6 The stance which the Dārṣṭāntikas take in the Vi and in the NA on the issue of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* accords with this doctrinal position of the Sautrāntikas.[135] Besides the fact that the Dārṣṭāntikas, too, maintain that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are — as all other *cittaviprayukta saṃskāras* — only conceptually given[136] and not really existing entities,[137] they also argue that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* should be correlated to series rather than to distinct moments, and they also show that if they are attributed to distinct entities they can be reduced to existence and non-existence.[138] On the basis of this position it can be safely assumed that the Dārṣṭāntikas, too, have held that conditioned entities perish immediately after their origination and are thus devoid of duration and change. This is also suggested by their denial

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[135] This, of course, raises the question to which extent they represent two distinct schools at all. I do not want to enter into this problem here. For the present purposes it may suffice to say that with respect to the doctrine of momentariness I was not able to identify any doctrinal differences between the position of the Sautrāntikas espoused in the AKBh on one side, and the opinions attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the Vi and the NA on the other side.

[136] Vi 200a4-7 (Vi_2 149c8f, cf. n. 99 for the citation of the phrase omitted here and n. 101 for the rejection of the Dārṣṭāntikas' argumentation): "The Dārṣṭāntikas make this explanation: ' ... one should say that the origination of the phenomena (*dharma*) at the beginning is called 'origination' (*jāti*). Their annihilation later is called 'destruction.' Their transformation in between is called 'age.'"

In contrast to the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, the Dārṣṭāntikas assume in this passage in accordance with the Trilakṣaṇasūtra that the only mark beside origination and destruction is change. That the Dārṣṭāntikas take this position here follows from the context (viz. the commenting on the Trilakṣaṇasūtra with its three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*). However, also in the passage which Saṃghabhadra attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas, when the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are reduced to origination and non-existence, only one *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*, beside the marks of origination and destruction, is considered, namely the mark of change. Therefore, it is possible that unlike the Sautrāntikas, at least some sections among the Dārṣṭāntikas took the canonical position that origination, change and destruction alone are *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* as their starting point.

[137] Vi 198a15-18 (= Vi_2 148b5-8, Vi 977b9-11, Vi 198c22f): "Others, like the Dārṣṭāntikas, hold that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* do not really have an own-being. They make this explanation: 'The *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are subsumed under the group of [non-material] factors dissociated [from the mind] (*viprayuktasaṃskāraskandha*). Because the [entities of] the group of [non-material] factors dissociated [from the mind] do not have a real own-being, the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* do not have a real own-being.' In order to repudiate this opinion it is explicated that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* really have an own-being."
Vi 198c22 (not in Vi_2): "The Dārṣṭāntikas maintain: 'An own-being of the marks of origination and so on does not really exist.'"

[138] NA 533c21-24: "And the Dārṣṭāntikas brought forth an argumentation contrary to the correct [teaching], a way of explanation which has not been heard of before. They hold [the view] that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* [consist of] origination and non-existence [only]. Thus there would then not result a total of three [*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*]; i.e. that the conditioned entities obtain their own-being (*ātmlābha*) would be origination; the mark of destruction and change would be the non-existence of this own-being."

of a cause of destruction (cf. § II.D.2.6), Vasubandhu's principle argument for the proof of the theory of momentariness.

7 The position of the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas was also espoused by the early Yogācāras. Thus in the BoBh the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are only accepted as conceptually given and not as really existing, causally efficient entities.[139] Moreover, also in the AS[140] and in the Hsien-

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[139] $BoBh_W$ 278,10-25, $BoBh_D$ 189,2-11 and $BoBh_W$ 279,6-9, $BoBh_D$ 189,16f: "He sees with respect to every single moment constituted by a conditioned factor (*saṃskārakṣaṇa*)[a] three marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) of the conditioned entity (*saṃskṛta*). After the [respective] moment he sees the fourth mark of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*). On that occasion he sees that the appearance of the own-being (*svabhāva*) of a *saṃskārakṣaṇa*, which has not existed before (*apūrva*), immediately after the destruction of the own-being of[b] the preceding *saṃskārakṣaṇa*, is birth (*jāti*). That the originated [factor] does just for that time (*tatkālāvipraṇāśa*) not vanish he sees as duration (*sthiti*). He sees that the otherness (*anyatva*) or difference (*anyathātva*) of this arisen [factor] with respect to the own-being (*svabhāva*) of the *saṃskārakṣaṇa* which has ceased before is age (*jarā*). He sees that the destruction of the own-being of just this arisen *saṃskārakṣaṇa* immediately after that moment of origination is annihilation (*vyaya*).

With the same own-being, that (*yatsvabhāva*) he sees the arisen momentary conditioned entity (*saṃskārakṣaṇa*) to be endowed with, he [also] sees its birth (*jāti*), duration (*sthiti*) and age (*jarā*) to be endowed with. He does not [see] them to be endowed with different own-beings than that of this [*saṃskārakṣaṇa*]. And in accordance with truth, he sees that the disappearance of the own-being (*svabhāva*) of this *saṃskārakṣaṇa* after the moment [of birth] is precisely [the disappearance] of the [marks of] birth and so on. ... Apart from the conditioned factor [itself], the Bodhisattva does not at any time see its birth, its duration, its age, its impermanence (*anityatā*) as fully existing in the sense of a real own-being." (*ekaikasmiṃ saṃskārakṣaṇe trīṇi saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni paśyati. kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ caturthaṃ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇaṃ samanupaśyati. tatra pūrvasaṃskārakṣaṇa*[b]*svabhāvavināśānantaraṃ yo 'pūrvasaṃskārakṣaṇasvabhāvaprādurbhāvaḥ sā jātir iti paśyati. utpannasya yas tatkālāvipraṇāśaḥ sā sthitir iti paśyati. taṃ pūrvaniruddhaṃ saṃskārakṣaṇasvabhāvam apekṣya tasyotpannasya yad anyatvam anyathātvaṃ vā sā jareti paśyati. tasmāj jātikṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ tasyaivotpannasya saṃskārakṣaṇasya yaḥ svabhāvavināśaḥ sa vyaya iti paśyati. sa yatsvabhāvam eva tam utpannaṃ saṃskārakṣaṇaṃ samanupaśyati, tatsvabhāvām eva tasya jātiṃ sthitiṃ jarāṃ ca paśyati,* <*na*>[c] *tadanyasvabhāvāṃ. tasmāc ca kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ ya eva tasya saṃskārakṣaṇasvabhāvasyāpagamaḥ, sa eva teṣāṃ jātyādīnām iti yathābhūtaṃ paśyati. ... tatra bodhisattvaḥ saṃskāramātraṃ sthāpayitvā na tasya jātiṃ, na sthitiṃ, na jarāṃ, nānityatāṃ sarvakālaṃ dravyasvabhāvapariniṣpattitaḥ paśyati.*)

That the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are not real entities is in the following proved on the basis of perception — they are not perceived as distinct from the qualified entity ($BoBh_W$ 279,9-13) — and by argumentation ($BoBh_W$ 279,13-280,11; cf. the citation of $BoBh_W$ 279,25-280,6 in n. 115).

[a] For the term *saṃskārakṣaṇa* which in this passage clearly designates the momentary entity itself, cf. n. 248.

[b] Both Wogihara and Dutt read *saṃskārakṣaṇe*, which is the reading on which also the Tibetan translation (P. 5538 źi 167a2, D. wi 146b7: *ḥdu byed kyi skad cig ma daṅ po la* — P. reads *skad cig pa*) is based. This reading is not convincing, given that *saṃskārakṣaṇa* is generally compounded with *svabhāva*. Therefore, I have emended the text in accordance with the Patna manuscript (fol. 189b4), which clearly reads *ṇa* and not *ṇe*. If this emendation is not accepted, the translation would have to read "in" instead of "of."

[c] *na* has been added by Wogihara and Dutt in accordance with the Tibetan (P. źi 167a5) and Chinese (544b10f) translation.

[140] AS 11,7-11: *jātiḥ katamā. nikāyasabhāge saṃskārāṇām abhūtvābhāve jātir iti prajñaptiḥ. jarā*

yang[141] it is taught that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* qualify an entire span of existence rather than discrete momentary entities. In the BoBh, however, the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are attributed to individual entities and not correlated to series.[142] Furthermore, the mark of duration is understood to be the non-destruction of the arisen entity. This accords with the position of the Sarvāstivādins and is at odds with Vasubandhu's definition of duration as the production of consecutive entities. The conception of age as the qualitative difference between the present and the preceding entity, however, is identical with the position put forward by Vasubandhu in the AKBh. Furthermore, in accordance with the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas, the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are in the BoBh reduced to existence and non-existence (cf. § I.C.2.1). Thus also the treatment in the BoBh does not differ fundamentally from that of the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas who, after all, also teach how the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* may be attributed to discrete momentary entities.

That the conception of momentariness espoused in the early Yogācāra works accords with the position of the Sautrāntikas is also borne out by the testimony of PG 5. This *gāthā*, which by its incorporation into the Yogācārabhūmi is accepted by the Yogācāras, posits that conditioned entities are without duration and hence do not have time to discharge any activity, as the Sarvāstivādins claim, who teach that the momentary entities become causally efficient on account of the mark of duration. By contrast, their very origination (and hence their existence, for they do not endure beyond origination) as such is taught in PG 5 to constitute action.[143] In other words, these acts of origination (again one may speak of flashes into

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katamā. nikāyasabhāge saṃskārāṇāṃ prabandhānyathātve jareti prajñaptiḥ. sthitiḥ katamā. nikāyasabhāge saṃskārāṇāṃ prabandhāvipraṇāśe sthitir iti prajñaptiḥ. anityatā katamā. nikāyasabhāge saṃskārāṇāṃ prabandhavināśe anityateti prajñaptiḥ.

[141] Hsien-yang 550c16-20: "The stanza says:

The beginning of one life-time (*janman*), [its] end and the interval between comprise the three marks of the conditioned entities (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*). (kā 22ab)

The explication says: The three marks of the conditioned are comprised by one life in a [specific] form of existence. That is to say: The time of birth at the beginning comprises the mark of origination; the time of death at the very end comprises the mark of destruction; the time of the duration of the continuum between these two (i.e. from birth until death) comprises the mark of change-while-enduring (*sthityanyathātva*)."

[142] It is noteworthy that the treatment of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* in the BoBh forms part of the instruction on how to contemplate impermanence. This shows that the issues discussed here were spiritually relevant and not mere scholastic quibbles.

[143] Cf. the explanation of the commentary on PG 5 (cited in n. 15) in the Yogācārabhūmi (Wayman 1984, p. 341,34-38): "It was said (in kā 1cd): 'All phenomena are devoid of activity.' It was not, however, explained why they are devoid of activity. Hence it is said here: 'All conditioned factors are momentary. How [could these] non-persisting [factors] have action?' It was [also] said in (in kā 1cd): 'But yet, action occurs.' Hence, it is explained how action occurs though action is non-existent: 'That which is their existence, precisely that is called 'action' and precisely that is called 'doer.'' Because [the existence] is the fruit of the preceding entity], it is action; because it is the cause [of the subsequent entity], it is a doer." (*"dharmāḥ sarve 'pi niśceṣṭā" ity uktam*[a]*. na tūktam kathaṃ niśceṣṭā iti. ata āha: "kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā, asthirāṇāṃ kutaḥ kriye"ti. "atha ced vartate kriye"ty uktam/*[a] *tat katham asatyāṃ kriyāyāṃ kriyā vartata iti āha/ "bhūtir yeṣāṃ*[b] *kriyā saiva*[c] *kārakaḥ saiva cocyata" iti/ phalatvāt*

existence) do not **have** any activity — in the words of PG1, they are *niśceṣṭa* "devoid of activity" (cf. n. 143) — but **are** the activity **themselves**. Thus, what is ordinarily perceived as a unit of action is constituted by a succession of these acts of origination. The difference between the attribution of activity to conditioned entities by the Sarvāstivādins on one side, and the identification of activity with the entity's existence by the Yogācāras (and Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas) on the other side is characteristic for the way the former retain their old doctrines based on the conception of entities as temporally extended, while the latter elaborate and accept the consequences of their radical theory of momentariness.

kriyā hetutvāt kārakaḥ/).

[a] PG 1cd: "All phenomena are devoid of activity, but yet there is action." (*dharmāḥ sarve 'pi niśceṣṭā atha ced vartate kriyā*).

[b] The Sanskrit manuscript of the Yogācārabhūmi (henceforth: Y) (photos of which are kept in the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna) seems to read *yaiṣāṃ*. Cf. n. 15.

[c] Emendation of Wayman's reading confirmed by both manuscripts (cf. Schmithausen 1987, n. 1394).

I.D Momentariness in the Early Yogācāra School

As documented in the first chapter, there is very little evidence for the doctrine of momentariness before it emerged in the post-canonical Abhidharma literature of the Sarvāstivādins. In this literature, momentariness is not dealt with as a topic in its own right before the AK.[144] Therefore, in the preceding chapter more detailed information on the conception of momentariness had to be deduced from the controversy on the marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) between the various Hīnayāna schools, notably between the mainstream Sarvāstivādins on one side and the dissident Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas on the other. In this context reference was also made to the position of the Yogācāras which was found to accord with that of the latter two schools.

In contrast to the paucity of pertinent material uncovered in the Abhidharmic literature examined so far, the theory of momentariness is dealt with extensively in the writings of the early Yogācāras, that is, in the textual tradition associated with Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga. These texts, notably the Yogācārabhūmi (ŚrBh, BoBh, VinSg), AS, Hsien-yang and MSA, are older than the AKBh, AD and NA and thus constitute, to my knowledge, the oldest textual material in which the doctrine of momentariness is dealt with as a topic in its own right.[145] Most importantly, it is here that the doctrine of momentariness for the first time is proved extensively and not taken for granted. Moreover, it can be witnessed how the theory of momentariness is placed in the wider context of the Buddhist doctrine. On the one hand, the sources reveal how the Yogācāras reconciled the position that all conditioned entities are momentary with their Mahāyāna stance which denies the substantial existence of these entities.[146] On the other hand, it can be observed how the original conception of *anityatā* as the impermanence correlated to existence over an extended period is not dismissed entirely, but features side by side with momentariness in the Abhidharmic enumeration of the various forms of *anityatā*. In this chapter, after a brief summary of the various kinds of proof, these two aspects of the treatment of momentariness by the Yogācāras will be documented. Particular attention will be paid to the differing interpretation by Prof. O. Hayashima who argues that the entire treatment of *anityatā* and momentariness in the Yogācāra school is based on the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine.

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[144] Even in the AK the issue of momentariness comes up only in the context of another controversy, namely whether *kāyavijñapti*, that is, manifest bodily action, is movement, as the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas contend, or not. The latter stance is taken by the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas on the basis of the doctrine of momentariness according to which entities are too short-lived to move, so that a change of spatial localization is due to the re-origination of a subsequent entity at a new point.

[145] In the TSi, only the momentariness of the mind is addressed, whereas the momentariness of matter is, as in the Vi, taken for granted (cf. T 1646 279b23-26, cited in n. 287).

[146] Following Hacker's definition of "substance" (*Grundlage indischer Dichtung und indischen Denkens*. Aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Klaus Rüping. Wien 1985. p. 109), I refer with the expression "substantial existence" to existence on account of an own-being (*svabhāva*), that is as a distinct entity in its own rights. The qualification of this form of existence as substantial does not imply that the concerned entity is endowed with a material substance.

1 Basically, three different kinds of proofs can be identified in the aforementioned Yogācāra sources.[147] They are of particular interest (and hence will be studied closely in the chapters II.B, II.C and II.D, because they allow one to infer some of the reasons and motivations which may have led, or at least contributed, to the development of the doctrine of momentariness. Besides, these proofs are important because most of the proofs of momentariness in later sources — the most important exception being the *sattvānumāna* developed by Dharmakīrti — can be traced back to them.

The first type of proof, which will be studied closely in chapter II.B, derives the momentariness of all conditioned entities on the basis of the presupposed momentariness of mental entities by demonstrating that the various ways in which mind and matter interact (in particular their causal relationship) preclude that matter can be non-momentary while the mind is momentary. The probably oldest and most complex argumentation of this kind can be found in the MSA (cf. n. 269). As I argue in n. 340, this argumentation was in different ways taken up and developed in the Hsien-yang (see appendix § 2.2) and in the AS(Bh). This kind of proof also found its way into the Vi (787c17-788a13).

The second kind of proof, which will be examined in chapter II.C, derives the momentariness on the basis that things, in particular the body, change at every moment, even though change, sometimes in the form of destruction, becomes only manifest after a time. This is the only argument advanced in the ŚrBh (486,1-14), to my knowledge the oldest source (with the possible exception of Vi 787c17-788a13) proving the momentariness of all conditioned factors. This argument is also very prominent in the MSA where it is first advanced in general (XVIII. 82d, 83a) and later applied specifically to sentient beings (XVIII. 86bc, 87, 88ab) and to inanimate objects (XVIII. 89cd, 90b, 91b). Furthermore, the Hsien-yang (appendix, § 2.4) and the AS (AS 41,12) adduce this type of argument.

The third type of proof, which will be scrutinized in chapter II.D and in the translation in the appendix (§ 2.3), argues that it is the inherent nature of things to perish spontaneously and deduces from this that they must be momentary. Of central importance for this proof is the argument that the seeming causes of destruction (e.g. fire) do, contrary to appearance, not destroy their respective object but only modify it. This argumentation is already advanced in the ŚrBh, though not as part of the proof of momentariness, but because the spontaneity of destruction is an intrinsic aspect of the Yogācāras' conception of momentariness and as such had to be substantiated by reasoning (cf. § II.D.3.2). By contrast, in the VinSg (Y_T P. zi 58a4-b4, D. źi 55a5-b5 cited in the notes in appendix, § 2.3 and in ch. II.D), the AS (41,12f) and the Hsien-yang (549a7-b12, translated in appendix, § 2.3), the non-existence of a cause

[147] Besides these proofs, the recurrent discussion of how the phenomenon of recognition does not, as the Brahmanical opponents allege, contradict the doctrine of momentariness can also already be found in these sources (Hsien-yang 550c9-15, MSA kā XVIII.82d, MSABh 150,19f, 154,22-26). Moreover, in Hsien-yang 549b21-550b13 the refutation of the permanent entities taught by the Brahmanical schools features already as a further corollary of the treatment of *anityatā*. By contrast, in the Y, on which the Hsien-yang is based at this point, the refutation of these entities is still completely dissociated from the topic of *anityatā*.

of destruction is proved in order to establish that all conditioned entities are momentary. As these entities perish due to their own nature, so the argument runs, they have to pass out of existence as soon as they have arisen, because they are produced with this nature. Also in the MSABh (150,9-16; and also in the MSA?)[148] it is argued that there are no causes of destruction, but this argument only plays a subordinate role in the proof that conditioned entities cannot endure at all and hence do not persist beyond origination (cf. § II.D.2.1)

§ 2 **2.1** With the exception of the Yogācāras, all schools mentioned so far as subscribing to the doctrine of momentariness belong to the fold of "Hīnayāna" Buddhism. On the level of highest truth, they accepted the existence of discrete momentary conditioned entities which have, despite their temporal and spatial minuteness, specific properties and make up the macroscopic world we live in.[149] In the Mahāyānist strand of the Yogācāra school,[150] by contrast, the substantial existence of conditioned phenomena was not accepted on the level of highest truth. This stance stood in conflict with the teaching that all conditioned entities are momentary, insofar as this teaching implies the substantial existence of these entities.[151] The dilemma alluded to here posed itself for all followers of the Mahāyāna irrespective of whether they understood the impermanence taught by the Buddha in terms of momentariness or not. It (i.e. the dilemma) followed from the authoritative status of the teaching that all conditioned entities are impermanent[152] — a status which made it impossible for any Buddhist, no matter how little he consented to the implication that there are phenomena which are subject to origination and destruction, to outright dismiss the characterization of conditioned entities as impermanent. The conflict between this characterization and the stance that no such entities can be said to exist at all is neatly expressed in MPPU 222b27-29 ($MPPU_L$ 1376):

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[148] As for the MSA, it is likely that "*abhāvāt*" in kā XVIII.82c refers either to the non-existence of a cause of destruction (so in the Chinese translation, T 1604 646c2ff) or — the solution I favour — to the non-existence of both a cause of destruction and a cause of duration (cf. MSABh 150,5-9). All the same, it cannot be excluded entirely that "*abhāvāt*" originally only alluded to the non-existence of a cause of duration (cf. MSABh 150,5-9). Hence it is not impossible that the argumentation with regard to the non-existence of a cause of destruction has only been introduced by the commentary and is missing in the MSA itself.

[149] Cf. the argument of the realist in BCA IX.7d that the Buddha taught the momentariness of all conditioned entities from the point of view of the highest truth, because momentariness is not ordinarily conceived and hence does not pertain to the level of conventional truth (cf. the refutation of this argument in BCA IX.8ab, cited in n. 427).
See also e.g. Vi_2 148c15f (= Vi 198c27f and 199a2) quoted in n. 196.

[150] In the oldest strata of the Yogācāra texts (notably in the ŚrBh, in considerable portions of the AS, as well as in some parts of the Y and Hsien-yang), the Mahāyāna ontology is not (or at least not consistently) presupposed (cf. Schmithausen 1969, p. 820 and Schmithausen 1973, p. 165f).

[151] Cf., for instance, the effort in the San-wu-hsing-lun (872b16-20, quoted in n. 161) to explain that *anityatā* in the ordinary sense of origination and destruction does not entail that there are real entities which originate and cease.

[152] The teaching that all conditioned entities are impermanent (*anitya*) lies at the very roots of Buddhism because it accounts for the ultimate non-satisfactoriness of these entities. Accordingly, it came to be accepted as one of the cardinal tenets in Buddhism.

"Question: Mahāyāna propounds[153] that the phenomena (*dharma*) do not arise and do not perish, that they have but one characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), namely not to have a characteristic. Why is it said here, that the phrase 'all conditioned entities are impermanent' is a seal of the doctrine (*dharmamudrā*)?[154] How do these two teachings not contradict each other?"

2.2 Already in the Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra (henceforth: AkṣM) which belongs to the corpus of Prajñāpāramitā literature,[155] this dilemma was solved by interpreting *anityatā* as non-existence rather than as impermanence:

"What is the meaning of "impermanent" (*anitya*)? It has the meaning 'non-existent' and '[something] not to be attached to,' but it does not have the meaning that things perish. The meaning of *anitya* is that the phenomena (*dharma*) are devoid of a self. That there is nothing which perishes because [the *dharmas*] are devoid of an own-being: this is the meaning of *anitya*."[156]

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[153] MPPU$_L$ 1376 n. 1 cites Pañcaviṃśati p. 164,8f (= T 223, 242c2-4 and 278c1f): *sarva ete dharmā ... ekalakṣaṇā yadutālakṣaṇāḥ*.

[154] For the expression *dharmamudrā* see MPPU$_L$ 1368 n.1.

[155] The AkṣM was translated into Chinese in 308 A.D. Braarvig (1988, p. xliv) reckons that it may be dated back to the first or second century A.D.

[156] AkṣM (Braarvig 1988, p. 232 [= P. bu 174b3-5, D. ma 168b5f, quoted in SAVBh P. tsi 156b5-8, D. tsi 132a4-7], T 397 210c9-12, T 403 610a8-10): *de la mi rtag paḥi don gaṅ źe na/ med paḥi don daṅ mi chags*[a] *paḥi don te/*[b] *dṅos po rnam par ḥjig paḥi*[c] *don ni ma yin no// mi rtag paḥi don ni chos la bdag med pa ste/ ṅo bo ñid kyis dben paḥi phyir, de la rnam par ḥjig pa*[d] *gaṅ yaṅ med de/*[e] *ḥdi ni*[f] *mi rtag paḥi don to//*

[a] The quotation of this passage in the SAVBh reads "*med paḥi don daṅ mi rtag paḥi don te/*" (= ... has the meaning "non-existent" and the meaning "*anitya*"). The Chinese translations also read "**anityārtha*," but construe it as a predicate rather than integrating it by "and" ("'non-existent' is the meaning of *anitya*").

It seems that already at an early stage there were two divergent readings. On one hand, the Tibetan translation of the AkṣM reads in all versions **asaktārthaś*(?) *ca* (... *daṅ mi chags paḥi don te/*; for *mi chags pa* cf. the Tibetan translation of the MSABh [P. phi 25a8-b5] which renders *na sakta* in MSA XVI.30-35 with *mi chags*, and consult the entry in Lokesh Chandra's *Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary* [s.v.] where *alipta* and *alobhya* are given as equivalents of *mi chags pa*). This reading is also commented upon by Vasubandhu. On the other hand, the SAVBh reads "*anityārthaś ca*" (*daṅ mi rtag paḥi don te/*). By omitting "and," the Chinese translations (or the version translated by them) aim to improve upon this reading.

Probably the reading of the AkṣM recorded in the Tibetan tradition is closer to the original. In this case, "**asaktārtha*" may have been an explication of the *anityatā* of non-existence, specifying that the non-existence referred to potential objects of attachment such as a Self (*ātman*) or things considered "mine" (*ātmīya*). Either by scribal error (possibly the original read "*asadartho 'saktārthaś cānityatārthaḥ*") or because "**asaktārtha*" was not understood in this context (but in this case the copulative particle should have been left out, too), "**asaktārtha*" may have been omitted or replaced subsequently. At any rate, the reading *anityārtha* poses (that is, if *anitya* is understood in the sense of impermanent) the problem that in the following sentence it is expressly stated that the destruction of things is not a meaning of *anityatā*.

As will be seen, the qualification as non-existent does not refer directly to the characterized entity as such, but to its own-being or essence. Thus, the Buddha's teaching that all entities are *anitya* comes to affirm here the Mahāyāna teaching that all entities are devoid of substantial existence and in that sense empty (*śūnya*). This interpretation of *anityatā* was made possible by analyzing *a-nitya* (=im-permanent) as *nityam a-sat* (= permanently, i.e. forever, non-existing).[157]

§ 2.3 **2.3.1** The Yogācāras adopted this Mahāyāna interpretation of *anityatā*. Already in the Bodhisattvabhūmi it is advanced in the following way:

> "And how does the Bodhisattva envisage all conditioned entities as *anitya*? Here the Bodhisattva sees (*paśyati*) all conditioned factors as *anitya* by perceiving the [supposed] expressible own-being of all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) to be non-existent in all [the three] times. Further, of that very (*eva*) inexpressible thing (*nirabhilāpya vastu*, i.e. True Reality, *tathatā*),[158] he perceives, insofar as it is not [yet?] completely known as it really is, the origination and destruction which are caused by the absence of [this] complete knowledge, and in this way he envisages (*samanupaśyati*) all these conditioned factors, which are all devoid of an own-being that could be expressed, as *anitya*."[159]

Alternatively, the following explanation for the two divergent textual traditions may be brought forward. The reading recorded in the Tibetan translation of the AkṣM *daṅ mi chags paḥi don te* does not render *asakta* (as I have presumed above) but *anitya*, which was — correctly — analyzed by the translator(s) as *an-itya*, "something not to be approached [with attachment]." The translator(s) of the SAVBh, by contrast, will have understood *anitya* in the ordinary meaning of "impermanent" — hence the rendering *mi rtag pa*. Thus the difference between the reading in the translation of the AkṣM and of the SAVBh would be due to the varying translation of the original, and not due to the original itself which in both cases will have read ... *asadartho 'nityārthaś ca.*

[b] P.: *don ste//*, P. of SAVBh *don to//*

[c] *rnam par* missing in SAVBh

[d] *rnam par* missing in SAVBh

[e] D. of SAVBh: *med/*

[f] P. of SAVBh reads *ḥdi la ni*

[157] Cf. the (Mahāyāna)-Sūtrālaṅkāraṭīkā (henceforth: MSAṬ) by *Asvabhāva, P. bi 169b6-170a1, D. bi 151b6-152a1): "As for the teaching 'For the Bodhisattvas the meaning of *anitya* is 'non-existent'' (MSABh 149,7), '*a*' [in '*anitya*'] expresses the negation, while '*nitya*' [in '*anitya*'] expresses permanence. Therefore, '*anitya*' means that (*yat*) it is for all times non-existent ...). (*byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ rnams kyi mi rtag paḥi don ni med paḥi don" ces bya ba ni/ "mi" źes bya ba ni dgag par brjod pa yin la/ "rtag pa" źes bya baḥi sgra ni rtag pa brjod pa yin pas mi rtag pa źes bya ba ni gaṅdus rtag tu med paḥo źes bya baḥi tha tshig ste/*)
The same explanation can be found in SAVBh P. tsi 156b4f (D. tsi 132a4f): *med paḥi don daṅ źes bya ba la/ "mi rtag" ces bya baḥi sgra/ rgya gar skad du/ "a ni ta ta"źes bya ba ḥbyuṅ ste/ "a" ni med paḥi don to// "ni ta ta"*[a] *rtag paḥi don te/*) and in ASBh 50,10f: ... akārasya pratiṣedhārthatvāt nityaśabdasya ca sarvakālārthatvād iti.)."

[a] corrupt for *a ni tya* or a *ni tya tā*?

[158] Cf. $BoBh_W$ 276,2-5 ($BoBh_D$ 187,15-17): *iha bodhisattvasya sarvābhilāpātmakena svabhāvena virahitaṃ nirabhilāpyasvabhāvaṃ vastu paśyataḥ yā cittasya sthitiḥ, ayam asyocyate sūnyatāsamādhiḥ.*

[159] $BoBh_W$ 277,16-22, $BoBh_D$ 188,16-20: *kathaṃ ca bodhisattvaḥ sarvasaṃskārān anityataḥ*

In contrast to the AkṣM where non-existence seems to be — provided the rendering *mi chags paḥi don* of the Tibetan translation of the AkṣM is accepted as faithful to the original (cf. n. 156) — explicitly taught to the exclusion of the understanding of *anityatā* as impermanence, the Yogācāras advance the Mahāyāna interpretation of *anityatā* without dismissing the original meaning entirely — an approach characteristic for their Abhidharmic background. As follows from the instruction in the BoBh of how the rise and fall of the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are to be contemplated, the impermanence is understood in its radicalized form as momentariness. However, as documented in the passage adduced here,[160] this understanding of impermanence is only provisional and secondary to the realization of the "inexpressible thing" (*nirabhilāpya vastu*), i.e. *tathatā*.

The approach adopted by the BoBh corresponds to the treatment of *anityatā* under the terms of the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine, which was developed on the basis of the BoBh. Whereas the non-existence entailed by *anityatā* applies in the BoBh to an expressible own-being that could be attributed to conditioned entities (*abhilāpyasvabhāva*), it refers under the terms of the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine to their imagined characteristic (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*), that is, to their purely fictitious aspects. Similarly, the conventional understanding of *anityatā* in terms of the origination and destruction of conditioned entities corresponds to the *paratantralakṣaṇa*, that is, to the nature of these entities that has arisen in dependence upon other factors. As in the BoBh where origination and destruction are understood to occur in every moment, so the *anityatā* of the *paratantralakṣaṇa* is generally understood in terms of momentariness.[161]

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samanupaśyati? iha bodhisattvaḥ sarvasaṃskārāṇām abhilāpyasvabhāvaṃ nityakālam eva nāstīty upalabhyānityataḥ sarvasaṃskārān paśyati. punar aparijñātasya[a] *bhūtataḥ tasyaiva nirabhilāpyasya vastunaḥ aparijñānahetukaṃ*[b] *udayavyayam upalabhya tān*[c] *nirabhilāpyasvabhāvān sarvasaṃskārān anityataḥ samanupaśyati.*

[a] $BoBh_D$: *avijñātasya*

[b] $BoBh_W$: *aparijñāta*°

[c] $BoBh_W$: *ublabhyate*. As confirmed by the pattern of the preceding sentence, the reading adopted in $BoBh_D$ is correct (but *upalabhya* and *tān* should be written apart).

[160] In the passage under discussion, the "knowledge of the inexpressible thing" referred to in the second sentence corresponds to the realization that the *saṃskāras* do not have an expressible own-being. Thus the Bodhisattva should only contemplate the rise and fall of conditioned entities as *anitya* if he has not mastered the task laid down in the preceding sentence, namely to realize the non-existence of an expressible nature. The realization of the non-existence of an expressible own-being corresponds to the level of True Reality (*tathatā*). By contrast, though an improvement over the erroneous conception of things as permanent, the observation of the fall and rise of phenomena is not in accordance with highest truth, because it presupposes the substantial existence of discrete entities. The superiority of the former realization is reflected by the use of *paśyati* (i.e. direct vision) in the former and *samanupaśyati*, which refers to a more indirect mode of observation (roughly: viewing something in a certain way), in the latter case. In terms of the later developed scheme of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*), the former realization matches the *pariniṣpanna* level, whereas the latter observation relates to the *paratantra* level.

[161] A different approach is adopted by Paramārtha in his San-wu-hsing-lun, which seems to be based on MAV III.5 (adduced in n. 164). He refrains from understanding origination and destruction in the ordinary sense in order to avoid the impression that something substantially existing originates or perishes. Instead, he takes origination to refer to the fact that the dependent nature is not truly non-

The understanding of *anityatā* in the sense of non-existence corresponds, as the MSA and the commentatorial tradition specify,[162] to the stage of a Bodhisattva because it is his task to

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existing, while destruction is understood to refer to the fact that the dependent nature is not truly existing either. The normal understanding of *anityatā* is not correlated by Paramārtha to any of the three natures. Instead, he teaches that on the level of conventional truth, *anityatā* consists in the non-existence before and after existence (i.e. in ordinary impermanence).

T 1617 872b12-23: "*Anityatā* has three meanings:

Firstly, the *anityatā* of non-existence: it refers to the imagined nature of suffering which forever is non-existent. This non-existence is the meaning of *anityatā*. The fact that this non-existence exists on the level of the highest truth is called 'true *tathatā*.'[a]

If non-existence before and non-existence after [existence] are defined as *anityatā*, then this is conventionally true (*saṃvṛtisat*). The non-perverted (*aviparīta*) is defined as '*tathatā*,' but not as 'true *tathatā*.'

Secondly, the *anityatā* of origination and destruction: it refers to the dependent nature of suffering. This dependent nature is neither substantially existing,[b] nor substantially non-existing. Because it differs from the perfect nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*), it is not substantially existing; because it differs from the imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), it is not really non-existing. Because it is not substantially existing, it is [something] perishing; because it is not really non-existing, it is [something] originating. Thus 'origination and destruction' are the meaning of *anityatā*. Origination, however, is not real origination (i.e. of something substantially existing); nor is destruction real destruction. This is true *tathatā*.

Thirdly, the *anityatā* of separation and non-separation: it refers to the perfect nature of suffering. Before the path, this nature is not yet free from pollution; after the path it is then free from pollution. Because regarding the state it is not fixed, one speaks of *anityatā*. The fact that this nature does not change is called *tathatā*."[c]

[a] The text differentiates between true *tathatā* and ordinary *tathatā*. Normally *tathatā* refers invariably to the absolutely true reality so that there is no scope for distinguishing between a truer and a less true form of *tathatā*.

[b] Should 亦 be read instead of 既 ?

[c] As far as I can see, the differentiation between *tathatā* and true *tathatā* must have been given up at this point. For 1 see no reason why the immutability referred to here should, in contrast to the preceding cases, not have been characterized as "true *tathatā*."

[162] MSA XVIII.81: "For the wise, the meaning <of *anitya*> is 'non-existent.'" (*asadartho ... dhīmatām ...*).

MSABh 149,7f and 11f: "For the Bodhisattvas, the meaning of *anitya* is 'non-existent.' What is permanently non-existing, that is im-permanent (*anitya*), namely their (i.e. the *saṃskāras'*) imagined characteristic.[a] ... Also 'perishing in a moment' (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*, i.e. being momentary) is to be known as a meaning of *anitya*[, namely] of the characteristic which has arisen in dependence (*paratantralakṣaṇa*)." (*bodhisattvānām asadartho' nityārthaḥ/ yan nityaṃ nāsti tad anityaṃ teṣāṃ yat parikalpitalakṣaṇam/... kṣaṇabhaṅgārtho'py anityārtho veditavyaḥ paratantralakṣaṇasya/*).

SAVBh P. tsi 157b4f, D. tsi 133a3f): "As for [the teaching in the MSABh] 'For the Bodhisattvas, the meaning of "*anitya*" is "non-existent": The meaning of *anitya* is twofold, namely 'originating and perishing' and 'non-existing.' Now regarding the meaning of *anitya* for the Bodhisattva, the meaning 'originating and perishing' does not apply, as it does in the case of the Śrāvaka; by contrast, it is the meaning 'non-existence' that is accepted as the meaning of *anityatā*."[b] (*"byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ*[c] *rnams kyi med paḥi don ni mi rtag paḥi don to" źes bya ba la/ mi rtag paḥi don la rnam pa gñis te/ skye ba daṅ ḥjig paḥi don daṅ med paḥi don to// de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ rnams kyi mi rtag paḥi don ni ñan thos la sogs pa lta bu skye ba daṅ ḥjig paḥi don ni mi rtag paḥi don ma yin gyi/ gaṅ med paḥi don ni mi rtag paḥi don du ḥdod do//*).

realize that all conditioned factors are forever devoid of the nature they are commonly imagined to have. The traditional understanding of *anityatā* as impermanence, by contrast, corresponds to the stage of the Śrāvaka, i.e. the adept who does not follow the path of the Mahāyāna.[163]

The treatment of *anityatā* within the framework of the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine eventually raised the question whether, and if so, in which way, *anityatā* can also be attributed to the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*. While this question is (still?) ignored in the MSABh (cf. the quotation in n. 162), the Hsien-yang felt the need to explicate that the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* cannot in any sense be said to be impermanent (cf. appendix, § 1.7). In the Madhyāntavibhāga (henceforth: MAV),[164] San-wu-hsing-lun (872b12-23, cited in n. 161) and Si,[165] by

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[a] The translation follows Asvabhāva (MSAṬ P. bi 169b8-170a1) who glosses *teṣām* with *saṃskārāṇām*. Alternatively, *teṣām* could stand for *bodhisattvānām* (i.e. "... this is for them *anitya*, namely ...").

[b] It is not clear how *gaṅ* is to be construed. Possibly, it refers to Bodhisattva (rather than to *med paḥi don* as presumed in my translation), so that it could be translated by "'in his case' it is accepted that... ." A further possibility is that *gaṅ* renders a causally employed *yat*, so that the following translation would result: " ... because (*gaṅ*) in the contrary (*gyi*) it is accepted that *anitya* means 'non-existing.'"

[c] *dpaḥ* is missing in P.

[163] The AS adopts the interpretation of *anityatā* as non-existence as one of the various forms of *anityatā*:

> AS P. li 89a4: "What is the mark [consisting in being] non-existent? It is the non-existence of a Self and of what-is-mine in the *skandhas* (i.e. the five groups constituting the person), in the *dhātus* (i.e. the six senses, their objects and the corresponding six kinds of consciousness) and in the *āyatanas* (i.e. the six sensory organs and the corresponding six kinds of objects)." (*med paḥi mtshan ñid gaṅ że na/ gaṅ phuṅ po daṅ/ khams daṅ/ skye mched rnams la bdag daṅ bdag gi dus rtag tu med paḥo//*).

In contrast to the other sources, it is specified here that the non-existence refers to a Self (*ātman*) and to what-is-mine (*ātmīya*) rather than to the own-being of conditioned phenomena. The denial of these entities accords with the standard Buddhist doctrine (e.g. SN IV 54) and, hence, is not peculiar to Bodhisattvas. This interpretation is typical for the approach of the AS to present Mahāyāna teaching (here the interpretation of *anityatā* as non-existence) in a way palatable to an Abhidharma-orientated audience.

[164] MAV III.5cd/6ab, MAVBh 38,21-39,3: "As a counter-agent against the perverted views [to regard the impermanent] as permanent etc., the non-perverted facts, namely impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and not-being-a-Self are [to be known] respectively in relation to the fundamental principle.[a] How are "impermanent" (*anitya*) etc. to be understood in this context (*tatra*)?

> The meaning of *anitya* is respectively in relation to the fundamental principle 'non-existing,' characterized by origination and destruction [and being *anitya* in the sense of] being [first] polluted [and then] free from taints. (MAV III.5cd/6ab)

The fundamental principle is of course (*hi*) the three natures. With regard to them *anitya* has respectively the meaning 'non-existent,' '[endowed with] origination and destruction' and 'being polluted and not polluted.'"

(*aviparyāsatattvaṃ nityādiviparyāsapratipakṣeṇānityaduḥkhaśūnyānātmatā mūlatattve yathākramam. kathaṃ ca tatrānityāditā*[b] *veditavyā?*

> *asadartho hy anityārtha utpādavyayalakṣaṇaḥ// (= III.5cd)*
> *samalāmalabhāvena mūlatattve yathākramam/ (=III.6ab)*

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trayo hi svabhāvā mūla-tatvaṃ[.] teṣu yathākramam asadartho hy anityārtha utpādavyayārthaḥ samalāmalatārthaś ca.)

MAVṬ 117,1-9 (P. tshi 86b6-87a1, D. bi 245b7-246a3): "The meaning of *anityatā* is threefold, namely 'non-existent,' '[endowed with] origination and destruction' and 'being polluted and not polluted.' What exists forever in the same way (i.e. without being subject to change), that is permanent (*nitya*); what is contrary to this is impermanent (*anitya*). 'Respectively with regard to these [three natures]':
[1] The imaginary nature is *anitya* in the sense of *anitya* as 'forever non-existent;' following others, it is to be understood, according to the principle of 'etymological' explanation (*nirukti*), that what is permanently non-existent (*asan nityam*) is *anitya*.[c]
[2] The dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is *anitya* in the sense of *anitya* that is characterized by origination and destruction at every moment.
[3] Even though by nature free from any change, the perfect nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) is *anitya* in the accidental sense of '*anitya*' that is characterized by the meaning 'being [first] polluted and [then] not polluted.'" (*trividho hy anityārthaḥ: asadarthaḥ, utpādavyayārthaḥ samalāmal<-atv?-[d]ārthaś ca. yaḥ sarvadā tathāsti sa nityaḥ, tadviparīto 'nityaḥ. teṣu yathākramam iti tatra>[e] sarvadā 'sadarthānityārthena parikalpitasvabhāvo 'nityaḥ. asan nityam anityam iti niruktinyāyena veditavyam ity anye. pratikṣaṇam utpādavyayalakṣaṇenānityārthenānityaḥ paratamtrasvabhā<vaḥ. tasya pratyayotpannatvāt vināśe cāhetukatvāt.[f] samalāmal-atv?[d]-ārthala>kṣaṇenāgantukenānityārthenānityo 'vikāradharmo 'pi pariniṣpannasvabhāva iti.[g]* The passages printed in brackets <...> are missing in the fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript. I have not always followed Yamaguchi's reconstruction.)

[a] The fundamental principle consists in the three natures (*trisvabhāva*), viz. the imagined, the dependent and the perfect nature (*parikalpita-*, *paratantra-*, and *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*). Sthiramati (MAVṬ 111,20-23) explains this expression as follows: "Explaining why the three kinds of nature are called 'fundamental principle,' [The MAVBh] says: 'because of the determination of the other principles with regard to [the three natures].' This is to say, the other principles such as the marks (i.e. *anityatā, duḥkhatā, śūnyatā, anātmatā*?) are comprised by the [three natures]." (*yena kāraṇena svabhāvas trividho mūlatattvam ity ucyate, tat pradarśayann āha:* ***tatrānyatattvavyavasthāpanād iti.*** *tatrānyasya lakṣaṇāditattvasyāntargata<tvam ity arthaḥ>.*)
Cf. MAVBh p. 38,3f (ad MAV III.3cd): "That the imagined characteristic is permanently non-existing, this is the true fact with regard to the imagined nature because it is not perverted (i.e. because it is a matter of fact)." (*parikalpitalakṣaṇam nityam asad ity etat parikalpitasvabhāve tattvam, aviparītatvāt.*)

[b] The reading has been adopted from the *pratīka* in MAVṬ (116,20); The MAVBh reads *anityatāditā*.

[c] According to my translation, Vasubandhu proposes two alternative ways in which it can be explained that *anitya* may mean "forever non-existent." In the former case, this meaning is arrived at grammatically by explaining the function of the *alpha privativum*. By contrast, in the latter case it is arrived at by way of *nirukti* (hence the awkward syntax), that is, by a quasi etymological explanation that does not purport to account grammatically for the derivation of a word.
Alternatively to this interpretation, *asan nityam* may be translated by "the non-existent eternal" (which would accord with standard syntax) so that *anitya* used in the sense of non-existence would refer to supposedly eternal entities which, as a matter of fact, do not exist at all, such as the Brahmanical Self (*ātman*). This is unlikely, however, as entities such as the proverbial hare's horn which are said to be *anitya* in the sense of non-existence (so SAVBh P. tsi 156b5f, 157b6f) would no longer fall under this definition because they are not supposedly eternal.

[d] Since at both places the Sanskrit is lost and since the text at the spot in question is also corrupt in the MAVBh (it reads *samalātārtha*), the term has to be reconstructed from the Tibetan. It is not certain whether the original reading is with or without an abstract suffix (*-tā/-tva*; i.e. whether *samalāmalat(v)ārtha* or *samalāmalārtha* is to be read), because the Tibetan translation reads the first time ... *dri ma daṅ bcas śiṅ dri ma med paḥi don to*, while it reads the second time *dri ma daṅ bcas pa daṅ dri ma med pa ñid kyi don*. However, given that the MAVṬ reads *anityārtha* (rather than *anityatārtha*)

contrast, it is conceded that the *parinispannasvabhāva* is *anitya* insofar as it is attained to by the process of purification and in that spurious sense linked to transformation.[166] In the MAVBh[167] this interpretation is accepted as the third form of *anityatā*.[168]

2.3.2 Hayashima contends that the application of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine to *anityatā* is intrinsically linked up with the issue of momentariness.[169] His starting point is the differentiation between impermanence in the sense of duration for some time[170] and impermanence in the sense of momentariness. According to Hayashima, under the terms of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine the former is imagined (*parikalpita*). On these grounds, it is correlated by him (1988b, diagram on p. 31) with the *parikalpitalakṣaṇa* and the understanding of *anityatā* in the sense of eternal non-existence (*nityam asat*). The momentariness, by contrast, is, as the adequate understanding of *anityatā* in the traditional sense of non-permanence, correlated with the *paratantralakṣaṇa*. Thus, according to Hayashima (1988b, p. 28f), the application of the scheme of *trisvabhāva* to *anityatā* serves to determine the status of momentariness and its relation to the impermanence as it is ordinarily perceived, viz. as entailing the existence over some time.[171]

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and given the reading *samalanirmalānityatā* which is attested in MAVBh 39,21, it is more likely that the correct reading is *samalāmalārtha* (or *samalanirmalārtha*).

[e] *gaṅ dus thams cad du de bźin du yod pa, de ni rtag pa ste/ de las bzlog pa ni mi rtag pa ste/ de dag tu go rims bźin no źes bya ba ni de la ...*

[f] *de ni rkyen las byuṅ ba daṅ ḥjig pa la rgyu med paḥi phyir ro//*

[g] *yoṅs su grub paḥi ṅo bo ñid mi ḥgyur baḥi chos yin du zin kyaṅ dri ma daṅ bcas pa daṅ dri ma med pa ñid kyi don gyi mtshan ñid glo bur gyi don mi rtag paḥo//*

[165] Si 47b4-7 (= Si_P p. 542): "Each [aspect] of the four [Truths] is endowed with the three natures. To start with, *anityatā* and so on (i.e. the other three aspects) of the Truth of Suffering have the three natures each. The three [natures] of *anityatā*: Firstly, the *anityatā* of the non-existence of an essence because forever an essence does not exist (i.e. the own-nature of conditioned entities is imagined and does not exist); secondly, the *anityatā* of origination and perishing because there is origination and destruction; thirdly, the *anityatā* of pollution and purification because the state changes."

[166] For the process of purification against the background of the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine, cf. SNS VI. 11.

[167] $MAVBh_N$ 39,20f (cf. n. 164): *trividhe mūlatattve trividhānityatā paridīpitā, asadarthānityatā, utpādabhaṅgānityatā, samalanirmalānityatā ca.*

[168] As can be witnessed here, in the development of the treatment of the impermanence of the *parinispannalakṣaṇa* the Hsien-yang reflects a more advanced stage than the MSABh and a less advanced stage than the MAV. Though not a decisive argument for the relative chronology of these texts, this observation confirms my impression (cf. n. 340) that the Hsien-yang is later than the MSABh, or, more precisely, than the material reproduced in this commentary.

[169] See in particular Hayashima 1988b, pp. 27-32 and Hayashima 1988c, pp. (422)-(421).

[170] Hayashima calls this "*santānānityatā*." For a critique of this usage, cf. n. 199.

[171] According to Hayashima (1988b, p. 28) the relationship between the *paratantralakṣaṇa* and the *parikalpitalakṣaṇa* in general (viz. the former is the ontological basis on which the latter is superimposed) also holds good between the momentariness and the conventional impermanence. Thus by the analysis of momentariness on the grounds of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine it can be explained how on the basis of

Contrary to this interpretation, I understand that the vital function of the application of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine to *anityatā* is to be seen in the coordination of the conventional understanding of *anityatā* as impermanence with the Mahāyāna interpretation of *anityatā* as non-existence (*anitya = nityam asat*). These two seemingly contradictory interpretations of *anityatā* are brought into accordance with each other by relating *anityatā* in the common sense of impermanence to the dependently originated mark, and by applying the interpretation in terms of non-existence to the purely imaginary aspect, that is, as the BoBh (cf. § I.D.2.3.1) and the Hsien-yang (cf. appendix, § 1.4) clearly state, to the supposed own-being of things, and not, as Hayashima seems to hold (1988b, diagram on p. 31), to their supposed duration. The question whether this *anityatā* of the *paratantralakṣaṇa* is to be understood in its radical form as momentariness or in its conventional form (i.e. as related to existence over a span of time) is an issue upon which the application of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine has no bearing. All that happens under the terms of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine is that *anityatā* in the traditional sense of non-permanence is identified with the *paratantralakṣaṇa*. Whether this non-permanence is conceived in terms of momentariness or not is secondary and not dependent upon the treatment of *anityatā* on the basis of the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine.

It is clearly documented in the Hsien-yang that the interpretation of *anityatā* according to the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine does not necessarily imply the theory of momentariness. Here it is stated that "the meanings of *anityatā* other [than non-existence] are to be understood in relation to the characteristic of dependent origination (*paratantralakṣaṇa*)." This refers to the other five, (if not to the other thirteen) forms of *anityatā*, viz. destruction, transformation and loss as well as the immediate present and the future *anityatā* (see § I.D.3.1). These forms (with the exception of the *anityatā* of the moment, if also the eight forms of *anityatā* of the second list is in view in the Hsien-yang) do not entail the momentariness, though they could of course be artificially understood to do so. Now, if it was intrinsic to the application of *anityatā* to the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine that the *paratantralakṣaṇa* corresponds to momentariness, the Hsien-yang should have specified that, contrary to appearance, the "other forms of *anityatā*" are all to be understood in terms of momentariness. In the absence of such an explanation one should not, as Hayashima seems to do (1988b, p. 28,7ff; 1988c, p. 422), resort to other texts (notably the MAV) where the *paratantralakṣaṇa* is supposedly set forth in terms of momentariness.[172]

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momentary entities ordinarily duration for some time is construed.

Cf. the fifth point of Hayashima's summary (1988b, p. 32) of the Hsien-yang where the *kṣaṇānityatā* and *santānānityatā* are said to be causally related insofar as they are respectively the *paratantra-* and *parikalpitalakṣaṇa*.

[172] Hayashima claims (1988b, p. 28) that the understanding of *anityatā* with regard to the *parikalpitalakṣaṇa* and the *parinispannalakṣaṇa* are identical in the Hsien-yang and MAV and that hence the *paratantralakṣaṇa* in the Hsien-yang may be understood according to the MAV. Such an approach is precarious. Before resorting to other texts (whatever their relationship to the text considered may be) the text in question should, as far as possible, be understood on its own merits. In the given case, the teaching that all forms of *anityatā* but that of non-existence are subsumed under the *paratantralakṣaṇa* clearly suggests that the *anityatā* in the conventional sense of impermanence is correlated with the *paratantralakṣaṇa* irrespective of whether it is understood in terms of momentariness or not. By contrast,

Furthermore, reference may be made to the MAVBh in order to show that the understanding of the *anityatā* in terms of the *paratantralakṣaṇa* is not inherently linked to the issue of momentariness. Both texts refer to the *anityatā* in the conventional sense of impermanence as consisting in origination and destruction, without specifying that they occur at every moment (cf. n. 164). Again, such a specification would not be missing, if it had been essential for the incorporation of the *anityatā* under the *trisvabhāva* scheme that the *paratantralakṣaṇa* is *anitya* in the sense of momentariness.[173]

To be sure, I am not contesting that in the Hsien-yang and MAV(Bh) the *paratantralakṣaṇa* should ultimately refer to momentariness for it is beyond doubt that these texts subscribe to the doctrine that all conditioned entities do not last for longer than a moment. The point I am trying to make is that in the immediate context of the application of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine to *anityatā*, the question whether the impermanence of the *paratantralakṣaṇa* is to be understood in terms of momentariness or not, is not addressed at all. This shows that for the purpose of coordinating the *trisvabhāva* doctrine with *anityatā*, it is sufficient to correlate the *paratantralakṣaṇa* with *anityatā* in the sense of impermanence, and that the issue of momentariness has no bearing at all in this context.

§ 2.4 **2.4.1** As argued in the preceding discussion, in the Yogācāra tradition associated with Maitreya and Asaṅga the conflict between the doctrine of *anityatā* and the denial of substantially existing entities was solved by the application of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine to the analysis of *anityatā*. Before passing on to the Abhidharmic treatment of *anityatā* within this tradition, I like to consider some other approaches adopted in the face of this conflict. As we have already seen, in the AkṣM the characterization of entities as "*anitya*" is adapted to the highest truth by interpreting "*anitya*" to mean "non-existent," while rejecting the traditional meaning of *anitya* as "impermanent." In the MPPU, by contrast, *anityatā* is not reinterpreted

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the interpretation of this passage in accordance with the MSA and MAVṬ raises problems (e.g. how the *anityatā* of separation is to be understood in terms of momentariness) and does to my mind only distort the original import of the passage under consideration.

Besides, Hayashima seems to overlook that it is not in the MAV or MAVBh but only in the much later MAVṬ by Sthiramati that the origination and destruction of the *paratantralakṣaṇa* are specified to take place at every moment. Furthermore, the teaching of the Hsien-yang and MAV with regard to the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* do not, as Hayashima presupposes (ibid.), accord completely. Whereas the Hsien-yang states that none of the meanings of *anityatā* applies to the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*, the MAV (cf. n. 164) concedes that the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*, though in reality not affected by *anityatā*, can be said to be *anitya* in the spurious sense that it is subject to change insofar as it underlies the process of purification from the accidental impurities.

[173] Likewise, in the extract from the BoBh quoted above (n. 159), it is set forth that if *anityatā* cannot be grasped in the sense that all entities are forever without an expressible nature (*abhilāpyasvabhāva*), then their rise and fall is to be contemplated upon. It is at this point not specified whether the rise and fall take place at every moment or only at the beginning and end of a certain stretch of time. Only the subsequent instruction how the rise and fall are to be envisaged reveals that it is to be understood in terms of momentariness. Thus also here it is of no immediate relevance whether the rise and fall of the *saṃskāras* takes place at every moment or not.

but instead dismissed on the level of *śūnyatā* (see below). Likewise in the BCA, the doctrine of momentariness is dismissed on the level of highest truth and only accepted on the level of conventional truth.[174] This dismissal of momentariness (or, less specific, of *anityatā* in the conventional sense of impermanence) on the level of highest truth is equivalent to the Yogācāras' correlation of momentariness with the *paratantralakṣaṇa* and their denial that the *parinispannalakṣaṇa* is in any but a spurious sense *anitya*.

2.4.2 The BCA (kā IX.2) stratifies the conventional truth, differentiating between the level of ordinary folk and yogins. The realization of momentariness obviously corresponds to the conventional level of Yogins (so BCA IX.8ab cited in n. 427). Similarly, in MPPU 372b19-24 (cited in n. 425, 229c3f quoted in n. 198) two forms of *anityatā* are distinguished below the level of highest truth, one form correlating *anityatā* to existence over a span of time, the other form correlating it to every moment. One should contemplate the former form at the beginning of the Buddhist path so as to become disgusted with common existence and thus strengthen the desire for emancipation. The latter form is employed in the MPPU as a "gate to *śūnyatā*," that is as a tool leading up to the realization of *śūnyatā*. This function entails that the doctrine of momentariness is, despite its ultimate dismissal, taught in such a way that it accords with the conception of *śūnyatā* as far as possible. This can be witnessed in the following passage (222c1-15, $MPPU_L$ 1376f):

> "To ponder *anityatā* is nothing but pondering the causes and conditions of *śūnyatā*. Contemplating that matter (*rūpa*) is *anitya* at every moment, one understands that it is empty.
>
> Since past matter (*rūpa*) has perished and cannot be seen, it does not have the characteristic of matter (*rūpa* is characterized by visibility). Since future matter has not yet arisen, is devoid of action and function and [hence] cannot be seen, it does not have the characteristic of matter. Since also present matter, being devoid of endurance, cannot be seen and cannot be discerned, it does not have the characteristic of matter. And not having the characteristic of matter, it is empty (*śūnya*). ...
>
> Question: Since past and future matter cannot be seen they lack the characteristic of matter. [But] the present matter can be seen when it abides. [So] why is it said that it lacks the characteristic of matter?
>
> Answer: Also the present matter does not have any time to endure. ... The marks of origination and destruction always stick to the conditioned factors so that they do not have any time to endure. If they did have such a time, then they would have neither origination nor destruction. Therefore, the present matter is devoid of any duration."[175]

[174] $BCAP_V$ 181,28f, $BCAP_P$ 376,18-377,1: "'In reality they (i.e. entities, *bhāva*) are not momentary' (= BCA IX.7c): In reality, that is on the level of the highest truth, they are also not (i.e. as they are not *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, *dhātus*) momentary because they do not have an own-being." (***tattvataḥ kṣaṇikā naita iti*** *tattvataḥ paramārthato niḥsvabhāvatvāt kṣaṇikā api na bhavanti*.)

[175] Cf. MPPU 200a22-b4 (cited in n. 417) where the same argument is applied to mental states, in order to demonstrate that they are devoid of anything that could be the object of desires.

Instead of posing a hindrance to the realization of *śūnyatā* by affirming the substantial existence of conditioned entities, the doctrine of momentariness harmonizes here with the position of *śūnyatā*. According to the radical conception of momentariness espoused by the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, conditioned entities perish immediately after they have originated and are thus without duration. On the basis of this understanding of momentariness, the MPPU advances its claim that conditioned entities are devoid of duration. However, while under the terms of the radical doctrine of momentariness the entities are without duration in as much as they pass in and out of existence without pausing in between, the MPPU equates the denial of the duration of conditioned entities with the denial of their existence.[176]

This approach is not an expression of scholastic sophistry, but reflects how the doctrine of momentariness may be employed in a spiritual context to undermine the substantial existence of conditioned entities. By reducing the duration of momentary entities to such an extreme that it entails the denial of any duration including the time taken for coming into being and vanishing, the entire existence may be effaced. In other words, the reduction of the moment to a point-instant may be carried so far that the point itself becomes erased, too. In precisely this sense, the doctrine of momentariness functions as a gate to *śūnyatā* (cf. also MPPU 290c2-6, MPPU_L 2093).

2.4.3 It can also be witnessed in the Paramārthagāthās how the radical conception of momentariness (PG 5ab, 8cd, 9cd) may be applied to undermine existence rather than to affirm it.[177] As mentioned above (§ I.C.7), on the basis of the position that conditioned entities are devoid of duration (*asthira*), their activity is in PG 5 identified with their very origination (*bhūti*). This position that entities do not have activity, but that their origination constitutes activity, entails that there is no subject of action at all.[178] Thus it is taught that the sense organs do not perceive their respective objects (PG 6-7),[179] and similarly (PG 39-

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[176] The same stance is documented in Śrīgupta's (7th century according to Seyfort-Ruegg 1981, p.67) Tattvāvatāravṛtti (P. 5292 ha 45b8-46a1): "As for [the question]: 'Given that in truth no entities exist, on what should momentariness be based?,' [the position is:] Considering that things are in truth non-existent, instantaneous destruction consists merely in the non-existence of duration." (*yaṅ dag par na dṅos med par// skad cig pa ñid ci la brten// de ltar na dṅos po rnams yaṅ dag par med pa yin na/ skad cig la hjig pa ñid gnas pa med pa kho naḥo//*)
This argumentation derives some of its plausibility from the ambiguity of √*sthā* which not only means "to abide," "to endure" but also "to exist," "to be present" (cf. MW, s.v. *sthā*).

[177] It has to be borne in mind that the Paramārthagāthās are an anthology of stanzas and as such may not be mistaken as the coherent exposition of a specific doctrinal position. Thus, the following observations do not apply to the Paramārthagāthas as a homogenous text but to some of the individual gāthās included in this anthology.

[178] Cf. PG 5cd where the action and the subject of action are identified as two different aspects of the existence of conditioned entities. See the commentary translated in n. 143.

[179] PG 6 and 7: "Neither does the eye see the visible (*rūpa*), nor does the ear hear sound, nor does the nose smell odor, nor can the tongue taste flavour, nor does the body feel touch, nor can the mind conceive mental objects (*dharma*). These [sense organs] do not have a governor; nor is there an inciter [impelling them]." (*cakṣuḥ paśyati no rūpaṃ, śrotraṃ śabdam śṛṇoti na/[a] ghrāṇaṃ jighrati no gandhān,[a]*

41) that there is no agent or subject that undergoes the process of liberation from the defilements (*kleśa*).[180] Along these lines, the doctrine of momentariness serves in the Paramārthagāthas as an instrument that decomposes the seeming unit constituted by a sentient being in a succession of discrete entities or events, and thereby stresses the non-existence of a Self.

Insofar as this approach is also adopted with respect to conditioned entities in general (besides PG 5, cf. PG 8ab and 9ab[181]), the doctrine of momentariness is used to dissolve the existence of all things as they are ordinarily perceived by reducing them to a succession of momentary entities which can ultimately be reduced to acts of origination (cf. § I.C.7). In this sense, the doctrine of momentariness undermines the substantial existence of phenomena,

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jihvā nāsvādayed rasān[a]//6// kāya<ḥ>[a] spṛśati na sparsān,[a] mano dharmān na kalpayet/ nāsti caiṣām adhiṣṭhatā prerako vidyate na ca//7//).

[a] Emendations in accordance with the manuscripts. Cf. Schmithausen 1987, n. 1394.

[180] PG 39-41 (translation by Schmithausen 1987, p. 233): "Defiled mind, of course (*hi*), is [something] that arises and ceases each time together with the Defilements. For it, liberation from the Defilements has [therefore] neither [already] happened nor will it [ever] happen (kā 39).

[For it is] not that this [very same defiled mind] arises afterwards as a pure one, but [rather what] arises [afterwards is] another mind [which is pure]. And [it is] this other mind, that, although it had] not been defiled before, is called 'liberated' from Defilements (kā 40).

That which is defiled is, in this [system], absolutely [defiled]; [what is] pure is radiant by nature. And [thus (?) there is], in this [system], no [person or even dharma which] is purified, nor is [he/it, *a fortiori*,] purified from anything. (kā 41)" (*sahotpannaniruddhaṃ hi kleśaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ sadā/ kleśebhyas tasya nirmokṣo na bhūto na bhaviṣyati//39// na tad utpadyate paścāc chuddham anyat tu jāyate/ tac ca pūrvam asaṃkliṣṭaṃ kleśebhyo muktam ucyate//40// yat kliṣṭaṃ tad ihātyantāc chuddhaṃ prakṛtibhāsvaraṃ/ na ceha śudhyate kaścit kutaścid vāpi śudhyate//41//*; text cited according to Schmithausen 1987, p.232; cf. also Sakuma 1990, pp. 51-55.)

Cf. TSi 278b21 where it is also taught that the impure mind cannot become pure so that purification implies the substitution of a defiled mind by a pure one.

[181] PG 8 and 9: "It is not the case that someone else produces it; nor is it the case that it arises by itself. [Rather,] dependently entities (*bhāva*) arise ever anew without getting old.
It is not the case that someone else destroys it, nor is it the case that it perishes by itself.[a] [Rather,] when the conditions are given, [entities] arise and having arisen they are susceptible to destruction on account of their own nature." (*na paro janayaty enaṃ svayaṃ naiva[b] ca jāyate/ pratītya bhāvā jāyante niṣpurāṇā navā navā<ḥ>[c]//8// na paro nāśayaty enaṃ svayaṃ nāpi ca naśyati/ pratyaye sati jāyante jātāḥ svarasabhaṅgurāḥ//9//*)

[a] As taught in the c- and d-*pāda*, destruction is dependent upon being originated and occurs on account of the own nature of the perishing entity. In this sense, it is negated in the b-*pāda* that things perish by themselves, that is, without any reason. Cf. the commentary p. 342,10f: *kiṃ* (*anusvāra* confirmed by the mansucript) *yathā pratītya jāyante, tathā pratītya vinaśyantīty āha*: **pratyaye sati jāyante jātāḥ svarasabhaṅgurāḥ**. The emendation of the text is confirmed by the Tibetan (P. 5536 dsi 239a6) and Chinese (T 1579 364c1f) translations.

[b] In analogy with PG 9, the b-*pāda* should read "*nāpi*" instead of "*naiva*." This emendation is supported by the Chinese (T 1579 363b2) and Tibetan (P. 5536 dsi 236a4f: *bdag ñid kyaṅ ni mi skye ste/*) translations, as well as by the *pratīka* in the commentary which seems to read "*vāpi*." However, as for the *gāthā* both manuscripts read "*naiva*."

[c] The *visarga* is missing in both manuscripts.

though without effacing them completely.

In the Paramārthagāthās in question, the existence of momentary conditioned entities is (albeit in a very reduced form) accepted on the level of highest truth — after all they are collected as "Stanzas of the Highest Truth" (= Paramārthagāthā). As we have seen, in the MPPU, by contrast, *anityatā*, more specifically momentariness, functions explicitly as a **gate** to *śūnyatā* and accordingly is discarded once this gate has been entered, i.e. on the level of *śūnyatā*. This step is substantiated by the argumentation that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are incoherent because they can neither discharge their respective function one after another within one moment (they are incompatible and there is no mechanism accounting for the succession in which they function; cf. MPPU 171b6-11, $MPPU_L$ 922), nor over a longer period of time (cf. MPPU 60b17-28, $MPPU_L$ 36-38). The function of momentariness as a gate to *śūnyatā* and its subsequent dismissal on the level of *śūnyatā* in this way may be documented by the following passage (MPPU 229b14-22, $MPPU_L$ 1436):[182]

> "Question: Which is the complete notion of *anityatā*?
> Answer: To see the conditioned entities arising and perishing in every moment as dust blown by the wind, as water flowing from the mountain, as flames fading away one after another. All conditioned entities are devoid of solidity, devoid of energy; they can neither be grasped nor be clung to. As illusions, they deceive fools. Due to this *anityatā* one obtains entry into the gate of *śūnyatā*. Since in this *śūnyatā* no phenomena (*dharma*) at all are to be found, also *anityatā* is not to be found. How is that? The marks of origination, of duration and of destruction cannot be found (= do not occur) in one single moment. At the time of origination, duration and destruction are not found to exist. At the time of duration, origination and destruction are not found to exist. At the time of destruction, origination and duration are not found to exist. Since the marks of origination, of duration and of destruction are by nature incompatible, they do not exist [at all]. Due to their non-existence, *anityatā*, too, does not exist."

2.5 In contrast to the MPPU, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (henceforth: LAS), a sūtra of the Yogācāra tradition which stands apart from the Asaṅga/Maitreya tradition, treats the doctrine of momentariness as an obstacle to the realization of insight which needs to be eliminated. Thus it ridicules this doctrine as the doctrine of fools and — besides the completely arbitrary re-definition of "*kṣaṇika*" in kā VI.10 — no attempt is undertaken to reconcile it with the ontology of the Mahāyāna.[183]

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[182] Cf. also MPPU 171a28-171b15 (= $MPPU_L$ 920-923) where the entrance into *śūnyatā* by means of the contemplation of *anityatā* is depicted similarly.

[183] LAS VI.9-11ab (VI.9-10 = X.116-117): "Fools consider conditioned entities to be empty, impermanent [and] momentary. What 'momentary' means they conceive by way of example with the river (illustrates the illusion of identity), the flame (exemplifies a momentary entity) and the seed (exemplifies the formation of series by the origination of subsequent entities).(kā VI.9).
The momentary is without activity, devoid [of an own-being] (*vivikta*), free of action, and the phenomena (*dharma*) are without origination. [This] I call the meaning of 'momentary.' (kā VI.10).
Verily, I do not teach the fools (who propound this) the destruction immediately after origination (i.e.

Without going into details of the difficult stanzas VI.11cd-14 (= X.823-825), it may be said that the doctrine of momentariness is firstly rejected because it implies the existence of outer objects while in reality only streams of mental events exist. Secondly, even on a conventional level where the existence of outer objects is taken for granted, the theory of momentariness is not accepted insofar as certain precious entities (e.g. the relics of the Buddha, gold as well as spiritual accomplishments such as the perfection of knowledge) are held not to be momentary since this would infringe upon their excellence.[184] Similarly, in the prose portion the *ālayavijñāna* is said to be non-momentary insofar as it is pervaded by undefiled factors.[185] This critical attitude towards the doctrine of momentariness is not only at odds

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ordinary momentariness).(kā VI.11ab)." (*śūnyam anityaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ bālāḥ kalpenti saṃskṛtam/ nadīdīpabījadṛṣṭāntaiḥ kṣaṇikārtho vikalpyate//9// nirvyāpāraṃ kṣaṇikaṃ viviktaṃ kriyāvarjitam/*[a] *anutpattiś*[b] *ca dharmāṇāṃ kṣaṇikārthaṃ vadāmy aham//10// utpattyanantaraṃ bhaṅgaṃ na vai deśemi bāliśān/11ab*).

[a] LAS VI.10 reads "*kṣayavarjitam.*" The reading "*kriyāvarjitam*" has been adopted from kā X.117. This is confirmed by the Tibetan translation of kā VI.10 (P. 775 ṅu 165a2); neither of the Chinese translations (T 671 560a27f, T 672 622a14f) render "*kṣayavarjita.*"

[b] LAS X.117 reads "*anutpattiṃ.*"

[c] It is possible to construe the c-*pāda* of kā 11 "*nairantaryena bhāvānāṃ*" with the a- and b-*pāda*: "Verily, I do not teach the fools that the things (*bhāva*) undergo destruction without interval immediately after origination."

[184] LAS VI.15-16 (= X.826-827): "The absorptions of yogins, gold, the relics of the Victors (i.e. Buddhas) and the heavenly palaces of the radiant [deities] (*ābhāsvara*)[a] cannot be destroyed by a worldly cause. (kā 15)
Verily, how can the permanent things (i.e. gold etc.) and the entities of [spiritual] accomplishment, the attainment of the knowledge of the Buddhas, monkshood, the attainment of insight (?)[b] be regarded as momentary? (kā16)" (*yogināṃ hi samāpattiḥ suvarṇaṃ*[c] *jinadhātavaḥ/ ābhāsvaravimānāś*[d] *ca abhedyā lokakāraṇāt//15// sthitayaḥ prāptidharmāś ca buddhānāṃ jñānasaṃpadaḥ/ bhikṣutvaṃ samayaprāptir*[b] *dṛṣṭā vai kṣaṇikāḥ katham//16//*).

[a] In the realm of the *ābhāsvara*-deities, sentient beings sojourn between the destruction of the world and its subsequent re-creation (cf. BHSD, s.v. *ābhāsvara*).

[b] The standard meanings of *samaya* (meeting, agreement, occasion etc.; cf. Monier Williams, s.v.) do not fit the current context. The translation proposed here presumes that "*samaya*" stands for "*abhisamaya*" (i.e. insight) which will have been shortened for metric reasons. The Tibetan translation (P. ṅu 165a5) which reads "*śes thob rnams*" (=attainment of knowledge) seems to corroborate this interpretation of *samaya*. Moreover, in favour of this solution the following extract (p. 236,10-12) from the corresponding prose portion (p. 236,9-15) may be adduced: *yadi punar Mahāmate abhisamayaprāptiḥ kṣaṇikaḥ syād, anāryatvam āryāṇāṃ syān, na cānāryatvāṃ āryāṇāṃ bhavati.*
However, the Chinese translation by Bodhiruci (T 671, 560b11) translates "the attainment of sameness" which may render *samatāprāpti* ("the attainment of [realizing] the sameness [of all living beings]"). Thus, the reading "*samayaprāpti*" may, despite its confirmation by the prose passage and the Tibetan translation, be secondary and should possibly be emended to "*samatāprāptir.*"

[c] LAS X.826 reads *suvarṇajinadhātavaḥ*.

[d] LAS X.826 reads *ābhāsvaravimānāni*.

[185] LAS 235,15-236,4: "This [non-sensory cognition (*manovijñāna*)] that does not endure [beyond] the time of a moment I call 'momentary' (*kṣaṇika*). Besides, momentary is, oh Mahāmati, the *ālayavijñāna*, which is [also] called '*tathāgatagarbha*;' connected with the mind (*manas*, here the seventh form of consciousness consisting in the notion of 'I' and 'mine'), it (i.e. the *ālayavijñāna*) is momentary

with the MPPU but also with the Yogācāra tradition associated with Maitreya and Asaṅga where the contemplation of momentariness is clearly assigned the function of a preparatory exercise for the attainment of emancipation (cf. § I.D.3.4).

3 **3.1** After it has been examined how the doctrine of momentariness was treated against the background of Mahāyāna ontology, it will be shown in the remaining part of this chapter how this doctrine was dealt with in the Abhidharmic sections of the early Yogācāra tradition. In these sections, *anityatā* is analyzed by distinguishing various forms or instances of *anityatā* for meditative purposes. The oldest list of *anityatās* can be found in ŚrBh 472-489 where five kinds of *anityatā* are identified, namely the *anityatās* in the form of 1) transformation (*vipariṇāmākāra*, pp. 474-485), 2) of destruction (*vināśākāra*, pp. 485-488), 3) of loss (*visaṃyogākāra*, p. 488), and 4) the *anityatā* consisting in [the fact that perishing is] the inevitable destiny (i.e. the *anityatā* to come in the future; *dharmatākāra*, p. 488f) and the *anityatā* 5) which is [experienced in the] immediate present (*saṃnihitākāra*, p. 489).

The VinSg (Y_C 586c11-18, Y_T P. zi 24a8-b4) takes over this list from the ŚrBh and adds to it a further form, namely the *anityatā* of origination, which refers to the fact that conditioned entities are also in that sense impermanent that they originate at a certain point of time and hence have not always existed in the past.[186] In contrast to the ŚrBh which, characteristic for its Śrāvaka position, ignores the Mahāyāna interpretation of *anityatā*, the VinSg (Y_C 672b2-4) in another passage juxtaposes the understanding of *anityatā* in the sense of non-existence with the traditional understanding of *anityatā* underlying the list discussed so far:

> "Furthermore, under two aspects the meaning of *anityatā* is explicated: Firstly, under the aspect of the Mahāyāna doctrine; secondly, under the aspect of the Śrāvakayāna

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because of the impressions (*vāsanā*) of the *pravṛttivijñānas* (i.e. the five ordinary forms of consciousness and the mind manifesting themselves in cognitive acts); because of the undefiled impressions (*anāsravavāsanā*) it (i.e. the *ālayavijñāna*) is non-momentary. But the foolish common people are attached to the doctrine of momentariness and do not realize this momentariness and non-momentariness of all phenomena. Because they do not realize this, they even do away with the unconditioned entities by their position of utter destruction (*ucchedadṛṣṭi*)." (*kṣaṇakālānavasthāyi tat kṣaṇikam iti vadāmi. kṣaṇikaṃ punar Mahāmate ālayavijñānaṃ tathāgatagarbha[ḥ]saṃśabditaṃ*[a] *manaḥsahitaṃ pravṛttivijñānavāsanābhiḥ kṣaṇikam, anāsravavāsanābhir akṣaṇikam. na ca bālapṛthagjanā avabudhyante kṣaṇikavādābhiniviṣṭāḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatām imāṃ sarvadharmāṇāṃ*<.> *tadanavabodhād ucchedadṛṣṭyāsaṃskṛtān api dharmān nāśayiṣyanti.*)

[a] Cf. LAS 235,7f: *tathāgatagarbha ālayavijñānasaṃśabdito.*

[186] $VinSg_C$ 586c13f(corresponds to VinSg P. zi 24b2): "Insofar as all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are [first] not yet existing and [then] presently existing, one says: 'impermanence constituted [by being subject to] origination.'"
This form of *anityatā* is not to be found in any other classification of the various forms of *anityatā* known to me, and is even missing in Paramārtha's version of the VinSg (T 1584 1024a5-12). It features, however, in the San-wu-hsing-lun when *anityatā* is examined on the basis of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine.[a] Also the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas differentiate between the non-existence before and after existence (cf. Schayer 1938, p. 20).

[a] San-wu-hsing-lun (T 1617) 872b15: "If non-existence before and non-existence after [existence] are defined as *anityatā*, then this is conventionally true (*saṃvṛtisat*)." Cf. n. 161.

doctrine. That is to say, [*anityatā* is explicated respectively] in the sense of non-existence and in the sense of destruction of the own being [of conditioned entities]."

The Hsien-yang (cf. appendix, § 1.2) went a step further than this juxtaposition and added the interpretation of *anityatā* in the sense of non-existence to the list of five *anityatās* which it either took over directly from the ŚrBh (from which it also took over the treatment of the *anityatā* of transformation), or, less likely, which it adapted from the VinSg by discarding the impermanence of origination. Side by side with this list of six *anityatās* that thus result,[187] the Hsien-yang (ibid.) presents a further list composed of eight different kinds of *anityatā*, to wit: "1) the kind belonging to the moment (*kṣaṇa*), 2) the kind belonging to the continuum (*santāna*), 3) the kind constituted by illness, 4) the kind constituted by age, 5) the kind constituted by death, 6) the kind affecting the [fluctuating] mind, 7) the kind affecting the [periodically destroyed] insentient world, 8) the kind affecting the [sooner or later perishing] objects of enjoyment." As will be seen, this second list does not supplement the first list, but rather presents a rival way of differentiating *anityatā*. Hence it is likely that this second list, too, has been taken over from another source, which, however, I could not trace.

The AS[188] went yet a step further and merged the two lists from the Hsien-yang. The list of six *anityatās* headed by the *anityatā* of non-existence was taken over without any changes. To this list, the second list of eight *anityatās* was added. This second list was reduced to six members by taking the *anityatā* of illness, of old age and of death to constitute one form of *anityatā* so that a list of twelve members resulted, viz. the *anityatā* 1) of non-existence (*asallakṣaṇa*), 2) of destruction (*vināśalakṣaṇa*), 3) of transformation (*vipariṇatilakṣaṇa*), 4) of loss (*viyogalakṣaṇa*), 5) the immediate present *anityatā* (*sannihitalakṣaṇa*), the *anityatā* 6) of the inherent nature (i.e. the *anityatā* to come in the future; *dharmatālakṣaṇa*), 7) of the moment (*kṣaṇalakṣaṇa*), 8) of the series (*prabandhalakṣaṇa*), 9) of illness, old age and death (*vyādijarāmaraṇalakṣaṇa*), 10) of the various forms of mental activity (*cittacitrākāravṛttilakṣaṇa*), 11) of the ruin of worldly riches (*bhogasaṃpattivipattilakṣaṇa*), and 12) of the dissolution and evolution of the material world (*bhājanalokasaṃvarttavivarttalakṣaṇa*).[189]

3.2 As can be witnessed here, the lists of *anityatā* are subject to constant modification and, as the addition of the *anityatā* of non-existence shows, are flexible enough a scheme to absorb new doctrinal developments. In this light it may be assumed that also the list of five *anityatās* as it is found in the ŚrBh and the list of eight *anityatās* as it appears in the Hsien-yang have

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[187] The six forms of *anityatā* are: the *anityatā* 1) of non-existence, 2) of destruction, 3) of transformation, 4) of loss, 5) the immediately present *anityatā*, 6) the future *anityatā*.

[188] AS p. 38,14-39,21 (reconstructed), P. li 89a4-90a4, D. ri 75b1-76a6; T 1605 674c4-675a9, ASBh hereon p. 50f, P. śi 45b1-46a8, D. li 36a3-36b7, T 1606 720a5-b26.

[189] There can be no doubt that the list in the AS results from the combination of the two lists that are presented in the Hsien-yang, which in turn is based on Y. While it cannot be excluded that the AS is not directly based on the Hsien-yang but on a third unidentified source, it is hardly conceivable that the Hsien-yang is based upon the AS. Thus, the comparison of the lists in the the Hsien-yang and AS strongly suggests that the AS builds upon the Hsien-yang rather than the other way around.

gradually evolved and are not homogeneous. As for the list of five *anityatās*, the core may have been constituted by the *anityatā* of destruction, of transformation and of loss which, in this sequence, represent the three most striking ways of being affected by *anityatā*, viz. by destruction (corresponds to the *anityatā* of death), by decay (corresponds to the *anityatā* of old age and illness) and by loss (corresponds to the *anityatā* of the ruin of worldly riches). In the list of eight *anityatās*, the core may have been constituted by the *anityatā* of illness, the *anityatā* of old age and the *anityatā* of death. The sequence here concurs with the sequence in which the Buddha was confronted by these forms of *anityatā* when he left his palace for the first time. As will be seen, according to this hypothesis the core of the shorter list refers to both animate and inanimate entities, whereas the core of the longer list refers exclusively to sentient beings. This reflects the fact that the list of eight *anityatās* is more differentiated and refers to non-sentient objects separately as the *anityatā* relating to the material universe (No. 7) and as the *anityatā* referring to objects of enjoyment (No. 8).

3.3 The understanding of *anityatā* underlying the core of both lists is clearly very old and does not in any way reflect the conception of momentariness. This called for a modification of these lists in order to account for the Yogācāras' stance that all conditioned entities are momentary.

In the ŚrBh this modification was effected by the interpretation of the *anityatā* of destruction in terms of momentariness.[190] Since the conception of momentariness is only superimposed at this point[191] — transformation and loss require that impermanence is viewed over some time, and the future and presently perceived forms of *anityatā* (No. 4 and 5) only specify the temporal location and not the nature of *anityatā* — the list effectively operates with two different conceptions of *anityatā*, one relating impermanence to an extended period, the other to every moment. There is, however, no open doctrinal conflict between these two

[190] The treatment of momentariness in the ŚrBh follows upon the exposition of the various forms of transformation and their causes. Insofar as the origination and destruction of conditioned entities at every moment is dealt with as the constantly ongoing process underlying phenomenal change, this treatment still appertains to the explication of the *anityatā* of transformation. This identification of transformation with momentariness accords with Vi 503a14-16 (= Vi_2 369b,3-5; quoted in n. 196), where it is specified that transformation refers to momentariness while destruction refers to the cessation of extended existence (i.e. to impermanence in the conventional sense). However, since there is besides the treatment of momentariness no passage that could refer to the *anityatā* of destruction — the conventional forms of destruction (i.e. the destruction of series by burning etc.) are treated as forms of transformation —, there can be little doubt that the momentariness as such is identified with the *anityatā* of destruction. Possibly it is not explicitly stated whether the treatment of momentariness still belongs to the treatment of the *anityatā* of transformation or refers already to the *anityatā* of destruction, because the momentariness refers both to the *anityatā* of transformation (it explicates the mechanism of change) and to the *anityatā* of destruction (this *anityatā* is constituted by the destructions occuring at every moment).

[191] That this form of *anityatā* was initially not understood in terms of momentariness follows among other things from the fact that in all other sources where this form of *anityatā* is enumerated, viz. in the VinSg, Hsien-yang and AS, there is no indication at all that the destructions referred to should take place at every moment.

conceptions of *anityatā*, because the contemplation of transformation and of separation (i.e. loss) are reconciled in the ŚrBh with the doctrine of momentariness by depicting transformation and separation as the alteration of states and not as processes undergone by enduring entities.

As for the longer list, the *anityatā* of the moment was added to this list — possibly because, in contrast to the shorter list, none of its members was suited to be interpreted in terms of momentariness — as a new form of *anityatā* in order to account for the doctrine of momentariness, just as the incorporation of the *anityatā* of non-existence in the shorter list accommodates the Mahāyāna interpretation of *anityatā*. As the counterpart of the *anityatā* of the moment, the *anityatā* of the series was added.

As follows from the explication in the AS, the impermanence of the series (*prabandhānityatā*) does not refer to the cessation of the series, i.e. to the operation of impermanence as viewed over a span of time. By contrast, it refers to the fact that, as long as it is not liberated from the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*), the series constituting sentient beings incessantly moves from one existence to the next and does **not** come to a standstill.[192] Thus the *prabandhānityatā* is ultimately identical with what is called *prabandhena nityatā* (permanence in the sense of succession) in other sources.[193] It differs from this form of permanence only insofar as the stress is not laid on the non-cessation of the series within *saṃsāra*, but on its fluctuating and in this sense impermanent mode of existence (*ājavaṃjavībhāvena vṛtti*). This form of *anityatā* has been included in order to counterbalance the detrimental effect which the realization that everything is subject to constant destruction may have (see below), namely when momentariness is wrongly understood to entail the complete disruption between the present and the past

[192] AS Ii 89a7f: "What is [*anityatā's*] character with respect to the series? That the series of arising conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) do not break off within the cycle of existence (*saṃsāra*), which is without a beginning." (*rgyun gyi mtshan ñid gaṅ źe na/ thog ma med paḥi dus kyi ḥdu byed rnams kyi skye baḥi rgyun mi ḥchad paḥo//*)
ASBh 50,16: "[*Anityatā's*] character with respect to the series is the occurence in a mode of restless moving to and fro within the *saṃsāra*, which is without a beginning." (*prabandhalakṣaṇam anādimati saṃsāre ājavaṃjavībhāvena vṛttiḥ.*)

[193] Cf.: — MSABh 46,12-15: "With regard to the three bodies, the permanence is to be known respectively in three ways. Hence the Tathāgatas are said to have permanent bodies. ... The [permanence is to be known] by way of succession (*prabandhena nityatā*), because when the supernaturally produced [body] disappears [at the time of death], again and again a [new] supernaturally produced [body] manifests itself." (*teṣu triṣu kāyeṣu yathākramaṃ trividhā nityatā veditavyā yena nityakāyas tathāgatā ucyante....prabandhena nairmāṇikasyāntardhāya punaḥ punar nirmāṇadarśanāt.*)
— Tāranātha: "gŹan stoṅ dbu maḥi sñiṅ po" in *Collected Works of Tāranātha*. Leh 1983-87, Vol. 4, p. 512,4-6: "Also the opinion that the meaning of 'permanent'[a] is 'permanent in the sense of succession' is incorrect. For permanent in the sense of succession are also the *saṃsāra* and everything grasped (*grāhya*) and grasping (*grāhaka*). Therefore, if 'permanent in the sense of succession' conveyed the full meaning of 'permanent,' then all conditioned entities would be permanent." (*rtag paḥi don rgyun gyi rtag pa la ḥdod paḥaṅ mi ḥthad de/ rgyun gyi rtag pa tsam ni ḥkhor ba daṅ gzuṅ ḥdzin kun yaṅ yin paḥi phyir daṅ/ rgyun gyi rtag pa tsam gyis rtag paḥi go chod na ḥdus byas thams cad kyaṅ rtag par ḥgyur ro//*).
[a] Taranātha discusses the eternal existence (*nityatā*) of the *tathāgatagarbha*.

and future so that any striving for emancipation becomes pointless.[194] The interpretation accords with the TSi which teaches that the view of momentariness guards against the erroneous view that things are eternal (*śāśvatavāda*), whereas the contemplation of series refers to the fact that objects arise in series (rather than isolated) and thereby stresses the continuity and thus ensures that the momentariness is not wrongly viewed as implying total destruction (*ucchedavāda*).[195]

While the *prabandhānityatā* (= *anityatā* of the series) does not refer to the cessation of series (i.e. to the operation of *anityatā* as viewed over a span of time), the remaining forms of *anityatā* of this list (viz. No. 3-8 in Hsien-yang or No. 9-12 in AS) clearly relate the impermanence to an extended period of time. Thus also the longer list operates with two conceptions of *anityatā*, one grasping it in terms of momentariness, the other in terms of extended existence. Such an approach can also be witnessed in other sources, such as the Vi,[196] the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (henceforth: SNS)[197] and the MPPU.[198] In these

[194] Note that by this interpretation of the *prabandhānityatā* it is avoided that the *anityatā* of the series overlaps with the *anityatā* of death, old age and illness, or with the *anityatā* of the material world or with the *anityatā* of objects of enjoyment, all of which already refer to series.

[195] TSi 317b16-18 (= 327b12f): "By practicing the middle path, the two extremes are destroyed. How is that? Seeing that the phenomena (*dharma*) arise in series (*santāna*), the view of utter discontinuity (*ucchedavāda*) is destroyed. Seeing that they perish from moment to moment, the view of eternity (*śāsvatavāda*) is destroyed."

Cf. Si 12c12-14: "From times with no beginning onwards, this consciousness (*vijñāna*) from moment to moment arises as a fruit and perishes as a cause. Because it arises as a fruit, it is not cut off; because it perishes as a cause, it is not eternal. Being neither cut off nor eternal is the principle of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)."

[196] Vi_2 148c15-17 (Vi 198c27f and 199a2): "Before (i.e. when dealt with in terms of momentariness) the marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) were explained on the basis of the highest truth (*paramārthasat*); now they are going to be explained on the basis of worldly truth (i.e. are correlated to an entire span of existence). Again, there are [some] who say: 'Before the *anityatā* relating to moments (*kṣaṇānityatā*) was explained; now the *anityatā* referring to one span of existence[a] is going to be explained.'" (Vi 199a2: "Before the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* of the moment have been explained; now the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* of the series are going to be explained.")
In Vi 198c28f, this difference is referred to also in the following way: "Before the subtle *saṃskṛtala-kṣaṇas* have been explained; now the gross *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are going to be explained."

Vi 503a14-16, Vi_2 369b3-5: "Question: What is the difference between transformation and destruction? Answer: Transformation indicates the subtle form of *anityatā*, destruction indicates the gross form of *anityatā*. Or rather, transformation indicates the *anityatā* of the moment (*kṣaṇānityatā*), destruction indicates the *anityatā* of one existence (*nikāyasabhāgānityatā*?; Vi_2: destruction is the *anityatā* at time of the body's death)."

Vi 772c15-17: "There is this position: The subtle *anityatā* (*sūkṣmānityatā*) is called "wane of the world" (**lokakṣaya*); the gross *anityatā* (*sthūlānityatā*) is called "wane of the *kalpa*" (i.e. of a very long cosmic period, **kalpakṣaya*). There is this position: The *anityatā* relating to moments (*kṣaṇānityatā*) is called **lokakṣaya*; the *anityatā* referring to one span of existence (*(eka)janmānityatā*?) is called **kalpakṣaya*."

[a] 一世無常 = (*eka-*)*adhvānityatā*?; cf. VisM XIII.114: *ekabhavaparicchinnaṃ pana addhā-paccuppannaṃ nāma.*

[197] SNS X.7 (cited in n. 368) juxtaposes momentariness (*skad cig ma ñid*) and gross *anityatā* (*mi rtag*

sources the *anityatā* operating at every moment is generally referred to as subtle (*sūkṣma*) or as the "*anityatā* of the moment" (*kṣaṇānityatā*), while the *anityatā* related to an extended stretch of time is referred to as gross (*sthūla*) or (if related to sentient beings) as the "*anityatā* of one span of existence" (*[eka]janma/adhva/nikāyasabhāga-anityatā*?) but, to my knowledge, never as *santāna/prabandhānityatā*.[199]

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pa rags pa ñid).
Cf. Ślokavārttika (Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa, kā 424 and 425, cited in n. 369) which, referring to the Buddhist deduction of momentariness from the eventual destruction of all things, juxtaposes subtle (= momentariness) and gross destruction (= *anityatā* viewed over an extended period of time).

[198] MPPU 229c3f (MPPU$_L$ 1437): "Furthermore, there are two ways of contemplating the notion of *anityatā*: 1) the death and destruction of the body, [and] 2) the constantly recurring origination and destruction." Cf. also MPPU 372b19-24 quoted in n. 425.

[199] Hayashima adopts the expression *santānānityatā* from the Hsien-yang (1988b, p. 8) in order to refer to the impermanence of temporally extended units. He uses this expression indiscriminately to relate to series (i.e. a succession of momentary entities which only forms a conceptual unit) or to selfsame entities. Thus, he refers both to the stance of the Vātsīputrīyas that material entities are not momentary (1988b, p. 10) and to the gross *anityatā* taught in the MPPU (cf. the citation of 372b29-24 in n. 425) as *santānānityatā* (1988b, p. 8 and p. 32). In the former case, one and the same entity (e.g. a mountain, the body, etc.) lasts over a certain stretch of time without undergoing destruction so that it is not acknowledged to be momentary. By contrast, in the latter case, the conception of duration over a stretch of time is not at odds with the momentariness of all entities. It is only attributed figuratively to a succession (*santāna*) of distinct and momentary entities.

As a matter of fact, in the first case the expression *santānānityatā* is a misnomer (at least if the compound is analyzed as "the impermanence of the continuum"). For, as a technical term for the series of momentary entities, the very concept of *santāna* entails the momentariness. Thus *santānānityatā* cannot refer to the uninterrupted duration of an entity identical with itself over a certain stretch of time. Even in the second case the usage of the term is problematic insofar as the equivalent expression *prabandhānityatā* is, as we have seen, not explicated in AS as referring to the annihilation of the continuum but rather to the very opposite, namely to its continuation within the circle of transmigration (*saṃsāra*) from beginningless time. Moreover, when differentiating in VisM XIII.111-114 between envisaging the present as a point instant (which cannot be perceived ordinarily), as a short while (the period ordinarily conceived of as present), or as an entire span of one existence, Buddhaghosa refers to the last form of present, which corresponds to what Hayashima means by *santānānityatā*, with the expression *addhāpaccuppanna* and not with the expression *santatipaccuppanna*, which he uses instead with respect to the second form of present. Instead of *santāna/prabandhānityatā*, the expression for referring to the *anityatā* related to a period of time (i.e. to the impermanence of series) seems to be "gross *anityatā*" or, if related to sentient beings, "*anityatā* of one existence" (*(eka)janma/adhva/nikāyasabhāga-anityatā*?; cf. n. 196).

The fact that Hayashima overlooks the difference between the view admitting the duration of conditioned entities and the attribution of duration to series has grave consequences. Thus he claims (1988b, p. 32) that the differentiation between the *anityatā* of the moment and the *santāna* in the Hsien-yang is characteristic for the Vātsīputrīyas (among others). This hardly makes sense given that the Vātsīputrīyas taught that some conditioned entities are momentary while others endure for some time, whereas the Hsien-yang, which supposedly took over this teaching, contends that all conditioned entities are momentary. By contrast, as fierce critics of the doctrine of momentariness (cf. AKBh, TSP), the Vātsīputrīyas should be among the opponents in the Hsien-yang against whom the argumentation proving this doctrine is directed.

3.4 That *anityatā* is treated in terms of extended existence despite the acceptance of the doctrine of momentariness can be explained by the soteriological advantages this treatment has over the contemplation of momentariness. On the one hand, so much weight may be accorded to the destructions occurring at every moment that, at least on a beginner's level, the Buddhist striving for emancipation, as for that matter any other activity, may become pointless. As witnessed in the TSi and AS, this needs to be counterbalanced by stressing that the world is not completely annihilated at every moment insofar as there is an uninterrupted succession of momentary entities and hence continuity. On the other hand, the destructions occurring at every moment may be taken lightly because, with the exception of the rare moment that the series is cut off, they are followed automatically by immediate re-creation and are hence largely divested of the disturbing effect they are meant to have. To be sure, analogous tensions can also be identified in the case of the contemplation of ordinary (i.e. macroscopic) impermanence: On the one hand, in order to motivate the striving for emancipation, it is necessary to teach that, unless emancipated from *saṃsāra*, death is inevitably followed by rebirth. On the other hand, there is the danger that in this way death loses some of its horrors, and that the present life as a human being is no longer conceived of as a very rare chance for spiritual advancement. However, there is the following decisive difference between the contemplation of momentariness and of ordinary impermanence: In the case of momentariness, the destructions are not commonly experienced, while the continuity is, whereas in the case of macroscopic *anityatā*, the destructions are commonly observed (i.e. death), whereas the fact of continuity (i.e. rebirth) is not.[200] Hence, the contemplation that all things (notably we ourselves), as we experience them normally, are destined to perish eventually is much better suited to stress the fleeting nature of existence and thereby inspire aversion and repugnance, than the consideration of the constantly ongoing process of destruction and re-creation, which obscures the soteriologically much more relevant fact[201] that all existence over a span of time is destined to cease.[202]

The contemplation of the gross *anityatā* is only superior in this way as long as the momentariness of existence can merely be grasped by discursive thinking and not by direct experience. For the direct experience of momentariness can yield a particularly immediate and pregnant realization of the impermanence of existence (cf. the sources cited in n. II.E.1.2), which — so the explicit statement in MSABh 150,3-5 (cited in n. 424) — cannot be attained to by the contemplation of macroscopic destruction. In this way, the experience of momentariness can be viewed as the perfection of the ordinary contemplation of imperma-

[200] Note that in the ŚrBh (p. 485,6-488,5) and SNS (X.7, cited in n. 368) the momentariness (viz. the destructions not perceived when contemplating *anityatā* in terms of momentariness) and the proof of existence before and after death (*paraloka*; viz. the continuity not perceived when contemplating ordinary impermanence) are proved side by side.

[201] Probably because it was felt to be intrinsic to human nature to structure life in such a way as if death is but a remote possibility, much greater stress was placed in Buddhism on the impermanence of existence than on the aspect of continuity.

[202] Cf. the quotation of MPPU 372b22-24 in n. 425.

nence.[203] However, since a direct experience of momentariness is, as the sources report (cf. § II.E.3.6), exceedingly difficult to attain to and probably beyond the scope of most of those addressed by the currently examined teaching, the point remains that for the vast majority of Buddhist practitioners, the consideration of the momentary nature of existence of momentariness is less suited to inspire aversion and disgust than the contemplation of the ordinary, macroscopic *anityatā*. On the other hand, one should not underrate the soteriological relevance of the contemplation of momentariness. For, in addition to its Śrāvakayāna application to the realization of the impermanent nature of existence, it may, as we have seen, also serve as a Mahāyāna tool to undermine the substantial existence of things; hence the aforementioned designation in the MPPU of the contemplation of momentariness as a gate to *śūnyatā*. This function can also be witnessed in the BoBh where the Bodhisattva reflects upon the unsubstantiality (*asāratā*) of conditioned entities by envisaging their nature to pass away in the moment they have originated (*kṣaṇabhaṅgura*). The soteriological relevance of the contemplation of momentariness in the BoBh is also borne out by the passage, where the Bodhisattva is taught to contemplate the momentary nature of existence as long as he has not yet realized that things are devoid of an own-being.[204]

As we have seen, the enumeration of the various forms of *anityatā* in the the Hsien-yang and AS does not only comprise the conventional and radical understanding of impermanence, but also the Mahāyāna interpretation of *anityatā* as eternal non-existence which, as mentioned above, corresponds to the level of highest truth. It can then be concluded that the enumeration of *anityatā* is structured in such a way that it allows for all forms of *anityatā* despite their differing claims to accord with truth. To be sure, as has been mentioned above, the juxtaposed forms of *anityatā*, though seemingly contradictory (how can the momentariness not be at odds with time consuming processes such as falling ill, and how can the impermanence of discrete entities be addressed at all if in truth they never have a substantial own-being?), can be — and indeed were — reconciled on a doctrinal level. Thus macroscopic destructions may be interpreted in terms of momentariness: the destruction after a certain period refers exclusively to those momentary destructions which are not automatically followed by re-origination, i.e. to the cutting of the series. In this way, the contemplation of momentariness and of ordinarily perceived destructions are not doctrinally opposed. Rather, they differ only as to their scope: the former referring to every destruction, the latter only to those of the final segment of a series.[205] Similarly, transformation (and likewise separation, etc.) is not the change of a selfsame entity but the alteration between different

[203] For example, cf. Vi 841a9f (cited in § II.E.3.2) where the vision of the rise and fall of the *skandhas* at every moment is called "the perfection of the viewing of origination and destruction" (**udayavyayānupaśyanāsiddhi*).

[204] Cf. Bobh_W 277,16-22 (adduced in § I.D.2.3.1) as well as BoBh_W 278,10-25 and 279,6-9 (both cited in n. 139).

[205] Cf. Vi 199b9f: The destruction of the very last *skandhas* is called 'death' and also '*anityatā*.' At [all] other times the destruction of the *skandhas* is called '*anityatā*' but not 'death.' Cf. also 838a16f-18, 838b22-26.

states (cf. § II.C.1.1). And just as the conventional way of envisaging *anityatā* can be reconciled in this manner with the doctrine of momentariness, so it can be argued that the *anityatā* of eternal non-existence does not have to be taught at the expense of the other forms of *anityatā* because these are — at least if grasped in terms of momentariness — valid on the level of relative truth.

3.5 In contrast to my contention that the classification of *anityatā* as presented above represents a distinct strand within the early Yogācāra tradition that is essentially Abhidharmic in character, Hayashima maintains that the lists of *anityatās* in the Hsien-yang (1988b, p. 27,17f; 1988a, p. 69; 1989b, p. 15 and p.17) — and indirectly also in the AS(Bh) (1988b: p. 32,4-10)[206] — are to be understood on the basis of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine.

He arrives at this position because he regards the interpretation of *anityatā* in terms of non-existence as specific to the *trisvabhāva* doctrine and because in the fifth stanza of the *anityatā*-chapter of the Hsien-yang (548c4-9, appendix § 1.7) the six *anityatās* of the shorter list (and possibly also the eight *anityatās* of the longer list) are correlated to the *parikalpitasvabhāva* and to the *paratantrasvabhāva*. For the following reasons I do not share this view:
1) The interpretation of *anityatā* as non-existence is not a specific characteristic of the *trisvabhāva* doctrine. It was developed much earlier than this doctrine and, as I have documented above, was added to the lists of *anityatā* to incorporate the Mahāyāna view of *anityatā*. Hence the acceptance of *anityatā* as non-existence only shows that the Abhidharmic classification of *anityatā* was exposed to the doctrinal influence of the Mahāyāna.
2) Since the list of *anityatās* is only correlated in passing with the *trisvabhāva* doctrine in the Hsien-yang, it does not follow that the classification of *anityatā* is to be understood in terms of this doctrine.[207] Besides, on Hayashima's own account the *paratantrasvabhāva* in the Hsien-yang consists in momentariness (1988b, p. 32), so that he is forced to understand the *anityatās* 2-6 (and likewise the eight *anityatās* of the longer list, should they also be in view here) in terms of momentariness (1988b, p. 28,7ff). However, as argued before, there is no evidence in the Hsien-yang which would suggest such an artificial understanding.[208]

[206] Hayashima does not refer to the list in the VinSg and advances no such claim with regard to the list in ŚrBh.

[207] In the course of the treatment of the various forms of *anityatā*, the Hsien-yang determines the scope of these forms. First (548a17-19, appendix § 1.3) it is specified which kind of entities (i.e. mental or material and, if the latter, corporeal or not) they affect, then (kā 3, 548c1-4, appendix § 1.6) in which cosmic realm they occur and finally (kā 5, 548c4-9, appendix § 1.7) to which aspect or characteristic of conditioned entities they refer. Thus the scheme of *trisvabhāva* is only dealt with in passing as one of three "dimensions" for which the extension of the various forms of *anityatās* has to be specified. The marginal role of the *trisvabhāva* scheme for the treatment of *anityatā* is also evinced by the fact that of the 23 *kārikās* (and the according prose sections) of the *anityatā* chapter of the Hsien-yang only one deals with the *trisvabhāva* doctrine.

[208] Also Yeh Ah-yueh (1975, pp. 519-523) interprets the enumeration of the various forms of *anityatā* in the Hsien-yang against the background of the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine and its treatment in other Yogācāra sources. Thus she claims that the purification of *tathatā*, which in the MAV etc. is identified with the

I also disagree with Hayashima's assertion (e.g. 1988b, p. 29,9ff; 1988c, p. 422) that the treatment of momentariness in the Hsien-yang is based on the *trisvabhāva* doctrine. For all I can see, the treatment of momentariness in the Hsien-yang is quite independent from any schemes, but the treatment of *anityatā* with which it is loosely connected insofar as one form of *anityatā* is the *anityatā* of the moment (*kṣaṇa*). This is clearly the situation in the case of AS 41,8 where the proof of momentariness explicitly refers back to the earlier characterization of *anityatā* in terms of momentariness. If there was such a substantial link between the momentariness and the *trisvabhāva* doctrine, as Hayashima maintains, why is it not expressly stated? In the sole *kārikā* where the *trisvabhāva* doctrine features in the *anityatā* chapter, momentariness does not play any role (or is at best indirectly involved if Hayashima's claim that the *anityatā* 2-6 are to be understood in terms of momentariness is accepted). Moreover, this *kārikā* and the matching prose passage (appendix, § 1.7) are separated from the treatment of momentariness by the examination of the relationship between impermanence and suffering (appendix, § 1.8). Besides, parts of the argumentation making up the treatment of momentariness can also be found in other sources such as the ŚrBh, AS, VinSg and AKBh where they are clearly not connected in any way with the *trisvabhāva* doctrine.

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anityatā of the *parinispannalakṣaṇa*, is comprised in the Hsien-yang under the *anityatā* of transformation. This is hardly possible given that this form of change is not included in the elaborate exposition of the various forms of change in the Hsien-yang. Moreover, this interpretation would entail that this accidental transformation of *tathatā* would, in contrast to all other sources, not be associated with the *parinispanna-lakṣaṇa*, but (as part of the *anityatā* of transformation) with the *paratantralakṣaṇa*. In contrast to Yeh, I contend that this accidental purification does not feature at all in the Hsien-yang. Rather, it only came later to be regarded as a form of *anityatā* when the application of the *trisvabhāva*-doctrine to the analysis of *anityatā* led to the qualification of even the *parinispannalakṣaṇa* as *anitya*, a development which had not yet reached this stage in the Hsien-yang, which still insists that the *parinispannalakṣaṇa* is in no sense at all *anitya*.

I.E The Various Definitions and Usages of the Term *kṣaṇa* in Buddhist Sources

So far, the term *kṣaṇa* and the English equivalent "moment" were used without further explication in the ordinary sense of a very small but not precisely defined unit of time. The term *kṣaṇa* is, however, often used in a more technical meaning and came to be defined and understood differently depending on the doctrinal stance and the given context. Thus *kṣaṇa* may in some contexts be understood as a precisely defined unit of time (e.g. 1/75th second), while in others it may (at least in certain compounds) refer to the momentary entity itself. These various usages and definitions reflect the doctrinal development with which they are intrinsically bound up, and highlight some aspects of the underlying conceptions of momentariness. They will, therefore, be examined in the present chapter, so as to round up the exposition of the doctrine of momentariness. Most of the pertinent material has already been presented by LVP,[209] but until now it has not been evaluated systematically either by him or — for all I know — by anyone else.

1 **1.1** The term *kṣaṇa* in its basic meaning denotes a very brief unit of time, i.e. a moment,[210] though it is also used quite differently.[211] The term *kṣaṇa* as such does not entail the

[209] "Notes sur le moment (*kṣaṇa*) des Vaibhāṣikas et des Sautrāntikas." In: *MCB* V, 1937, pp. 134-158. Cf. also "Notes sur le moment ou *kṣaṇa* des bouddhistes." In: *Rocznik Orjentalistyczny* VIII 1934: pp. 1-9. For a more general (but, at least as far as the Buddhist material is concerned, obscure and unreliable) examination of the concept of *kṣaṇa* that also takes into account non-Buddhist sources, see the article by Saroja Bhate on *kṣaṇa* (Vol. II, pp. 235-246) in *Kalātattvakośa* (edited by Kapila Vatsyayan, Delhi, 1992).

[210] This accords with the etymological explanation by Mayrhofer (*A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary* Heidelberg 1956: s.v. *kṣaṇa*) who derives the word *kṣaṇa* from *akṣan* (= "eye"; the PW suggests *īkṣaṇa* which also means "eye") so that *kṣaṇa* refers to the winking of the eye, more precisely, to the time taken by the winking. According to this explanation, the term *kṣaṇa* would correspond to the term *nimeṣa* (cf. also German "Augenblick") which means winking of the eye and is by extension also used in the sense of a very short unit of time (cf. n. 214).

[211] The expression *kṣaṇa* is not only used in the literal sense of "moment." In the Theravāda canon *khaṇa* (=*kṣaṇa*) often denotes "opportunity," "auspicious moment" (cf. Theragāthā 231, Jātaka IV 204 and V 455, Buddhavaṃsa 3 etc.). This usage seems to be derived from the evaluation of every moment of human existence as auspicious in the sense that it entails the chance for spiritual advancement (cf. AN IV 228, Dhammapada 315 etc.). Possibly the usage of the word *samaya* in Jainism for "moment" is conversely to be explained as a generalization of its (i.e. *samaya's*) meaning "auspicious moment." Corresponding to the usage of *khaṇa* in the Pāli canon, *akkhaṇa* is used in the sense of "inauspicious time" (cf. "untimely"), and in particular as a technical term for the eight or nine times, at which it is, for lack of access to the Buddhist teaching, inopportune to be born (e.g. DN III 263 and 287, AN IV 225, Daśottarasūtra IX-X, Mahāvyutpatti 2299-2306).

The variety of meanings in which *kṣaṇa* can be used is documented by the various explanations (*nirukti*) put forward by Saṃghabhadra to account for the expression *kṣaṇa*. These *niruktis* are not to be taken as etymological in the sense that they purport to unravel the historic derivation of the examined word. They are of particular interest because they reflect various aspects of the conceptualization of the moment and momentariness, and are, therefore, reproduced here (cf. also the translation by LVP 1937, 152-154):

— NA 533b12-14: "Or [the moment] is called *kṣaṇa* because it destroys (√*kṣaṇ* = to injure, break), that is, it functions as the cause destroying all entities (*dharma*). [*Kṣaṇa*] denotes the mark of impermanence which destroys all entities. [Because] the conditioned factors are endowed with this [mark], they are called *kṣaṇika*."
Also Yāska (Nirukta II.25: "'*kṣaṇa*' is derived from the root *kṣaṇ*, it is the injured time." *kṣaṇaḥ kṣaṇoteḥ, prakṣṇutaḥ kālaḥ*) derives the word *kṣaṇa* from the root *kṣaṇ*. However, according to his explanation, the *kṣaṇa* is linked to destruction not in the sense that it destroys but in the sense that it itself suffers injury. For Yāska refers metaphorically to the dissection of time into a *kṣaṇa* as the whetting of time — the *kṣaṇa* corresponding to the sharpened blade — which is conceived of as an act of violence (a blade, i.e. time, is violated when it is sharpened). Cf. the commentary by Durga on Yāska II.25: *sa (=kṣaṇa) hi prakṣṇutaḥ prakarṣeṇa hiṃsitaḥ kālo 'lpatvāt.*

Cf. Nyāyavārttika (henceforth: NyāVārt) on Nyāyasūtra 3.2.14 where Uddyotakara cites (and then refutes) the following *nirukti*: "What does *kṣaṇika* (i.e. momentary) mean? If according to the principle of 'etymological' explanation (*nirukta*) [it is held] 'Moment (*kṣaṇa*) [means] destruction (*kṣaya*) [and something] is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) because (*iti*) it is endowed with that [moment],' then this is not correct, because of the time difference [between the existence of the momentary entity and its destruction]." (NyāVārt 837,14 [=TSP 142,10f]: *kṣaṇika iti sa katham? yadi niruktanyāyena "kṣayaḥ kṣaṇa iti kṣaṇo 'syāstīti kṣaṇika" iti tan na yuktam kālabhedāt.* Cf. n. 242 where the continuation of this passage in NyāVārt is cited.). Also in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra (edited by J. Oshika in *Acta Indologica.* Vol. I, Naritassan 1970, p. 208,30-34; = P. 843 bu 227a3-6) the terms *kṣaya* and *kṣaṇa* are correlated. It seems that both Tripathi (1990, p. 328) and Silburn (1955, p. 278: "... le sense premier du terme '*kṣaṇa*' est 'destruction.'") accept this as the correct etymological explanation, but there can be little doubt that the explanation by Mayrhofer (n. 210) should be given preference to.

— NA 533b14-16: "Or, *kṣaṇika* is commonly (*loke*) used in the sense of "empty" (*śūnyaka*). This means that [entities] in the state of being present (rather than being past or future) are called *kṣaṇika* because they are devoid of something which would support them so that they do not perish, and hence they necessarily do not persist."

Cf. BHSD (s.v. *kṣaṇika*) where *kṣaṇika* is recorded in the meaning "empty" and the following example from the Mahāvastu (II 252,14) is adduced: *kṣaṇikena hastena gṛhaṃ gacchati* (= he went home empty handed). Edgerton tries to explain this usage as follows: "Is this an extension of the meaning of Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī *khaṇika*, 'idle, unemployed, out of work' (which is itself derived from Sanskrit *kṣaṇin* 'at leisure')?"

— NA 533b16-19: "Or, *akṣaṇika* is commonly (*loke*) used in the sense of not having any leisure. This means that [people] who busy themselves with other things and [thus] do not have any time for themselves are called *akṣaṇika*. Only when present (rather than past or future) do [entities] necessarily have a little time to realize their own fruit (i.e. be causally effective). Hence they are called *kṣaṇika*."

This explanation reflects the dominant stance of the later Sarvāstivādins that the conditioned entities, which are held to exist in all three times, are only causally efficient when present, and that on this basis their present state can be distinguished from their past and future state.

The *niruktis* cited so far are preceded by the following definition (NA 533b7-12): "What does *kṣaṇa* mean? It means the briefest [unit of] time, [a unit] that does not allow for a division into earlier and later. ... Because it is the most compressed [unit of] time it is called *kṣaṇa*. ... The present entities (by contrast to past and future entities) which have [this] measure of duration (i.e. the *kṣaṇa*) are called *kṣaṇika* (momentary), as [an infant of one month is called] *māsika* (*māsa* =month and *-ika*)."

It is difficult to reconstruct a *nirukti* on the basis of the Chinese translation. In the light of the definitions recorded in Guṇaratna's Tarkarahasyadīpikā on the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya by Haribhadra (edited by Luigi Suali, Calcutta Asiatic Society, 1905-1914. p. 28,5: *paramanikṛṣṭaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ*) and adduced by Vyāsa (when commenting on Yogasūtra [henceforth: YS] III.52) in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya (henceforth: YSBh): *paramāpakarṣaparyāntaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ* — cf. n. 215 where the pertinent passage is quoted in full) it may be suggested that 促 (Mathews: close, crowded) renders an expression in the

conception of one definite and ultimate smallest unit of time (i.e. an atomistic conception of time) but leaves open the possibility that time is infinitely divisible (i.e. that there are always smaller units of time than the one currently designated as *kṣaṇa*). This is documented in the Theravāda tradition where the stretch of time referred to as *kkhaṇa* (= *kṣaṇa*) varies depending on the specification in the given context, and where no particular unit of time is posited as being so short that it does not allow — at least in principle — for further subdivision. So a material entity (*rūpadhamma*) lasts 17 times as long as a moment corresponding to one mental entity (*cittakkhaṇa*) does. This moment in turn is constituted by an equally long moment of origination (*uppādakkhaṇa*), of endurance (*ṭhitikkhaṇa*) and of destruction (*bhaṅgakkhaṇa*).[212] Even the snapping of the finger is regarded as momentary (*accharākkhaṇa*), though it is held that while it endures hundred and thousands of *koṭis*[213] of mental events take place (cf. Sāratthappakāsinī II 99,27-31, cited in n. 449).

1.2 Within the fold of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, however, the term *kṣaṇa* is used more specifically in a technical sense as **the** smallest unit of time, as the Abhidharmic texts put it, as "time's furthest extreme" (*kālaparyanta*), that is as the definite final unit of time which cannot in turn be subdivided (*bhettum aśakyaḥ kṣaṇo bhavet*, Pramāṇanavārttikavṛtti cited in n. 216).[214] This usage clearly presupposes an atomistic conception of time.[215] This is

Sanskrit original which is derived from the root √*kṛṣ*. This cannot satisfy, however, insofar as *kṣaṇa* differs considerably from any derivative of √*kṛṣ*. Moreover, √*kṛṣ* only yields the fitting meaning "compressed," "reduced" if *ni-*, or *apa-* is prefixed to it. Therefore, the present definition may not be a *nirukti*, but simply a straightforward definition. This is also suggested by the fact that it is again taken up by Saṃghabhadra after the presentation of the above cited *niruktis* as the correct (or most satifactory) definition (NA 533b20f).

In the NyāVārt this definition is repudiated on the grounds that time is not a real entity (i.e. purely conceptual) and hence cannot be possessed by the momentary entity, as the *ika*-suffix in *kṣaṇika* implies (NyāVārt 867,17-868,2 (=TSP 142,14-16): *atha "kṣaṇāvasthitikālāḥ kṣaṇikā" iti; sarvāntyaṃ kālaṃ kṣaṇatvena pratipadya "tatra ye 'vatiṣṭhante, te kṣaṇikā" iti. etad api na yuktam, saṃjñāmātratvena kālasyābhyugamāt. ... na hi saṃjñāmātraṃ vastuviśeṣaṇatvena yuktam.*). Śāntarakṣita responded to this criticism by defining *kṣaṇika* not as the possession of a moment's duration, but as the possession of a nature that lasts for a moment (TS 387ab: *kṣaṇāvasthitarūpaṃ hi vastu kṣaṇikam ucyate.*).

212 Cf. the citation of VisM XX.24 and Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha ch.4, par. 3 in n. 59.

213 *koṭi* refers to the highest number in a given system of numbers. According to the PW, MW and Childers Pāli-English-Dictionary (s.v. koṭi) this is 10 millions, according to the PTS dictionary (s.v. koṭi) one hundred thousand.

214 Note that outside the fold of Buddhism, there is a tradition which treats the *kṣaṇa* not as the smallest unit of time but as a twelfth part of a *muhūrta* (= 4 minutes ?), whereas it is itself made up of 30 *kalās*, which in turn are composed of thirty *kāṣṭhas*, which again are constituted by 18 *nimeṣas*, which, so it seems in the Śāṅkhāyana-Āraṇyaka (VIII.21), may in their turn be subdivided into *dhvaṃsis* (cf. Bhate 1992, p. 238f).

215 I refer to the conception of time underlying here as atomistic only in the sense that time is — irrespective of its ontological status — not considered to be infinitely divisible. Though there are traces of a "somatic" conception of time (Schayer 1938, 14ff), Buddhism by and large does not consider time as a substance or entity (*dharma*) and does not postulate the existence of time-atoms of one kind or another (as the characterization as atomistic may have suggested). At any rate, as Schayer has pointed

out (Schayer 1938, 10f), the subdivision of time in the Indian context does not preclude that time is, like ether and unlike matter, conceived of as a homogenous substance which is not made up out of distinct entities.

This is not the place to examine the Buddhist views of time more closely. It may, however, be added that the atomistic conception of time within Buddhism probably has to be explained against the background of the atomization of time within Jainism. A direct influence is suggested by the Buddhist adoption of the Jaina determination of the moment as the movement from one atom to the next (see n. 233). There are also traces of an atomistic conception of time within the Brahmanical systems, and this raises the question whether they (or their forerunners) may have affected the Buddhist conception of time, too. As an example, the explanation of the concept of *kṣaṇa* in the commentary by Vyāsa on YS III.52 (p. 383,11-21; cf. the citation of this sūtra in n. 423) may be cited here:

> "As the atom (*paramāṇu*) is the most reduced substance (*dravya*), so the moment (*kṣaṇa*) is the most reduced time. Or the instant it would take a moving atom to abandon the former point [of location] and reach the subsequent point, this time is a *kṣaṇa*. The non-interruption of their (i.e. the moments') flow is the succession (*krama*). There is no aggregate of the moment and the succession (i.e. of a given moment with the moments preceding it?) that would be a substantial entity. Hence, (*iti*) hours (*muhūrta*), days and nights and so on are [nothing but] conceptual aggregates (*buddhisamāhāra*). This time is devoid of reality, (*vastuśūnya*), is fabricated by the mind (*buddhinirmāṇa*), it follows from verbal knowledge (*śadbajñānānupātin*). It appears to the ordinary [people] with their strongly agitated viewing[a] as if it had the nature of a really existing entity (*vastu*). The moment, by contrast, belongs to [the class of] real things (*vastupatita*) and occurs within (lit. is suspended from) the succession.[b] And the succession has as its essence the uninterrupted sequence of moments. Those versed in time, the yogins, call this (i.e. the *kṣaṇa*) 'time.'
>
> And it is not the case that two moments coexist; nor is there the succession of two simultaneously existing [moments] because this is impossible. [Rather,] it is the immediate following of the later [moment], which is coming to be, upon the preceding one that is the succession of the moment. Therefore, there is only one present moment; the preceding and following moments do not exist . Thus, there is no aggregate (*samāhāra*) of them." (*yathāpakarṣaparyantaṃ dravyaṃ paramāṇur, evaṃ paramāpakarṣaparyāntaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ. yāvatā vā samayena calitaḥ paramāṇuḥ pūrvadeśaṃ jahyād uttaradeśaṃ upasaṃpadyeta, sa kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ. tatpravāhāvicchedas tu kramaḥ. kṣaṇatatkramayor nāsti vastusamāhāra iti buddhisamāhāro muhūrtāhorātrādayaḥ. sa khalv ayaṃ kālo vastuśūnyo buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupātī laukikānāṃ vyutthitadarśanānāṃ vastusvarūpa ivāvabhāsate. kṣaṇas tu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī. kramaś ca kṣaṇānantaryātmā. taṃ kālavidaḥ "kāla" ity ācakṣate yoginaḥ. na ca dvau kṣaṇau saha bhavataḥ; kramaś ca na dvayoḥ sahabhuvoḥ asaṃbhavāt; pūrvasmād uttarasya bhāvino yad ānantaryaṃ, kṣaṇasya sa kramaḥ. tasmād vartamāna evaikaḥ kṣaṇo na pūrvottarakṣaṇāḥ santīti. tasmān nāsti tatsamāhāraḥ. ...*)

As can be seen, the moments and the larger units formed by a succession of moments are, in contrast to the Buddhist theory of momentariness, purely temporal categories relating to time and not to existence within time. Whereas in Buddhism conditioned entities are atomized temporally, in the YSBh time is atomized into moments which alone are considered to be real. Despite this fundamental difference, it seems that the position of the YSBh bears the mark of the Buddhist theory of momentariness. In Buddhism only the momentary entities are real (*dravyasat*), whereas the series formed by them (*santāna*) are not real entities but only conceptually existing (*prajñaptisat*). Similarly, in the YSBh only the time atoms, that is the moments, are real, while all larger units of time are only imaginary entities which are nothing but the succession of a certain number of distinct atoms. The emphasis that only present and not past or future moments exist suggests that the YSBh is at this point influenced by the Sautrāntikas (or Yogācāras) rather than by the Sarvāstivādins.

[a] The *saṃyama* of the yogins is contrasted here with the *vyutthitadarśana* of common people.

[b] I have refrained from understanding *kramāvalambin* as "supports the succession," because I know

reflected by the fact that the *kṣaṇa* is treated in unison with the division of matter into atoms and of speech into syllables, which are equally considered not to be infinitely divisible.[216] Also the numerous attempts to determine the *kṣaṇa's* dimension presuppose that time (and hence the *kṣaṇa*) cannot be divided infinitely. Such an atomistic conception of time seems to have been taken for granted. At any rate, I know of no textual evidence to the effect that at least the possibility that time may be infinitely divisible was envisaged in the Abhidharmic tradition of the Sarvāstivādins.[217] Moreover, there are to my knowledge no passages that indicate what bearing the conceptualization of the *kṣaṇa* as a definite smallest unit of time has on the nature of time (e.g., whether time flows evenly or advances in leaps).

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of no textual evidence showing that *ava√lamb* can (except in a causative construction) mean "to support." The passage adduced by MW (s.v. *ava√lamb*) to document such a meaning also for a non-causative formation, namely Raghuvaṃśa VII.9, reads *avalambya*, a gerund formation which may be causative and thus does not prove that a non-causative formation of *ava√lamb* can mean "to support."

[c] The edition by Gosvāmi Dāmodara Śāstrī (Kashi Sanskrit Series 110, Varanasi 1989) reads *uttarabhāvino*; the other editions consulted accord with the reading adopted here.

[216] The atomistic conceptualization of the moment and the conjunction of this with the atomization of matter and speech can be documented abundantly:

- Vi 701a27-29: "The conditioned entities (*saṃskṛta*) are subject to three forms of dissection, namely as to time, as to matter [and] as to words. The smallest unit of time is called moment (*kṣaṇa*), the smallest unit of matter is called atom (*paramāṇu*), the smallest unit of words is called syllable (*akṣara*)."

- SAH 886c9f and 17f: "There are three forms of dissection, [namely] as to words, as to matter and as to time. The [product of the] first dissection is called one syllable; [that of] the remaining [two, respectively,] [one] atom, [one] moment. ... As for the small[est unit of] time it is called one moment. Because with the moment the smallest [unit] of time is reached, it is said that the moment is [the product of] the dissection of time."

— AK III.85bc: ... *paramāṇvakṣarakṣaṇāḥ/ rūpanāmādhvaparyantāḥ* ...
AKBh hereon (176,11f): *kālasya paryantaḥ kṣaṇaḥ.*

— NA 521b20-22: "Dissecting matter with a sharp intellect, one reaches the atom (*paramāṇu*). Therefore, one atom is the smallest [unit of] matter. Likewise, dissecting words and time one reaches the syllable (*akṣara*) and the moment (*kṣaṇa*) which constitute [respectively] the smallest [unit of] words and of time." Cf. NA 533b7-12 translated in n. 211.

— *Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya (P. 5865 ño 18a4): *dus kyi mthaḥ ni skad cig ma ste/*

— Pramāṇavārttika (III.496ab, p. 160 in the edition by Pandeya): *ekāṇvatyayakālaś ca kālo 'alpīyān kṣaṇo mataḥ/* and Manorathanandin (Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti) thereon: ... *bhettum aśakyaḥ kṣaṇo bhavet.*
— the Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* adduced by Uddyotakara in NyāVārt (on 3.2.10) 824,4f: *kṣaṇaś cālpīyān kālaḥ, kṣaṇasthitikāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ* (cf also 867,18 *sarvāntyaṃ kālaṃ kṣaṇatvena pratipadya* ... quoted in full in n. 211).

Cf. also the quotations from the Tarkarahasyadīpikā and YSBh adduced above n. 211.

[217] In Madhyamaka (RA I.69-70), however, the conception of the *kṣaṇa* as the smallest unit of time is — albeit from a different point of view — refuted:

> "As the moment has an end, also its beginning and middle have to be assumed. Since the moment is thus endowed with these three sections, the duration of the world is not a moment.(kā 69) Beginning, middle and end [of the moment] should be considered [to have], in their turn, [beginning, middle and end,] just as the moment (which leads to an infinite regress).(kā 70ab)"(*yathānto 'sti kṣaṇasyaivam ādimadhyaṃ ca kalpyatām/ tryātmakatvāt kṣaṇasyaivaṃ na lokasya kṣaṇaṃ sthitiḥ//69// ādimadhyāvasānāni cintyāni kṣaṇavat punaḥ//70ab//*)

1.3 As the smallest unit of time, the *kṣaṇa's* measure was by one Abhidharmic strand fixed by correlating it to larger units of times. Thus it was determined to be precisely 1/120th of a *tatkṣaṇa*, which corresponds to 1/75th of a second.[218] So as to render this dimension of the *kṣaṇa* concrete — an obvious necessity, given the non-existence of clocks as a frame of reference — various comparisons are adduced in the Buddhist sources. The most frequent illustration is by reference to the snapping of the fingers which, in the case of a strong man, is said to take 65 (or 64) *kṣaṇas* (i.e. just under a second).[219] Prominent is also the allusion to spinning where the threads are said to come forth between the fingers with the speed of one *tatkṣaṇa* so that a 120th part of that coming forth corresponds to one *kṣaṇa*.[220] In case

[218] Vi 701b8-12: "120 *kṣaṇas* (0.014 seconds, more precisely: 0.013 period) make up one *tatkṣaṇa* (1.6 seconds). 60 *tatkṣaṇas* make up one *lava* (1.6 minutes), which [thus] has 7200 *kṣaṇas*. 30 *lavas* make up one *muhūrta* (48 minutes), which [thus] has 216.000 *kṣaṇas*. 30 *muhūrtas* make up one day and night (i.e. 24 hours), which [thus] has 6.480.000 *kṣaṇas*."

The total number of *kṣaṇas* per 24 hours deviates slightly in Hsüan-tsang's translation of a different passage of the same text where they are said to amount to 6.499.980 (Vi 202c8f) and not to 6480.000 as in the translation by Buddhavarman (Vi_2 151c7, translated in n. 25). Probably the discrepancy can be accounted for like this. Both in Vi 701b11f and in Vi_2 151c7 the text renders 6.480.000 by "6.500.000 minus 20." Since 6.4800.00 (i.e. = 30 x 216.000) must be the correct number of *kṣaṇas*, it has to be understood that 20 has as an unmentioned coefficient 1000. Thus the rendering of 6.499.980 in Vi 202c8f is probably based on the rendering "6.500.000 minus 20," ignoring that "20" really means "20 thousands."

In the Buddhist sources consulted here (cf. *Samskṛtāsamskṛtaviniścaya P. ño 18a4ff, AK III.88, SAH 887b7-15) the reckoning was found to be identical. There is, however, one exception, namely Divyāvadāna p. 643,2f and p. 644,8f, where the *tatkṣaṇa* is the smaller unit than the *kṣaṇa*. In the face of the testimony of the other sources, it is likely that they were simply confounded. Such a mistake in the Divyāvadāna can be well explained because preceding the definition of the different units of time, an example is adduced (viz. spinning, cf. n. 220) illustrating the length of a *tatkṣaṇa* and not, as may have been expected, of the smallest unit, the *kṣaṇa*. In the Vi where the passage translated above is preceded by the same example (701b3-6), it is added that the duration of the *kṣaṇa* is, in order to facilitate comprehension, exemplified indirectly by the illustration of the *tatkṣaṇa's* dimension. Such an explanation is missing in Divyāvadāna so that erroneously it may have been thought that the illustration must refer to the smallest unit of time which hence would have to be the *tatkṣaṇa* and not the *kṣaṇa*. At any rate, the meaning of *tatkṣaṇa* may not be determined solely on the basis of Divyāvadāna as a 120th part of a *kṣaṇa* as Edgerton does (BHSD s.v. *tatkṣaṇa*).

[219] AKBh 176,13f: *balavatpuruṣācchaṭāmātrena pañcaṣaṣṭiḥ kṣaṇā atikrāmanty ity ābhidhārmikāḥ/* (identical wording in Pr 547,15f and — judging from the Tibetan translation (ño 18b5f) — also in *Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya.

Vi 701b14: "During the instant taken by snapping of the fingers of a strong man, 64 moments (*kṣaṇa*) pass." Identical wording in SAH 886c20f.

Cf. also n. 234. For further material, see $MPPU_L$ 921 n.1.

[220] Vi 701b2-6: "The Prajñaptiśāstra teaches: A middle aged woman when twisting animal hair (in the process of spinning) draws out a fine hair [in such a way that] it is neither long nor short. One says that this is the measure of a *tatkṣaṇa*. This does not refer to the length or shortness of the thread. It refers only to [the length in which] the threads come forth between the fingers, [so that] the measure of this coming forth is a *tatkṣaṇa*.[a]"

[a] This explanation of the simile was possibly added by the Chinese translator. Cf. Divyāvadāna p. 644,9f: *tadyathā striyā nātidīrghanātihrasvakartinyāḥ sūtrodyāmaḥ evaṃdīrghas tatkṣaṇaḥ.*

of both similes, the reckoning coincides and can be taken as a serious attempt to circumscribe the length of one 75th of a second, so that it accords with the conception of the *kṣaṇa* as a 120th part of a *tatkṣaṇa*.

1.4 Side by side with this conception of the *kṣaṇa*, another strand can be identified which does not grasp the *kṣaṇa* as of small but yet computable dimension, but conceives it as an unimaginably short unit of time, the measure of which can only be known by the Buddha. Accordingly, the similes adduced in this context to illustrate the extension of the *kṣaṇa* depict it as infinitesimal. Thus in the Vi it is explicated that within the short span of time during which an arm is bent and/or stretched, the Buddha endowed with supernatural power moves from the realm of human beings up to the highest point within the sphere of material existence. For this it is necessary to pass through every single point between here and this realm. Since the passage from one point to the next takes exactly one moment (see below), as many moments will have passed within the span of the bending and/or stretching of the arm as there are points in space between the realm of humans and the highest point in the material universe. Obviously, their number is unimaginably high, though they are not infinite, so that the moments must in turn be unimaginably brief (though retaining a certain duration) so as to fit into the given span.[221] Comparable to this example is the illustration of SAH according to which the number of moments passing while a strong man turns around quickly corresponds to the number of stars which he will have seen during this movement.[222] In Pr it is likewise reported that when a pile of one hundred thousand lotus leafs is perforated by a needle, the perforation of each single leaf lasts exactly one *kṣaṇa*.[223] In the same manner

[221] Vi 201b28-c6 (cf. Vi_2 150c19-22): "The character of duration of a moment is extremely minute, it is difficult to know, it is difficult to imagine. Therefore, it is taught that it does not endure. This is to say that the extension of a moment is known by the Buddha; it is not the object [of the knowledge] of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, etc. As when [the Buddha] by use of supernatural power (*ṛddhi*) disappears from this place and reaches the summit of [the realm of] matter (*rūpa[dhātu]*) (in the SN and MN Brahmaloka, in the Vi_2 mount Sumeru) in the short instant taken by the bending and/or stretching of the arm.[a] This does not mean that in this time he could reach from this place to that place without forming a series (*santāna*). Nor does it mean that one entity (*dharma*) gets by locomotion to that [place] or that there is an entity that gets from this to that place by leaping over [the spatial points in between]. Therefore, it is definitely the series arising and perishing from moment to moment that moves from this to that place. The measure of the moments [falling] in the stretch of time [taken by this movement] are exceedingly minute and can only be known by the Buddha."

[a] This teaching refers to Bakabrahmasūtra where it is taught (SN I 142,17-20; MN I 326,12-16) that the Buddha moved from Jetavana (SN) or Subhagavana (MN) up to Brahmaloka in the short instant taken by the stretching of the bent arm or the bending of the streched arm (... *seyyathāpi nāma balavā puriso samiñjitaṃ vā bāhaṃ pasāreyya pasāritaṃ vā bāhaṃ samiñjeyya*). It is not certain whether in the Vi (which accords literally at this point with the Chinese version of this sūtra, viz. Saṃyuktāgama, T 100 412b11) the bending and stretching are, as in the SN and MN, conceived of as two alternative movements or whether they jointly form one unit of movement.

[222] SAH 886c18f: "As for the measure of the *kṣaṇa*, there is this explanation: As when a strong man turns around quickly he successively sees a great mass of stars. As [he looks at them] successively, one star [being seen correponds to] one *kṣaṇa*, and so do all [the others]."

[223] Pr 547,14-18: "And in a sole moment the lowering and raising [of the cross-bar (*daṇḍa*)] of a

it is taught in Vi that when many fine threads of cloth from Benares are together torn or cut apart in one go, then the severing of each single thread corresponds to one moment.[224] Similarly, when the reckoning in the comparisons adduced earlier was no longer intended to convey an idea of the precisely defined extension of the moment, it was changed so that the dimension of the *kṣaṇa* became reduced almost to the point of having no duration at all. Thus Buddhaghosa says that in the moment of snapping the fingers not the traditional 65 but hundred thousands of *koṭis* of *kṣaṇas* pass (cf. Sāratthappakāsinī II 99,27-31, cited in n. 449).[225]

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scale (cf. e.g. May 1959, n. 908, Y 19,2) is not possible because [the act of] lowering and raising is split up by time because of the saying that 65 moments pass during the mere snapping of the fingers by a strong man. [As for the saying] 'as the perforation of hundred thousand lotus petals by a sharp needle,'[a] in this case, too, [the action does not take place in one moment insofar as] the perforation of the hundred thousand lotus petals by a sharp needle is to be understood as a gradual perforation (i.e. which does not take place in a sole moment) because of the exceeding minuteness of the moment." (... *na caikasminn*[b] *eva kṣaṇe nāmonāmau tulāyāḥ saṃbhavataḥ, nāmonnāmayoḥ kālabhedāt, "balavatpuruṣācchaṭāmātrena pañcaṣaṣṭiḥ kṣaṇā atikrāmantī"ti pāṭhāt. utpalapattraśatasahasravedhavat sūcyagreṇeti. atrāpy*[b] *utpalapatraśatasahasravedhaḥ sūcyagreṇa kramaśo vedho 'vaseyaḥ kṣaṇānāṁ atisūkṣmatvāt.*)
It is not entirely clear whether the image of the perforation of a pile of lotus leaf is adduced by the upholder of the doctrine that death and re-birth are simultaneous or by Candrakīrti. In the former, less likely case the argumentation may be reconstructed thus: After the illustration of the co-occurrence of death and birth in one moment by the image of the simultaneous rising and lowering of the two ends of a scale has been refuted on the grounds that the movement of the scale's end from top to bottom and vice versa does not happen in one moment because the passage over each point of space takes one moment, the upholder of the simultaneity of death and birth would refer here to the piercing of a pile of lotus leafs, because this illustrates a process which takes place in one go and yet allows for several stages. This will be rejected by Candrakīrti because the perforation of each single leaf corresponds to a moment so that the perforation of the whole pile only seemingly takes place in one moment. On this interpretation, Candrakīrti's opponent would adduce an example which is elsewhere used to illustrate rather the opposite (namely that a process which is seemingly simultaneous is as a matter of fact temporally differentiated) of what he intends. It may, therefore, be more plausibly assumed that Candrakīrti adduces this image as a further example after the snapping of the fingers to illustrate the temporal differentiation of seemingly momentary actions.

[a] The perforation of a pile of lotus leafs by a sharp needle is generally referred to in order to illustrate that something seemingly simultaneous is as a matter of fact temporally differentiated (cf. G.A. Jacob: *A Handful of Popular Maxims current in Sanskrit Literature [Laukikanyāyāñjali]*. Vol. II, 77f [second edition. Bombay 1907-1911]; in the first edition: Vol II [1902], 43 and Vol. III [1904], 44). In this way it is, for instance, explained within the Buddhist tradition (cf. n. 265) that the seemingly simultaneous perception of a variegated object (= the perforation of the entire pile), is made up of a succession of distinct monochrome perceptions (i.e. the perforation of single leafs).

[b] Emendations according to de Jong 1978, p. 247.

[224] Vi 701b15f: "When two strong men pull many fine threads of cloth from Benares[a] so that they tear apart, then as many threads are torn so many *kṣaṇas* have elapsed."
Vi 701b17f (almost identical in SAH 886c21f): "When two strong men hold and stretch many fine threads of cloth from Benares[a] and there is a [further] strong man who quickly cuts them asunder with a sword from China hardened a hundred times, then as many threads are cut so many *kṣaṇas* have elapsed."

[a] Cf. BHSD, s.v. *kāśi*.

[225] Also in case of the the illustration by way of the perforation of a pile of lotus leafs, the number has been increased in such a manner to stress the brevity of the *kṣaṇa*. As the other uses of this image

1.5 The conception of the *kṣaṇa* as infinitesimal underlying these images results from an approach that does not compute the *kṣaṇa's* dimension by correlating it with other units of time, but by correlating it to the shortest conceivable incident. This determination follows from the atomistic conception of the *kṣaṇa* which entails that there can be nothing briefer than it. Given the Buddhist stance that there is nothing more transient than mental events and that each event is a distinct mental entity, it is not surprising that in this way the *kṣaṇa* came to be equated with the duration of mental entities[226] (and of those entities which were regarded to be equally transient) and was in accordance with their utmost brevity conceived of as unimaginably short.

This process is documented in the Vi (701b19-c4) where, after the determination of the *kṣaṇa* as one 75th of a second and after the illustration of this unit of time by way of QQexample, the sūtra with the four archers (Dhanuggaho: SN II 265f) on the speed with which the *āyuḥsaṃskāras*[227] pass away is adduced in support of the position that the duration of a *kṣaṇa* is too brief to be comprehended. Being asked how fast the *āyuḥsaṃskāras* arise and perish,[228] Buddha answers that this happens so fast that this cannot be understood by the interlocutor (i.e. "ordinary" monks) and proceeds to give a simile in order to convey at least an idea of their evanescence.[229] By adducing this sūtra as a proof that the Buddha taught that the moment's dimension is too brief to be comprehended, the Vi obviously equates the *kṣaṇa*'s duration with the brevity of the *āyuḥsaṃskāras*. Thus it can be witnessed how the *kṣaṇa* is regarded as infinitesimal once it is determined in the light of entities which are considered to be unimaginably short-lived.

attest (cf. n. 223), the number of lotus petals to be perforated was originally a hundred and not hundred thousand(s), as it indeed hardly can be if the pile is to be perforated by an ordinary needle in one go.

[226] Thus the term *kṣaṇa* will, at least if Mayrhofer's etymology is accepted (cf. n. 210), first have referred to the time taken by the winking of the eye, then will have become a unit of time dissociated from this action and, as the shortest division of time, thereafter will have become identified with another, according to the Buddhists even briefer, unit of action, namely a mental event.

[227] What exactly is to be understood by *āyuḥsaṃskāra* is a complicated issue (cf. AK_P II, 122ff) I do not want to elaborate upon at this point. Roughly speaking, they — the same applies to the so-called *jīvita* or *jīvitendriya* or *āyus* — may be understood to be the forces or factors which determine the length of the life of the person they pertain to.

[228] In the Pāli version instead of "arise and perish" the verb *khīyanti* (lit.: to waste away) is used which suggests that the Buddha does not illustrate the speed with which the *āyuḥsaṃskāras* arise and perish but with which they become weaker. Since the Vi adduces the sūtra to demonstrate how exceedingly short-lived the *āyuḥsaṃskāras* and hence the *kṣaṇas* are, there can be no doubt that the rendering of the Chinese translation fits into the context. Of course it is another matter how the sūtra is to be understood in the Pāli version.

[229] To start with, in the version transmitted in the Vi (701b19-c4; = LVP 1934, pp. 3-5) the speed someone would have to run — should he catch four arrows which are shot simultaneously by four mighty archers in the cardinal directions — is said to be slower than that of the terrestrial *Yakṣas*. In the following the speed with which the *āyuḥsaṃskāras* arise and perish is increased successively by enumerating ever faster heavenly beings.

Also in the Jaina tradition the moment (*samaya*) is equated with the shortest conceivable incident (and accordingly held to be infinitesimal)[230] when it is defined as the time taken for the movement from one spatial point to the next,[231] or, following Masson-Oursel ("Die atomistische Auffassung der Zeit." In: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* Vol. 40, 1931: p. 174 [of pp. 173-188]), for the compounding of two atoms. The former specification of the *kṣaṇa's* dimension can also be found in Buddhism,[232] but most likely has been adopted from Jainism.[233] Also in the YSBh by Vyāsa (on YS III.52, cited in n. 215) the moment is

[230] Cf. Tattvārthādhigamasūtra V 38-39 and the formulation *asaṃkhyair samayair āvali bhavet* in Gaṇitasārasaṃgraha I.32 (cited in n. 231).

[231] Umāsvāti's auto-commentary on Tattvārthādhigamasūtra IV.15: "The time [needed] by an atom, which is endowed with the most subtle [form] of movement (*paramasūkṣmakriyā*) [, i.e.] which is completely turned around its axis (?),[a] to pass to the [new] place it occupies (lit.: to the place of its immersion; i.e. the next spatial point) is called (*iti*) 'moment' (*samaya*)." (*paramasūkṣmakriyasya sarvajaghanyagatipariṇatasya paramāṇoḥ svāvagāhanakṣetravyatikramakālaḥ samaya iti.*)

Cf. also the Gaṇitasārasaṃgraha by Mahāvīrācārya I.32: *aṇur aṇvantaraṃ kāle vyatikrāmati yāvati/ sa kālaḥ samayo 'saṃkhyaiḥ samayair āvalir bhavet//.*

[a] I have not pursued the question how precisely *sarvajaghanyagatipariṇatasya* (lit.: "turned around by the movement with even its hindermost part") is to be understood. In accordance with Jacobi's translation ("sich um seine eigene Körperlänge weiterzubewegen," *ZDMG* XL 1906, p. 320), I understand that it expresses that the atom has moved completed and not partially (but would a partial movement be possible at all?) onto the next spatial point.

[232] AKBh 176,12f: "What is the measure of a moment? As much as [the time taken] by a moving entity to move from one atom to the next." (*kṣaṇasya punaḥ kim pramāṇam? ... gacchan vā dharmo yāvatā paramāṇoḥ paramāṇvantaraṃ gacchati.*)

Cf. also *Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya (P. 5865 ño 18b4f: *de yaṅ dus ji srid du rdul phra rab kyis rdul phra rab gźan brgal bar gyur pa, de srid kyi dus la skad cig źes byaḥo//*) and Pramāṇanvārttika III.496ab (cited in n. 216).

[233] That this determination of the *kṣaṇa* fits better into the context of Jainism than in that of Buddhism can be made plausible as follows: To speak of the movement by one atom presupposes that empty space is subdivided into spatial atoms which is exactly the case according to the Jainas who maintain that space is a discontinuous substance constituted by spatial points (*pradeśa*). This is not, however, the case in Buddhism, where space is not subdivided into atomic units and where "the movement by one atom" can only be understood as referring to the movement which covers a distance corresponding to the size of one atom. On the other hand, it seems that the concept of space being subdivided into points is not completely absent in Buddhism either. Maintaining that the stream of conciousness (*cittasantāna*) does not — as the Theravādins maintained — move from the place of death to that of rebirth without traversing the entire space between these two points, it is, for instance, taught that it (i.e. the *cittasantāna* in the intermediate state) moves by continuously re-arising at the point adjacent to the one it occupied the moment before (cf. also Vi 201b28-c6 cited in n. 221). This point is referred to as *deśa*, which calls to mind the Jaina term *pradeśa* designating the spatial point.[a]

Moreover, the specification of the moment's duration by movement is at odds with the Buddhist theory of momentariness insofar as according to the latter all conditioned things exist for too short a span of time to allow for any movement at all. Of course, it could be argued that this specification really refers to the disappearance at one, and reappearance at the next point. It is obvious, however, that such an interpretation would be the result of bringing new methaphysical assumptions (i.e. the theory of momentariness of all conditioned things) in accordance with an older pre-existing definition. Besides, such an interpretation would entail that the definition referred to the time between two momentary entities

defined by the movement from one atom to the next. Here, however, this definition may not have been taken over directly from Jainism (as the use of the expression *samaya* suggests), but may, similarly to other doctrinal tenets, have been adopted from Buddhism (as the other definition for *kṣaṇa* which Vyāsa adduces [cited in n. 215] suggests).

§ 2 **2.1** The equation of the *kṣaṇa* within the Buddhist tradition with the duration of transient entities as the shortest conceivable incidents led to the direct determination of the *kṣaṇa* in terms of these entities. Insofar as these entities were in turn regarded as momentary (*kṣaṇika*), the definition of the *kṣaṇa* along these lines came to be intrinsically connected with their characterization.[234] The definition of the Sautrāntikas, for instance, that the *kṣaṇa* lasts "as

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(namely to the interval between the disappearance of one and the reappearance of the next entity) and thus implies that momentary entities within a stream are not contiguous, but are separated from each other by interposing moments — a state, which would be contrary to the *santāna's* uninterrupted continuity. This difficulty could only be solved by arguing that the "disappearance" merely refers to the fact that the old entity has been replaced by a new one (i.e. is not itself a time-consuming process), and that the "re-appearance at the adjacent point" includes the entire existence of the re-arisen entity. According to such a solution, however, the *kṣaṇa* would no longer be defined by movement but by the appearance and existence of a momentary entity. Such a definition would, of course, have nothing left in common with the original definition as the movement by one atom, but would correspond closely to the one given by Vasubandhu in AKBh 176,12f (cited in n. 235). It can, therefore, be concluded that among the Buddhists at least the adherents of the theory of momentariness cannot have devised the specification of the *kṣaṇa* in terms of atomic movement, but must have accepted it without considering its compatibility with the doctrine of momentary existence.

[a] AKBh 120,18f: "Entities (*dharma*), insofar as they exist as series (***santāna***), are observed to appear at other places without being disconnected, just as in the case of the series of rice." (*santāna-varttināṃ hi dharmāṇām avicchedena deśāntareṣu prādurbhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā vrīhisantānasya.*)
AKVy 267,19-24: "For the later matter of the rice-series arises as one that is preceded by matter occurring as a series throughout the space lying between the one place, [viz. the one] from where [the rice] moves away, and the other place, [viz. the one] where it arises [anew]. For this is the doctrine of us *kṣaṇikavādins* (i.e. the propounders of the doctrine of momentariness): When rice is taken from one village to another, then it is not the case that the rice having perished in the former village arises in the other village, even if many *yojanas* (one *yojana* ca. 5 miles) away [from the former], without arising in the space between the villages. What instead? It arises in[, that is, it moves to] the other village gradually by originating and perishing without gaps at the points in the space [between the villages]." (*vrīhisantānapaścāttararūpaṃ hi yato deśāntarād apaiti yatra ca deśantara utpadyate tadantarālasantāna-vartirūpapūrvakam utpadyate. kṣaṇikavādīnāṃ hy ayam asmākaṃ siddhāntaḥ: yadā grāmād grāmāntaram nīyate vrīhiḥ, na sa vrīhiḥ pūrvatra grāme nirudhya tadgrāmāntarāle 'nutpadyamāno 'nekayojanāntarite 'pi grāmāntara utpadyate. kiṃ tarhi? nirantarākāśadeśotpādanirodhakrameṇotpadyate grāmāntare.*)
Cf. Y 19,1: ... *antarābhavasya tad(=cyuti)deśanirantarasya prādurbhavo bhavati.*

[234] That the equation of the *kṣaṇa* with the duration of transient entities entails that these entities are in turn conceived of as momentary (*kṣaṇika*), so that they come to be characterized indirectly by the definition of the *kṣaṇa* is particularly evident in MPPU 171a28f (MPP_L 920f; for the context, cf. n. 262 where MPPU 171a28-b2 is cited) where the duration of mental entities is — contrary to the general trend to adapt the duration of the *kṣaṇa* to that of transient entities — computed on the basis of the standard Abhidharmic calculation of the moment's measure (cf. n. 219):

> "During the instant of the snapping of the fingers there are 60 [points of] time. At every single [point of] time the mind is subject to origination and destruction."

long as the origination of an entity when the entire conditions [for its production] are given"[235] specifies indirectly (for it refers to the entire existence of the originated entity) that momentary entities do not exist beyond origination and do not undergo a time-demanding process of destruction — the latter being only a word denoting that something having existed before does not exist any longer (AKBh 77,13: *bhūtvābhāvo vyayaḥ*). Similarly, the definition of the *kṣaṇa* as the time taken by the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to discharge their function — Vasubandhu concedes that the Sarvāstivādins could put forward such a definition in order to circumvent the problem how to squeeze the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* into one moment — implies that momentary entities are exposed to the causal efficiency of each of the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*.[236]

2.2 In fact, these specifications of the *kṣaṇa* no longer convey a concrete idea about its duration at all,[237] but only serve to characterize the momentary entity. Vasubandhu was bold enough to represent the *kṣaṇa* accordingly in a further definition not as a unit of time but as the mode of existence of momentary entities. According to this definition,[238] the *kṣaṇa* no longer has the same extension as the origination of an entity but actually **is** the origination, an "origination which is characterized by the immediately subsequent destruction [of the originated entity]" (*ātmalābho 'nantaravināśī*).[239] To be *kṣaṇika* (i.e. momentary), that is

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235 AKBh 176,12f: *kṣaṇasya punaḥ kim pramāṇam/ samagreṣu pratyayeṣu yāvatā dharmasyātmalābhaḥ.*

236 AKBh 78,24: "Precisely this is the moment [according to] our [understanding, namely the time] in the course of which all these [activities of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*] are completed." (*eṣa eva hi naḥ kṣaṇo yāvatāitat sarvaṃ samāpyata iti.*)
AKVy 178,18f: "'Precisely this is the moment [according to] our [understanding]' is to say that [the moment] is characterized by the completion of what is to be done [by the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas], and that it is not characterized by [the entity's] destruction immediately after its origination." (*eṣa eva hi naḥ kṣaṇa iti. kāryaparisamāptilakṣaṇo na tūtpattyanantaravināśalakṣaṇa ity arthaḥ.*)

The definition refers specifically to the activity of the mark of duration, old age and impermanence and is meant to solve the problem how these three forces can exercise their contradictory functions in the same moment (cf. § I.C.3.1). The forerunner of this definition can be found in Vi 200a11 cited in n. 101.

237 On this ground Saṃghabhadra criticizes the definition of the Sautrāntikas (NA 521c6-10): "By the Definition: '[The measure of a *kṣaṇa* corresponds to] the obtainment of the own-being (*ātmalābha*, i.e. origination) of an entity when the entire conditions [for its production] are given' it is not yet understood how much time this (and hence the *kṣaṇa*) lasts. And ordinarily (*loke*) the moment (*kṣaṇa*) of an entity (*dharma*) is not perceived. Therefore, if asked what measure [of time] is called 'one *kṣaṇa*,' one ought to answer that the *kṣaṇa's* measure is so and so. Rather than [saying] 'the instant [during which] the *dharma* obtains its own-being (i.e. originates), that is the *kṣaṇa*,' one [should] set forth the measure of the *kṣaṇa* by referring to the *kṣaṇa*. Therefore the principle of his (i.e. Vasubandhu's) explanation is not correct."

238 AKBh 193,2f: *ko 'yam kṣaṇo nāma? ātmalābho 'nantaravināśī. so 'syāstīti kṣaṇikam, daṇḍikavat.*

239 Literally, Vasubandhu's definition in the AKBh sets forth that the *kṣaṇa* "is the origination that is characterized by an immediately following destruction" (for the rendering of the *in*-suffix, cf. p. 191 of Thieme's review of "Wackernagel, J.: Altindische Grammatik II.2: Debrunner, A.: Die Nominalsuffixe" in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* 209, 1955, pp. 182-216; reprinted in *Thieme: Kleine Schriften*

to be endowed with such a *kṣaṇa*, then entails according to Vasubandhu to perish immediately after having originated. Rather than defining *kṣaṇika* as "being of momentary duration," Vasubandhu in this way specifies the nature of this momentary existence and thus excludes alternative conceptions such as that of the Sarvāstivādins.[240]

Wiesbaden 1971, pp. 661-695). Obviously, by this Vasubandhu must have meant that the originated entity and not the process of origination itself vanishes immediately afterwards. It is difficult to reconcile such an understanding with the actual wording.

One approach which has been adopted by Frauwallner (1956, p. 104) and the early LVP (AK_P IV, p. 4, but later given up: 1937, p. 146 n. 1) is the modification of the wording so that the text reads *ātmalābhād anantaravināśī* (or *ātmalābhānantaravināśī*, the wording as quoted by Kamalaśīla [142,19] — provided the text has been edited correctly) instead, so that the *kṣaṇa* would be characterized by Vasubandhu as "ceasing immediately after the origination." This does not make sense, however, because the *kṣaṇa* which is defined by Vasubandhu is the *kṣaṇa* which a momentary entity possesses (see below) so that the destruction immediately after origination should pertain to the momentary entity (*kṣaṇika*) itself and not, as it would do according to the proposed emendation, to the *kṣaṇa* this entity possesses. Moreover, besides the testimony of the TSP, such an emendation lacks the textual basis — all manuscripts used for the edition of the AKBh and AKVy, where the phrase in question is quoted, read *ātmalābho 'n°* — so that it cannot be accepted until more textual evidence can be adduced in support of it.

LVP[a] later tried to solve the problem of Vasubandhu's definition by identifying *ātmalābha* with the essence (*svabhāva, svarūpa*) of the originated entity, maintaining that they are synonymous in this context. Unfortunately, he does not justify how the acquisition of one's being, that is the process of origination, can be identified with the originated essence. This identification is very problematic as it poses the problem how to correlate the qualification of the *kṣaṇa* as *utpādānantarāsthāyisvarūpa* (TS 388) with the Kośa's definition *ātmalābho 'nantaravināśī*. Instead of identifying *ātmalābha* with *svarūpa* and accepting the qualification of *ātmalābha* as perishing immediately after its origination, it is much more obvious to equate *utpāda* with *ātmalābha*. The same applies to Yaśomitra's equation (AKVy 345,19f; text cited in n. 338) of "to be momentary" (*kṣaṇika*) with "to have the nature of perishing immediately after origination" (*utpattyanantaravināśirūpam*) and to the definition of impermanent (*anitya*) as "perishing immediately after the origination" in Pr (281,1: *ye hy anityās, ta utpādasamanantaram eva vinaṣṭāḥ*). Furthermore, LVP's identification of *ātmalābha* with *svarūpa* stands in clear contradiction to Vasubandhu's own explication of his definition in which he explicitly uses *ātmalābha* in the sense of "origination" (AKBh 193,3: *sarvaṃ hi saṃskṛtam ātmalābhād ūrdhvaṃ na bhavati* ...). Besides, in ASBh 50,15, where the *anityatā* of the moment is defined along the same lines (viz. *ātmalābhānantaram avaśyavināśitā*), *ātmalābha* clearly means origination. In the face of this evidence, it is, for all I can see, only possible to come to terms with Vasubandhu's definition if it is understood in such a way that the origination is characterized by destruction not in the sense that it is destroyed itself, but only in the sense that the entity originated by it is destroyed.

[a] LVP 1937, 146 n.1: "'L'*ātmalābha* — "acquisition de l'être,' 'prise de l'existence,' 'coming into existence, birth' (Monier Williams), — n'est pas autre chose que le *dharma* instantané lui-même; équivalents: *svabhāva, svarūpa* (Tattvasaṃgraha)."
LVP 1937, 147: "On nomme *kṣaṇa* l'être (*svabhāva, svarūpa*) de la chose (*vastu*); est *kṣaṇika* ce qui a le *kṣaṇa*. Comme dit Vasubandhu: 'La prise du soi (*ātmalābha* = *svabhāva*) périssant immédiatement, c'est le *kṣaṇa* ...'"

[240] What is implied by Vasubandhu's definition, namely that the *kṣaṇa* is a property (*svabhāva*) of the momentary entity, seems to be explicitly stated by Saṃghabhadra (see n. 241) and possibly also by Śāntarakṣita, namely if *svabhāva* in his adaptation of Vasubandhu's definition (TS 388) should only refer to **one of the** properties of the momentary entity, so that the following translation results:

Vasubandhu's definition of the *kṣaṇa* occurs in the context of the explication of the term *kṣaṇika* (in AK IV 2d) and was possible because the *ika*-suffix in *kṣaṇika* (=momentary) implies a possessive relationship so that the *kṣaṇa* Vasubandhu defined could be looked upon as a property possessed by the momentary entity. Of course, Vasubandhu could also have said that that entity is *kṣaṇika* which lasts for the moment taken by the origination of an entity. Such a circular definition, however, would have only obscured the main point Vasubandhu wants to make, namely that being momentary means to pass out of existence immediately after having originated.

2.3 Saṃghabhadra[241] and Uddyotakāra[242] assailed Vasubandhu's definition on the grounds

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"The nature (*svabhāva*) of the thing not to persist immediately after its origination is called *kṣaṇa*. What is endowed with this [*kṣaṇa*] is considered to be *kṣaṇika*." (*utpādānantarāsthāyi-svarūpaṃ*[a] *yac ca vastunaḥ/ tad ucyate so 'sti kṣaṇaḥ yasya tat kṣaṇikaṃ matam* //388//

However, Śāntarakṣita's definition can also (and admittedly more naturally) be understood differently, because *svarūpa* (i.e. "own-nature") is ambiguous. It can refer either to one particular property of an entity or to the sum of all its properties, that is, to its entire constitution and thus to the entity itself (Cf. Steinkellner: *Dharmakīrti's Hetubindu*, vol. II, Wien 1967, pp. 100-102). Therefore, it is also possible to understand (as LVP did)[b] Śāntarakṣita in such a way that the *kṣaṇa* is not **a** property of the momentary entity, namely to perish immediately after origination, but **the** own-being of that entity (and hence the entity itself) which itself does not endure beyond origination. According to this alternative, *utpādān-antarāsthāyin* is not the property the *svarūpa* consists in, but the property that qualifies the *svarūpa* itself.

[a] In the light of Kamalaśīla's gloss *utpādānantaravināśisvabhāvo* (or *utpādānantaravināśasvabhāvo* according to the edition by Shastri) it seems preferable to understand that *utpādānantarāsthāyi* and *svarūpaṃ* form a compound.

[b] LVP 1937, 147: "L'être (*svarūpa*) de la chose ne dure pas (= périt) immédiatement après la production: c'est ce qu'on nomme *kṣaṇa*. Est *kṣaṇika* ce qui a le *kṣaṇa*."

241 NA 533b23f: "It is not the case that there is a distinct *dharma* being different from the nature which consists in perishing immediately after the obtaining of one's own-being."

In accordance with his interpretation of Vasubandhu's definition, LVP (1937, 146) translates this passage thus: "Il n'y a pas de dharma qui diffère de l'*ātmalābha* qui par nature périt immédiatement." While such a translation is possible, it has the disadvantage that 性, contrary to standard Chinese syntax, follows, rather than precedes, the noun (viz. *ātmalābha*) it qualifies.

242 NyāVārt 837,14-17: "What does *kṣaṇika* (i.e. momentary) mean? ... Now it may in turn be held that the very existence which is characterized by destruction immediately [after origination] is [called] *kṣaṇa* [and that what is endowed with this *kṣaṇa* is called *kṣaṇika*]. Also in such a case [a suffix] having the value of the possessive suffix (*matup*)[a] is not [rightly] employed, because that very [entity] is not due to itself (lit. due to that very [entity]) an [entity] endowed with that." (*kṣaṇika iti sa katham? ... atha punar bhāva evânantareṇa vināśena viśiṣyamānaḥ kṣaṇa ity ucyate,*[b] *tathāpi tenaiva tadeva tadvan na bhavatīti na yukto matvarthīyaḥ.*)

Again in accordance with his interpretation of Vasubandhu's definition, LVP (1937, 146) understands that *kṣaṇa* is here defined as "un existant" ("Si *kṣaṇa* est défini comme un existant (*bhāva*) caractérisé par la destruction immédiate ... "). This understanding has the disadvantage that the *kṣaṇika*-entity would have to be endowed by "un existant" so that there would not even be a conceptual difference between the endowing and the endowed entity — a consequence which would render Vasubandhu's definition very defective indeed. Moreover, to understand *bhāva* as "existence" or even "origination," as I do in accordance with my interpretation of the AKBh, fits the context perfectly. For Vasubandhu's definition is presented as an attempt to avoid the shortcoming of the previous *nirukti*-definition (NyāVārt

that according to it the *kṣaṇa* and the *kṣaṇika*-entity are not two distinct entities as the possessive relationship implied by the *ika*-suffix in *kṣaṇika* (cf. Pāṇini 5.2.115) requires. This charge is rejected by the interlocutor in NA on the grounds that the difference between *kṣaṇa* and *kṣaṇika*-entity is purely conceptual — an argument which Saṃghabhadra takes great pains to repudiate.[243] A similar approach was adopted later by Śāntarakṣita who argues that it is permissible that the *ika*-suffix in *kṣaṇika* does not imply a real possessive relationship,

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837,14f, cited in n. 211), namely that the *kṣaṇika* entity cannot be endowed by destruction (i.e. the *kṣaṇa*) because they are not simultaneous. Thus, by defining the *kṣaṇa* not as destruction but as existence which is immediately followed by destruction, Vasubandhu would ensure the co-existence of the *kṣaṇika*-entity and the *kṣaṇa*. According to LVP's interpretation, by contrast, the dilemma of the moment's definition as destruction would be solved in a far more radical way than is plausible in the given context.

[a] For *matvarthīya*, see L. Renou *Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit*. Paris 1942(?)-1957: s.v. *mat*.

[b] In contrast to this wording, the citation of the NyāVārt in TSP 142,12f reads *bhāvānantaravināśena viśiṣyamānaḥ kṣaṇa ity ucyate*. LVP (1937, 146) favours the reading of the NyāVārt itself and emends the text of the TSP accordingly to read *bhāvo 'nantaravināśena viśiṣyamānaḥ kṣaṇa* .... This should be correct because otherwise (and also if *kṣaṇika* was read instead of *kṣaṇa* in accordance with the variant reading of the NyāVārt) the momentary entity would still be endowed with a destruction of some sort which is precisely what this definition aims to avoid. Moreover, taking *bhāva* as the subject, the definition corresponds to *ātmalābha* in Vasubandhu's definition which will thus be reproduced by Uddyotakara with only a slight modification of the wording (*bhāvo 'nantaravināśena viśiṣyamāno* instead of *ātmalābho 'nantaravināśī*).

[243] NA 533b27f: "One should not argue that [*kṣaṇika*] is said with regard to something seemingly different because the man having a staff is adduced as a similar example."
The position that the term *kṣaṇika* is used without implying the distinctness of *kṣaṇa* and *kṣaṇika*-entity, is here refuted by Saṅghabhadra on the grounds that a similarity between the cited example and the possession of the *kṣaṇa* by the entity is not given, if it is assumed that they are not really distinct from each other. This refutation is only directed against the comparison with the man possessing a staff and leaves the possibility open to discard the example while sticking to the same definition. To counteract such a stance Saṃghabhadra argues in the following (NA 533b28-c2) that the term *kṣaṇika* cannot be used metaphorically:

> "Or one may [maintain] that metaphorically speaking (假) one says *kṣaṇika* since by way of metaphorical language the principle should be so. One should, however, not permit a metaphorical *kṣaṇika* since there is no really existing entity which is *kṣaṇika*. That is to say that if [and only if] there existed entities which were [really] *kṣaṇika* one could concede that there are other [entities] which on the basis of similarity [with these] one could metaphorically call [*kṣaṇika*]. Since there is no [*kṣaṇika*]-entity to be similar with, no imitating metaphoric [can] be established."

The gist of Saṃghabhadra's position is that any metaphorical usage requires that it imitates other instances which are to be understood literally. The metaphorical sunrise, for instance, makes only sense if there are in reality things which arise. In the case of *kṣaṇika*, however, there is no such really existing thing to be imitated as no *kṣaṇika*-entities as defined by Vasubandhu exist in the literal sense implied by the *ika*-suffix. Of course, this argument is not very convincing because the metaphorical usage is limited to the *ika*-suffix, of which there are instances which exist in the literal sense (e.g. the man possessing the staff [*daṇḍika*]). At any rate, it is difficult to see how Saṃghabhadra's argumentation could pose a threat to the position of Śāntarakṣita (see below). For, denying categorically that there is perforce a link between language usage and reality, Śāntarakṣita will not feel compelled to accept Saṃghabhadra's restriction on the use of metaphorical language.

because language is used only conventionally and does not necessarily correspond to reality.[244] In support of this argument, Kamalaśīla adduces a few examples ("the body of the sculpture," "own own-being") where the genitive construction is only used in an inexact manner as a figure of speech without implying a real possessive relationship.[245]

2.4 At least on the surface, Vasubandhu's definition does not identify the *kṣaṇa* with the essence of the momentary entity and hence the entity itself (cf. n. 239). While it is possible, though not certain (cf. n. 240), that such an identification is entailed by Śāntarakṣita's definition of the *kṣaṇa*, there can be no doubt that the term *kṣaṇa* is at times (particularly when it is compounded) employed to refer to the momentary entity itself.[246] An obvious example is the expression *cittakṣaṇa* which is frequently used in the sense of "momentary mental entity."[247] Similarly, in BoBh ($BoBh_W$ 278,10-25 cited in n. 139) *saṃskārakṣaṇa* designates the momentary entity itself and not the unit of time taken by the existence of one conditioned factor as it could also do.[248] And there are also cases where *kṣaṇa* on its own

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[244] TS 389: "And even when there is no difference of entities, it is still not wrong to say 'this is his.' For language is a mere convention devised according to wish." (*asaty apy arthabhede ca "so 'sty asye"ti na bādhyate/ icchāracitasaṃketamātrabhāvi hi vācakam//389//*)

[245] TSP 142,26f: *yathā "svasya svabhāvaḥ," "śilāputrasya śarīram" ity ādāv asaty api vāstave bhede buddhiparikalpitaṃ bhedam āśritya vyatirekaṣaṣṭhīvibhaktir bhavati, tathehāpi bhaviṣyati.*

A corresponding passage is found in the AKBh (78,5-9) where it is argued that, despite the genitive construction in "his characteristic" (*tasya lakṣaṇam*), the characteristic and the qualified entity are not distinct. As examples Vasubandhu cites the hardness of earth (for the Sautrāntika the elements are only names for certain properties) and the rising of smoke (for the *kṣaṇikavādin* the upward movement of smoke is nothing but smoke itself reproducing itself successively at higher points; cf. AKVy 177,19-24). Cf. also Si 5c21f, Si_P p. 64f.

[246] In order to account for the fact that the term *kṣaṇa* may refer both to an instant of time and to the entity existing during this instant, E. Steinkellner renders *skag cig ma* (= *kṣaṇa*) in his translation of Dharmakīrti's Hetubindhu (*Dharmakīrti's Hetubindhu. Teil II. Übersetzungen und Anmerkungen*. Wien 1967. Cf. the remarks on p. 95, note I, 40) by "phase."

[247] Cf. the usage of *cittakṣaṇa* in connection with the description of the path of insight (*darśanamārga*) as for instance documented in AS 67,3f (almost identical wording in the Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā by Haribhadra 347,4f [ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1960, 347,4f]): "These sixteen *cittakṣaṇas* (i.e. momentary mental units) are called the path of insight (*darśanamārga*). The accomplishment of the generation of knowledge with respect to the object of knowledge should be known as one *cittakṣaṇa*." (*ime ṣoḍaśa cittakṣaṇā darśanamārga ākhyātāḥ. jñeye jñānotpattiparisamāptir ekaś citta[la]kṣaṇo* veditavyaḥ//* *emendation confirmed by the Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā).
This usage of *cittakṣaṇa* is also testified in AKVy 176,5, cited in n. 35.

[248] In BoBh, the compound *saṃskārakṣaṇa* could be analyzed either as "the moment which is a conditioned factor" or as "the moment of a conditioned factor." In the latter case, it would refer to the individual momentary segments (i.e. also the momentary entity) making up the series which would be alluded to as conditioned factor. The former analysis is more convincing given that *saṃskārakṣaṇa* is probably formed in analogy with *cittakṣaṇa* where the latter analysis can be excluded.

However, there also occur cases in which *kṣaṇa* retains its original meaning as unit of time in such compounds. Thus, in the Abhidharmic tradition of the Theravādins *cittakkhaṇa* (= *cittakṣaṇa*) sometimes mean "moment taken by a mental entity." This usage concurs with those cases where *kṣaṇa* is compounded with events rather than with entities, as for example in *uppādakkhaṇa* or *accharākkhana*

(i.e. not as part of a compound) is used in the sense of momentary entity. Thus in the controversy whether the so-called marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*) are correlated to momentary conditioned entities or to series formed by them, Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra use *kṣaṇa* to refer to the discrete momentary entity.[249]

2.5 The usage of *kṣaṇa* in the sense of momentary entity documents that the change in the conception of the term *kṣaṇa* was brought to its logical conclusion. Starting out with the basic meaning of "very short time," the *kṣaṇa* came to be understood — reflecting an atomistic conception of time — as "the shortest unit of time," the length of which came to be equated with the duration of mental entities (or transient entities in general) as the briefest conceivable events. Conversely, these entities were understood to be momentary so that the characterization of the moment became a characterization of momentary entities, a constellation which — in the context of the definition of *kṣaṇika* (lit. endowed with a moment; i.e. momentary) — prompted the conceptualization of the moment as the evanescent nature of these entities. Given this identification of the moment with **a** (or in the case of Śāntrakṣita possible even **the**) nature of the entity, it is understandable that *kṣaṇa* was also used to refer to the entity itself, which is after all held to be nothing beyond its properties.

(i.e. the moment of [= the moment taken by] the origination/the snapping of the fingers) (cf. § I.E.1.1).

[249] AKBh 76,29-77,3: *bhagavāṃs tasya saṃskārapravāhasya saṃskṛtatvaṃ pratītyasamutpannatāṃ dyotayitukama idam āha: "trīṇīmāni saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni," na tu kṣaṇasya. na hi kṣaṇasyotpādādayaḥ prajñāyante. na cāprajñāyamānā ete lakṣaṇaṃ bhavitum arhanti.*
AKVy 174,16-18: ***na tu kṣaṇasyeti.*** *pravāhasyaiva saṃskṛtatvaṃ dyotayitukāma idam āha, na tu kṣaṇasya saṃskṛtatvam.*
AKBh 77,18f: *sthitiḥ katamā. utpannānāṃ saṃskārāṇām avināśa iti. na hi kṣaṇasyotpannasyāvināśo 'stīti.*
Cf. Brahmavidyābharaṇa on Brahmasūtra II 2,20 (quoted in Thibaut's translation of the Brahmasūtra [Oxford 1890 — Sacred Books of the East, vol. XXXIV — Vol.1 p. 407] by Advaitānanda Tīrtha [18th century]): "Among the Buddhists an object such as a pot is designated by the word *kṣaṇa* while apart from this [object] there exists no time by the name of *kṣaṇa*." (*bauddhānāṃ kṣaṇapadena ghaṭādir eva padārtho vyavahriyate, na tu tadatiriktaḥ kaścit kṣaṇo nāma kālo 'sti.*)

II. The Origins of the Doctrine of Momentariness

II.A The Momentariness of Mental Entities

1 In § I.B.4 it was documented that the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas only held mental entities to be momentary, while material entities were, with the exception of flames and sounds, considered not to be momentary. Traces of such a conception were also identified in the Abhidharma tradition of the Theravādins (cf. § I.B.3), according to which mental entities are momentary, while material entities last seventeen times as long. Similarly, in Vi 787c22-788a9 (adduced in n. 61) the stance is reported that the sense organs lasts three times as long as the corresponding momentary cognitions. This raises the question of how the position that only mental entities are momentary had developed.[250] In this chapter I will try to establish that the stance that mental entities are momentary evolved a) from the denial of a subject of mental events which in turn is based on the denial of a persisting Self (*ātman*), and b) from the observation of the fleeting nature of these events, and thus is not (as it would have been possible) a reduced version of the original conception that all forms of conditioned entities are momentary. It is important to settle this issue not only for its own interest, but also because of its implications for the further inquiry into the roots of the full-fledged doctrine of momentariness.

§ 2 **2.1** The decisive factor for the doctrine that all mental entities are momentary is, as far as I can see, the denial of a Self insofar as it was understood to entail that the mind is devoid of a lasting, let alone eternal, substance or layer that could function as the subject of psychic events.[251] This position implies that the mind cannot change, as this would presuppose an

[250] The stance that all mental entities are momentary is the result of a doctrinal development within Buddhism. This is borne out by the numerous passages in the *nikāyas* which still conceive of the mind as continuous rather than as a series of mental states. Reference may, for instance, be made to AN I 10,1-4 (quoted in n. 255) or to the simile with the roaming monkey adduced in SN II 95,5-9 (see the citation in n. 258 and the remarks in § II.A.2.3). Cf. also NA 534c14-17 (cited in n. 11) where Saṃghabhadra adduces canonical passages which do not conceive of the mind as momentary, and where he attempts to harmonize them with the doctrine of momentariness. Also the recurring formulations *samudayadhammānupassī cittasmiṃ viharati* etc. in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta (cf. n. 433) indicates that the *citta* was, in contrast to feelings (*vedanā*), originally envisaged of as continuous. Besides, the depiction of meditative practices leaves no doubt that some mental states were not regarded as fleeting but as stable (cf. Kv II.7 [discussed in § II.A.2.5] and the treatment of the yogic absorptions [*samāpatti*] in LAS VI.15-16 [cited in n. 184]). Conversely, there is (to my knowledge) no testimony in the entire *nikāyas* attesting to the stance that all mental entities are momentary.

[251] Whether the Buddha and pre-canonical Buddhism accepted a lasting Self of sorts or explicitly refuted it or ignored this issue as irrelevant cannot be settled conclusively with the textual material available. It is definite, however, that the doctrine that the mind is but a stream of distinct mental states or events does not date back to the beginnings of Buddhism but resulted later from the dogmatic elaboration of the denial of a Self. The denial of an *ātman* does not *per se* entail the denial of a subject of psychic events, and, conversely, as the example of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas shows, the analysis of the mind as a stream of momentary mental events does not necessarily preclude the acceptance of an eternal soul. Thus, I do not base my argument on a supposedly intrinsic link between the denial of a permanent Self and the denial of a subject of psychic events. Rather, I refer to the historic fact that it became the dominant view within the fold of Buddhism that a subject of psychic events does not exist because this

enduring element which accounts for the identity of the entity with itself before and after it has changed. Thus any mental fluctuation, that is, any new thought, perception, feeling or even any stage of a mental process entails the substitution of the old "mind" by a new one.[252] According to Buddhist ontology, each mental event, therefore, constitutes a distinct entity in its own rights which is variably referred to as *vijñāna* (consciousness), as *citta* (mental state, thinking) or as *manas* (mental faculty). Hence, what is commonly perceived as the stable mind is only the uninterrupted flux of mental events devoid of any enduring substratum. From this in itself the momentariness of mental entities does not follow automatically. It only entails that mental entities are impermanent insofar as their substitution by a new mental unit implies their destruction.[253]

2.2 The second factor underlying the momentariness of mental entities is the conviction that the mind is in constant flux, that with great speed mental events follow upon each other without standstill, so that an event, as soon as it has come to be, is replaced by the next one. Such a stance probably followed quite naturally from introspection[254] and was explicitly taught in the sūtras. In AN I 10, for instance, the Buddha says that he "does not even perceive a single other entity which moves on as quickly as the mind" and adds that it is difficult to illustrate this by way of simile.[255]. This sūtra still grasps the mind as a unity

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would be at odds with the doctrine of No-Self (*anātmavāda*).

[252] That mental changes imply destruction and origination once a persisting soul is denied can be witnessed in Śāntarakṣita's argument that the "soul" (the *puruṣa* of the Mīmāṃsakas) would have to undergo origination and destruction whenever the mental states change, if the stance was taken that the soul and its state are not completely distinct (i.e. if it was denied, as the Buddhists do, that there is an unchanging substance which is in no way affected by the fluctuations of the mind).

> TS 268: "And if the states (*avasthā*) were not completely distinct from the *puruṣa*, then, when there is the destruction and origination of these [states], there would also be both [the destruction and origination] of this [*puruṣa*]." (*tatra no ced avasthānām ekāntena vibhinnatā/ puruṣāt, tadvyayotpāde syātām asyāpi tau tathā//*)

[253] According to Vasumitra's doxography (T 2031 16a8, $SBhC_M$ 1b.6 and 7, cited in § I.B.2), the Mahāsāṅghikas maintained that mental entities are, by contrast to matter, not subject to change. This stance shows that the immutability of the mind is not necessarily linked up with the issue of momentariness. It is even conceivable that Vasumitra's silence about the Mahāsāṅghikas' attitude towards momentariness points to a stage in the doctrinal development where they had come to conceive of the mind as a stream of mental states, without deducing the momentariness from this.

[254] The differentiation of mental states is well attested in the Buddhist literature (cf. Schmithausen 1987a, § 5, pp. 318-337) where it plays an important role in the context of the application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) and of the knowledge of the mind of other beings (*cetaḥparyāya-* or *paracittajñāna*). Cf. the explication of the *anityatā* that is characterized by the manifold modes of existence of the mind (*cittacitrākāravṛttilakṣaṇam*) quoted in n. 262.

[255] AN I 10,1-4: *nāhaṃ bhikkhave aññaṃ ekadhammam*[a] *pi samanupassāmi yaṃ*[b] *evaṃ lahuparivattaṃ yatha-y-idaṃ cittam yāvañ c' idaṃ bhikkhave upamā pi na sukarā yāva lahuparivattaṃ cittan ti.*

That the stance expressed in this sūtra is based on the observation of the flux of mental events is indicated by the fact that the Vi illustrates this sūtra, which it has cited before (T 1545 902c11f), by adducing the following differentiation of mental acts according to their quality, according to the sensory organ they are based upon and according to their object (T 1545 902c22-25): "It is said: 'With one

moving from one object on to the next one. This is confirmed by the Vi which explicitly states that it refers not to the mind conceived of as a momentary entity, but as a series.[256]

§ 2.3 **2.3.1** Canonical Buddhism is not a systematic philosophy aiming at maximum coherency. Therefore, it is not self-evident that two disconnected teachings are seen in the context of each other and that the bearing they may have upon each other is worked out. Given the Buddhist preoccupation with the mind, it is, however, only to be expected that this rapidity of mental activity was seen in the light of the analysis of the mind as a flow of mental states. In particular, this may have happened in a meditative context where the attention is focussed onto the mind, as for instance in the course of the application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*). Thus, according to the proposed hypothesis mental entities will have come to be conceived of as evanescent and hence momentary once the rapidity with which mental states succeed upon each other was viewed on the basis of the doctrine that each mental state constitutes a distinct mental entity in its own right.

2.3.2 In support of this hypothesis, the Markaṭasūtra (SN II 94f, Nidānasaṃyukta pp. 115-120, Saṃyuktāgama T 99 81c4-29; extracts quoted e.g. in Tattvasiddhi T 1646 278c1f, in MPPU 200b23f, in NA 534c7-9 [cf. n. 11]; cf. $MPPU_L$ p. 1165 n. 1) can be adduced. Here the Buddha aims at eradicating any identification with or attachment to the mind. Explaining why "it is better if the stupid, uninstructed common man accepts the body which is made up of the four gross elements and not the very mind as his Self,"[257] he contrasts the relative stability of the body with the brevity of mental states.

For this he adduces the simile with the monkey who "roaming through the jungle, the forest, seizes a branch and letting go of it seizes another branch."[258] The original import of this

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individual (lit.: body) the *citta* is at times good, at times bad, at times not determined as to its moral quality; at times it depends on the organ of vision [,of hearing etc.] up to at times it depends only on the mind (*manas*); at times it has as its object the visible (*rūpa*) [, sound etc.] up to at times mental objects.' Because with every kind [of mental event the *citta*] passes on (*saṃcāra*), it was taught that it moves on quickly."

[a] In Kv 205,26-29 where this passage is cited, the reading is *ekaṃ dhammaṃ*.

[b] *yaṃ* is missing in the Kv.

[256] Vi 902c22: "Therefore, [the Buddha] only taught with regard to the series (*santāna*) that the mind moves on quickly."

[257] SN II 94,21-23: *varaṃ bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano imaṃ cātumahābhūtikaṃ kāyam attato upagaccheyya na tveva cittam.*

[258] SN II 95,5-9: "As, oh monks, a monkey roaming through the jungle, the forest, grasps one branch and letting go of it grasps another one, just so that which is referred to as 'thinking' (*citta*) or also 'mind' (*mano*) or also 'consciousness' (*viññāṇa*) after night and after day arises as another and passes away as another." (*seyyathāpi bhikkhave makkaṭo araññe pavane caramāno sākhaṃ gaṇhati, taṃ muñcitvā aññaṃ gaṇhati, evam eva kho bhikkhave yad idaṃ vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam iti pi, taṃ rattiyā ca divasassa ca aññad eva uppajjati aññaṃ nirujjhati.*)[a]

This citation is discussed extensively with the parallel passages and the commentary by Buddhaghosa in n. 449. Suffice it to say here that according to Buddhaghosa (Sāratthappakāsinī II 99,23-27) the canonical formulation that the mind arises as another and passes away as another entity, does not

illustration will have been that the mind is as restless as the movement of a roaming monkey, never pausing at an object, that is, only grasping an object so as to abandon it the next moment just as the monkey does with the branches.[259] Contrary to the very intentions of the sūtra under discussion, the mind at this stage will then still have been conceived of as a unity. Thus the simile will have originally corresponded to such a position as expressed in the *sūtra* dealt with before (AN I 10) illustrating how quickly and uninterruptedly the mind moves from object to object.

In order to illustrate with this simile that the mind is short-lived, the sūtra had to view it in the light of the doctrine that the so-called mind is nothing but a succession of mental events, that each seizing of an object is a distinct mental entity. Thus the seizing and abandoning of a branch by the monkey was likened to the origination and destruction of mind, and the monkey was no longer identified with the mind but with "that which is referred to as 'thought' (*citta*) or also 'mind' (*mano*) or also 'consciousness' (*viññāṇa*)," that is, with the stream of mental events. So as to keep to the structure of the simile, this purely conceptual mind is said to "arise [and pass away] as another and [to arise and] pass away as yet another [distinct entity]" (cf. n. 258).[260] By this application of the simile to a context where the mind is not grasped as a unity, but as a succession of mental events or states which are conceived of as entities, the extreme brevity of these entities becomes implied. For according to the image, mental events have to be devoid of a stable phase, lest the restless mental activity would be interrupted by a pause. Thus it may be concluded that mental events and hence mental entities do not endure, but pass out of existence immediately after they have originated. According to the logic of the simile, they will be as brief as the moment during which the roaming monkey is suspended from a branch.

It seems that this implication is not fully worked out in the Pāli version. Here it is only said that after night and after day one mind arises and perishes and another one arises and perishes. By contrast, in the Sanskrit version and in the Chinese translation of the Saṃyuktāgama (cf. n. 449) this is specified further by adding that this also takes place after every moment. Buddhaghosa (cf. Sāratthappakāsinī II 99,27-31, cited in n. 449) explains the formulation of the Pāli version as due to tradition and adds that in the single moment of

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imply that the mind, after having originated, changes its identity and perishes as another one. Rather the formulation drives at the constant flux, the implication being that the entity perishing is not identical with the one having originated because in the meantime the originated entity has already passed away and been substituted by the origination of a new one (cf. the rendering of this phrase in the text below).

[a] Some scribal errors (*arāññe*, *ānnad*) as well as some *anusvāras* have been emended with the help of Kv 205,36-206,5 where this passage is quoted.

[259] Cf. the visual representation of the 12 members (*nidāna*) of the causal nexus (*pratītyasamutpāda*) in the wheel of life (*bhavacakra*) where a monkey frequently symbolizes consciousness (*vijñāna*) as the reincarnating principle, and, more particularly, is sometimes (e.g. Essen and Thingo: *Die Götter des Himalaya*. München 1989, Tafelband, plate i-28) depicted to represent grasping (*upādāna*).

[260] Besides the artificiality of such a language usage, this entails that much of the visual image conveyed by the simile is lost. How, for example, should the seizing and abandoning of a branch illustrate the origination and destruction of separate mental entities?

snapping the fingers, many hundreds and thousands of *koṭis* of mental entities (*citta*) arise. Of course, already in the Pāli version it must have been clear that new minds arise very frequently and not just twice within twenty-four hours, which according to Buddhaghosa (ibid.), is conveyed literally by the phrase "after night and after day" (*rattiyā ca divasassa ca*). On the other hand, the explicit elaboration in terms of momentariness in the Sanskrit version suggests that only later were the full implications of the adoption of the simile realized. Thus the Markaṭasūtra reflects how the observation of the restlessness and rapidity of mental activity may, once it was seen in the light that the mind is but a stream of distinct mental events, have led to the stance that mental entities originate and perish at every moment.

§ 2.4 **2.4.1** This hypothesis can be further strengthened by the proofs of the impermanence and momentariness of mind adduced in later Buddhist sources, which confirm that the doctrine of selflessness (*anātmavāda*) forms the basis for the conception of mental entities as momentary. These proofs are based on the argument that the various mental acts which make up the stream of consciousness are distinct entities because they differ from each other with respect to the causes and conditions bringing them about, with respect to their object and with respect to their state, that is, their feeling, their intention and their moral character.[261] Since this is taken to imply that these mental acts are impermanent, it is presupposed that any change of mental activity entails the replacement of the old by a new mental entity — that is, the destruction of the old and the origination of a new one.[262] Thus these proofs are based

[261] In the Hsien-yang the treatment of impermanence comprises the refutation of various permanent entities assumed by the Brahmanical schools, among them the perceptive faculty (*buddhi*) (550b6-13) and the soul (*ātman*) (549b22-c1). The arguments advanced accord largely with those adduced in Y 129-137. The perceptive faculty (*buddhi*) of the Sāṃkhyas is identified with what the Buddhists refer to as *citta*, *manas* or *vijñāna*. Thus it is reduced to a concrete mental act which is said to differ according to its object and to its properties, that is whether it is joyful, painful and so on, whether it is tainted by desire and so on, whether it intends good, bad or neutral deeds such as almsgiving and so on. The variation of the state along these lines is also applied to the soul (*ātman*) on account of which it cannot be eternal.

In Kv II.7 the opponent's position that there are cases of mind lasting for an entire day is refuted. Presupposing that all mental entities have to be homogenous as to their mode of existence, it is argued that the mind does not last for a day because of the variety of mental activity within this span of time. The variety of mental acts refers to the quality (be hateful, ignorant etc.; 206,15-19), to the nature of consciousness (visual, auditory etc., 206,14f), to the organ and object of perception (206,23-30) and to the bodily movement it is associated with (because each movement presupposes a distinct volatile impulse [*cetanā*]?; 206,34-207,3).

[262] That the differentiation of the mental states entails the impermanence of the mind is evinced in AS li 89a8-89b3 (D. ri 75b5-7) — and also in the Hsien-yang, cf. appendix, § 1.2 — where one of the 12 forms of impermanence (*anityatā*) distinguished in this text is taught to be characterized by the manifold modes of existence of the mind (*cittacitrākāravṛttilakṣaṇa*[a]):

> "What is the mark of the manifold modes of existence of the mind (*cittacitrākāravṛttilakṣaṇa*)? It is the mind's existence in the form that it is at times endowed with passion and at times free of it and in the same way endowed with hatred and free of hatred, endowed with confusion and free of confusion, collected (*saṃkṣipta*)[b] and diverted (*vikṣipta*), sluggish and energetic, agitated and not agitated, calm and not calm, absorbed and not absorbed and so on." (AS P. li 89a8-89b3, D. ri

on the premise that the mind is devoid of an enduring element and can be reduced to mere mental activity.

This premise is explicitly stated in an analogous argument in the TSi (278bc) where it is proved that the mind is not an enduring unit but a succession of distinct entities. In a first step, mind is defined as consciousness (*vijñāna*; 278b8), thereby denying any enduring substance which may underlie the fluctuations of mental activity.[263] Then it is shown that the different acts of consciousness constitute distinct entities because they differ as to their nature (visual, olfactory etc.), as to the conditions they depend upon (e.g. light and unobstructed vision) and as to their properties (be false or correct etc.).

2.4.2 The following argument adduced in TSi 280a26-28 does not only, as the preceding examples, testify to the fundamental role of the doctrine of selflessness, but also documents — that is, if the proposed interpretation is followed — how the momentariness ensues from the denial of a permanent subject of psychic events once it is seen in the light of the rapidity of mental activity:

"Furthermore, thought (*citta*), [that is,] mind (*manas*), [that is,] consciousness

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75b5-7: *sems sna tshogs kyi rnam par ḥbyuṅ*[c] *baḥi mtshan ñid gaṅ źe na/ res ḥgaḥ ni ḥdod chags daṅ bcas paḥi sems daṅ/ res ḥgaḥ ni ḥdod chags dan bral ba daṅ/ de bźin du źe sdaṅ dag bcas pa daṅ/ źe sdaṅ daṅ bral ba daṅ/ gti mug daṅ bcas pa daṅ/ gti mug bral ba daṅ/ bsdus pa daṅ/ gyeṅs pa daṅ/ byiṅ ba daṅ/ rab tu bzuṅ ba daṅ/ rgod pa daṅ/ mi rgod pa daṅ/ ñe bar śi ba daṅ/ ñe bar mi źi ba daṅ/ mñams par bźag pa daṅ/ mñams par ma bźag pa la sogs paḥi rnam par sems kyi ḥbyuṅ ba gaṅ yin paḥo//*)

The bearing which the differentiation of mental states has upon impermanence is also borne out by MPPU 171a28-b2: "During the short while taken by the snapping of the fingers there are sixty points of time (時). At every single point of time the mind (*citta*) is subject to origination and destruction. Because they arise within a series [the yogi] knows this to be a thought of desire (*rāgacitta*), knows this to be a thought of hatred (*dveṣacitta*), knows this to be a thought of delusion (*mohacitta*), knows this to be a thought of faith (*śraddhācitta*; Lamotte p. 921: *prasādacitta*), knows this to be a pure thought (*viśuddhacitta*), knows this to be a thought of insight (*prajñācitta*), knows this to be a thought of meditation (*dhyānacitta*). The monk (lit.: practitioner) observes the origination and destruction of mind (*citta*) as the water of the stream or as the flame of the lamp."

[a] The emendation of Tatia's reading *cittacittākāra*° is supported by the manuscript.

[b] Schmithausen (1987a, p. 328 n. 109) documents that originally *saṃkṣipta* had a negative connotation referring to a languid state of mind. This clearly does not apply here where *saṃkṣipta* forms the positive counterpart to *vikṣipta* (cf. ASBh 50,17).

[c] P. reads here *ḥgyur* but earlier (li 89a3) also *ḥbyuṅ*; D. (ri 75b1,5) reads both times *ḥbyuṅ*. ASBh, however, reads both in D. (li 36a7) and in P. (śi 45b6) *ḥgyur*. Also the ASVy (D. li 181a2, 181b2 and 4) reads *ḥgyur*. *ḥbyuṅ* must be the correct reading (cf. the end of the sentence).

[263] The underlying conception of the mind as a concrete mental act rather than a faculty becomes particularly clear in TSi 279b21-23:

"Rightly defined, perception is mind (*citta*). As, however, the perception of something visible (*rūpa*) is different from the perception of sound, how can the mind (*citta*) be one? Moreover, as the action of the hand taking the pot is not that very action which again grasps another thing, in the same way the *citta* which grasps something visible (*rūpa*) is not the very *citta* which hears sound."

(*vijñāna*), perish without exception in each moment. Why is that? When a complex of colours, blue and so on, is in front of us, it is able to generate promptly a [corresponding] perception. [Since this perception is made up of a succession of distinct monochrome perceptions] one knows that [*citta* etc.] are without duration."

This argument is based on the presupposition that our visual impressions of the world around us are only polychrome because they are made up of a very fast succession of distinct monochrome perceptions. These perceptions have to be devoid of duration (i.e. be momentary) lest they delay the cognition of the next colour. Since it has been laid down before that the mind is nothing but perception and that the perception of each colour constitutes a distinct mental unit,[264] it follows that mental entities have to be momentary. Thus it can be witnessed here, how the momentariness of the mind is proved by a) grasping the mind as a succession of mental acts and by b) referring to the speed with which these mental acts follow upon each other.[265]

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[264] Cf. TSi 280a12-15: "Furthermore, it is perception that is mind (*citta*). When blue is perceived, it is not the case that then yellow is perceived. Therefore, supposing that enduring for some while blue was perceived, then yellow could not be perceived. Moreover, the times when one perceives blue and when one perceives non-blue are different. One entity (*dharma*) cannot be associated with two points of time. The entity is joined to the point of time and the point of time to the entity." Cf. also the discussion of the latter argument in n. 373.

[265] This interpretation is problematic insofar as the major presupposition is not stated explicitly, namely that multicoloured perceptions are impossible and that the polychrome experience of the world results from a sequence of monochrome sensations. On the other hand, this presupposition may have been alluded to by the preceding explication that the perception of blue is distinct from the perception of yellow (cf. n. 264). More importantly, such a presupposition seems to be implied by the *pūrvapakṣa* (i.e. the opponent's argument which Harivarman refutes here): "Moreover, [one and the same] thought (*citta*) is able to grasp various colours such as blue and so on as a whole and is, therefore, not to be known as momentary" (TSi 279c23f).

Besides, the interpretation advanced here can be strengthened by other sources testifying to the position that the experience of complex objects results from the fast succession of distinct acts of perception. In Vi 64a18-20 (cf. Vi_2 52b9-11 and Vi 64c3-5), for instance, the following position is ascribed to the Bhadanta Vasumitra:

"It is not the case that grasping simultaneously many colours (*rūpa*), one visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) arises. Because of the speed [with which these consciousnesses occur], the non-simultaneous is said to be simultaneous. This (i.e. the impression that they are simultaneous) is [merely] an imagination (*abhimāna*). As it is [merely] an imagination when in the case of the circle formed by revolving fire (*ālatacakra*) something not a circle is said to be a circle."

Such a stance is documented (and also repudiated) in later sources, too. In TS 1246 for instance, so as to establish the position that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is free of conceptualization (*kalpanā*), the position is refuted that the apprehension of an object results from the fast succession of distinct cognitions: "If it is held that consciousnesses arise successively but that there is the imagination that they exist simultaneously due to their fast occurrence as in the case of the glowing coal, [then this is refuted as follows in kārikā 1247-1255]." (*krameṇaivopajāyante vijñānānīti cen matam/ sakṛdbhāvābhimānas tu śīghravṛtter alātavat//*) Cf. also Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (P. 5263 ha 324b7f, LVP p. 168,7-9) by Candrakīrti and Madhyamālaṃkāra by Śāntarakṣita (kā 24; P. 5285 sa 58a4 = p. 84 in the edition *Madhyamālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla* by M. Ichigō, Kyoto 1985.)

In ḥJam dbyaṅs bźad pa's account of the Sautrāntikas (Wassiliew 1860, p. 312 [= p. 284 in the

2.5 The theory that invariably all mental entities are momentary will not have followed automatically from the observation of the flux of mental activity in the light of the fragmentation of the mind into distinct mental entities. Besides the fact that the extreme evanescence of mental entities had to be conceptualized in terms of momentariness,[266] the development of this theory requires that the intuitively plausible momentariness of ordinary mental events was also accepted with regard to such states of mind where this was less obvious, as for instance in the case of certain meditations where any mental fluctuation is suspended. In Kv II.7 the Andhakas (ascription according to Kv-a p. 57) maintain, for instance, that certain thoughts (*citta*) can last for an entire day (*ekaṃ cittaṃ divasaṃ tiṭṭhatīti* p. 204,17) with which they refer, following the commentary, to the mind absorbed in meditation (*samāpatticitta*) and to sub-conscious states (*bhavaṅgacitta*). They even argue that the mind of the deities in the immaterial sphere (i.e. in the *ārūpyadhātu*) lasts for 20 thousand aeons (*kalpa*), that is, for the entire duration of their life, because in the absence of a material body the destruction of their mind is tantamount to their death, so that their mind cannot perish before their span of life (*āyus*) has elapsed. Similarly, in the Śāriputrābhidharma the mind (*citta*) absorbed in the "thunderbolt-like-contemplation" (*vajropamasamādhi*) is held to persist for immeasurable time (cf. n. 42).

That momentariness is expounded also with regard to these special instances requires that the momentariness of ordinary mental entities had been developed into a rule or doctrine about the mode of existence of mental entities in general. Given the tendency characteristic for Buddhist scholasticism to unify the properties of all entities pertaining to the same class, there will have been the urge to apply the principle of momentariness also to those mental states where this is less evident or even problematic. This can in fact be witnessed in Kv II.7 (p. 206,10-207,25) where the position of the Andhakas is refuted on the grounds that it is not coherent since they do not hold ordinary consciousness to last for an entire day, nor do they accept that beings below the realm of space-infinity are endowed with one and the same mind during their entire life (cf. n. 261).

§ 3 **3.1** To sum up, according to the hypothesis advanced here, mental entities will have come

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Russian original]), this stance is illustrated by the perforation of a pile of hundred lotus petals by a sharp needle (cf. the application of this simile in n. 223). Though the pile seems to be pierced at once (= experience of a variegated object), as a matter of fact one petal is pierced after the other (= one colour is perceived after the other). Cf. the Sāhityadarpaṇa by Viśvanātha where the perception of what is not directly expressed, but only insinuated (*vyaṅgya*) in poetry is taught to be built up successively. On account of its speed, so Viśvanātha, this process is not observed (i.e. it seems as if the perception in question arises at once), just as hundred lotus petals seem to be perforated at once though they are actually pierced one after another. (*atra vyaṅgyapratīter vibhāvādipratītikāraṇakatvāt kramo 'vaśyam asti kintūtpalapatraśatavyatibhedaval lāghavān na saṃlakṣyate.* ad no. 255, p. 102 in the edition by Roer, Calcutta 1850-1875, repr. Osnabrück 1980)

[266] The identification of the extreme brevity of mental event with the duration of a moment will have followed from the use of *kṣaṇa* which at this stage was not yet a precisely defined unit of time, and, in fact, never became so in Theravāda, but simply denoted the smallest unit of time under consideration (see § I.E.1.1).

to be looked upon as momentary when the fleeting nature of mental events was viewed in the light of the conceptualization of the mind as a flow of discrete mental entities, which ultimately is based on the denial of a persisting Self. Considering the plausibility of this explanation and the textual evidence which can be adduced to substantiate it, I think it can be excluded that the momentariness of mental entities resulted from the partial adoption of an all-encompassing theory of momentariness and in this sense is intrinsically bound up with the conception that all forms of conditioned entities are momentary. To be sure, the fact that the doctrine of momentariness originated on its own grounds does not necessary entail that the full-fledged doctrine of momentariness was only developed later in a second step which then will not have been taken by all schools. This is, however, suggested by the fact that the textual evidence for the conception that mental entities are momentary is older than the testimony to the full-fledged doctrine of momentariness.[267]

3.2 The findings of this chapter are important for the further inquiry into the roots of the doctrine of momentariness. For they raise the possibility that the all-encompassing doctrine of momentariness was developed on the basis that mental entities are momentary. Such a possibility, which will be scrutinized in the next chapter, accords with the deduction of the momentariness of matter from the presupposed momentariness of the mind, as it is attested in various forms in the Yogācāra sources. Moreover, even if it should turn out that the presupposed momentariness of mental entities was of no immediate consequence for the formation of the doctrine that all *saṃskāras* are momentary, the analysis how mental entities came to be conceived of as momentary is still relevant because it is possible that the all-encompassing momentariness was "discovered" along the same lines as the momentariness of mental entities. In chapter II.C, I will argue that this is indeed the case and refer back to the findings of the present chapter as corroborating evidence.

[267] Reference may be made to the version of the Markaṭasūtra preserved in the Nidānasamyukta (cited in n. 449) according to which mental events arise at every moment, while the body may last up to one hundred years and more. The greater antiquity of the stance that all mental entities are momentary is also suggested by the fact that this issue (Cittaṭṭhitikathā) is treated in the first half of the KV (viz. VII.2), whereas the momentariness of all phenomena (Khaṇikakathā) is only dealt with at the very end of the KV (viz. XXII.8) which indicates a later time of incorporation into the KV (cf. the remarks in § I.A.2.1).

II.B The Deduction of the Momentariness of all Conditioned Entities from the Momentariness of the Mind

1 It has been argued in the preceding chapter that the momentariness of mental entities was in all likelihood derived independently from that of all conditioned entities. This raises the question whether the all-encompassing momentariness resulted from the extension of the scope. Such a course of development is indeed suggested by the numerous arguments which prove the momentariness of all conditioned entities by deducing from the presupposed momentariness of mental entities that matter, too, is momentary. This type of argumentation is found in the MSA(Bh), Hsien-yang, AS(Bh), NA and, as the opponents' opinion to be refuted (*pūrvapakṣa*), in the YSBh and the sub-commentaries.[268] In the following, these arguments will be reviewed in order to examine whether they were only devised retrospectively to prove the momentariness of all conditioned entities, or whether they possibly reflect the considerations which led on the basis of the mind to the acceptance that matter, too, is momentary.

To start with, the arguments are arranged according to their structure in the following table reproduced on p. 124. I have followed the sequence as it is found in MSA XVIII.83bcd which I regard as the oldest source advancing the type of argumentation reviewed here (cf. n. 340).[269] The arguments subsumed under 1b) and 6), which are adduced later in the MSA (XVIII.85d, 88c and 91c), have been placed into the sequence as seemed fitting. The arguments are summarized only by key terms which will make more sense once they have been dealt with in the course of this chapter. Under the heading "scope of the argument," I have specified which kind of matter the argument relates to. The argumentation which is based on the appropriation of the body (subsumed under 2), for instance, only refers to corporeal matter. In the case of the MSABh (with the exception of 1a), 1b) and 6)[270] and

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[268] — MSA XVIII: 83bcd, 85d, 88c, 91c; MSABh: 150,28-151,14; 152,14-16; 154,17-21; 153,8f, 154,5f
— Hsien-yang 548c22-549a3
— AS P. li 89a4-6, D. ri 77a3-5; ASBh 52,8-53,2
— NA T 1562: 534b29-c7
— YSBh introducing YS IV.16: 434,3-5; hereon the Vivaraṇa attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, p. 343,22-30.

[269] MSA XVIII.83: *pariṇāmopalabdheś ca taddhetutvaphalatvataḥ/ upāttatvādhipatyāc*[a] *ca śuddhasatvānuvṛttitaḥ//*

[a] This emendation of Levi's reading *adhipatvāc* is confirmed by the manuscript A of Ōtani. It is also supported by the *pratīka* (MSABh 151,4) as well as by the Tibetan translation (P. phi 254b7 and 256b1).

[270] The arguments subsumed under 1b) and 6) are taken from a different context where they are advanced to prove specifically the momentariness of bodily matter (1b), of matter pertaining to the group of mental objects (*dharmāyatanaparyāpannaṃ rūpam*) in general (6b), and of meditative images in particular (6a). As for the argument subsumed under 1a), it is asserted that it only refers to the sensory organs and their objects (*cakṣūrūpādi*). This reflects that, in contrast to the various ways in which mind effects matter, the causation of mind by matter was held to be limited to the production of perception by the respective organ and object.

of the Hsien-yang the specification of the scope has been provided by me. It is not expressly stated in these two texts, because there the arguments do not deduce momentariness directly, but are advanced as further proofs that all conditioned factors are effected by the mind.[271] In their case, only in a second step is momentariness deduced on the grounds of this causal linkage. As can be gathered from the table, this is the most frequent mode of deriving momentariness. It will be discussed in some detail after all arguments have been dealt with.

Though I have considered all the relevant arguments known to me,[272] the table may not be complete. Given the vastness of the pertinent Buddhist literature, it cannot be excluded that there are more arguments which are relevant in this context. It is hoped that they would not substantially affect the conclusions to which I come on the basis of the arguments examined here.

[271] The arguments refer to the production of all conditioned entities. Insofar as the momentariness of mental entities is presupposed, they, however, only aim at the material entities.

[272] However, I have not listed in the table the argument found in VinSg (cited in n. 327), because this argument is kept in very general terms and does not specify why all conditioned factors should be the product of the mind (*cittaphala*).

TEXT	RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIND (*CITTA*) AND MATTER (*RŪPA*)	BASIS ON WHICH MOMENTARINESS IS DEDUCED	SCOPE OF ARGUMENT
1a) MSA(Bh)	perception	causality	objects and sensory organs
1b) JP/Vi, MSA(Bh), AS(Bh)	perception (MSA only: causation of mind)	relationship between basis (*āśraya*) and supported entity (*āśrita*)	*āśraya* (JP/Vi, MSABh: sensory organs; ASBh: entire body)
1c) *pūrvapakṣa* in YSBh and Vivaraṇa	perception	existential dependence upon perception	outer objects (*bāhya artha*)
2) MSA(Bh), AS-(Bh), NA	appropriation of the body	- causality (MSA) - existential dependence of the body upon the mind (NA, ASBh)	corporeal matter
3) AS(Bh), NA; cf. MSA(Bh)	bodily changes caused by the mind	body changes in accordance with the mind at every moment	corporeal matter
4) MSA(Bh)	domination (*ādhi patya*) of the mind	causality	corporeal matter
5) MSA(Bh), Hsien-yang, AS(Bh)	manipulation of matter according to yogic will (*adhimokṣa*)	causality (MSA, Hsien-yang); specific process of manipulation (ASBh)	manipulated matter
6a) MSA(Bh), Hsien-yang	generation of images in meditation (*pratibimba*)	causality (Hsien-yang); existential dependence (MSABh)	meditative images (*pratibimba*)
6b) MSA(Bh)	matter pertaining to the group of mind objects depends upon the mind.	causality (so SAVBh)	matter pertaining to the group of mind objects
7) MSA(Bh), Hsien-yang, AS(Bh)	conditioning of matter by karma	causality	corporeal and external matter

§ 2 **2.1 1) Perception**

According to the canonical formula "visual consciousness arises in dependence upon the eye and the visible" (*cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ*),[273] cognition is dependent upon the respective sensory organ and object. This dependence of the mind on matter is exploited in the arguments 1a) and 1b). Whereas these arguments deduce the momentariness of matter from the momentariness of the entity depending upon it (i.e. the mind), all other arguments invert the relationship and refer to the dependence of matter upon mind. This holds good also for 1c), which reflects a more advanced stage of Buddhist thinking than 1a) and 1b), and presupposes, in contrast to them, that the object is dependent upon cognition.

2.1.1 1a) MSABh 151,1-3 comments on the argument in MSA XVIII.83b which derives the momentariness of sense organs and objects from their "being-the-cause of something [momentary]" (*taddhetutva*, MSABh: *kṣaṇikahetutva*).[274] The MSABh explains that this reasoning refers to the causation of perception by the sensory organs and objects. Momentariness is deduced on the grounds that the momentariness of the effect implies the momentariness of its cause. This type of argumentation on the basis of the causal relationship will be examined below in § II.B.2.8.

2.1.2 1b) The arguments subsumed under 1b) only refer to the sensory organs and not to the objects. As the base (*āśraya*) on which cognitions are based (*āśrita*), the organs are held to have the same duration as those cognitions. Already in the JP (998c20-24, T 1543 876b18-22; translated in n. 27), the latest of the canonical Sarvāstivāda works, it is taught that the four gross elements constituting the matter of the sensory organs (*indriyamahābhūta*) arise, abide and perish together with their respective mental act (*citta*), which, provided the mental acts are conceived of as momentary in this context, implies their momentariness (cf. n. 28). This is taught, however, apart from the issue of momentariness and there is no indication in the JP that this simultaneity was taken to imply the momentariness of the sense organs or even of all material entities (cf. § I.A.2.2). In the Vi, by contrast, this passage is interpreted as the demonstration that not only mental, but also material entities are momentary (Vi 787c17-23;

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[273] E.g. SN II 72,18f; SN IV 33,22f; cf. AK_{P} II, p. 105 n.4.

[274] MSABh 151,1-3: "The mind (*citta*) is commonly known to be momentary, and the other conditioned factors, [namely] the eye, the visible and so on [are commonly known] as its cause. Therefore, it is proved that they also are momentary. It is, however, not possible that something momentary (i.e. mind) originates out of something non-momentary (i.e. matter), as it is said (*iti*) [to be impossible that] something impermanent [originates] out of something eternal."[a] (*kṣaṇikaṃ hi cittaṃ prasiddhaṃ, tasya cānye saṃskārāś cakṣūrūpādayo hetutaḥ*[b]. *tasmāt te 'pi kṣaṇikā iti siddhaṃ. na tv akṣaṇikāt kṣaṇikaṃ bhavitum arhati, yathā nityād anityam iti.*).

[a] The last sentence explaining why the causal relationship implies the momentariness of the cause is cited (again) and discussed in n. 331.

[b] Possibly *hetavaḥ* should be read instead of *hetutah*. This is suggested by the Tibetan translation (P. phi 256a7f, D. phi 232b6f: *sems ni skad cig mar rab tu <b?>sgrub paḥo// deḥi rgyu ni mig <daṅ gzugs> la sogs pa ḥdu byed gźan dag yin no//*). Cf. also the Chinese translation T 1604 646c22.

translated in n. 29). Accordingly, the Vi argues on the basis of the simultaneity of sense organ and consciousness when it reasons that three units of consciousness may not arise and perish while one sense organ does (as the proponents of the doctrine of three moments contend), because "cognitions (*vijñāna*) have [both] origination and destruction in accordance with their base (i.e. originate and perish when their base does)" (Vi 788a1f and 8f; cf. the translation of the entire passage in n. 61).

As in the Vi, so also in the MSABh and ASBh the momentariness of the sense organs — in the ASBh even of the entire body[275] — is deduced from their function as the base for perception. In the MSABh the relationship between the base and the entity supported by it is likened to that of a cart and the passenger, the argument being that the passenger only moves when the cart does.[276] Thus the constant rise and destruction of consciousness (= the movement of the passenger) implies that of the sensory organs (= the movement of the cart).[277] In the ASBh it is argued that the basis gives rise to the supported entity by its destruction so that they are not simultaneous, but stand in a causal relationship implying a time difference. The origination of a new mind entity at every moment implies that at every preceding moment the sensory organ and body perish in their function as basis and are thus momentary.[278]

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[275] The ASBh takes it as self-evident (*prasiddha*) that not only the sensory organs but the entire body are the basis for the origination of mental entities.

[276] Strictly speaking, he could move on the cart from its front to the back, etc. Possibly Sthiramati (SAVBh P. tsi 189b2-6) wanted to exclude such a possibility when he exemplified the relationship with a mounted horse and the rider.

[277] — MSABh 152,14-16: "In the case of the origination [of consciousness] on account of the [sensory organs'] functioning as a basis, [the momentariness of the organs ensues] because [without the basis being momentary] the-being-based-upon-it [of the consciousness] is impossible. For if the basis abides, it is not possible that [the entity] based upon it does not abide, just as it is not possible that the passenger of a cart does not abide while the cart does. For otherwise the functioning as the basis would not be possible." (*āśrayabhāvenotpattāv āśritatvāsaṃbhavāt. na hi tiṣṭhati āśraye*[a] *tadāśritasyānavasthānaṃ yujyate, yāne tiṣṭhati tadārūḍhānavasthānavad*<.> *anyathā hy āśrayatvaṃ na saṃbhavet.*)

— MSABh 154,17-19: "Again he (i.e. the opponent) should be asked thus: 'Do you maintain that the passenger moves while the cart abides?' If he answers, 'Of course not', he should be spoken to thus: 'When the eyes and so on (i.e. the other sensory organs) abide, it is [then also] not possible that the consciousness based on it moves as a series [of moments]." (*punaḥ sa idaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ: "kaccid icchasi yāne tiṣṭhati yānārūḍho gacched" iti. yadi "no hī" ti vadet, sa idam syād vacanīyaḥ: "cakṣurādiṣu tiṣṭhatsu tadāśritaṃ vijñānaṃ prabandhena gacchatīti na yujyate".*)

Prabandhena is ambiguous and refers both to the perpetuity of the movement and to the mode of existence, the nuance translated here. The ambiguity is clearly brought out by Sthiramati's rendering of *prabandhena* as *skad cig maḥi rgyun gyis rgyun du* (SAVBh P. tsi 189b7; in D. tsi 161b1 *skad cig maḥi* is missing).

[a] *ca* in Levi's edition has been elided in accordance with manuscript A and B of Ōtani.

[278] ASBh 52,16-20: "**[As mind and the mental factors are momentary, so also matter is momentary] because it is the basis for the mind** (*citta*). The body with the sensory organs is commonly known to be the basis of the mind. That which serves as the basis for the origination of something is not seen to do so without perishing itself, as in the case of firewood, the seed and so on [which are the basis] for fire, the sprout, and so on. Therefore, it is proved that the [body] is destroyed at every moment

The fact that the simultaneity of sense organ and consciousness was taught in the JP independently from the issue of momentariness suggests that this simultaneity was not postulated as a consequence of the acceptance of the doctrine of momentariness, but had been arrived at on other grounds. Given that there is to my knowledge no clear testimony to the doctrine of momentariness in the entire Abhidharmapiṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins, it is well possible that this had happened even before the doctrine of momentariness was adopted. Considering the argumentation employed in the Vi, MSABh and ASBh, this raises the possibility that the doctrine of momentariness resulted from the elaboration of the implications that the material sense organs are simultaneous with the cognitions they generate. For it is feasible, given the Buddhist tendency to generalize qualities, that the momentariness of the gross elements of the sense organs, which is implied by their simultaneity with mental entities, was generalized into a property characterizing gross matter in general and thereby applying to all forms of material entities. As suggested by the ASBh, which considers the entire body as the basis of perception, this process may have happened in two stages. Thus the momentariness of the sense organs, which itself will have been deduced in a previous step from the momentariness of the mind, will have first been extended to encompass all corporeal matter and on this basis also all inanimate matter will have come to be conceived of as momentary in a further step.

Such a hypothesis presupposes that the simultaneity of sense organs and cognitions was understood in the pregnant sense that their existence is completely congruent. This is indeed the case in the JP which, as mentioned before, explicitly teaches that sense organ and cognition arise, persist and perish together. There can be no doubt, however, that initially the simultaneity of sense organ and perception was not understood in such a pregnant sense, but only entailed a partial overlapping, viz. that at the time of the cognition the corresponding sense organ exists, too.[279] Thus, the simultaneity of cognition and sense organ will originally not have meant that the sense organ cannot exist before and after the corresponding cognition.[280] Hence, under the terms of the hypothesis considered here the simultaneity

because it functions at every moment as the basis for the mind." (***cittāśrayatām upādāya;*** *cittasya hi sendriyaḥ kāya āśrayaḥ prasiddhaḥ; yasya ca ya utpattyāśrayo, nāsau svavināśam antareṇa tasyāśrayībhavan dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathāgnyaṃkurādīnām indhanabījādikaḥ. tasmāt pratikṣaṇaṃ cittasyāśrayabhāvāt pratikṣaṇam eva vinaśyatīti siddham.*)

279 Cf. the "Three-Moments"-doctrine cited in Vi 787c22-788a9 (adduced in n. 61) according to which the sense organs last for three moments so that they also exist when the momentary cognitions they generate do not exist. Reference may also be made to the doctrine of the Theravādins (cf. § I.B.3) that the cognized object (as all other forms of matter) lasts seventeen times as long as the discrete acts of cognition.

280 That it requires additional considerations to deduce the complete congruency of the sense organ and cognition from their relationship as basis and supported entity is borne out by the artificial argumentation that is advanced in the MSABh (see n. 277) in order to prove that the sense organs originate and perish together with the cognitions they generate. This argumentation equates the standstill of cart and passenger with the duration of *vijñāna* and organ, and associates the subjection to continuous origination and decay with locomotion. This difficulty is glossed over by the use of derivatives of the root *sthā* (*tiṣṭhati* and *anavasthāna*) which refers both to spatial as well as temporal fixation (cf. "to

came to acquire its pregnant sense in a first step, and on this basis the momentariness was deduced in a second step. This raises the question of which reasons could have been so pressing — certainly not those adduced in the MSABh (cf. n. 280) — to define the simultaneity of sense organs and cognitions as complete congruency, even though this would entail the contra-intuitive consequence that the sense organs, which hitherto had been conceived of as persisting, should now be regarded as constantly originating and perishing.

I have not been able to pursue this question systematically within the framework of the present study. However, it seems to me that the testimony of the JP is, in any case, not a sufficient textual basis for the presumption that the pregnant understanding of simultaneity had been established as such an undisputed tenet among the Sarvāstivādins (or some other school) that even such a far-reaching and contra-intuitive consequence as the momentariness of corporeal matter could have been derived from it.[281] On the other hand, I find it con-

abide"): *tiṣṭhati* qualifying *āśraya* means one time "fixed (at one place)" and one time "enduring (as the selfsame entity)," *anavasthāna* means with regard to the passenger "non-locomotion," while it means "non-fluctuation" with regard to consciousness. Similarly, the movement which is attributed to consciousness (*prabandhena gacchati*, i.e. " ... consciousness moves as a series [of moments]") is not a movement in space but in time (i.e. the phrase refers to the reproduction of the stream of consciousness at every moment).

That it was by no means self-evident to see the relationship between basis and supported entity in the light of the relationship between cart and passenger is borne out by the objection brought forward against it (MSABh 154,19-21), namely that the relationship between *vijñāna* on one hand and senses and object on the other hand can be illustrated differently so that the endurance of the basis (the wick) and the fluctuation of the supported entity (flame) is entailed:

> "If [the opponent] speaks thus: 'Is it not seen that when the flame which is based on the wick moves as a series [of moments], the wick abides?' this should be answered to him: 'It is not seen because due to the series of this [flame], a change of the wick (i.e. its burning down) is brought forth at every moment [so that it does not abide].'" (*yady evam vadet: "nanu ca dṛṣṭaṃ varti-saṃniśrite pradīpe prabandhena gacchati vartyā avasthānam" iti, sa idam vacanīyaḥ: "na dṛṣṭaṃ tatprabandhena vartyāḥ pratikṣaṇam vikārotpatter" iti.*)

Also Sthiramati (SAVBh P. tsi 176b6f; D. tsi 150a2) admits of a different illustration of the relationship between basis and supported entity:

> "Further, when the cloth is burnt, the colour blue and so on based upon the cloth will necessarily also be burnt. When the colour blue is not burnt, it is not possible that still the cloth is burnt." (*gźan yaṅ ras tshig na ras la brten paḥi kha dog sṅon po la sogs pa yaṅ gdon mi za bar tshig par ḥgyur ro// gal te kha dog sṅon po ma tshig na ras kyaṅ tshig par mi rigs so//*).

[281] It could be held that the passage in the JP as the starting point and its interpretation in the Vi as the conclusion bear witness to the "discovery" of the momentariness of material entities in the way suggested above. Given that the proof of momentariness on the basis of the sense organs' function is more characteristic for the Yogācāra school and to my knowledge not recorded in any other Sarvāstivāda or Sautrāntika source, I think it is more likely, however, that the interpretation in the Vi did not evolve from the occupation with the JP, but had been superimposed from without and possibly been incorporated in the Vi some time after its initial compilation.

Also the derivation of the momentariness on the basis of the relationship between sense organs and cognitions as it is documented in the ASBh and MSABh will in all likelihood have been devised retrospectively. In the case of the MSABh, this is suggested by the artificial argumentation employed to substantiate the claim that sense organ and consciousness must originate and perish together because the former functions as the base for the latter (see n. 280). As for the ASBh, this impression is conveyed

ceivable that considerations about the simultaneity of the sense organs with the mental entities will have contributed towards the process -- at the very least, by rendering the position that things constantly undergo destruction and origination less implausible — that led to the conviction that not only mental, but also material entities are momentary.

2.1.3 1c) As can be seen, the arguments under 1a) and 1b) operate on the basis that cognitions are dependent upon their respective sensory organ and object. This relationship is, as mentioned above, inverted in the argumentation of the opponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) as it is reported in the YSBh by Vyāsa and the Vivaraṇa thereon (attributed to Śaṅkarācārya) in the introduction to YS IV.16.[282] After the position of the Vijñānavādins that the objects of the

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by the premise that a base can only generate an entity if it itself undergoes destruction. Such a reasoning hardly accords with a doctrinally unprejudiced way of looking at things, and already presupposes the principle underlying the doctrine of momentariness, namely that the momentary entities within a series generate the subsequent entity. This is borne out by the illustration with the sprouting of the seed which is understood in the ASBh in such a way that the seed does not develop into a sprout, but is the basis which perishes and thereby gives rise to the sprout.

Thus the examination of the argumentation in the MSABh and ASBh as well as different considerations in the case of the Vi suggest that the doctrine of momentariness had been developed in a different context, and that the derivation of the momentariness of all conditioned entities on the basis of the sense organs' relationship with consciousness has been devised retrospectively in order to prove the doctrine of momentariness.

[282] YSBh 429,1f (introducing YS IV.16): "Some maintain: 'The object only exists simultaneously with the cognition (*jñāna*) [of it], because it is something to be experienced (*bhogyatvāt*) as in the case of joy and so on '. In this way they refute [that one object] may be common [to several cognitions] and deny the very substance of the thing (i.e. its existence) in earlier and later moments [than its cognition]." (*ke cid āhuḥ: "jñānasahabhūr evārtho bhogyatvāt sukhādivad" iti. ta etayā dvārā sādhāraṇatvaṃ bādhamānāḥ pūrvottarakṣaṇeṣu vasturūpam*[a] *evāpahnuvate.*)

Vivaraṇa (343,22-30): "Others among those very Buddhists, accepting the [existence of] outer objects, **maintain: 'The object only exists simultaneously with the cognition (*jñāna*) [of it]**. As the consciousness (*vijñāna*), which is devoid of a substratum (*dharmiśūnya*), arises and perishes every moment so the object arises and perishes exactly with the cognition (*jñāna*) of it [at every moment], **because it is something to be experienced, as in the case of joy and so on**. As things to be experienced, which are of such kind as joy, pain and so on, arise and perish with the consciousness [of them] and are not common [to several cognitions], so also [outer] objects like a pot and so on only arise and perish at the same time as the consciousness [of them], because they are something to be experienced. Thus **they**, too, like the Vijñānavādins, **refute that [one object] may be common [to several cognitions]**, that is, be the object of several cognitions [taking it as] agreeable and so on (as it is put forward in sūtra IV.15). [Thus by maintaining] that the thing does not exist [before or after its cognition], **they deny the substance of the thing (i.e. its existence) in the earlier and later moments**, [i.e.] in those [moments] which precede and follow the origination of the consciousness of it." (*eṣām eva bauddhānām anyatame bāhyam artham abhyupagacchanta* ***āhuḥ: "jñānasahabhūr evārthaḥ***. *yathā vijñānam pratikṣaṇaṃ dharmiśūnyam utpadyate vinaśyati ca, tathā sahaiva jñānenārtho vij[ñ]āyate*[b] *vinaśyati ca,* ***bhogyatvāt sukhādivat***. *tadyathā sukhaduḥkhādirūpaṃ bhogyaṃ vijñānasahotpattivināśam asādhāraṇaṃ, evaṃ ghaṭādir artho 'pi vijñānasamānasamayajanmavināśa eva, bhogyatvād" iti. te 'pi tathaiva vijñānavādivat* ***sādhāraṇatvam*** *anekasukhādicittālambanatvaṃ* ***bādhamānāḥ, pūrvottarakṣaṇeṣu*** *svakīyavijñānotpatteḥ paurastyeṣu pāścāteyeṣu ca "vastu nāstī" ti* ***vastusvarūpam evāpahnuvate.***)

[a] The Vivaraṇa reads *vastusvarūpaṃ*.

senses only appear in the mind has been rejected in the preceding *sūtra*, the stance is disproved that external objects (*bāhya artha*) do exist but only in dependence upon the mind perceiving them. The Buddhists are credited with a position according to which outer objects only exist as long as they are actually perceived so that they arise and perish in every moment together with the perception of them. They are reported to argue that what applies to non-external objects of perception such as pain or joy (*sukhaduḥkhādirūpaṃ bhogyaṃ*), namely that they only exist with the perception of them (there can be no unperceived pain), also has to apply to external things such as a pot because they, too, are objects of perception (*bhogyatvāt*).[283] If this argumentation renders the Buddhist position without distorting it (see n. 283), then it raises the possibility that the momentariness had become extended to material entities, because, being regarded as potential (if not actual) objects of perception, their mode of existence was determined in analogy with mental objects.[284] Given that the momentari-

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[b] If *vijñāyate* was adopted as the correct reading, the translation should run as follows: "...so the object is perceived by the cognition [and hence arises] and perishes with it [at every moment]...."

[283] This seemingly unconvincing argument derives some plausibility from the particularities of the classical syllogism (*anumāna*) in Buddhism with its three conditions (*trairūpya*). So as to be valid this syllogism only requires that the logical reason (*hetu*, here *bhogyatva*, i.e. to be the object of experience) 1) inheres in the *pakṣa* (i.e. the subject of the syllogism, here external objects), 2) that it inheres in at least one entity other than the *pakṣa* in which the argued property (*sādhya*, here *jñānasahabhū-tva*, i.e. the existential linkage with perception) is extant (in the present case, reference is made to *sukhādivat*, i.e. to mental objects like joy etc., as cases where the proving property co-exists with the argued property), and 3) that it (i.e. the *hetu*) does not inhere in any *vipakṣa* instances (entities in which the argued property is not found; here not explicated). If the trust in the validity of such a formally correct syllogism was — despite its inductive nature — strong enough, the argument under review would have been accepted as conclusive.

On the other hand, it is to be expected that a syllogism like this one was only developed later to justify a doctrinal stance that had originally been adopted for other reasons. In the given case, it is difficult to identify what these reasons might have been without reconstructing what precisely the Buddhist position was that is referred to here. The refutation of the Buddhist position presupposes that they held eternal things to be non-existent when they were not perceived.[a] To my knowledge, however, such a position is unknown in Buddhism. It therefore may well be that the Buddhist position is less radical. As a matter of fact, the citation of the Buddhist position in the YSBh (cited in n. 282) may be understood as referring only to the fact that the perception and its object are simultaneous (probaly in a pregnant sense, implying the momentariness of the object), so that the object is momentary and does not precede its perception as it did according to the Sautrāntikas (cf. § II.B.2.1.4). Such a position is well attested in Buddhism, and was for instance held by the Sarvāstivādins (cf. § II.B.2.1.4). In that case, the Buddhist position would have been distorted in the Yogasūtra tradition because the argumentation with the analogy of pain and so on would have suggested, contrary to the original import of this comparison, that material objects have the same ontological status as pain, etc., do.

[a] YS IV.16: ***na caikacittatantraṃ vastu, tad apramāṇakaṃ; tadā kiṃ syāt?***; the rhetorical question is answered by the Vivaraṇa: *na hi kiṃ cid api syāt*. Cf. Vācaspatimiśra's explanation in this context (Tattvavaiśāradī p. 429,13-15): *bhavatv artho jñānād vyatiriktas; tathāpy asau jaḍatvān na jñānam antareṇa śakyaḥ pratipattum. jñānena tu bhāsanīyaḥ. tathā ca jñānasamaya evāsti, nānyadā, pramāṇābhāvād iti.*

[284] Such a possibility is also implied by the following extract from the refutation of the theory of momentariness in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Here (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya by Śaṅkara on II,2,4,20, p. 532,10f) Śaṅkarācārya argues that the theory cannot account for the continuous origination and decay of

ness of matter is first attested in realistic schools such as the Sarvāstivāda where the existence of external objects is in no way linked to their status as objects of perception, such a course of development is, however, highly unlikely.

2.1.4 With regard to 1a), 1b) and 1c), it can be summarily added that it is also unlikely that considerations about the process of perception led to the conviction that the sensory organ and the object need to be equally momentary as the mind they interact with, because there is evidence that their momentariness even posed serious doctrinal problems. Given the momentariness of mental entities, one unit of consciousness cannot first encounter the object on the basis of the organ and then perceive it. Rather, the perception of the object has to arise as a distinct mental entity in its own right at least a moment after the encounter. If the object is also momentary, this entails that at the time of perception the perceived object has already passed away, so that the cognition of the world is always delayed. This consequence must have been considered problematic because not all schools accepted it, as the Sautrāntikas (that is, at least the strand recorded in AKBh) did.[285] The Sarvāstivādins[286] and Harivarman[287] maintained that the perception of the object and the object itself arise at the same moment. The effect of the object and sense organ on the perception the Sarvāstivādins explained with the concept of causality between co-existing factors (*sahabhūhetu*).[288] This

momentary entities: "And if the perception and non-perception of the entity were its origination and destruction, also in this way the eternity of the thing would result because these two (*darśanādarśana*) are states of the perceiver and not states of the object." (*yadi ca darśanādarśane vastuna utpādanirodhau syātām, evam api draṣṭṛdharmau tau na vastudharmāv iti vastunaḥ śāśvatatvaprasaṅga eva.*).

[285] AKBh 145,17f: *tatrāpi pūrvam indriyārthau paścād vijñānam.*

[286] Vi 201c16-19 (cf. n. 126 where this passage is quoted in full): "By force of the mark of duration, the conditioned factors are, once they have originated, ... able to grasp their object. ... If there was no mark of duration ... mental states (*citta*) and factors (*caitasika dharma*) would be without an object."

I do not see how the doctrine that the perception only grasps the object after it has originated can be reconciled with the doctrine that the object and the perception thereof arise simultaneously (*sahabhū*). Possibly the latter doctrine has been introduced to replace the earlier one which may have become unacceptable once mental entities were viewed as infinitesimal. In this case, the question poses itself whether this development is later than the argument formulated here, or whether the Vi and the Vi_2 refer — for the sake of the argument — back to an earlier stance which at the time of the argument's conception had already been (largely) superseded.

[287] TSi 279b23-26: "And this visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) takes the eye as its basis (*āśraya*) and the visible (*rūpa*) as its object (*ālambana*). [As] these two, being impermanent (*anitya*), arise and perish from moment to moment, how could it not be for the visual consciousness that it perishes from moment to moment?[a] As for example when there is no tree the shadow also will accordingly be non-existent, so also the consciousness, which arises with [the eye and the visible] as its basis, perishes from moment to moment because the eye and the visible perish from moment to moment."

Contrary to the arguments reviewed under 1), the momentariness of the mental entity is deduced from the presupposed momentariness of the sensory organ and of the object. The relationship between consciousness on one side and organ and object on the other side is likened to that between the simultaneously arising sprout and its shadow, with the Sarvāstivādins a standard example for the causality between co-existing factors.

[a] Cf. SN IV 68f cited in n. 324.

[288] AKBh 145,16f: *<kāryakāraṇayoḥ>*[a] *sahabhāvo 'pi tu siddhaḥ, tadyathā cakṣurvijñānādīnāṃ*

type of causality refers generally to mutual relationships where the existence of one entity implies the existence of the other and vice versa, as for instance in the relationship between candlelight and candle-flame.[289] In the given case, this raises, as the Sautrāntikas objected, the question which effect the perception should have on the sense organ and — it may be added — on the object.[290] As for the Theravādins, their doctrine that matter lasts as long as seventeen mental entities allowed them to teach that one and the same object underlies a complete unit of perception (cf. § I.B.3), so that the problem of the delayed perception of the world did not pose itself (cf. Sarathcandra 1958, p. 45f). This is not the place to enter upon the intricacies of the various Buddhist theories of perception. All that is of interest here is that they bear witness to the adaptation of the theory of perception to the momentariness of matter. This process of adaptation corroborates my contention that the momentariness had not initially been "discovered" by working out the implications of the Buddhist conception of perception.

2.2 2) Appropriation of the Body

The arguments of this type refer to the mind as the principle animating the body. A new embryo is only conceived when the impure substances of the parents (*aśuci*), i.e. sperm (*śukra*) and ovum (*śoṇitabindu*), merge with the mind of a being in the intermediate state between birth and rebirth (*antarābhava*) which for this purpose has entered the mother's womb. Not only the origination of the body in this way, but also the continued existence depends upon the mind's inherence in the body. For, once the mind parts from the body, the

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cakṣūrūpādibhir bhūtabhautikānāṃ ca.
Cf. AKBh 34,9f: *tatra cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣuḥ sahaja āśrayo yāvat kāyavijñānasya kāyaḥ.*

[a] *kāryakāraṇayoḥ* has been supplied from the preceding sentence.

[289] AK II.50b: *sahabhūr ye mithaḥphalāḥ/*
AKBh 83,19: *mithaḥ pārasparyeṇa*[a]<.> *ye dharmāḥ parasparaphalās, te parasparaṃ*[b] *sahabhūhetur*<.>
AKBh 84,21f: *katham sahotpannānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ hetuphalabhāva iti. tadyathā pradīpaprabhayor aṅkuracchāyayoś ca.*

[a] The reading *pāramparyena* has been emended in accordance with the Tibetan (*gcig la gcig*, P. 5591 gu 99b1) and the Chinese (T 1558 30b18) translation.

[b] The reading *parasparaḥ*, though confirmed by the manuscript, must be faulty. Cf. AKBh 85,1 cited in n. 290.

[290] AKBh 85,1: "There may be [the relationship of cause and effect (*hetuphalabhāva*)] among simultaneously arisen [things]; but how should it be mutual?" (*syāt tāvat sahotpannānāṃ, parasparaṃ tu katham.*)
AKVy 197,27-31: "As for 'There may be [the relationship of cause and effect (*hetuphalabhāva*)] among simultaneously arisen [things]' and so on: The relationship of cause and effect (*hetuphalabhāva*) among simultaneously arisen [things] is accepted, just as the eye, though simultaneously arisen with the visual consciousness, is the cause for the origination of that latter one. But how should it be mutual? For the visual consciousness is not the cause for the eye." (***syāt tāvat sahotpannānām** iti vistaraḥ: sahotpannānāṃ hetuphalabhāva iṣyate, tadyathā cakṣuḥ sahotpannam api cakṣurvijñānena tadutpattau hetur bhavati. **parasparaṃ tu katham**? na hi cakṣurvijñānaṃ tasya cakṣuṣo hetur bhavatīti.*)
Possibly, the mutuality of the causal relationship between object and perception contributed to considerations that also the object in its turn is dependent upon the perception.

individual dies and the body decays. In this sense it is said that the body is appropriated by the mind (*upātta*). That the fate of the body is intrinsically linked up with that of the mind finds expression in the concept of "sharing the same destiny" (*ekayogakṣematā*). This concept is ambiguous. It refers both to the animation of the body as well as to the intrinsic bond between the welfare of the body and of the mind, insofar as the state of mind determines that of the body. A body endowed with a strong and "healthy" mind will itself have these qualities, whereas it will be ailing when the mind is afflicted. At least according to Y, this relationship is reciprocal insofar as the state of mind in turn will depend upon the condition of the body.[291] Here, however, only the subjection of the body is of interest.

The MSABh specifies that the body is appropriated by the mind insofar as the former — or more precisely, insofar as the proto-embryonic matter (i.e. sperm and ovum) — coagulates (*sahasaṃmūrchana*) with the mind and then continues to exist only by its favour (*tadanugrahānuvṛtti*).[292] In the ASBh[293] the appropriation of the body is specified as consisting in

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[291] Y 24,16f: "And by the force of the mind, [the embryonic matter] does not rot. And by the fostering or damaging of it (i.e. the embryonic matter), the mind and the mental factors are fostered or damaged. Therefore, this [bond] is called 'the sharing of the same destiny' (*anyonyayogakṣema*)." (*cittavaśena ca tan (=kalalarūpam) na pariklidyate. tasya cānugrahopaghātāc cittacaitasikānām anugrahopaghātaḥ. tasmāt tad anyonyayogakṣemam ity ucyate.*)
Cf. Schmithausen 1987, n. 184.

[292] MSABh 151,4-6: "All conditioned factors, the eye and so on with their basis (SAVBh: the body) are appropriated by the mind insofar as they persist by its favour from coagulation (i.e. conception) onwards. Therefore, they are the effect of the mind." (*cittena hi sarve saṃskārāś cakṣurādayaḥ sādhiṣṭhānā upāttāḥ, sahasaṃmūrcchanā<t> tadanugrahānuvṛttitaḥ. tasmāt te cittasya phalam<.>*)

I conjecture that *sahasaṃmūrchanāḥ* should be emended to *sahasaṃmūrcchanāt* so that *saha°* is used temporally (cf. BHSD s.v. 1 saha-). Otherwise, it would (in addition to *upātta*) have to be construed with *cittena*, which would be clearly awkward, though not impossible. ("Coagulating with the mind [at the time of conception], all conditioned factors, the eye and so on with their basis are appropriated by it insofar as they persist by its favour.") The conjecture also is more satisfactory insofar as it is the proto-embryonic matter and not, as Lévi's reading suggests, the sensory organs and their basis which coagulate with the mind.

Both the Tibetan and Chinese translation (646c28, where *sādhiṣṭhānā* and *sahasaṃmūrcchanāḥ/t* are not rendered at all) deviate substantially at this point from the Sanskrit so that it is difficult to establish the correct reading on their basis. The Tibetan translation (P. phi 256b2; D. 4040, 233a1), however, supports the assumption that *sahasaṃmūrcchana* is not to be read as a nominative but as an ablative: *mig la sogs paḥi ḥdu byed rnams ni [des] °sems daṅ lhan cig mtshuṅs par ldan paḥi phyir*°[a] *<des>*[b] *rjes su zin par ḥjug paḥi sgo nas rten daṅ bcas par zin pa ste*[c]*/ de lta bas na sems kyi ḥbras bu yin no//.*[d] Fortunately, the textual uncertainty entailed by the conjecture is, for the present purposes, of no consequence.

Also the rendering of *tadanugrahānuvṛttitaḥ* is problematic insofar as *anuvṛtti* means primarily "compliance with," "accordance to." This, however, does not fit with "favour" (*anugraha*), but would require rather something like "state." Given that the ASBh and probably also the NA only explicate *ekayogakṣematva* in terms of the animation of the mind by the body and do not expressly refer to its other nuance, namely the qualitative determination of the body by the mind, I prefer to understand "*anuvṛtti*" in the sense of "to exist along," "to continue to exist." It cannot, however, be excluded that *tadanugrahānuvṛttitaḥ* does, as Sthiramati seems to hold, refer **also** to the dependence of the body's welfare upon that of the mind. This dependence would, as explicated in the SAVBh, corroborate the

the sharing of the same fate (*ekayogakṣematva*), a concept which, as mentioned above, refers to the existential bond between the body and the mind, and is ambiguous insofar as it may allude to both the animation of the body by the mind and to the body's qualitative determination by the mind. At this point, this concept is only explicated in terms of the animation of the body by the mind. However, though no express reference seems to be made to the dependence of the body's state upon that of the mind (i.e. its qualitative determination), the argumentation appears to derive some of its plausibility from this dependence. Despite the Chinese translation which renders *ekayogakṣematva* by "equality as to well-being and

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causal relationship between mind and body:

SAVBh P. tsi 170a4-8, D. tsi 144a4-7: "For after the *vijñāna* has entered the mother's womb, it merges (lit.: faint) [with the impurities of the parents (i.e. sperm and ovum)] and then out of the parents' impurities the body (*ātmabhāva?*) [of the new existence] develops [in the successive stages of] the *kalala*, the *arbuda* and so on. As long as the *vijñāna* has not entered the mother's womb and merged there [with the procreative substances], for so long no *kalala*, *arbuda* and so on will originate from the parents' impurities. Because the body [thus] complies with the mind, it is appropriated by it. ... Moreover, when the mind becomes afflicted, the body also does; when the mind comes to fare well also the body does. Because the body hence complies with the mind, it is appropriated by it. Therefore, all conditioned factors are the fruit of the mind." (*ḥdi ltar maḥi mṅal du rnam par śes pa źugs nas, brgyal bar*[e] *gyur pa daṅ/ gdod pha maḥi mi gtsaṅ ba las nur nur po daṅ mer mer po la sogs pa lus kyi dṅos por ḥgrub kyi/ ji srid du rnam par śes pa maḥi mṅal du źugs nas brgyal bar ma gyur pa, de srid du pha maḥi mi gtsaṅ ba las nur nur po daṅ mer mer po la sogs pa mi ḥgyur bas °na, lus ni*°[f] *sems kyi rjes su ḥbraṅ baḥi phyir, sems kyis lus yoṅs su bzuṅ ṅo// ... gzan yaṅ sems la gnod par gyur na lus la yaṅ gnod par ḥgyur la/ sems bde bar gyur na lus kyaṅ bde*[g] *bar ḥgyur bas, sems kyi rjes su lus ḥbraṅ baḥi phyir/ sems kyis lus zin paḥi phyir/ de bas na ḥdu byed rnams* <*sems*>[h] *kyi ḥbras bu yin no//*)

[a] P. omits °...°

[b] The position of *des* has been changed because it is not to be construed with *sems daṅ lhan cig mtshuṅs par ldan paḥi phyir* but with *rjes su zin par ḥjug paḥi*. Possibly *sems daṅ lhan cig mtshuṅs par ldan paḥi phyir* was originally also missing in D. and, being later taken over from a different tradition (cf. the SAVBh below), accidentally inserted after and not before *des*.

[c] D. *zin pa yin te/*

[d] The Tibetan translation that can be found in the SAVBh deviates to some extent: *sems kyis mig la sogs pa gnas daṅ bcas pa zin pa ste (P. tsi 170a2)/ lhan cig tu brgyal ba daṅ/ bde bar zin paḥi rjes su ḥbraṅ baḥi phyir ro (P. tsi 170a4)//.*

[e] P. *brgyal par*

[f] D. *ni lus na*

[g] D. *dge*

[h] *sems* missing both in P. and in D.

293 ASBh 52,11-13 on AS 41,9f: "[**As mind and the mental factors are momentary, so also matter is momentary**] **because of the appropriation [of the body] by the mind.** For the body is appropriated by the momentary mind. In which sense? **Because it shares the destiny with the mind.** For the body only comes into being if endowed with consciousness (*vijñāna*) and rots once the consciousness withdraws from it. Because of this sharing of the destiny with the mind, the [body] should be known to be momentary like the [mind]." (***cittopāttatām upādāya.*** *kṣaṇikena hi cittena kāya upāttaḥ. kenārthena?* ***cittaikayogakṣematām upādāya.*** *tathā hi kāyaḥ savijñānaka eva samudāgacchati, vijñānāpakrāntyā ca pūtībhavati. tasmāc cittenāikayogakṣematvāt tatvad*[a] *evāsya kṣaṇikatvaṃ veditavyam.*)

[a] The emendation of Tatia's faulty reading *tadivāsya* is supported by the manuscript.

affliction,"[294] and thus emphasizes the qualitative determination and not the animation, the NA reproduces the ASBh with only slight modifications and basically accords with it.

In the MSA the appropriation of the body by the mind is adduced as the first, and probably most fundamental, reason why the body is the effect of the mind. Thus it only implies the momentariness indirectly insofar as the body's momentariness follows from its production by a momentary cause. As mentioned above, this type of argument based on the causal relationship will be examined in more detail at the end of this chapter in § II.B.2.8.

In the ASBh (and hence also in the NA) the momentariness of the body is deduced directly as resulting from its existential bond with the momentary mind. "Because the body shares mind's fate," it is argued, "it should be known to be momentary just like that [mind]." The argument presupposes that the existential dependence of the body upon the mind — the (living) body's beginning and end are determined by the mind's entrance and withdrawal — entails that the body's mode of existence accords with that of the mind. For if the body continued to exist when the mind undergoes destruction, mind and body would no longer share the same fate.[295]

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[294] NA (534c3-7): "Moreover, because as to well-being or affliction the body complies with the mind (**kāyasya cittaikayogakṣematvāt*). That is to say, because the body is appropriated by the momentary mind, it necessarily complies with it as to well-being or affliction. When the body is endowed with consciousness, it lasts as a series for a long time. When the consciousness withdraws from it, it rots. Because it complies with the momentary mind as to well-being or affliction, the body should be known to be necessarily momentary as the mind is."

[295] Reflecting the ambiguity of the concept of *yogakṣematā*, there are basically two different possibilities of how precisely the argument is to be reconstructed here, one drawing on the animation of the body by the mind, and one on the qualitative determination of the body by the mind.

The former reconstruction requires that the existential dependence as it is commonly known to exist between the body and the mind series is presupposed to hold also between the body and the distinct momentary mind entity. What applies to extended existence, namely that the body does not continue to exist (as a living one) when it is left alone by the mind, also applies to momentary existence so that every destruction of a mind unit entails the destruction of the body. Similarly, as the presence of the mind effects the origination of the body at the time of conception, so at every other moment the re-origination of the mind prompts the re-origination of the body. Thus the argument would refer with "mind" one time to the momentary mind entity, namely when the body's momentariness is derived from that of the mind, and one time to the mind series, namely when, on the basis of the animation by the mind, the existential dependence of the body upon it is established.

According to the latter reconstruction, the argument deduces from the qualitative determination of the bodily state by the mind that the body's mode of existence accords with that of the mind. "Mind" in this sense refers to the mind series and not to a distinct momentary mind entity. It is conceived of as undergoing constant destruction and re-origination. Since the body's linkage to the mind is so tight that not only the beginning and end of its existence but also its state during this existence is determined by the mind, the body, too, has to perish and re-arise every moment. According to this reconstruction, the qualitative dependence does not only determine whether the body fares well or not, but also in which mode it is existing. In other words, the mode of existence (i.e. to constantly undergo destruction and re-origination) is conceived of as a property which like well-being etc. is "taken over" by the body from the mind because of its existenial dependence upon the latter.

Though in the ASBh and NA explicit reference is only made to the animation of the body by the mind, the latter reconstructing drawing on the qualitative determination may not be discarded. Probably

Though the sharing of the same fate is a powerful argument for the deduction of the body's momentariness, it hardly carries enough weight on its own to have led to the acceptance of the momentariness of the body. I, for one, do not see why the dependence of a persisting body upon a series of distinct mind entities should have been so problematic that the fragmentation of the body, hitherto conceived of as temporally extended, should have been preferred as more acceptable.[296]

2.3 3) Bodily Changes

The existential bond between the body and the mind, on the basis of which the body's momentariness is deduced under 2), includes the dependence of the body's welfare upon that of the mind. Here again the arguments are based on the physical effects of the mind. Especially, reference is made to short term changes brought about by particular psychic events. Hatred, according to the example given by Sthiramati, causes the contraction of the eyebrows, the clenching of the fist and a grin, whereas desire brings a smile on the face. This effect of mental states on the body constitutes, according to Sthiramati, one of the aspects of the domination of the mind over the body (*ādhipatya*) which is adduced as a separate argument in the MSA. This interpretation by Sthiramati will be dealt with under 4) where the

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the two possibilities of reconstructing the argumentation were not distinguished at all. Rather, without being differentiated as distinct, they may both have underlain the argument accounting jointly for its plausibility. At any rate, the explication in the ASBh and NA is too brief to allow for a decision how precisely the argument should be reconstructed.

[296] There is an argument in a Sarvāstivāda source, namely the Vi, that resembles the derivation of the momentariness of corporeal matter from the animation of the body by the mind, as reviewed in this paragraph. The Vi concludes its refutation of the Three-Moments-Doctrine (cited in n. 61) by the argument that it entails the absurd consequence that immediately after death there will be two bodies (which possibly even exist in two different realms of existence), because the old body which has originated together with the penultimate and/or with the ultimate unit of consciousness (*vijñāna*) should still exist for one or two more moments when the consciousness, having parted from it, has already acquired a new body belonging to the next existence:

> Vi 788a9-13: "And both [versions of the Three-Moments-]doctrine (viz. the doctrine of mixed origination and the doctrine of succession) have a further common fault, namely: When someone dies in the realm of men (*manuṣyagati*) and is born in hell, the realm of men not having been abandoned yet (the corporeal matter having originated together with the penultimate and/or with the ultimate unit of consciousness (*vijñāna*) abides for one or two more moments), hell will be attained to. Thus the realms of existence (*gati*) will become confounded and the bodies will become confounded. The confusion of the realms of existence consists in that this sentient being is [at the same time still] in the realm of humans and [already] in the realm of hell. The confusion of bodies consists in that this sentient being has a [new] body in hell (which arises together with the first unit of consciousness in hell) and it also has [at the same time] the [old] human body. This then amounts to a big mistake."

This argument, at least as it is formulated here, presupposes that the first moment after death already pertains to the new existence and thus denies an intermediate state (*antarābhava*) between death and rebirth. The continuation of the old body beyond death must be unacceptable, insofar as it is still regarded as animated, obviously because it is precluded that animated matter becomes inanimate without losing its numeric identity. Thus the argument is based on the principle that change implies substitution, while the existential bond between body and mind is only indirectly of avail.

argument alluding to the domination of the mind is examined.

In the ASBh[297] and NA[298] the momentariness of the body is derived directly from the fact that is is affected by mental states. As the mind changes every moment, the body, too, will have to do so because its changes are brought about by the mind.[299] Since the body is in this way (at least at certain times) subject to change at every moment, it is momentary.[300] The fundamental presupposition of this argument is that the changes of the body at every moment entail its momentariness. Presuming that any qualitative change implies the destruction of the old and the origination of a new entity (cf. § II.C.1), it is ruled out from the outset that the body continues to exist while its accidental characteristics are altered by the mind's changes. Thus the argument under review rests on the same principle as those proofs which deduce momentariness on the basis of change. The momentariness of the mind is only of minor importance insofar as the constant subjection of the body to change follows from it, whereas in other proofs of this type it follows from other considerations. In MSABh 152,16-18 (cf. n. 360) the momentariness of the body is even deduced from the bodily change brought about by desire and so on, without alluding to the mind's momentariness at all. Therefore, the argument as it is put in the ASBh and NA will not be examined further here, but will be dealt with together with the other arguments referring to change in ch. II.C.

2.4 4) Domination (*ādhipatya*) of the Mind

In the MSABh the reason "because of the dominance [of the mind over the body]" (*ādhipatyāt*) in *kārikā* 83c is commented upon by adducing the two following citations of the

[297] ASBh 52,14-16: "Moreover, **[as mind and the mental factors are momentary, so also matter is momentary] because when the mind changes the [body] changes**. For in states of happiness and suffering, desire and hatred, and so on the body is observed to change on account of the change of the mind. Thus the momentariness of the body is proved because it complies with the mind which changes at every moment." (*kiṃca cittavikāratadvikāratām upādāya; cittasya hi <vi>kāreṇa kāyasya vikāro dṛśyate sukhaduḥkharāgadveṣādyavasthāsu. ataḥ pratikṣaṇaṃ vikāriṇaś cetaso 'nuvidhānāt kāyasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ siddhaṃ.*)

[298] NA 534b29-c3: "The body is momentary because one observes it to undergo changes in accordance with the mind and so on.[a] That is to say, one observes that the distinct features of the body change in accordance with the mind and so on when pain or joy, desire or hatred and so on arise. Because the body undergoes change in accordance with a momentary entity (*dharma*), namely the mind and so on, its momentariness ensues."

[a] "And so on" should refer to the mental factors (*caitta*) accompanying the mind. (cf. AS P. li 91a5, D. ri 77a4: *ji ltar sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba skad cig ma yin pa de ltar gzugs kyaṅ skad cig mar blta ste/*).

[299] The argumentation seems to surmise that the mental change from one moment to the next has an immediate effect on the body so that the body changes, at least at times, as quickly as the mind does.

[300] Given that the mind also undergoes relatively stable phases as for instance in deep sleep or meditation, the deduction of the body's constant subjection to change will be limited to situations where the mind changes very rapidly and the body follows suit. That the momentariness deduced in such a specific context holds good in general for corporeal matter will follow from the principle that entities of the same kind cannot differ with regard to such fundamental properties as that of being momentary.

Buddha.[301]

> "By the mind this world is led, by the mind it is dragged to and fro; it is subject to the power of the again and again arising mind."

and

> "The mind-matter complex [constituting a living being] (*nāmarūpa*) is conditioned by consciousness (*vijñāna*)."

Sthiramati explains that the first part of the first quotation refers to the control over the body insofar as it follows the volitive impulses of the mind.[302] According to him, the second part of this quotation alludes to bodily changes brought about unwillingly by the mind. This is exemplified by the effect hatred or desire have on the body.[303] This aspect of the mind's domination corresponds to the arguments subsumed under 3). The second quotation cited by the MSABh is taken from the standard formulation of the causal nexus (*pratītyasamutpāda*). In accordance with the standard interpretation, the MSAṬ explains that it refers to the

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[301] MSABh 151,6-8: *yathoktam bhagavatā: "cittenāyaṃ loko nīyate cittena parikṛṣyate cittasyotpannasyotpannasya vaśe vartate"*[a] *iti/ tathā "vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam" ity uktam. tasmāc cittasya phalaṃ.*

[a] This passage is also cited in Hsien-yang 549a3-5 (translated in the appendix, cf. n. 515 where further material is adduced) in order to prove by canonical tradition that all *saṃskāras* are derived from the mind.

[302] SAVBh P. tsi 170b2, D. tsi 144b1f: "Whereto the mind wills [the body], with this the body accords. Therefore it is said: 'By the mind [this world] is led and dragged to and fro.'" (*sems kyis gaṅ du bsams par lus kyaṅ deḥi rjes su ḥbraṅ bas na sems kyis khrid pa daṅ draṅs pa źes byaḥo//*).

[303] SAVBh P. tsi 170b3-5, D. tsi 144b2-3: "As for '[the mind] is subject to the power of the again and again arising mind': When desire arises in the mind, the body complies with this so that its distinctive features (*lakṣaṇa*) change, that is, its comportment is rough (? for *zed zed po*),[a] there is a smile on his face, and so on. When hatred arises in the mind, [the distinctive features of the body] change, that is the fists become clenched and the face wrinkled with anger and so on. Hence the dominance of the mind over the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*)." (*sems skye źiṅ ḥbyuṅ*[b] *<baḥi dbaṅ du>*[c] *ḥgyur ro źes bya ba la/ sems la ḥdod chags źig* (sic.) *skyes na[s] lus kyaṅ deḥi rjes su ḥbraṅs*[d] *nas spyod pa zed zed po daṅ/ bźin ḥdzum pa la sogs paḥi mtshan ñid gźan du ḥgyur ro// gal te sems la*[e] *źe sdaṅ źig skyes na ni khu tshur ḥchaṅ ba*[f] *daṅ/ bźin khro gñer bsdus pa la sogs par gźan du ḥgyur bas na ḥdu byed rnams la sems dbaṅ ṅo//*).

Cf. SAVBh 172b5-7 where also the change of the body on account of mental events is set forth. Here desire is said to cause a smile on the face and a change of complexion, whereas the effect of hatred is specified as the contraction of the eyebrows and a grin.

[a] I have not been able to identify the meaning of *zed zed po*. It is not listed in the indices consulted by me, nor in Lokeścandra's Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary. The meaning given for *zed zed po* in Sumatiratna's Tibetan-Mongolian dictionary (p. 755,4), viz. "worne out" etc., does not fit the context here. *spyod pa zed zed po* should be the impassioned counterpart to the hateful clenching of the fists.

[b] MSABh P. phi 256b3 *sems byuṅ źiṅ byuṅ*

[c] Completed according to MSABh P. phi 256b3, D. phi 233a2; SAVBh D. reads ... *ḥbyuṅ bar ḥgyur ro...*

[d] D. *ḥbraṅ.*

[e] D. *sems las.*

[f] P. *ḥchaṅs pa.*

causation of a new existence by the pre-existing consciousness.[304] This aspect of the domination of the mind corresponds to the arguments under 7) which allude to the karmic conditioning of matter by mind. It also has its parallels in the arguments subsumed under 2), which are based on the existential dependence of the body upon the mind.

It is subject to doubt whether the domination of the mind was already in the MSA itself conceived of as having these three aspects. Probably reference was made primarily to the control the mind has over the body insofar as it is subservient to its commands.[305] That also the existential dependence as expressed by the second quotation was considered as an aspect of the mind's dominance is doubtful given that this function of the mind was already dealt with before in the context of the appropriation of the body by the mind. Possibly, it is only the commentary (viz. MSABh) which understood the mind's dominance also in this sense and therefore quoted the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra. As for the first citation of the Buddha, it is not clear whether it was adduced in the MSABh already with the differentiation in mind between the body's compliance to volitive impulses and the effect mental states have on it. Since this effect is not deliberately brought about by the mind, it does not fit so well with the conception of its dominance. Thus in the ASBh it is dealt with separately from the dominance of the mind, which is only seen in terms of the karmic determination of matter by mind. It may well be then that only Sthiramati identified the being affected of the body by mental states, which in the MSA and MSABh is dealt with elsewhere (see n. 360), as a further form in which the dominance of the mind manifests itself.

At any rate, the question of what precisely is referred to by the dominance of the mind at each stage of the compilation of the MSA and its commentaries is not so relevant here. For the dominance of the mind is only adduced to substantiate that the body is produced by the mind, and will thus be dealt with in § II.B.2.8 as part of the argumentation based upon the causal connection between mind and body.

[304] MSAṬ P. bi 171a8-b1: "As for, 'thus it is also said: "the mind-matter complex [constituting a living being] (*nāmarūpa*) is conditioned by consciousness"': consciousness is the dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*) for the mind-matter complex because it (i.e. *nāmarūpa*) comes to be by force of the consciousness." (*"de bźin du 'rnam par śes paḥi rkyen gyis miṅ daṅ gzugs' źes kyaṅ gsuṅs pa lta bu" źes bya ba ni rnam par śes pa ni miṅ daṅ gzugs kyi bdag poḥi rkyen te rnam par śes paḥi dbaṅ gis de ḥgrub paḥi phyir ro//*).

Sthiramati does not comment on this quotation.

[305] The ASBh refers with the term "domination of the mind (*cittasyādhipatya*)" to the karmic effects mental acts can have (see n. 324). Hence the domination of the mind relates not only to corporeal but also to external matter which is conditioned by collective karma. Given that the function of the mind to condition external matter is dealt with elsewhere in the MSA (see n. 323), it is unlikely that it is also alluded to here. Thus the domination of the mind will at this point only refer to corporeal matter. Accordingly, the citations of the Buddha will have been adduced in the MSABh with reference to living beings so that "world" (*loka*) in the first quotation will not refer to the material universe (*bhājanaloka*) but to sentient beings (*sattvaloka*). This is confirmed by Sthiramati's explanation of the quotation in terms of the body.

2.5 5) Manipulation of Matter

Already in the canon (AN III 340f; Saṃyuktāgama [Chinese translation] No. 494, T 99 128c27-129a3; quotation in Vasubandhu's Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā P. 5496 chi 15b7f, cf. Muroji: 1991 p. 54f) there is testimony to the yogic manipulation of matter by a corresponding act of willful concentration (*adhimokṣa*). The yogin who is absorbed in meditation applies his concentration to a particular object, for instance a log of wood, with the wish and conviction that it is not wood but, for instance, gold. By the power of this *adhimokṣa*, the wood not only appears to him as gold but actually turns into gold.[306] The factual basis for this is the potential existence of the *dhātus*, that is elements, metals, etc., like gold, in the wood (cf. AKBh 53,14f, AKVy 125,5-11). The application of such a willful act of concentration requires a mind "which has been purified by discarding the obstructions to absorption" (Hsien-yang), which "is distinguished by might" (ASBh: *prabhāvaviśiṣṭa*) as it is found with "a monk absorbed in meditation who is endowed with special powers and has gained control over his mind" (MSABh: *dhyāyī bhikṣuḥ ṛddhimāṃś cittavaśiprāptaḥ*).

In the MSABh[307] and Hsien-yang[308] this manipulation of matter by the mind of a yogin is cited as a further reason why matter is the effect of the mind. By contrast, in the ASBh momentariness is again deduced directly.[309] Given the momentariness of mental events,

[306] In contrast to the other versions of the sūtra, in the Pāli recension it is not explicitely stated that the object of the monk's *adhimokṣa* (e.g. wood) is actually transformed. It may, however, be that this is expressed by *adhimucceyya* (a verbal form, like *adhimokṣa* derived from *adhi√muc*) itself which in the Pāli recension could well mean "to transmute by an act of wilful concentration."

[307] MSABh 151,8-11: "And [the conditioned factors are the effect of the mind] because they comply with the pure mind. For the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) comply with the pure mind of the yogins. As it is said: 'If a monk absorbed in meditation who is endowed with special powers and has gained control over his mind concentrates on this log of wood with the wish and conviction (*adhimucyate*) that it is golden, then it will also be so for him.' Therefore, too, the conditioned factors are the effect of the mind." (*śuddhacittānuvṛttitaś ca. śuddham hi yoginām cittaṃ saṃskārā anuvartante. yathoktam: "dhyāyī bhikṣuḥ ṛddhimāṃś cittavaśiprāpta*[a] *imaṃ dāruskandhaṃ sacet suvarṇam adhimucyate tad apy asya tathaiva syād" iti. tasmād api cittaphalaṃ saṃskārāḥ.*)

The qualification "for him" does not imply that wood only appears to be transformed into gold to the yogin. By contrast, it is imperative to understand that wood factually is transformed into gold because otherwise the adduced argument would no longer substantiate the claim that matter is the product of the mind. This understanding is confirmed by Sthiramati who explains that "the conditioned factors do become whatever the mind of the yogin wills". (SAVBh P. 170b8, D. 144b6: *ḥdu byed rnams ni rnal ḥbyor paḥi sems kyis ji ltar ji ltar bsams pa de bźin du ḥgyur bas na ḥdu byed rnams la sems dbaṅ byed do//*)

[a] In the light of the Pali version (*cetovasippatto*), the reading *cittavaśe prāpta* is probably faulty.

[308] Hsien-yang 548c29-549a1: "And with those whose mind has been purified by discarding the obstructions to absorption (*samādhi*), all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) change in accordance with [their] mind; [that is], due to the domination of their willful concentration (*adhimokṣa*), [the conditioned factors] change in various ways."

[309] ASBh 52,24-53,2: "**And because of the subjection to the power of the mind, [matter is also momentary as the mind and the mental factors are]**. And matter is subjected to the mind [of the yogin], which is distinguished by might, because it (i.e. matter) is transformed by it (i.e the yogin's mind) according to wish. Thus when there is at every moment a willful act of concentration (*adhimokṣa*)

there will be a new *adhimokṣa* at every moment when the yogin engages in this practice. Each single *adhimokṣa* evokes a corresponding re-origination of the concerned object in changed form. Being thus subject to constant origination and — as part of this process — destruction, the object is momentary.

It is not explicated why the transformation of wood into gold by a series of *adhimokṣas* entails that each momentary act of *adhimokṣa* effects an altered re-origination of the object. Without a detailed knowledge of the practice of *adhimokṣa*, it is difficult to reconstruct the presuppositions underlying this argumentation. In the MPPU, the product of the transformation of elements into other elements (e.g. water into earth) and of the transformation of stone into gold is said to be an illusory entity (*nirmāṇa*) (T 1509 105a18-22; $MPPU_L$ p. 382) which only lasts as long as the corresponding thought (*nirmāṇacitta*), that brought it forth (T 1509 105b3; $MPPU_L$ p. 384). If the transformed object in the ASBh had the same ontological status, its momentariness would follow directly from its existential dependence upon the momentary mind.[310] Given that the argument in the ASBh, as well as those in the MSABh and Hsien-yang, set out to prove the momentariness of real matter and do not, as the passage in the MPPU does, drive at the illusory nature of existence, this can be excluded here.

It is, however, quite possible that the nature which has resulted from the transformation (i.e. being golden instead of wooden) has a similar ontological status as the product of transformation does in the MPPU. Being dependent upon the sustained application of the yogin's concentration, the new nature would be replaced by the original one as soon as this application was terminated, so that the object would revert to its original state (e.g. wood). In this case, the transformed object (e.g. gold) would have to be transformed every moment anew because its transformation would terminate together with each act of willful concentration that effected it. That the constant re-transformation of the object entails its constant re-origination can only be deduced if it is precluded that wood can change into gold without losing its numeric identity. For why else should it not be one and the same log of wood that is constantly transformed into gold?

The subjection to change at every moment and hence the momentariness can also be reconstructed differently if it is assumed that the transformation of the object is like the firing of pottery a gradual process extending over a span of time so that at every moment a certain quantum of change takes place. If this applied, the object would, as the fired pot, continue to exist in its newly acquired form also when it is no longer focussed upon by the yogin.

Both reconstructions deduce the momentariness from change at every moment and thus

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to the effect that [the object becomes] different, then [the object arises] differently at every moment. Therefore the momentariness [of matter] is established." (***cittavaśavarttitāṃ copādāya;*** *prabhāvaviśiṣṭasya ca cittasya rūpaṃ vaśe vartate, tena yatheṣṭaṃ pariṇāmāt. ataḥ pratikṣaṇam anyathādhimokṣe saty anyathotpādāt kṣaṇikatvasiddhiḥ.*)

[310] In this sense, the argument would correspond to the proof (subsumed under 6a) of the momentariness of images generated in meditation (*pratibimba*) which are momentary because they only exist as long as the mind having brought them forth.

presuppose that qualitative change implies — at least in the case of the transformation of wood into gold[311] — numeric difference. Thus, it seems that here again the momentariness of the mind is only employed to derive the constant subjection of matter to change. It has to be borne in mind, however, that the proposed reconstructions of the argumentation have to remain highly speculative since we do not know how precisely the Buddhists conceived of the transmutation of wood into gold by means of *adhimokṣa*.

2.6 6) Matter Pertaining to the Group of Mental Objects (*dharmāyatanaparyāpannaṃ rūpam*)

6a) The third argument adduced in the Hsien-yang to establish that "all conditioned factors result from the mind" refers to the yogic practice of generating images in meditation so as to contemplate upon them.[312] These images, the so-called *pratibimbas*, are usually considered by the early Yogācāras as a particular form of matter (*rūpa*) which is, contrary to ordinary matter, invisible (*anidarśana*) and penetrable (*apratigha*) and as such belongs to the group of mental objects (*dharmāyatanaparyāpanna*).[313]

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[311] In the argument under review, the acceptance of this premise may have been rendered more plausible by the particular case referred to. For the transformation of one substance into another adds credibility to the claim that they are two distinct entities. On the other hand, an existential link between these two substances is established in the texts themselves insofar as the product of transformation already exists latently in the object before transformation.

[312] Hsien-yang 549a2f: "[All conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) result from mind (*cittaphala*) because] due to the power of the mind [abiding] in absorption (*samādhi*), meditative images (*pratibimba*) originate at will as the object of [this] mind [abiding] in absorbtion (*samādhi*)."

[313] — Hsien-yang (484a13-22): The matter pertaining to the group of mental objects (*dharmāyatana-paryāpanna rūpa*), that is to say, [what] is at all times [only] the object of the mind, is comprised under the group of matter (*rūpaskandha*; i.e. is considered to be material) [and] is neither visible nor impenetrable. It is of three kinds, namely the matter of discipline (*saṃvara rūpa*), the matter of non-discipline (*asaṃvara rūpa*) and the matter which is object of contemplation (*samādhiviṣaya rūpa*).
— Y 68,13f: "[Among the entities (*dharma*) belonging to the class of mental objects (*dharmadhātu*) is the matter] pertaining to the group of mental objects (*dharmāyatanaparyāpanna*), namely the matter comprised by discipline (*saṃvara*) and non-discipline (*asaṃvara*) and the matter which is an object of contemplation." (*dharmāyatanaparyāpannaṃ/ saṃvarāsaṃvarasaṃgṛhītaṃ rūpaṃ samādhigocaraṃ ca rūpaṃ* ...).
Cf. also MAVṬ 26,3-7.
— AKBh 197,4-7: "With regard to this, the Yogācāras teach: 'The matter which is an object of contemplation for those absorbed in meditation (*dhyāyin*) arises due to the power of contemplation. Because it is not the object of the visual senses it is invisible; because it does not obstruct a place it is penetrable.' If it is thought: 'How could this be matter?' then this same [question could also be raised] with regard to the *avijñapti* entity." (*tatra yogācārā upadiśanti: "dhyāyināṃ samādhiviṣayo rūpaṃ samādhiprabhāvād utpadyate. cakṣurindriyāviṣayatvāt anidarśanaṃ; deśānāvaraṇatvād apratigham" iti. atha matam: "kathaṃ idānīṃ tat rūpam?" iti, etad avijñaptau samānam.*)

As an example for a meditative image, Yaśomitra mentions a skeleton.[a] This points to the practice of contemplating upon a corpse in its various degrees of decay. That only the image of a skeleton and not the skeleton itself is contemplated upon is possibly linked to the change in funerary rites that the corpses were no longer exposed to open air on the charnel fields but buried. It may also have been a matter of practicality to be able to contemplate upon decay not only on charnel fields but anywhere else

In contrast to the Hsien-yang, the MSABh does not deal with the momentariness of the *pratibimbas* in the context of the argumentation deriving the all-encompassing momentariness from the causal linkage with the mind. In opposition to this mode of derivation, the momentariness of the *pratibimbas* is here deduced directly. "Given that they comply with the mind (*citta*) they should be," so it is maintained, "known to be momentary because at every moment they arise [anew] by force of a [new] mind."[314] This argumentation presumes that the *pratibimbas* cannot exist detached from their respective *citta* which has generated them and thus have to pass away once their mind does.[315] Hence at the time when the yogin engages in this practice, a new, that is, a numerically distinct, *pratibimba* arises whenever a new mind does, i.e. at every moment.[316]

As plausible as the deduction of the momentariness of *pratibimbas* in this way may be, it cannot account for the view that also ordinary matter is momentary. This also follows from the fact that in the MSABh the *pratibimbas* are not dealt with in the context of the deduction of the momentariness of matter from mind. Instead, their generation is added to a list of thirteen kinds of origination related to persons which all imply in one way or another the momentariness of corporeal matter.[317]

(cf. Schmithausen 1982, pp. 70-74).

Yaśomitra's example can be supplemented by that given by Sthiramati. He (see n. 316) specifies the images as consisting in "yellow, blue and so on" with which he refers to the objects of the *kasiṇa* practise in the course of which one object (e.g. earth, water but also a colour) is visualized to the exclusion of everything else and then expanded (cf. Lamotte's summary, $MPPU_L$ pp. 1287-1290; Schmithausen 1982, p. 72).

[a] AKVy 355,15: *samādhiviṣayarūpam iti samādher ālambanam asthisaṅkalādi.*

[314] MSABh 153,8f: *pratibimbotpattau kṣaṇikatvaṃ cittānuvṛttito veditavyaṃ, pratikṣaṇam cittavaśena tadutpādāt.*

[315] It is not possible that after the cessation of the initial *citta* subsequent *cittas* can cause the *pratibimba* brought forth by this first *citta* to persist. For when the first *citta* ceases the *pratibimba* has to cease with it, because the second *citta* has not yet arisen — lest two *cittas* of one series co-exist — and hence is in no position to ensure the *pratibimba's* continued existence.

[316] Sthiramati reconstructs the argumentation differently. In accordance with the other arguments which reason on the basis of the momentariness of the mind, he deduces the momentariness of the *pratibimbas* solely on the ground that they are the product of the momentary mind.

SAVBh P. 183a6f, D. 155b4f: "Also the images such as yellow or blue that appear every moment, appear each in such a way as they have been willed by the mind of the yogin. As they arise by force of the mind,[a] the images such as blue which are produced by the mind should be known to be also momentary on account of the momentariness of the mind." (*skad cig ma re re la ser po daṅ sṅon po la sogs pa gźugs brñan snaṅ ba yaṅ rnal ḥbyor paḥi sems kyis ji ltar ji ltar bsams pa de ltar de ltar snaṅ ste/ sems gyi dbaṅ gis snaṅ la sems kyaṅ skad cig ma yin pas na sems las skyes paḥi sṅon po la sogs paḥi gzugs brñan yaṅ skad cig mar rig par bya ste/*).

[a] It is also possible that *sems gyi dbaṅ gis snaṅ la* is to be construed with the preceding sentence as specifying *snaṅ* (i.e. ... appear, that is appear by the force of the mind ...).

[317] MSABh 152,5f: "[The origination] as an image is the origination of the conditioned factors which are called "images" by the force of the concentration (*samādhi*) of the [yogins] absorbed in the eight liberations (*aṣṭavimokṣa*)." (*pratibimbatvena yo aṣṭavimokṣadhyāyināṃ samādhivaśena pratibimbākhyā-*

6b) In a series of arguments establishing the momentariness of specific forms of non-corporeal (*bāhya*) matter, the matter appertaining to the group of mental objects (*dharmāyatanika rūpa*) is the last kind of matter dealt with. Its momentariness is deduced on the basis of its accordance with the mind without specifying what kinds of entities precisely are referred to.[318] Normally these would be the *pratibimbas* and the so-called *avijñapti* (lit.: the not-making-known) entities. The latter are special entities appertaining to individual persons (*sattvākhya*)[319] and basically accounting for their spiritual status. Here, however, where only external matter (*bāhya*) is dealt with, it is dubious whether the argumentation also refers to the *pratibimbas*, since their momentariness has already been established earlier when the momentariness of matter pertaining to the person (*ādhyātmika*) was treated. Accordingly, Sthiramati takes it that this passage only alludes to *avijñapti* entities.[320] On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that the *pratibimbas* are a border line case and are for the sake of completeness treated both as matter pertaining to the individual and as external matter. At any rate, there can be no doubt that the *pratibimbas* in the MSABh are conceived of as matter of some sort, because otherwise their momentariness would not be proved at all.

The deduction of momentariness from the conformity with the mind is not explicated by the

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nāṃ saṃskārāṇām utpādaḥ.)

The generation of the *pratibimbas* is set apart from the other thirteen kinds of origination. Those all refer to the person in a strict sense and are more or less chronologically arranged. That is, they commence with birth and finish with the last moment of existence in *saṃsāra* (i.e. the production of the last groups constituting a person [*skandhas*] of an arhat).

[318] MSABh 154,5f: "Also the matter appertaining to the group of mental objects is known to be momentary because of its conformity with the mind as mentioned above." (*dharmāyatanikasyāpi rūpasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasiddham eva cittānuvṛtter yathā pūrvam uktam.*)

[319] AKVy 359,23f: *sattvākhyā (=AK IV.6a) sattvasantānapatitvāt.*

[320] SAVBh P. 187b1-3, D. 159a6-b1: "As for the group of mental objects (*dharmāyatana*), [proof of momentariness] is to be made with regard to the matter [pertaining to it], namely the *avijñapti*. And this [*avijñapti*] is of three kinds, namely the discipline [relating to the] *prātimokṣa* (*prātimokṣasaṃvara*), the discipline [relating] to absorption (*dhyānasaṃvara*) and the discipline free from evil influences (*anāsravasaṃvara*). Following the mind, these three kind of disciplines are brought forth by it. Hence, because the mind is momentary, also the matter, namely the *avijñapti* which comes to be as its fruit, is momentary. [For] before it was established that whatever entities arise from the mind, those [entities] are momentary." (*chos kyi skye mched ni rnam par rig byed ma yin paḥi gzugs la bya ste/ deḥaṅ so sor thar paḥi sdom pa daṅ/*[a] *bsam gtan gyi sdom pa daṅ/ zag pa med paḥi sdom pa rnam pa gsum mo// sdom pa de gsum sems kyi rjes su ḥbraṅ źiṅ sems kyi rgyu las skyes pas ni sems skad cig yin paḥi phyir/ deḥi ḥbras bur gyur pa rnam par rig byed ma yin paḥi gzugs kyaṅ skad cig mar ḥgyur te/ "chos gaṅ sems las skyes pa, de dag ni skad cig ma yin no" źes snar bsgrubs zin to//*[b]).

Sthiramati only refers to the three kinds of discipline (*saṃvara*) and does not make any mention of non-discipline (*asaṃvara*) and neither-discipline-nor-non-discipline (*naivasaṃvara-nāsaṃvara*) which are, according to AK IV.13ab, also *avijñapti* entities. It is not evident why he does not include here non-discipline which, contrary to neither-discipline-nor-non-discipline, is explicitely taught in other Yogācāra texts such as the Hsien-yang and the Yogācārabhūmi (cf. n. 313).

[a] *śad* missing in D.

[b] Cf. AKBh 205,17f: *trividhaḥ saṃvaraḥ. prātimokṣasaṃvara ihatyānāṃ kāmāvacaraṃ śīlam. dhyānasaṃvaro rūpāvacaraṃ śīlam. anāsravasaṃvaro 'nāsravaṃ śīlam.*

MSABh. Reference is only made to a prior but not clearly identified passage. There can be little doubt that Sthiramati's interpretation is correct that this reference alludes to the argumentation that the product of the momentary mind has to be momentary itself (see n. 320). For the *avijñapti* entities are, though their material cause is derived matter (*upādāya-rūpa*; cf. AK IV.4cd-6), brought forth by the mind. Thus the momentariness of the *avijñapti* entities (and, if included here, *pratibimbas*) is deduced from the mind's momentariness in the same way as in the arguments of the MSABh subsumed under 2), 4), 5) and 7), namely on the basis that by definition any product of the mind has to be momentary — a line of argumentation which will be scrutinized in § II.B.2.8.

2.7 7) Conditioning of Matter by Karma

The last group of arguments refers to the karmic effect of the mind. Insofar as those acts (*karman*) which entail retribution are not the bodily (*kāyakarman*) or vocal actions (*vākkarman*) themselves, but only the volition (*cetanā*) prompting these actions, karma is mental and its effects, therefore, are mind-made. The MSABh differentiates between the retribution which only effects the concerned individual and the retribution which determines the material world.[321] The former kind of retribution was, at least according to the MSABh and SAVBh, referred to as one aspect of the domination of the mind over the body (see § II.B.2.4). The later kind of retribution is caused collectively by the karma of the individuals inhabiting the affected world. It will determine, for instance, the quality of the harvest or cause inferior things to appear as objects of great worth and vice versa.[322] This compliance of the outer world with the moral quality of the beings populating it is adduced by the MSABh as a further proof for the causation of matter by mind.[323]

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[321] The examples given in the SAVBh and also the phraseology in the MSABh (compliance with the mind) only allude to the determination of the state of already existing things by the collective karma. As known from other sources (e.g. AS P. li 89b4-90a4, ASBh 50,20-51,1; AK III.90 and AKBh hereon, particularly 179,2ff and 12ff), this karma also determines however, whether matter exists at all or not. Thus the material world (*bhājanaloka*) vanishes when there are no more beings to populate it and re-appears when there are again such beings because its existence is dependent upon the collective karma.

[322] Cf. SAVBh P. 171a2-5, D.145a1f: "For by force of the mind of those committing evil actions, the harvest and so on will become weak in colour, in scent and in taste; even things like gold and so on will appear to be coal and so on. By force of the mind of those committing meritorious actions, grain, etc., will appear as perfect in colour and scent; even inferior things will appear to be jewels and so on. Therefore, it is evident that the conditioned factors are the fruit of the mind." (*ḥdi ltar sdig*[a] *pa byed paḥi sems can rnams kyi sems kyi dbaṅ gis lo tog la sogs pa yaṅ kha dog daṅ/ dri daṅ ro la sogs pa rnams mthu chuṅ bar ḥgyur źiṅ gser*[b] *la sogs paḥi dṅos po yaṅ sol ba la sogs par snaṅ la/ bsod nams byed pa rnams kyi sems kyi dbaṅ gis ḥbru la sogs pa kha dog daṅ dri phun sum tshogs par snaṅ la/*[c] *dṅos po ṅan pa rnams kyaṅ rin po che la sogs par snaṅ bas na/ ḥdu byed rnams sems kyi ḥbras bu yin par mṅon no//*)

[a] P. *stig*.

[b] D. *gsar*.

[c] D. Shad fehlt

[323] MSABh 151,11-13: "And because of the compliance with the mind of the sentient beings, [the conditioned factors are the fruit of the mind]. For the outer things become inferior when the beings commit evil actions and become excellent when they commit meritorious actions. Hence it is proved that

The Hsien-yang and ASBh, which also base themselves on the karmic determination of matter, do not differentiate between the two forms of retribution. The ASBh argues that "all corporeal and outer (*ādhyātmikabāhya*) matter originates under (or: due to) the domination of the mind" and is, therefore, the fruit of the mind.[324] It is not sure whether the instrumental *ādhipatyena* (under/due to the domination) in the ASBh only refers to the determination of the quality of the matter as in the MSABh, or whether it also conveys that the mind's domination prompts the causation of matter in the first place. It is in the latter sense that the Hsien-yang seems to grasp the domination when it argues that the conditioned factors (i.e. also matter) are products of the mind also because "they get to originate by force of the dominance of the impressions (*vāsanā*) in the mind."[325] As can be seen, both the ASBh and the Hsien-yang refer to the conditioning of matter by the essentially mental karma as the mind's "domination" (*ādhipatya*), the latter source specifying which aspect of the mental complex the "domination" refers to precisely.[326] The MSABh, by contrast, uses this term slightly different, only applying it to the sovereignty of the mind over the body.

Here for the first time the ASBh, too, advances an argument that drives at the production of matter by mind. Already all the arguments by the MSABh are, with the exception of 6a) which is taken from a different context, adduced to document that matter is in some form produced by the mind (table 2, 4, 5, 6b, 7) or, inversely, that mind is effected by matter (table 1a and 1b). Also all the three arguments of the Hsien-yang (table 5, 6a, 7) do not arrive at momentariness directly, but only establish that "all conditioned factors are effected by the mind" (*cittaphala*). In a second step, so to speak, all these arguments deduce the momentariness of matter on the basis of its production by the mind (or causation of it).

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the conditioned factors are the fruit of the mind because they comply with their (i.e. sentient beings') mind." (*satvānuvṛttitaś ca. tathā hi pāpākāriṣu satveṣu bāhyā bhāvā hīnā bhavanti, puṇyakāriṣu ca praṇītāḥ. atas taccittānuvartanāt cittaphalatvaṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ siddham.*)

[324] ASBh 52,20-24: "**[As mind and the mental factors are momentary, so also matter is momentary] because it is brought forth under** (or: due to) **the domination of the mind**. For all corporeal and outer (*ādhyātmikabāhya*) matter originates under (or: due to) the domination of the mind. Hence the effect (i.e. matter) is to be known as momentary because of the momentariness of the cause as follows from the [following] sūtra passage: 'Also all the causes and conditions for the origination of matter are impermanent. Having [thus] originated in dependence upon impermanent causes and conditions, how could matter itself be permanent?'"[a] (***cittasyādhipatyasaṃbhūtatām upādāya.*** *sarvam hy ādhyātmikabāhyaṃ rūpaṃ cittasyādhipatyena saṃbhavati. ataḥ kāraṇasya kṣaṇikatvāt kāryasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ veditavyaṃ "ye hetavaḥ ye pratyayāḥ rūpasyotpādāya te 'py anityāḥ; anityān khalu hetupratyayān pratītyotpannaṃ rūpaṃ kuto nityaṃ bhaviṣyatī" ti sūtrapadānusāreṇa.*)

[a] Cf. SN IV 68,32-69,2: *yo pi hetu yo pi paccayo cakkhuviññāṇassa uppādāya, so pi hetu so pi paccayo anicco vipariṇāmī aññathābhāvī. aniccam kho pana bhikkhave paccayam paṭicca uppannaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ kuto niccam bhavissati.*

[325] Hsien-yang 548c28-29: "Good and bad factors (*dharma*) impregnate (*vāsayanti*) the mind. By force of the dominance of the impressions (*vāsanā*) in the mind, the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) get to originate."

[326] The term *ādhipatya* is also used in this sense in the AKBh (179,13: ... *sattvānāṃ karmādhipatyena bhājanānāṃ pūrvanimittabhūtā ākāśe mandamandā vāyavaḥ syandante/*) where it refers to the role of the collective karma in the process of the world's re-evolution.

Without establishing in which respect all conditioned factors are effected by the mind, the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, too, proves the momentariness of all conditioned factors on this basis.[327] This is then the most frequent way of deriving the momentariness of matter from that of the mind,[328] and it needs to be seen whether the assumptions and considerations underlying it may reflect the motivation which led to the conviction that not only mental but also all material entities are momentary.

2.8 ASBh 52,20-24 (cited in n. 324) and MSABh 151,13f[329] justify the deduction of momentariness from the casual relationship between mind and matter on the basis of the principle that something impermanent cannot beget something eternal (*nitya*),[330] or (so MSABh 151,2f)[331] for the causation of the mind by matter on the basis of the inversion of this principle (i.e. nothing impermanent can be begotten by something eternal).[332] This

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[327] VinSg (Y_T P. zi 55b5): "Moreover, because all conditioned factors are the fruit of the mind (*cittaphalatvāt*), they should, as the mind, be known to be momentary." (*yaṅ ḥdu byed thams cad ni sems kyi ḥbras bu yin paḥi phyir sems bźin du skad cig pa ñid yin par rig par byaḥo//* Sanskrit manuscript folio 24b3: *api khalu cittaphalatvāt* sarvasaṃskā[ṇāṃ]rāṇāṃ cittavat kṣanik<at>ā veditavyā//* * the manuscript seems to read *cittacayalatvāt*)

[328] In a later section of the MSABh,[a] also the momentariness of earth is proved on the basis of its production by a momentary cause. Because at the time of the evolution of the world the earth originates out of water and wind, which already have been proved to be momentary, it itself is momentary, too. (MSABh 153,23-25: *pṛthivyās tatsaṃbhavāt pariṇāmacatuṣṭayāc ca (=MSA Kā 90ab). tacchabdenâpaś ca gṛhyante vāyuś ca. adbhyo hi vāyusahitābhyaḥ pṛthivī saṃbhūtā vivartakāle. tasmāt tatphalatvāt sāpi kṣaṇikā veditavyā.*).

[329] MSABh 151,13f: "...it is proved that the conditioned factors are the fruit of the mind. Therefore they are momentary. For it is not possible that the fruit of something momentary is not momentary, because [the fruit] complies with the [cause]." (... *cittaphalatvaṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ siddhaṃ. tataś ca kṣaṇikatvaṃ. na hi kṣaṇikasyākṣaṇikaṃ phalaṃ yujyate tadanuvidhāyitvāt.*)

[330] Strictly speaking, the origination by anything, no matter of what nature it is, entails that the originated entity is impermanent because, as the various forms of impermanence (*anityatā*) clearly show, not being impermanent (*anitya*) not only entails that something will last forever but also that it has lasted forever in the past (cf. n. 186).

[331] MSABh 151,2f (cf. this passage has been cited already in n. 274: "It is not possible that something momentary (i.e. mind) originates out of something non-momentary (i.e. matter), as it is said (*iti*) [to be impossible that] something impermanent [originates] out of something eternal." (*na tv akṣaṇikāt kṣaṇikaṃ bhavitum arhati, yathā nityād anityam iti.*)

If *iti*, which is neither rendered in the Tibetan nor in the Chinese translation, is the correct reading, then the MSABh would refer here in the same way to the canonical tradition as the ASBh does in the parallel passage.

This is commented upon by Sthiramati as follows (SAVBh P. tsi 169b4f): "It has been said: 'as something impermanent out of something eternal', that is, it is impossible that something impermanent originates out of something eternal. Out of the eternal space, for instance, impermanent things such as pots, woven cloth and so on do not originate." (*"rtag pa las mi rtag pa bźin no" źes bya ba smos te/ rtag pa las ni mi rtag pa ḥbyuṅ bar mi srid de/ dper na nam mkhaḥ rtag pa las bum pa daṅ snam bu la sogs paḥi mi rtag paḥi dṅos po mi ḥbyuṅ ba bźin no//*).

[332] As for the Hsien-yang and the VinSg, no arguments are advanced to validate the deduction of momentariness on the basis of the production of matter by the mind. Hence, it is impossible to identify

principle is already attested in the *nikāyas*,[333] and the ASBh cites the concerned passage in support of its argumentation. In a Buddhist context, this principle is valid because impermanent and eternal things, i.e. the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), exist on different planes that are not causally linked. The exemplification of this principle by Sthiramati (see n. 331), namely that eternal space (*ākāśa*) cannot beget a pot or cloth, clearly exploits this.

It is not at all self-evident, however, why the validity of this principle should entail that the duration of the product and cause have to be identical. This only ought to follow if it is assumed that momentary and non-momentary entities exist as much on different planes as impermanent and eternal entities do, so that there can be no causal linkage between them. Such an assumption, however, can solely be accounted for if it is presumed that not being momentary entails being permanent.[334] Thus, the argument that matter has to be momentary because its cause (or effect) is momentary, is based on the presupposition that everything impermanent is momentary. Therefore, it can be excluded that the deduction of the momentariness from the causation by (or of) mental entities as it is recorded in the various

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the precise reasoning underlying the deduction in these texts. It can, however, be assumed that the relevant considerations do not differ significantly from those explicated in the ASBh and in the two passages in the MSABh, so that my deliberations should also hold good for the Hsien-yang and the VinSg.

[333] Cf. SN IV 211,25-27 (*aniccaṃ kho pana saṅkhatam paṭiccasamuppannam kāyam paṭicca uppannā sukhā vedanā kuto niccā bhavissatīti.*) and SN IV 68f cited in n. 324. On the basis of this principle also Āryadeva argues in his Catuḥśataka (IX.11: *dṅos po rtag pa las skyes pa/ ci ltar bur na mi rtag ḥgyur/ nam yaṅ rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu gñis/ mtshan ñid mi mthun mthoṅ ma yin//*).

[334] Without the principle differentiation between momentary and non-momentary entities, it would be impossible to explain why the product of the mind does not have to be mental but may be material, whereas it is impossible that it is not momentary as the mind is. For such a position surmises that being momentary or not is conceived of as a more intrinsic quality than being mental or material. Given how fundamentally mind and matter are already differentiated in early Buddhism, this, however, could only be the case if the differentiation between being momentary and not momentary was more fundamental than that between existing for one moment or a certain stretch of time, i.e. if it was already understood that not to be momentary means to be permanent.

That the equation of non-momentariness with eternity underlies the argumentation reviewed here is clearly evinced by the following explanation by Sthiramati (SAVBh P. tsi 171a7-b1, D. 145a4-6):

> "According to what kind the cause has been sown, so the corresponding kind of fruit originates. As for example when a seed of rice is sown [as the] cause, also only a fruit of rice matures [as its] fruit; likewise, since the cause of the conditioned factors, namely the mind, is momentary, also its fruit, namely the conditioned factors, should be known to be momentary. It is not reasonable that, while the mind is momentary, its fruit, namely the conditioned factors, should **be non-momentary, [i.e.] be characterized as eternal.**" (*rgyu ci ḥdra bar btab pa ḥbras bu yaṅ de ḥdra bar skyeḥo// de yaṅ dper na rgyu ḥbras sā luḥi sa bon btab na ḥbras bu yaṅ ḥbras bu*[a] *sā luḥi ḥbras bu ñid smin pa de bžin du/ ḥdu byed rnams kyi rgyu sems skad cig ma yin pas na deḥi ḥbras bu hdu byed rnams kyaṅ skad cig mar rig par bya ste/ sems ni skad cig ma yin la/ deḥi ḥbras bu ḥdu byed rnams skad cig ma ma yin pa rtag paḥi mtshan ñid du ḥgyur bar ni mi rigs so//*)

[a] D. *hbras bu* must be wrong; *ḥbras sā lu* is the translation of Sanskrit *śāli* (i.e. rice); cf. Udrāyaṇa 3.9.

proofs examined here underlay (at least not as the principle consideration) the formative process that led to the conviction that matter, too, has to be momentary (rather than being impermanent in a less pregnant sense).[335]

3 To sum up, the examination of the arguments subsumed under 1) to 7) suggests that none of them reflects the main doctrinal reasons for the development of the full-fledged doctrine of momentariness. Though it cannot be excluded entirely that the momentariness of the sense organs (and in further steps that of corporeal and external matter in general) was deduced from the stance that they have to be simultaneous with the cognitions they generate (= argument 1b), there is, as mentioned, too little textual evidence to suggest that such an approach could have carried enough weight on its own to have given rise to the conviction that all phenomena are momentary. In the case of the other arguments, they can best be accounted for if they are taken to be retrospectively devised in order to justify the already conceived theory of momentariness. This follows also from the fact that, in contrast to the argument 1b), they presuppose the pre-eminence of the mind over matter which is characteristic for the Yogācāra-school and not for the earlier Hīnayāna schools among which the doctrine of momentariness originated. Thus the arguments examined here are, with the exception of the Vi, of the NA (which at this point adopts the argumentation from the ASBh) and of the *pūrvapakṣas* (i.e. the reported position of the opponents) reproduced in Brahmanical treatises, only attested in Yogācāra texts.

Though the types of argumentation examined here do not seem to reflect the main doctrinal considerations underlying the formative process of the theory of momentariness, it is yet possible that the momentariness of matter was derived from that of the mind on other grounds. For it is feasible that the main motivation for this derivation were not the considerations on which the arguments subsumed under 1) to 7) are based, but the drive, characteristic for Buddhist scholastic thinking, to standardize the qualities of all members belonging to the same class of entities. In support of such a possibility, reference may be made to an argument only alluded to briefly in the Kv as the false opinion (*laddhi*) that "all phenomena (*dhamma*) are as momentary as a single mental entity" (*ekacittakkaṇika*).[336] The commentary on the Kv reproduces this position in more detail and attributes it to the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas. These are quoted as arguing that "since all conditioned

[335] That it was not the analysis of the causal relationship between mind and matter that gave rise to the doctrine of momentariness is also suggested by the arbitrary nature of the entire argumentation, which presupposes that the momentariness of the mind is beyond any doubt, whereas the duration of matter is at stake. While matter as an effect has to comply with the cause and be equally momentary, mind as an effect implies the momentariness of its cause, namely matter (arguments 1a and b). If the principle that the cause and the effect have to concur as to their duration had been so compelling, why is it that the duration of material entities should have been adapted to that of mental entities and not vice versa? How arbitrary the entire argumentation is also follows from Tattvasiddhi (279b23-25, cited in n. 287) where the relationship is inverted and the momentariness of the mind is deduced on the grounds that it originates on the basis of momentary entities, namely the sensory organs and the object.

[336] Kv XXII.8, p. 620,5: *ekacittakkhaṇikā sabbe dhammā ti.*

entities are impermanent, therefore they are as momentary as a single mental entity."[337] This argumentation reflects the aforementioned tendency to standardize, as is evinced by the argument advanced in support of this position: "Given the impermanence common [to all conditioned entities], what [should] be the restrictive principle here, according to which one thing ceases quickly, [whereas] another does so [only] after a long time?" Also the fact that the proofs of momentariness and of the spontaneity of destruction are often exemplified by referring to mental entities bears witness to the tendency to generalize the evident momentariness of these entities.[338]

I think it is hardly likely, however, that the compulsion to standardize alone was so strong that it was deemed impossible that mind and matter were both impermanent and yet endured differently long. Rather, there must have been other doctrinal reasons that suggested the momentariness of matter. On the other hand, it is likely that the preconceived momentariness of mental entities will have favoured the acceptance of the position that all forms of phenomena are momentary.[339] In this context the considerations about the interaction between mind and matter (in particular about the prevalence of the mind and about the simultaneity of cognitions and sense organs), which underlie the various arguments discussed above, may have played a significant role by furnishing the factual foundation for the tendency to generalize the mind's momentariness, thus adding momentum to it. At any rate, there can be no doubt that the conception of the mind as a stream of momentary entities must have paved the way for the stance that everything is momentary and by concatenation forms the macroscopic objects of ordinary experience.[340]

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[337] Kv-a XXII.8, p. 195f: *"tattha yasmā sabbe saṃkhatadhammā aniccā, tasmā ekacittakṣaṇikā yeva. samānāya hi aniccatāya 'eka lahu bhijjati, eko cirenā' ti ko ettha niyamo" ti.*

[338] Cf. e.g. AKVy 345,19f: "[How is the momentariness of conditioned entities proved?] **Because conditioned entities necessarily vanish,** they have the nature to perish immediately after origination (i.e. are momentary), as in the case of the mind and mental factors." (*"saṃskṛtasāvaśyaṃ vyayād"* (= AK IV.2d) *iti utpattyanantaravināśirūpaṃ, cittacaittavat*).

[339] That the preconceived momentariness of mental entities must have been of bearing also with non-Yogācāras is borne out by the fact that the deduction of the momentariness of all conditioned entities from the mind is also advanced as an argument by an orthodox Sarvāstivādin like Saṃghabhadra. There can, at any rate, be no doubt that this deduction does not in any way entail an "idealistic" conception. This is clearly evinced by the specific arguments examined before. The appropriation of the body by the mind (table 2), for instance, clearly entails the distinct existence of body and mind. Besides, the very undertaking to derive the momentariness of matter from the mind would be nonsensical if, at least on a certain level, its existence apart from the mind was not accepted.

[340] The question of the relative chronology and interdependence of Yogācāra and related sources is far too complex to be entered into here. The examination of the same type of argumentation in different texts does, however, allow us to determine at least tentatively the relationship between the respective passages in the MSA(Bh), AS(Bh), Hsien-yang and NA. As can be gathered from the table at the beginning of this chapter, all the different types of arguments but the third are advanced in the MSA. In the AS this argument is also adduced, but the arguments subsumed under 6) are missing. As for the fourth argument, its factual basis is at least partially included by the ASBh under the seventh type of argument. By contrast, in the Hsien-yang only the arguments 5) to 7) are advanced. In the NA even only the second and third types of argument are brought forward. Though it is perfectly plausible that later

texts add more arguments when they make use of the reasoning in an older source, in the given case the development seems to have proceeded along the opposite lines. From the MSA as the oldest and broadest source (or from an unidentified further source on which also the MSA is based or which itself is based on the MSA), arguments were taken over selectively and, in the case of the ASBh (and subsequently the NA), modified.

This course of development is suggested by a comparison of the respective passages. That the ASBh is later than the MSA follows from a greater degree of sophistication in its argumentation. Rather than reducing the entire argumentation to proofs that mind and matter are causally linked and to conclude on this basis the momentariness, the ASBh deduces the momentariness directly from the particular relationship between mind and matter referred to by each argument and thus has a much broader basis for its conclusion that matter, too, is momentary, than the MSA does. This should also apply to the AS itself because, in contrast to the MSA, the various arguments here too seem, as in the ASBh, to be independent. At any rate, they do not serve to substantiate the causal linkage as they clearly do in the MSA. This suggests that the MSA is older than the AS and ASBh insofar as it is difficult to see why the MSA, if it was later, should have given up this argumentative superiority. Besides this, the treatment of momentariness in the AS and ASBh is, on the whole, more stringent and concise than in the case of the MSA and thus makes a later impression. As for the MSABh, it follows the argumentative structure of the MSA, and with the exception of its explication of the domination of the mind (*ādhipatya*; cf. § II.B.2.4), there is no reason to assume that it does not accord with the MSA. Of course this does not imply that the commentary as a text has to precede the AS and ASBh, since it may only reproduce traditional material.

As for the relationship between the Hsien-yang and the MSA, no difference in the argumentative structure (i.e. exploitation of the causal relationship) can be discerned. I hold the Hsien-yang to be later primarily because, as in the case of the AS, its entire treatment of momentariness bears the mark of later systematization. Disregarding the dependence of perception upon matter completely, the Hsien-yang seems to have taken over only those arguments from which the causation of matter by mind plausibly follows, leaving aside other arguments where such a deduction is less evident (e.g. the appropriation of the body). It has to be conceded, however, that the establishment of such a dependence upon the MSABh is problematic insofar as there is to my knowledge no explicit proof that the Hsien-yang is familiar with the MSABh — it does not adopt the theory of the three Buddha bodies (*trikāya*) — or, for that matter, with any of the works attributed to Maitreyanātha. On the other hand, the assumption that the Hsien-yang is later than the MSABh is supported by my earlier finding (n. 168) that the express negation of the impermanence (in any sense) of the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* in the Hsien-yang reflects a more advanced stage than the complete disregard of this issue in the MSABh.

For all I can see, the passages under discussion do not yield any clue as to the relationship between the AS and the Hsien-yang. Both texts present different approaches to incorporate the material from the MSA. It seems that both the selective approach of the Hsien-yang and the approach of modification as adopted by the AS address what must have been considered as a weakness of the argumentation in the MSA, namely that widely varying relationships between mind and matter are reduced to causality. A comparison of the enumeration of the different forms of *anityatā* in the Hsien-yang and in the AS suggests, however, that at least at this point the AS is based on the Hsien-yang rather than vice versa (cf. n. 189).

As for the NA, its version of the second and third type of argument accords, as far as can be made out from the Chinese translation, almost verbatim with the rendering in the ASBh. Given that the AS will have been commented upon as a whole, it can be excluded that the ASBh adopted the interpretation from the NA. By contrast, the passage in the NA can be taken to be an extract of the ASBh (or, at the very least, an extract of a third unidentified source which is also reproduced in the ASBh).

To sum up, this comparison of the argumentation of the four sources suggests that the material presented in the MSA was adopted (either from the MSA itself or from a third source) both by the AS(Bh) and the Hsien-yang, though in different ways. The argumentation in the NA does not present a

further development and seems to be a mere (possibly even verbatim) reproduction of the ASBh. To be sure, the considerations underlying these findings are not conclusive and are thus presented here only tentatively. At any rate, they do not refer to the texts as a whole — though they will be of bearing for their chronological classification — but only to the passages where the theory of momentariness is proved on the basis of the presupposed momentariness of the mind.

II.C The Deduction of Momentariness from Change

As has been seen in § I.D.1, there are basically three types of proof of momentariness. They deduce the momentariness respectively from the momentariness of the mind, from the change of phenomena and from the spontaneity of their destruction. After it has been excluded in chapter II.B that the first type of proof reflects the doctrinal constellation that led to the assumption that everything is momentary, it remains to be seen whether the origins of the doctrine of momentariness may be inferred from the two remaining types of proof. In this chapter, I will argue that it is indeed likely that the doctrine of momentariness is primarily based on the analysis of change.

§ 1 **1.1** The oldest argumentation (at least within the Yogācāra tradition) with respect to momentariness known to me can be found in the ŚrBh. Its point of departure is the analysis of the process of transformation which concludes the extensive treatment of the various forms and causes of change (cf. n. 190). This analysis is set forth in the following central teaching, summing up the doctrine of momentariness in very much the same terms as it is summed up in PG 9ab (cited in n. 181):

> "When these and these conditions (this may refer to the eight causes of transformation enumerated in 474,20-476,16; cf. appendix, § 1.5.2.2) are given, [the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*)] arise in such and such a way; when they have arisen, they perish independently from a cause of destruction on account of their own essence."[341]

The proposition that when exposed to certain conditions, the conditioned factors arise in an according form is taken up in the first part of the argumentation in the ŚrBh in the following way:

> "This change between earlier and later (which was expounded before when the various forms of change were dealt with; cf. appendix, § 1.5.2.1) is possible in the case of such conditioned factors which have arisen, perished and vanished in [every] moment; but [it is not possible] in the case [of such conditioned factors] which persist in exactly the same way [as they have always done]. Therefore, conditioned entities are evidently momentary."[342]

Though phrased as a proof, this first part does little more than claim that change presupposes momentariness.[343] What is of interest is the underlying claim that if an entity is not momentary, it has "to persist in exactly such a way [as it has always done]" (*tathaivāva-*

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[341] ŚrBh 485,13-15: *teṣu teṣu pratyayeṣu satsu tathā tathotpadyante, utpannāś cānapekṣya vināśakāraṇaṃ svarasena vinaśyanti.*

[342] ŚrBh 485,11-13: *kṣaṇotpannabhagnavilīnānām eṣāṃ saṃskārāṇām iyam pūrveṇāparā vikṛtir yujyate, na tu tathaivāvasthitānām: iti hi kṣaṇikāḥ saṃskārāḥ.*

[343] That there can be no change of something not changing (*tathaivāvasthita*) hardly makes an argument. Thus all the argument does is to assert that there can only be change of something arising and perishing every moment.

sthita), i.e. without any modification.[344] By this claim it is excluded from the outset that non-momentary entities may become modified. Since momentary entities are too short-lived to undergo change, there are no selfsame entities at all that change. Thus change between earlier and later can only be brought about by the destruction of an old and the origination of a new, dissimilar entity.[345] Hence change only consists in the qualitative difference of distinct entities and never in the difference between an earlier and later state of one and the same entity. In other words, the subject of change cannot be a distinct entity but only a series constituted by a succession of distinct entities. The principle that any qualitative change implies numeric difference, i.e. the substitution of an old by a new entity, is exemplified in TSi 278b20f by the greying of hair: Black hair does not become white but is replaced by white hair. That this analysis of change underlies the presently examined passage in the ŚrBh is confirmed by the fact that earlier in the ŚrBh (cf. appendix, § 1.5.2.1) the fifteen forms of transformations relating to sentient beings are treated in terms of the substitution of one state (e.g. being healthy) by another (e.g. being ill).

On its own, the presupposition that change entails substitution is not sufficient to justify the claim that change is only possible with momentary entities. For change by substitution is also conceivable if the concerned entities last longer than a bare moment. In other words, additional considerations are needed to ensure that at every moment conditioned entities are substituted by new entities. In the ŚrBh no argument is advanced to prove this.[346] However, the repetition "*teṣu teṣu*" and "*tathā tathā*" in the above cited central teaching insinuates that reproduction is a constantly ongoing process. Moreover, immediately afterwards the ŚrBh explains that the supposed causes of destruction, such as fire etc., function as agents which cause the exposed object to change. This suggests that at least these kinds of transformations entail the constant modification (and hence momentariness) of the concerned object. Therefore, it may be surmised that in the ŚrBh substitution has to occur at every moment because the conditioned entities change their quality all the time.

Alternatively, it could have been held that it is impossible for things to endure for some time and then change, because this would require that they perish (so as to be replaced by the subsequent entity) after having endured for some time. To make this argument conclusive the additional consideration is needed that neither a change of disposition (this would require a change of nature which presupposes substitution) nor the causal power of an external agent (adventitious causes of destruction are not accepted) could explain why one and the same entity first endures and later undergoes destruction. In this case, however, the decisive point of the argument would no longer be that the change of non-momentary entities is impossible,

[344] For the sake of the argument, as I understand it, it does not matter whether this persistence should be forever or not, i.e. whether *tathaivāvasthita* means that the entity does not undergo change while it persists, or that the entity persists eternally in the same way.

[345] Cf. the Sautrāntikas' definition of the mark of change as the qualitative difference between earlier and later entities (AKBh 77,21-24, cited in n. 134).

[346] Therefore, the ŚrBh should possibly not be understood as a full-fledged proof but rather as an allusion to such a proof.

but that only momentary entities can perish (this reasoning will be examined in the next chapter). The factum of change would only be of relevance insofar as it implies that entities are not eternal but eventually have to perish, namely when they are substituted by a new entity in the process of transformation.It seems that precisely this reasoning is employed in MSABh 153,25-29, where it is argued that the change of the earth implies momentariness "because there are no causes of destruction" (cf. § II.C.1.4). This, however, is the sole argument (but cf. the argument [MSABh 152,16-19 cited in n. 360] that sudden corporeal changes induced by desire etc. imply momentariness) known to me where the momentariness is explicitly deduced in this way from change. Generally in the proofs referring to change, the momentariness is — this is, however, not always specified — deduced on the basis that change and hence substitution occur at every moment. Thus, it is likely that also in the ŚrBh the momentariness of all conditioned factors follows in this way, and not indirectly on the grounds that change implies destruction which in turn presupposes momentariness.

1.2 In the other sources, the proof of momentariness of the basis of change is basically identical, though it is not as defective as in the ŚrBh. However, in these texts, too, the premise that qualitative change implies the substitution of an old by a new entity is usually not explicitly stated.[347] A notable exception is the NA where Saṃghabhadra expressly states and explicates the premise that any qualitative change implies numeric difference, i.e. the substitution of an old by a new entity.[348] In contrast to the ŚrBh, often great pains are taken

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[347] As in the ŚrBh, this premise may in some instances be deduced from the presupposition that everything which is not momentary has to be persisting in exactly the same way as it has always done (*tathaivāvasthita*). Notably in the MSABh it is frequently presupposed that non-momentariness implies unchanging persistence. Cf. MSABh 150,21f (translated in n. 538), 152,12-14 (translated in n. 359), 152,16-19 (translated in n. 360), 152,19-24 (translated in n. 361) and 153,4-8 (translated in n. 362). Similarly, in the MSABh[a] the momentariness of firewood, which is referred to at this point in order to demonstrate that the fire which is based upon this wood has to be momentary, follows because "it does not persist in the same way" (*na tathaivāvatiṣṭhate*) when it is exposed to fire.

[a] MSABh 153,29-154,2: *tejasaḥ punaḥ kṣaṇikatvam indhanādhīnavṛttitvāt. na hi tejasy utpanne tejaḥsahotpannam indhanaṃ tathāivāvatiṣṭhate. na ca dagdhendhanaṃ tejaḥ sthātum samarthaṃ. mā bhūd ante 'py anindhanasyāvasthānam iti.*

[348] NA 534c20-26: "Furthermore, it is established that the entity/own-being (*sva/bhāva*) is another one when there is a difference of character: It is not the case that with one [and the same] entity there can be a difference of character, because [whenever] one sees directly different entities then also the character differs,[a] as an ox has a dewlap hanging down while the horse has the mane falling back.
Since the characters within a series differ, for this reason one can infer that the entities have to be different. Though in the case of the colour of milk and sour milk the character is identical, they are yet necessarily different entities, because their accompanying [factors] differ. That is to say, because the two colours are [respectively] accompanied by sweet and sour taste, the entity necessarily has to differ numerically between earlier and later. The same applies to the body: since earlier and later states do not have the same character, for this reason one knows that the mass of bodily elements differ numerically between earlier and later and, therefore, are momentary."

Cf. also AKBh 193,5-10 (cited in n. 397) and TSP 141,1-4 (cited in n. 411) where the premise that selfsame entities cannot change their nature is explicated as part of the proof of momentariness on the basis of the spontaneity of destruction.

[a] When numeric distinctness is perceptible, it always is accompanied by a difference of character.

to prove that change occurs at every moment. As a typical example the following argumentation from the MSABh (150,20-28) may be cited:

> "How is it known that this cognition (i.e. the recognition 'this thing now is that very thing perceived earlier') is caused by the similarity and not by the identity (lit. by being that) [of the presently perceived thing with the thing perceived earlier]?[349] ... And [this is also ascertained] because at the end transformation is observed. For transformation means change (*anyathātva*). If this change did not set in right from the beginning, then transformation at the end would be observed neither of inward (*ādhyātmika*) nor of external (*bāhya*) things (*bhāva*, i.e. of no things whatsoever). Therefore, this is established: Change sets in right from the beginning so that, gradually gaining in momentum, it becomes manifest in the end, just as [the change] of milk [becomes manifest] when the state of sour milk [has been reached]; but as long as this change is not discerned because it is too subtle, one has the idea 'this [thing now] is precisely that [thing perceived before],' because one is [mis]lead by the similarity [between the presently and the earlier perceived entity]. And because there is hence change at every moment, momentariness is established."[350]

The MSABh refers to the gradual transformation over a period of time. This transformation is either not caused (milk turning into sour milk) or effected by the constant exposure to the same condition (a pot fired in a kiln). Because the external conditions do not change (either the objects are not exposed to any external agent at all, or they are constantly exposed to the same agent) during the entire period of the process in question,[351] so the argument runs,

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Hence, it follows that, even though it may not be perceived, there is numeric distinctness whenever there is a difference of character. Though this is not stringent, there can be no doubt that Saṃghabhadra contends here that a qualitative difference can only be given when there is numeric distinctness. The Chinese could be understood to express this explicitly. This would, however, require a rather artificial translation along the following lines: " ... because [only] then the character is different, when one sees (objectively speaking) another entity."

[349] The explication of the phenomenon of recognition on the basis of the doctrine of momentariness can also be found in Hsien-yang 550c9-15.

[350] MSABh 150,20-28 (cf. n. 538 where the passage omitted here is translated): *sādṛśyāt tadbuddhir, na tadbhāvād iti. katham gamyate? ... ante pariṇāmopalabdheś ca. pariṇāmo hi nānyathātvam. tad yadi nādita evārabdham bhaved, ādhyātmikabāhyānāṃ bhāvānām ante pariṇāmo nopalabhyeta. tasmād ādita evānyathātvam ārabdham, yat krameṇābhivardhamānam ante vyaktim āpadyate, kṣīrasyeva dadhyavasthāyām. yāvat tu tad anyathātvaṃ sūkṣmatvān na paricchidyate, tāvat sādṛśyānuvṛttes tad evedam iti jñāyata iti siddham. tataś ca pratikṣaṇaṃ anyathātvāt kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasiddham.*

[351] In the MSABh it is not stated explicitly that the outer conditions have to remain constant, but this follows from the nature of the argument. In other sources this prerequisite is often stipulated. E.g.:
— KSi (P. si 159a1f, KSi_M 11,7-10): "Even though there is no change of the outer conditions (e.g. fire) for the products of burning (*pākaja*, e.g. fired pottery),[a] a difference is perceived in the end. Thereby it is known that [there is] change at every moment." (*ḥdi ltar tshos byed las skye ba rnams kyi phyi rol gyi rkyen tha dad pa med kyaṅ/ phyi maḥi khyad par bzuṅ ba ḥdi ñid skad cig re re la gźan du ḥgyur baḥi khuṅs yin no//*)
— Nyāyavārttika (824,16f, ad NSBh 824,5-8 [cited in n. 363] on Nyāyasūtra III.2.10): *asya prayogaḥ: pratikṣaṇaṃ śarīram anyac cānyac ca bhavati bāhyapratyayābhede saty ante viśeṣadarśanāt pacyamāna-*

the subtle changes which add up to the perceptible transformation of the object after some time have to take place from the beginning onwards at every moment, since there is no reason why they should take place at one moment and not at another. Given that change implies the substitution of the old by a new entity, a new entity originates at every moment so as to be replaced by yet another one immediately afterwards. Thus the objects of ordinary experience are fictitious units and in truth are nothing but series of constantly arising and perishing discrete entities. This proof only establishes that the objects are momentary while they undergo such a process, but insofar as all objects are at all times subject to ageing, they always undergo such a process of transformation and hence are, without exception, momentary.

The same argument is taken up again in the dispute with the opponent at the end of the treatment of momentariness in the MSABh.[352] It is also brought forward in the ASBh,[353]

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bhūmipākajavat apacyamānabhūmipākajavac ceti.

— NA 408b10-13: "If it is held that not at every single moment there is the change of the body and so on, how then can the manifest difference of the body etc. be perceived at a later time, [though] there is no alteration of the external conditions? When in such a case the outer conditions do no change, what causes the difference between earlier and later within the series (*santāna*)?"

[a] *pākaja* refers not only to the products of burning or cooking, but also to the products of other gradually evolving processes such as erosion. Cf. the usage of *pākaja* in AKBh 194,1-9 cited in n. 402.

[352] MSABh 154,7-12: "By interrogation, too, the momentariness of all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) is established. How is that? To start with, one should ask the opponent of the doctrine of momentariness the following: 'Why do you accept that the *saṃskāras* are impermanent, [but] not that they are momentary?' Should he answer thus: 'Because otherness[a] is not perceived at every moment,' then this should be retorted: 'In the case of things which are evidently momentary such as flames, etc., why do you not maintain that they are not momentary when they are in a motionless state, on the grounds that this (i.e. otherness) is not perceived?' If he answers thus: 'Because later they are not perceived as [they were perceived] earlier,' this should be responded: 'Why is this not also maintained with respect to [all other] conditioned factors [which are equally perceived differently after some time]?'" (*pṛcchātaḥ*[b] *khalv api sarvasaṃskārāṇāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ sidhyati. katham kṛtvā. idam tāvad ayam akṣaṇikavādī praṣṭavyaḥ: "kasmād bhavān anityatvam icchan*[c] *saṃskārāṇāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ necchatī"ti. yady evam vadet: "pratikṣaṇam anyatvasyāgrahaṇād" iti, sa idam syād vacanīyaḥ: "prasiddhakṣaṇikabhāveṣv api pradīpādiṣu niścalāvasthāyāṃ tadagrahaṇād akṣaṇikatvaṃ kasmān neṣyate." yady evam vadet: "pūrvavat paścād agrahaṇād" iti, sa idam syād vacanīyaḥ: "saṃskārāṇām api kasmād evaṃ neṣyate."*)

[a] Instead of *anyatva* (lit. otherness), the Tibetan translation reads *anityatā* (P. phi 260a1: *skad cig ma re re la mi rtag pa ñid mi ḥzin paḥi phyir*), and the Chinese translation (T 1604 648b4f) "destruction." As confirmed by Sthiramati's explanation (SAVBh, P. tsi 188a2f), all three readings refer to the same thing, namely to the non-perception of momentariness.

[b] The reading *pṛcchātaḥ* has been adopted from Ōtani A and B. It is confirmed by the Tibetan translation and MSA XVIII.91c.

[c] Levi's reading *icchati na* must be faulty. This is confirmed by the Tibetan (P. phi 259b8-260a1) and Chinese (T 1604 648b3f) translation. The reading suggested here is based on the reading *icchanasaṃs*° in Ōtani A and B.

[353] ASBh 53,2-5 (on AS 41,12): "**Furthermore, because at the end change is perceived, [also matter should be understood to be momentary].** For it is not the case that the change of matter at the end is possible spontaneously without [being preceded] by a change of nature at every moment. But this change [at the end] is perceived. Therefore, it is proved that matter is momentary, because its

Hsien-yang (cf. appendix, § 2.4), KSi (quoted in n. 351) and, furthermore, testified in the Yuktidīpikā (henceforward: YD)[354] and, less explicitely, in RA.[355] Reference may also be made to the YSBh where Vyāsa argues like the Buddhists that the final manifestation of change (notably ageing) implies the constant modification of the entity concerned from its origination onwards.[356]

[perceptible] change at the end is caused by the [gradual] increase of the change occurring at every moment within its series." (***api khalu ante vikāropalabdhitām upādāya;*** *na hi pratikṣaṇaprakṛtivikāritām antareṇākasmiko rūpasyānte vikāro yuktaḥ, sa copalabhyate. tasmāt svāsāṃtānikapratikṣaṇavikārābhivṛddhihetukatvād antyasya rūpavikārasya kṣaṇikaṃ rūpam iti siddham.*)

[354] YD 78,13f: "And even you taught this in the section on momentariness:[a] 'For if something does not change at every moment, then it [could] not differ on account of external conditions[, as it actually does,] when difference is later perceived, just as [there could be no difference] of the product of firing from the unfired clay[, if the clay did not change at every moment].'" (*tathā ca kṣaṇabhaṅgādhikāre bhavadbhir apy uktaṃ: yasya hi pratikṣaṇam anyathātvaṃ nāsti, tasya bāhyapratyayo bhedaḥ paścād viśeṣagrahaṇe nāsti, tadyathā bhūmer apacyamānāyāḥ pākajānām.*)

[a] The *pūrvapakṣa* where this argument is formulated is missing in the fragmentary manuscript of the YD. The passage adduced here is a partial citation of an extract of this *pūrvapakṣa* in a different context. Though the precise understanding of this citation is problematic (my translation is only tentative), the general import should be sufficiently clear.

[355] Ratnāvali I.66: "If there is always transformation, how can an entity not be momentary. If there was no transformation, on what account could there in reality be change?" (*katham akṣaṇiko bhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ sadā yadi/ nāsti cet pariṇāmaḥ syād anyathātvaṃ kuto 'rthataḥ //*).

[356] In the YSBh, and more explicitly in the Vivaraṇa, i.e. the sub-commentary ascribed to Śaṅkara, it is argued that the oldness of a pot becoming manifest after some time is the result of the constant change of the pot's state (*avasthā*) at every moment. As the the Vivaraṇa explains, these changes are too subtle to be perceived, but can be inferred from the eventually manifest oldness of the pot. Thus Patañjali deduces on the same grounds as the Buddhists that things are changing all the time. In contrast to the Buddhists, this is not taken to imply their momentariness, because there is an enduring substance underlying change (i.e. the clay out of which the pot is fashioned) that ensures the numeric identity of the things before and after their transformation.

> YSBh on YS III.15 (p. 312,9-11): "So also the series of the transformations referring to the state (*avasthāpariṇāmakrama*): Of the new pot, oldness will be perceived at the end;[a] and [it is] by being manifested by [this] series that proceeds according to the succession of moments [that] this [oldness] obtains its final manifestation (i.e. becomes perceptible)." (*tathāvasthāpariṇāmakramo 'pi, ghaṭasyābhinavasya prānte purāṇatā dṛśyate. sā ca kṣaṇaparamparānupātinā krameṇābhivyajyamānā*[b] *parāṃ vyaktim āpadyata*[c] *iti.*)

Vivaraṇa 260,26-261,13: "The oldness will be brought forth by the erosion of the newness at every moment. ... But in the middle [between newness and manifest oldness], the oldness does not become apparent because of its minuteness. Therefore, though existing, the series [of transformations] is not perceived in the middle state. It will [, however,] be deduced on the grounds that [the oldness] manifests itself at the end: 'It is the very series [of transformations referring to the state] that has caused this oldness to attain to its final manifestation.'" (*pratikṣaṇam abhinavabhāvaparimardanena purāṇatā saṃjaniṣyate. ... madhye tu sūkṣmatayā na vibhāvyate. tena madhyāvasthāyāṃ sann api kramo na lakṣyate. prāntakālābhivyaktiliṅgenānumāyiṣyate. yena iyaṃ purāṇatā parām vyaktim upaprāpitā, so 'yaṃ krama iti.*)

[a] In accordance with the Vivaraṇa's gloss "*avasānāvasthāyām*" (p. 260,25, cf. also *prāntakālābhivyakti* on p. 216,12) I understand that "*prānte*" means "at the end" and not "on its rim," as Woods (1914, p. 230) translates.

1.3 The deduction of momentariness from change, which in the passages adduced above, refers indifferently to corporeal and inanimate matter, is frequently directed specifically at the body. Thus, later on in the MSA[357] the momentariness of the conditioned factors constituting sentient beings (*ādhyātmika saṃskāra*) is, among other reasons, deduced on the grounds that sentient beings are subject to change insofar as they evolve and grow up,[358] consume

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[b] The reading *abhyūhyamāna* that is only attested in the edition of the Vivaraṇa does not fit. The oldness is inferred from the wear becoming finally manifest and not from the succession of minute changes occurring all the time. By contrast, the joint effect of these changes is the cause for the manifest oldness at the end.

[c] According to the pratīka in the Vivaraṇa: *āpāditā*.

[357] After the momentariness has been proved indiscriminately for all conditioned entities (*saṃskāra*, MSA XVIII.82-83), the MSA proves separately the momentariness of sentient beings (i.e. of the *ādhyātmika saṃskāras*) and of external matter (*bāhya saṃskāra*, MSA XVIII.89-90), and then concludes the proof of momentariness by the direct exchange of arguments (again with reference to all conditioned entities) with the opponent. The momentariness of the *ādhyātmika saṃskāras* is proved by enumerating fourteen kinds of origination of these *saṃskāras* (MSA XVIII.84-85) and then demonstrating for each kind that it implies the momentariness of the *ādhyātmika saṃskāras* involved (MSA XVIII.86-88).

[358] On the basis of the gradual evolution of a newly conceived embryo, the MSABh proves the momentariness of sentient beings (more precisely of the factors constituting them) separately for the first moment of their new existence (i.e. for the complex of mind and matter formed when the transmigrating consciousness, the semen and the ovum merge) and for the subsequent moments. The momentariness of the sentient being after the moment of conception follows from the fact that the evolution of the foetus (its growth and probably also the development and intensification of the senses and the consciousness) is a gradual process of transformation that takes place all the time. Since change implies substitution, the constituent factors perish at every moment as they are replaced by new factors.

> MSABh 151,29f and 152,10-12 (on MSA XVIII.86b): "[The origination] as more and more [grown] is [the origination] that [starts to occur] after the moment of the first production. ... In the case of the origination as more and more [grown, the momentariness follows] from the difference in measure. 'Measure' has the meaning of 'size.' For without difference (i.e. growing) at every moment, there would not be the difference of size (SAVBh, P. tsi 175b2f: between a newly conceived embryo and a foetus etc.)." (*taratamena yaḥ prathamajanmakṣaṇād ūrdhvam ... taratamotpāde mānaviśeṣāt. māṇam pramāṇam ity arthaḥ. na hi pratikṣaṇaṃ vinānyatvena parimāṇaviśeṣo bhavet.*)

Insofar as any specific moment in the cause of existence results from the moment immediately preceding it, it is presupposed that the sentient beings (more precisely, the entities constituting them) as they are present at any given moment are caused by the constituent entities as they were present the moment before. On this basis, it is argued that the causal efficiency of the constituent entities in the very first moment of a new existence must differ from their causal efficiency in the second moment and so on, because the effects differ: the entities in the second moment (= effect of the entities in the first moment) differ from the entities in the third moment (= effect of the second moment). If the causal efficiency in the first moment did not differ from that of subsequent moments, then all the time a being having the maturity of two moments (in Sthiramati's words a *kalala*, that is, an embryo shortly after conception) would be brought forth, because there would not be the difference in causal efficiency that would be necessary if a further evolved embryo (according to Sthiramati an *arbuda*, i.e. a foetus some weeks after conception which constitutes the next evolutionary phase of an embryo after that of a *kalala*) was to be brought forth afterwards.[a] Thus there would be no evolution at all. Since the constituent factors of the first moment of a new existence, therefore, have to function differently from those of the second moment (they cause the less evolved entities of the second moment, whereas the entities of this second moment

and generate bodily energy,[359] react to mental events and grow old.[360] Furthermore, these

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cause the more evolved entities of the third moment), they are numerically distinct, because, following the line of thinking, having different effects implies numeric difference.

> MSABh 151,28f and 152,8-10: "The initial origination is [the origination] which consists in the appearance of the basis of personal existence (*ātmabhāva*) at the beginning (i.e. at the time of conception). ... To start with, in the case of the initial origination the momentariness follows because [the originated first moment of the new existence] differs as a cause [from subsequent moments]. If it did not differ as a cause [from subsequent moments], the difference between later and [still] later [moments in the process] of the evolution of the conditioned factors [following] upon this [initial moment] would not be perceived, because the cause [for these later moments] would not differ. But as there is the difference [between later and still later *saṃskāras*], the momentariness [of the *ātmabhāva* produced at the beginning of a new existence] is proved, because it is distinct from the [*saṃskāras*] following upon it." (*ādya utpādo yā tatprathamatā*[b] *ātmabhāvābhinirvṛttiḥ. ... ādyotpāde tāvat hetutvaviśeṣāt. yadi hi tasya hetutvena viśeṣo na syāt, taduttarāyāḥ saṃskārapravṛtter uttarottaraviśeṣo nopalabhyeta hetvaviśeṣāt. viśeṣe ca sati taduttarebhyas tasyānyatvāt kṣaṇikatvasiddhiḥ.*)

As the causal efficiency of an entity is an expression of its nature, this argument, too, is indirectly based on the presupposition that qualitative difference implies substitution. Moreover, this argument also presupposes that transformation (at least in the initial phase after conception) takes place all the time. Thus this argument only differs from the argument cited before insofar as it deduces the momentariness of the cause and not of the effect. Thereby, the scope of the argument is shifted by one moment: The momentariness is already proved for the entity preceding the first entity that is subject to constant change.

This possibly explains why the momentariness of the entities constituting the first moment of a new existence is derived on different grounds than that of the subsequent moments. For commencing a new existence, the entities in the first moment do not differ from any preceding entities. Thus the reason for the momentariness at all subsequent moments, namely that there is a difference as to measure, can only be attributed to them insofar as they differ from the entity following upon them (viz. the constituent entities of the second moment), and not, as in the case of all subsequent moments (but the last one), because they differ both from the preceding and the following entity. However, it has to be conceded that this alone should have sufficed to imply their momentariness.

[a] Cf. SAVBh, P. tsi 175a6f: *gal te rtag pa źig yin na ni rtag tu yaṅ nur nur po ḥbaḥ źig tu snaṅ bar ḥgyur gyi/ mer mer po la sogs paḥi dṅos po mi ḥdra ba gźan daṅ gźan snaṅ bar mi ḥgur ro//*

[b] The reading *yāvat*, which is clearly faulty, has been emended in accordance with the Chinese (T 1604 647a16) and Tibetan translation (P. phi 257a6: *daṅ por skye ba ni daṅ po ñid du bdag gi ṅo bo mṅon par grub pa gaṅ yin paḥo.*; cf. the *pratīka* in SAVBh, P. tsi 172a1).

[359] MSABh 152,12-14: "[The origination characterized] by accumulation is the [origination characterized] by the accumulation [of corporeal matter] due to nutrition, sleep, celibacy, absorption. ... In case of the origination [characterized] by accumulation, [the momentariness follows] because [without it] accumulation would be senseless. For accumulation is sustainment, [and] this would be senseless if there was no momentariness, because [in that case sentient beings] would persist in the same way [as they have always done] (so that there would be no exhaustion of nutrition etc. that would have to be compensated). Further, [the momentariness results] because [without it] accumulation itself would be impossible. For unless [corporeal matter] originates at every moment more and more strengthened, accumulation would not be possible." (*cayena ya āhārasvapnabrahmacaryāsamāpattyupacayena. ... upacayotpāde cayāpārthyāt. upastambho hi cayaḥ. tasyāpārthyaṃ syād antareṇa kṣaṇikatvaṃ, tathaivāvasthitatvāt. ayogāc copacayasyaiva. na hi pratikṣaṇaṃ vinā puṣṭatarotpattyā yujyetopacayaḥ.*)

[360] MSABh 151,31f and 152,16-19: "[The origination] on account of change is the [origination] because of the alteration of the complexion and so on due to desire and so on. [The origination] on account of maturation is the [origination] into the [various] stages [of life, namely that of] an embryo,

saṃskāras change insofar as the maturation of karmic impressions presupposes the constant transformation of the beings to whom these impressions pertain,[361] and insofar as the

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an infant, a child, a youth, an adult and an elder. ... In case of the originations because of change and because of maturation, [the momentariness results] because [change] of something persisting is impossible since without destruction [right] from the beginning there is no change [at the end]. For change because of passion etc. is not possible of something persisting in the same way;[a] nor is the maturation into different stages of life [of something persisting in the same way possible], because if there was not destruction right from the beginning there would be no change at the end." (*vikāreṇa yo rāgādibhir varṇādipariṇāmataḥ.*[b] *paripākenayogarbhabālakumārayuvamadhyamavṛddhāvasthāsu.... vikārotpattau paripākotpattau ca sthitasyāsaṃbhavāt ādyanāśāvikārataḥ. na hi tathāsthitasyaiva rāgādibhir vikāraḥ saṃbhavati, na cāvasthāntareṣu paripāka ādāv avināśe saty ante vikārābhāvāt.*)
It can be seen here how the constant subjection of the body to change is one time deduced on the grounds that the eventual manifestation of transformation implies that the transformed being has been changing all the time before, and one time is deduced from the direct observation of change (here the change of complexion when desire etc. is aroused).

[a] At this point, it seems that the momentariness does not follow because the body changes at every moment, but because something cannot change after having persisted before. Therefore, the argument seems to rest on the assumption that something cannot first persist and later perish. If this interpretation is correct, it derives its plausibility in the same way as the aforementioned argument that the changes undergone by earth imply its momentariness "because there are no causes of destruction" (cf. § II.C.1.4).

[b] Cf. MSABh, P. phi 257a7f: *ḥgyur bar ni ḥdod chags la sogs pas kha dog la sogs pa rnam par ḥgyur baḥi sgo nas gaṅ yin paḥo//* Cf. SAVBh 172b5-7 referred to in n. 303.

361 MSABh 151,32-152,3 and 152,19-24: "The [origination] as inferior and as excellent is [the origination] of those [beings who] are reborn in, respectively, a bad or a good form of existence (*gati*). The [origination] as shining is [the origination] of those [beings who] are, because in these states the fulfillment of wishes] is only dependent upon the mind,[a] reborn among those who supernaturally create their objects of desire, among those whose objects of desire are created by others supernaturally, [as well as reborn in the realms of subtle] matter or in the immaterial [realms] (i.e. the beings who are reborn in the two highest levels of the realm of desire or above). The [origination] as not-shining is [the origination] of those [beings who] are reborn elsewhere (i.e. in the realm of desire below the two highest levels) ...

The momentariness in the case of inferior and excellent origination is to be known [on the same grounds] as in the case of the originations because of change and because of maturation. For if the conditioned factors persisted in the same way [as they have always done], the karmic impressions (*karmavāsanā*), on account of which there should be the rebirth in a bad or a good form of existence (*gati*), [could] not become [causally] efficient. For it is by the particular, gradually [realized] transformation of the series[, which has been 'karmically impressed,'] that [these impressions later] become causally efficient.

To the shining and not-shining origination, too, the momentariness pertains in this very way (i.e. as it does in the case of the originations because of change and because of maturation). To start with, in the case of the shining [origination, the momentariness results] because for something persisting in the same way [as it has always done] it is impossible to exist in a way depending upon the mind. But also in the case of the not-shining [origination the momentariness results, namely] because without destruction right from the beginning the change at the end[b] is impossible." (*hīnatvena viśiṣṭatvena ca yo durgatau* <*sugatau*>[c] *cotpadyamānānāṃ yathākramaṃ. bhāsvaratvena yo nirmitakāmeṣu paranirmitakāmeṣu rūpārūpyeṣu copapannānāṃ cittamātrādhīnatvāt. abhāsvaratvena yas tadanyatropapannānāṃ... tathā hīnaviśiṣṭotpattau kṣaṇikatvaṃ veditavyaṃ yathā vikāraparipākotpattau. na hi tathāsthiteṣv eva saṃskāreṣu karmavāsanā vṛttiṃ labhate, yato durgatau vā syād utpattiḥ sugatau vā. krameṇa hi saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt vṛttilābho yujyate. bhāsvarābhāsvare 'pi cotpāde tathaiva kṣaṇikatvaṃ yujyate.*

skandhas constituting the sentient beings first incessantly perpetuate themselves, and then cease to exist entirely at the time of final emancipation from the cycle of existence (*saṃsāra*).[362] Likewise, in the Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (henceforth: NSBh) the Buddhist deduces

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bhāsvare tāvat tathāsthitasyāsaṃbhavāt cittādhīnavṛttitāyāḥ. abhāsvare 'pi cādau vināśam antareṇānte vikārāyogāt.)

[a] Supplementation in accordance with SAVBh, P. tsi 173b1. Thus the beings who are reborn as shining are momentary because they exist in accordance with their wishes, which would be impossible if they persisted always in the same way (*tathāshita*).

[b] It is likely that in analogy with the deduction of momentariness in the case of inferior and excellent origination the change at the end refers to the maturation of the karmic impressions determining the next existence. Alternatively, it could refer to decay and death in one existence as a pre-condition for the next existence.

[c] *sugatau* was added in accordance with Ōtani B, the Tibetan (P. phi 257b1) and the Chinese (T 1604 647a21f) translation.

[362] With the exception of the final *skandhas* before emancipation (i.e. the groups of factors constituting the emancipated "being" at the moment of death), all *skandhas* are followed by further *skandhas* which are regarded as the effect of the *skandhas* preceding them. In this sense, all but the final *skandhas* function as seeds for future *skandhas* (cf. n. 358). Since it presupposes a qualitative difference if something at one time functions as a cause and at another does not, the *skandhas* have to function as a cause and hence perish (because the process of procreation entails the self-destruction ?) at every moment of their existence.[a] In contrast to all other *skandhas*, the final *skandhas* of an arhant at the moment of death are not followed by further *skandhas* and hence do not function as a cause. Therefore, they are momentary, because they are numerically distinct from all earlier *skandhas*, whose nature it is to give rise to subsequent *skandhas*. Thus the *skandhas* existing in the last moment have not existed before, and hence they are momentary.

MSABh 152,4f and 153,4-8: "The [origination] with seed is [any origination] but that of the last *skandhas* of an arhant (i.e. the person emancipated from *saṃsāra*). The [origination] without seed is [the origination] of these last *skandhas* of an arhant. ... In case of the origination with and without seed, the momentariness is to be known [respectively] because something persisting cannot [function as a seed after it has not been functioning as a seed before], and because it cannot be the last. For it is impossible that something persisting thus, [i.e.] without functioning as a cause at every moment, could function on the contrary as a seed at another time. Nor [is it possible that something persisting] is without seed at the last moment [if it had been endowed with a seed all the time before].[b] And one cannot accept that something first has a seed and at the last moment does not have a seed, because without this (viz. the destruction of the old and subsequent origination of a new entity at every moment)[c] the being-the-last would be impossible. For thus (i.e. if momentariness is not presumed) the being-the-last is impossible."[d] (*sabījatvena yo 'rhataś caramān skandhān varjayitvā. abījatvena yas teṣām evārhataś carameṣām. ... sabījābīja-bhāvenotpattau kṣaṇikatvaṃ veditavyaṃ sthitāyogāc caram<atv>āsaṃbhavāc*[e] *ca. na hi pratikṣaṇaṃ hetubhāvam antareṇa tathāsthitasyānyasmin kāle punar bījabhāvo yujyate. nirbījatvaṃ vā carame kṣaṇe. na ca śakyaṃ pūrvaṃ sabījatvaṃ carame kṣaṇe nirbījatvam abhyupagantum. tadabhāve caramatvāsaṃbhavāt. tathā hi caramatvam eva na sambhavati.*)

[a] Cf. SAVBh, P. tsi 182b5: *rtag pa la ni sa bon daṅ bcas pa daṅ sa bon med pa rnam pa gñis su ḥygur mi srid do//*

[b] It seems that Dharmakīrti reasons in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (P. 5710 ce 277a4-6) along the same lines in order to prove, as part of the *sattvānumāna*, that non-momentary entities cannot be causally efficient: "A non-momentary entity cannot be causally efficient, because of contradiction in the case of gradual and instantaneous [discharge of causal efficiency]. Gradually it [can]not be [efficient], because [if] it was independent [from adventitious factors] causally efficient because of its mere existence, a [partial] delay [of the discharge of this causal efficiency] would not be possible. [If, however, because

the momentariness on the grounds that the body is constantly subject to increase and decrease, since it grows by the digestion of food and diminishes — so one may add — because corporeal activities burn up the energy generated by the digestion of food. Though these processes only become manifest after some time (when a person has grown or become emaciated?), they have to be occurring at every moment, because, as Uddyotakara specifies, otherwise they would not materialize at all.[363] Moreover, in the YD the Buddhist deduces

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of the dependence upon external factors] it was not [fully] causally efficient earlier, [then it should] not become so later either, because its own-being is not subject to change. ... Nor can it be instantaneously causally efficient. For it is not possible that its nature [that is efficient earlier] is not also efficient later." (*skad cig ma ma yin pa de ni don byed par srid pa ma yin te/ rim dan cig car hgal bahi phyir ro// rim gyis ni ma yin te/ ltos pa med par ran yod tsam gyis byed pa por gyur pa ni sdod par mi rigs pahi phyir ro// snar byed pa po ma yin pa ni phyis kyan mi hgyur te/ ran gi no bor hgyur ba med pahi phyir ro// ... cig car byed pa yan ma yin te/ dehi ran gi no bo ni phyis kyan mi byed par mi hthad pahi phyir ro//*)

[c] Cf. SAVBh P. tsi 183a1f: *gal te sa bon dan bcas pahi skad cig ma ni hgags/ phyis sa bon med pahi skad cig ma skyes pa ni ma yin gyi/ dus thams cad du rtag par gnas na ni/ rtag tu yan sa bon dan bcas pahi dnos por gnas gyi sa bon med par hgyur bar ni phyis kyan med par hgyur te/ ...*
Cf. MSAṬ P. bi 172a7f: *de med na tha ma ñid mi srid pahi phyir ro// źes bya ba gan med na skad cig re re la hdus byas rnams gźan ñid du hgyur ba med na ste/ skad cig la hjig pahi nan can yin na ni der hgyur ro//*

[d] According to Sthiramati (see quotation), to be last would be impossible, because the entity would persist eternally if it was not momentary. The underlying reasoning is not specified but may be supplied from the earlier argument (MSABh 150,21f, cited in n. 538) that things cannot perish after having persisted for some time, because such a change in behaviour presupposes a change of nature which is precluded by the Buddhists as it entails the loss of identity. Alternatively, the argument here may be understood in such a way that "being-the-last" is inconceivable without momentariness, because being last presupposes that there are earlier entities, and this is not possible if the entity existing at the end is identical with the entity existing earlier.

Sthiramati (SAVBh P. phi 182b5f) understands that this argument provides the reason for the preceding assertion that something persisting cannot be without seed at the end. By contrast, I understand that this argument — irrespective of its precise analysis — supplements the earlier argument that "being-the-last" of something persisting is impossible, because it cannot be without seed after having been endowed with seed earlier as this implies qualitative change. Also in the Chinese translation (T 1604 647c26-29) it is understood that two distinct arguments (the order in the translation is inverted) are adduced in order to show that "being-the-last" is impossible without momentariness.

Despite the interpretative difficulties of the passage under consideration — the argumentation is too elliptic to settle with certainty how precisely it is to be reconstructed — there can be little doubt that the momentariness is basically deduced on the grounds presented at the beginning of this note.

[e] Emendation confirmed by the Tibetan translation (P. phi 258b7).

[363] NSBh 824,5-8 (ad III.2.10; cf. n. 351 where Uddyotakara's formalization of this argument is cited): "But how is it known that manifest entities (*vyakti*) are momentary? Because it is seen that in bodies etc. there is a constant succession of increase and decrease. There is increase insofar as the essence of the food processed by digestion becomes blood etc. in the body, and [this] increase occurs constantly. Because of [this] increase there is the origination of manifest entities, and because of decrease there is the destruction of manifest entities. This being so, the growth of the body is perceived after some time because of the difference due to the transformation of the [constituent] parts [of the body]." (*katham punar gamyate kṣaṇikā vyaktaya iti. upacayāpacayaprabandhadarśanāc charīrādiṣu. paktinirvṛttasyāhāra-rasasya śarīre rudhirādibhāvenopacayo upacayaś ca prabandhena pravarttate. upacayād vyaktīnām utpādaḥ, apacayād vyaktinirodhaḥ. evaṃ ca saty avayavapariṇāmabhedena vṛddhiḥ śarīrasya kālāntare gṛhyate ...*)

the momentariness on the basis of bodily changes brought about by breathing, exhaustion and possibly — my understanding of *rūpa* is tentative — by the alteration of the complexion.[364] Besides, in ASBh 52,14-16 (quoted in n. 297, cf. NA 534b29-c3 quoted in n. 298) it is argued on the basis of the corporeal changes brought about by psychic events or states that the body is momentary, because it changes at every moment in accordance with the mind. It

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This is corroborated by Vācaspatimiśras formulation of this argument in the Tātparyaṭīkā (824,19f): *śarīrasya ca kālaparipākavaśena sthaulasya hrāsasya ca darśanāt pratikṣaṇaṃ sūkṣmaḥ pariṇatibhedo 'numīyate* ....

The explication that the manifest entities (*vyakti*) — the terminology is that of the Sāṃkhyas against whom this argument is directed — originate because of the increase and cease because of the decrease could suggest that at every moment corporeal entities originate because of energy input and are subsequently destroyed because of energy output. This, however, is at odds with the spontaneity of destruction entailed by the doctrine of momentariness and makes also for other reasons little sense. Instead, it seems that the origination and destruction addressed in the NSBh refer to two processes occurring side by side (the body generates and uses up energy), which are understood respectively as the incorporation of new entities and the separation from old ones. This interpretation, which accords with the NSBh's definition of the cause of origination and destruction,[a] is supported by Uddyotakara who explains that the origination and destruction of individual entities (*vyakti*) become manifest after some time because the body is constantly increased and decreased.[b] If I understand the argument correctly, growth only becomes manifest as long as the increase is greater than the decrease. If this situation is reversed (i.e. when the body is not nourished adequately), then instead of growth, emaciation should manifest itself after some time.[c] Possibly, the NSBh only refers to the manifestation of growth after some time, because this is the standard case. Notwithstanding these interpretative difficulties, there can be little doubt that in the NSBh, as in the corresponding passage in the MSA(Bh), the body is always subject to change and hence momentary because it constantly generates and uses up energy.

[a] NSBh 826,8-827,1 (ad III.2.12): *utpattikāraṇaṃ tāvad upalabhyate avayavopacayo valmīkādīnām, vināśakāraṇaṃ copalabhyate ghaṭādīnām avayavavibhāgaḥ.*

[b] NyāVārt 824,13f: *tau cotpādanirodhau tasya kālāntareṇa dṛṣṭau. ato 'vagamyate: pratikṣaṇam upacīyate cāpacīyate ca śarīram iti.*

[c] In Vācaspatimiśra's formulation of this argument (Tātparyaṭīkā 824,19f: *śarīrasya ca kālaparipākavaśena sthaulyasya hrāsasya ca darśanāt pratikṣaṇaṃ sūkṣmaḥ pariṇatibhedo 'numīyate* ...), momentary change is expressly deduced both from corporeal increase (*sthaulya*) and from emaciation (*hrāsa*).

[364] YD 60,2-5: "**If it be held: 'The momentariness is proved because difference is perceived.'**[a]: It may be thought [by the Buddhist]: 'If there is not the cessation of things immediately after they have arisen, how is the difference of the body and so on, which is effected by breathing, exhaustion, [alteration of] the complexion (for *rūpa*?)[b] and so on, brought about; and how is the difference of the conch and so on, which is effected by the contact with heat and coldness, brought about? And bells etc., which do not resound [now, change insofar as they] are later perceived to resound. Therefore, momentariness is not refuted.'" (***viśeṣagrahaṇāt kṣaṇikatvasiddhir** iti cet.*[a] *syān matam: yady utpannamātroparatir nāsti bhāvānāṃ, kiṃkṛtaḥ śarīrādīnāṃ prāṇāpānaśramarūpādikṛto 'bjāśmaprabhṛtīnāṃ ca śītoṣṇasparśakṛto bhedaḥ. ghaṇṭādīnāṃ cāśabdakānāṃ paścāc chabdavatāṃ grahaṇam. tasmād aniṣiddhaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅga iti.*)

[a] As Bronkhorst has shown (J. Bronkhorst: "*vārttika*" in WZKS XXXIV, 1990, pp. 123-146), the *vārttika* and the commentary thereon are by the same author.

[b] Cf. the *varṇakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā* in the ŚrBh and Hsien-yang (see appendix, § 1.5.2.1) which is said to be constituted by the change of complexion. The passage could also be translated thus: " ... how is the difference of the body and so on, which is effected by the [alteration of] the complexion due to breathing and exhaustion ... "

will be seen that in the case of breathing and metabolism, the subjection of the body to constant change is evident and does not have to be deduced from the final manifestation of change or destruction, as in the case of the growing and ageing of the body. As for the reaction of the body to emotions etc., it is argued in the ASBh, but not in the equivalent passage of the MSABh, cited in n. 360), that the changes have to occur at every moment, because they are prompted by the mind which itself changes all the time.

1.4 In contrast to these arguments, the argumentation based on change is also directed exclusively towards external matter in the MSA(Bh), where the extensive treatment of *kṣaṇikatva* comprises specific arguments for the momentariness of each of the four gross elements and the six sensory objects (cf. n. 357). Thus, the momentariness of water is deduced on the grounds that the decrease or increase of water in ponds etc., which becomes perceptible after some time, presupposes that the water, that is the mass or quantity of water, has been changing all the time before.[365] Similarly, in the case of seemingly persisting sounds such as that produced by a bell — the momentariness of ordinary sound was considered to be self-evident, momentariness follows because at every moment the sound becomes softer.[366] Here the change at every moment is immediately perceptible and does not have to be deduced. The momentariness of earth (*pṛthivī*) is proved on the basis that it is transformed by the karma of sentient beings, by ploughing, digging etc., by fire, water and wind, as well as by the passing of time.[367] In the case of earth, the momentariness is not

[365] MSABh 153,17-19: "To start with, [momentariness is attributed] to water because it desiccates and it augments. In springs, lakes, ponds etc., a gradual increase and desiccation of water is observed. But they both would not be [possible] without the transformation [of the water] at every moment, because [otherwise] there would be no cause for the difference [in the quantity of the water that is observed] later (i.e. once the joint effect of the imperceptible changes from moment to moment has become perceptible)." (*apām tāvac chośavṛddheḥ. utsasarastaḍāgādiṣv*[a] *apām krameṇa vṛddhiḥ śoṣaś copalabhyate. tac cobhayam antareṇa pratikṣaṇaṃ pariṇāmaṃ na syāt, paścād viśeṣakāraṇābhāvāt.*)
Water is conceived here collectively as the mass of water (and not in terms of discrete water atoms). This conception corresponds to the usage of "*ap*" ("water") which in post-Vedic literature is only employed in the plural (i.e. "waters").

[a] Levi's reading *taṭāgādiṣv* has been emended in accordance with the manuscripts Ōtani A and B.

[366] MSABh 154,3-5: "Even the sound that is perceived for a certain stretch of time, as the sound of bells etc., should be known to be momentary, because of the gradation [of its volume]. For if it was not momentary, it would not be observed that at every moment it is softer [than before]." (*śabdaḥ punar yo 'pi kālāntaram upalabhyate ghaṇṭādīnāṃ tasyāpi kṣaṇikatvaṃ veditavyaṃ tāratamyopalabdheḥ. na hy asati kṣaṇikatve pratikṣaṇa<ṃ> mandataratamopalabdhiḥ syāt.*)
It should be noted that the stance that a loud sound and soft noise are numerically distinct does not necessarily presuppose the position that all qualitative change implies substitution. For the numeric distinctness between the sound when it is louder and softer may not follow from a rule concerning qualitative change in general but from the specific case, insofar as the change in volume can arguably only be explained by the substitution of an old by a new sound.

[367] MSABh 153,25-29: "And four kinds of transformation of the earth are observed: [1) the transformations] caused by karma, that is, by the various karma of sentient beings (the quality of the earth is determined by the karma of the sentient beings inhabiting it; cf. SAVBh P. tsi 815a7-b3), [2) the transformations] caused by violence such as by striking (e.g by agriculture, mining etc.; cf. SAVBh

deduced on the grounds that the changes occur all the time. Instead it is argued — that is, if I understand the elliptic reason "because of the non-existence of a cause of destruction" (*vināśakāraṇābhāvāt*) correctly — that since the earth changes at certain times, it must have been constantly perishing and re-arising before, because change implies the destruction of the old entity. This destruction cannot occur after the existence for some time, because there are no external causes of destruction that could explain why one and the same entity first persists and later perishes. Thus, this argument only refers to change in order to show that there are times when the earth perishes. Besides this, it does not differ from the deduction of momentariness on the grounds that things are destroyed eventually (cf. § II.C.1.1).

1.5 Possibly, the reasoning that the eventual transformation presupposes change at every moment also underlies the deduction of momentariness (directed indifferently at all conditioned factors, *saṃskāra*) from "the gross *anityatā*," that is, from the destruction of empirical phenomena existing over a certain period of time, as its attested in the SNS[368] and

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P. tsi 185b3f), [3) the transformations] caused by the elements[, i.e.] by fire etc., [4) the transformations] caused by time[, that is,] by staying for a certain period of time.[a] But without the origination of another [earth-entity] at every moment, [these transformations] are not possible, because there is no cause of destruction [that could open the way for change by annihilating the old entity after it has existed for some time]." (*caturvidhaś ca pariṇāmaḥ pṛthivyā upalabhyate. karmakṛtaḥ satvānāṃ karmaviśeṣāt, upakramakṛtaḥ prahārādibhiḥ,[b] bhūtakṛto 'gnyādibhiḥ, kālakṛtaḥ kālāntaraparivāsataḥ.[b] sa cāntareṇa pratikṣaṇam anyotpattiṃ na yujyate, vināśakāraṇābhāvāt.*)

[a] Asvabhāva (MSAṬ P. bi 172b3f) exemplifies this by the transformation undergone by a spot of earth, upon which first a village is built and which later turns into wilderness (as the village decays?). Sthiramati (SAVBh P. tsi 185b7-186a1) adduces the same example, mentioning also the reversal of the process (i.e. wilderness turned into a settlement). According to him, the transformation refers, furthermore, to seasonal changes and to the transformations brought about by the qualitative differences of the various cosmic aeons.

[b] The emendations *prahārādibhiḥ* (for *prahādibhiḥ*) and *kālāntaraparivāsataḥ* (for *kālāntarapariṇāmataḥ*) are confirmed by Ōtani A and B and by the Tibetan translation (P. phi 259b2f).

[368] SNS X.7, p. 156 (= P. ṅu 56a6-b1 and in Y_T P. ḥi 103b8-104a2, Chin.: T 676 709b27-c4 and in Y_C, T 1579 734c27-735a5, SNSVy P. cho 170b5-8): "[1] The sense perception of the gross impermanence,[a] that inheres in the [conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*)[b] which are endowed with momentariness], [2] the sense perception of the diversity of living beings, which depends upon the diversity of karma, and [3] the sense perception of the suffering and the happiness of living beings, which depend upon good and evil deeds, [are perceptions] by means of which the imperceptible is to be deduced, [namely respectively 1] the momentariness of all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*), [2] the existence of the yonder-world (i.e. of existence before birth and after death) and [3] the not-getting-lost (*avipraṇāśa*) of good and evil deeds. [These perceptions] and [other perceptions] of this kind [are instances] for [the **upapattisādhanayukti*[c] which is] characterized by the sense perception of something having this (i.e. the thing to be deduced) as its basis (**tadāśrayapratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa*)."[d] (*ḥdu byed thams cad skad cig ma[e] ñid daṅ/ ḥjig rten pha rol[f] yod pa ñid daṅ/ las dge ba daṅ/ mi dge ba chud mi za ba la[g] de la gnas paḥi mi rtag pa[h] rags pa ñid[i] mṅon sum du dmigs pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ[j]/ sems can sna tshogs las sna tshogs la gnas pa mṅon sum du dmigs pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ/ sems can bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal ba las dge ba daṅ mi dge ba la gnas pa, mṅon sum du dmigs pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ/[k] gaṅ gis mṅon sum du ma gyur pa la rjes su dpag par bya ba daṅ/ de lta bu daṅ mthun pa gaṅ yin pa de ni de la gnas pa mṅon sum du dmigs paḥi mtshan ñid yin no//*).

[a] Cf. SNSVy P. cho 171b7f-172a3: *gnas paḥi mi rtag pa[r] rags pa ñid ces bya ba ni skad cig la*

in the Ślokavārttika.[369] For since destruction is analyzed in terms of transformation (cf. n. 377 and § II.D.2.4), the gross destruction may be conceived of as a gradual process — the object is destroyed by the gradual corrosion brought about by the passing of time (i.e. ageing) or by the prolonged exposure to a specific factor such as fire — so that the momentariness of the object may be deduced on the grounds that it has to undergo change all the time. Given that the external factors are constant, so the argument could run, the annihilation at a later time can only be explained if it is assumed that the object is constantly modified until it finally reaches such a state that it ceases to exist. The only difference between this gradual destruction and the process envisaged in the passages adduced before would consist in the result: one time the object would be transformed in such a way that it continues to exist in an altered form, the other time in such a way that it ceases to exist. Since for the sake of the argument it only matters that the object is subject to constant change, while it is of no importance whether this modification leads up to transformation or destruction, the argumentation with respect to the gross *anityatā* and with respect to transformation could hence be regarded as two versions of the same proof of momentariness.[370] Thus the

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ḥjig[s] pa ma yin paḥi mi rtag pa la rags pa ḥchi ḥpho ba daṅ/ skye ba daṅ ḥjig paḥi mtshan ñid de/ ... mṅon sum du dmigs pa gaṅ yin pa źes bya ba ni ... sgrub par byed paḥi phyogs kyi chos raṅ bźin gyi rtags mi rtag paḥi rags pa ñid mṅon sum du dmigs pa dehi sgo nas/ bsgrub par bya baḥi chos skad cig ma ñid rjes su dpag par byaḥo//

[b] Cf. SNSVy P. cho 171b6f: *de la gnas paḥi mi rtag pa[r] rags pa ñid mṅon sum du dmigs pa gaṅ yin pa źes bya ba la de la źes bya ba ni rjes su dpag par bya baḥi chos can ḥdu byed kyi dṅos po laḥo//*

[c] **upapattisādhanayukti* is rendered by Sakuma (1990, vol. II, p. 101; cf. fn. 602, 603, 604) as "Stimmigkeit aufgrund (/Begründung im Sinne) des Nachweises mittels Beweismitteln."

[d] The Sanskrit — if it is reconstructed on the basis of the Tibetan and also Chinese translation as *tadāśrayapratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa* — may also mean "characterized by the perception which is the basis for that" (viz. for the deduction).

[e] P. ṅu 56a6 reads wrongly *pa*.

[f] Y_T, P. ḥi 103b8: *rol tu*.

[g] So Y_T, P. ḥi 103b8; *la* is missing in P. ṅu 56a6 but has to be read in analogy with *mṅon sum du ma gyur pa la* ...

[h] So Y_T, P. ḥi 103b8 and SNSVy, P. cho 172a5 and a8; P. ṅu 56a7 and SNSVy, P. cho 170b6 and 171b6 read *rtag par*; SNSVy, P. cho 172a3 reads *rtag paḥi*.

[i] The position of *ñid* is problematic. It really should precede *rags pa* (i.e. *mi rtag pa ñid rags pa*) since *tā* (= *ñid*) in the Sanskrit original "**audārikānityatā*" (or the like) pertains primarily to *anityatā*.

[j] I refrain from translating *daṅ*, because *gaṅ gis* should refer back to the three enumerated perceptions. Otherwise *gaṅ gis* and *de lta bu* would both refer to other perceptions of the same kind.

[k] The text ° ... ° is missing in Y_T.

[369] Ślokavārttika, Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa 424-425: "Also the [Buddhists], who imagine that in the time between [origination and cessation all things] are characterized by subtle destructions at every moment because otherwise [their] gross destruction would not occur, they also cannot prove that sounds are characterized by destruction, because they do not perceive their characterization by gross destruction that would be more [pronounced and hence perceptible] than their characterization by momentary destruction." (*ye 'pi sthūlavināśānām anyathānupapattitaḥ// kalpayanty antarā sūkṣmaṃ vināśitvaṃ pratikṣaṇam //424// te'pi kṣaṇikanāśitvād adhikāṃ sthūlanāśitām/ śabdānām avijānanto na śaktā nāśisādhane//425//*).

[370] I use the term "macroscopic" in order to refer to the temporally extended objects perceived

deduction of momentariness from gross *anityatā* could be understood as a further instance of the proof that long term changes presuppose modification at every moment and hence indicate the momentariness of all things.[371]

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ordinarily (i.e. tables etc.) which in the final analysis are not really existing entities *(dravyasat)*, but only fictitious units *(prajñaptisat)* formed by the succession and compounding of atomic, momentary entities. To these later entities, which alone are really existing, I refer as "microscopic."

[371] There is some textual evidence strengthening the interpretation that the momentariness follows from the gross *anityatā* because the destruction of macroscopic entities implies a process of transformation: In the ŚrBh the destruction by fire etc., as well as death and the decomposition of the body, are considered as forms of transformation. Similarly, in the AKBh (cf. n. 402) burning, corrosion and other similar gradual processes of destruction are treated in the same way as the firing of pottery, namely as maturation processes *(pāka)*, where the external agent causes the origination of successively more burnt, corroded, fired etc. entities, thereby transforming the series exposed to it. Also in all other sources dealing with the supposed destruction of macroscopic objects by external agents, it is argued that fire etc. does, contrary to appearance, not destroy wood etc., but only effects its transformation (cf. appendix, § II.D.2.4). Moreover, in MPPU 200b4-9 (= MPPU_L 1163) the argument that things undergo destruction from the first moment onwards (and hence are momentary), because they eventually perish, is exemplified by the wear and tear of clothes (in MPPU 222c10-12 of shoes), i.e. by a process of gradual transformation.

According to the commentary on the deduction of momentariness from the gross *anityatā* in the SNSVy (cf. the extracts appended to the translation in n. 368), the gross *anityatā* is the logical reason *(sādhanadharma)* which by its inherence in the conditioned factors (i.e. in the *pakṣa*) proves that they are momentary *(sādhyadharma)*. This analysis accords with the explication of the argument "because destruction is seen at the end," as it is recorded in the *pūrvapakṣa* adduced in YD 57,13-15:

> "What has destruction at the end (= logical reason, *hetu*), that is observed to be momentary (= quality to be proved, *sādhya)*, as in the case of the flames of a lamp, cognitions and sound (= example, *dṛṣṭānta*, for the concomitance of *hetu* and *sādhya*)" *(āha: ante kṣayadarśanāt. iha yasyānte kṣayas tasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tadyathā pradīpajvālābuddhiśabdānām. asti cānte kṣayaḥ saṃskārāṇāṃ tasmāt kṣaṇikā.*[a]

It can be safely excluded that initially a formal syllogism of this kind underlay the argument, and that accordingly the argument derived its plausibility from the trust in the validity of a correct syllogism *(anumāna)*. This is, among other things, borne out by the other two deductions which in the SNS are adduced alongside with the deduction of momentariness as further examples for the *upapattisādhanayukti*, namely the inference of the existence before birth and after death from the diversity of sentient beings and the deduction of the law of retribution *(karma)* from their suffering and happiness (cf. n. 368). Any application of a formal syllogism to these deductions would clearly be secondary. Moreover, the deduction of momentariness from change in the ŚrBh as presented at the beginning of this chapter does not operate with a formal syllogism, even though it corresponds to the deduction of momentariness from the gross *anityatā* in the SNS. This correspondence is evinced by the fact that as in the SNS so in the ŚrBh immediately after the deduction of momentariness, the existence before and after death *(paralokasaṃskārapravṛtti)* is deduced from the diversity of sentient beings (ŚrBh 485,14ff).

Instead of inferring the momentariness from the gross *anityatā* on the grounds that macroscopic destruction entails change, it is also possible to deduce it on the basis of the reasoning that the perceptible destruction of things is only possible if it is assumed that all the time before they have perished, too (cf. § II.C.1.1). In such a case, the reasoning may be applied that things which have an enduring nature cannot be destroyed by a cause of destruction. Thus the apparent destruction as for instance the breaking of a pot by a hammer can only be accounted for if it is assumed that the pot has a perishable nature all along, and accordingly constantly undergoes destruction and origination even before it meets with the supposed cause of destruction (i.e. the blow of the hammer), which in truth only disrupts the process of

§ 2 The textual evidence adduced here raises the question whether the proof of momentariness on the basis of change reflects the considerations that led to the conception of the doctrine of momentariness. This calls for a closer scrutiny of the two main components of this argument, namely the underlying presupposition that qualitative change implies numeric difference and the demonstration that things change at every moment.

2.1 As for the underlying presupposition that change implies substitution, it follows from the anti-substantialist tendency in Buddhism which negates that entities have a substantial core beyond the sum of their properties and thus equates the properties with the entities themselves. This equation is reflected by the designation of phenomena as "*dharmas*" — a term which may also stand for "property," "quality." Once this identification of property and entity has been adopted, the Buddhist position that qualitative change implies numeric difference follows from their analysis of change as the substitution of one quality by another. In the case of the dyeing of a cloth, for instance, there is no longer a basis to identify the pale cloth at the outset and the ruby cloth later, once the colouration of a persisting cloth is rejected on the grounds that the cloth and its colour cannot be differentiated. Thus the succession of different shades of redness in the process of dying entails that there is a succession of distinct cloths, because the substitution of one property by another is nothing but the substitution of one entity by another. This analysis of transformation corresponds to the analysis of the mind as a stream of distinct mental entities. Just as the denial of a permanent soul implies that a change of mental state entails the destruction of the old and the origination of a new mind-entity (cf. § II.A.2.1 and particularly n. 252), so the denial of a persisting substance in the case of matter implies that any change of property entails the destruction of the old and the origination of a new material entity.[372]

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the reproduction of pots so that no more "pots" arise (cf. § II.D.2.4). It will be seen that according to this interpretation the argument would correspond to the type of proofs based on the independence of destruction from an external cause. This alternative reconstruction of the argument has the advantage that it also accounts for such cases of destruction where an object which itself is unimpaired is suddenly destroyed from without as in the example with the pot, i.e. to cases where the destruction may not be conceived of as a gradual process.

To sum up, there is strong evidence to support the interpretation that the destruction of macroscopic things entails momentariness because this destruction is a process of gradual decay that presupposes the transformation of the concerned object at every moment. It cannot, however, be excluded that this interpretation misses the mark and that the momentariness is meant to follow, as in the case of the arguments based on the spontaneity of destruction, because things cannot endure for some time and then perish. Cf. n. 538 where it is argued that the argument in the Hsien-yang and MSABh that things are momentary because eventually they perish may not be understood along the lines suggested here for the SNS (i.e. that the final destruction results from the transformation of the perishing entity at every moment). Of course, it is well possible that these two alternative ways of construing the argument were not strictly differentiated, so that they both underlay the deduction of momentariness from the gross *anityatā*.

[a] I emend the text and read *ucyate* (which introduces the next clause, indicating a change of speaker) instead of *ucyante* so that the clause terminates with *kṣaṇikā* and not with *ucyante* as in the edition by Pandeya.

[372] In contrast to the Buddhists, the Sāṃkhyas profess that there is a persisting substance (in later

Two main factors may be identified as underlying this anti-substantialist tendency. Most importantly, the admittance of a substantial element underlying change runs contrary to the

terminology [cf. Wezler 1985, p. 19]: *dharmin*, e.g. clay) which is qualified by properties (again in later terminology: *dharma*). This substance underlies change and accounts for the fact that the entity before and after change are identical and not, as the Buddhist contests, distinct. The substance alone is substantially existing, whereas the *dharmas* are not distinct entities from the substance, but merely the mode in which the substance exists at a given time (e.g. as a lump, a pot, potsherds etc.). In the Abhidharmic strand of Buddhism, by contrast, the existence of a substance is denied and real existence is attributed to the *dharmas* alone.

Despite this fundamental difference, there is a striking parallel between the Buddhist conceptualization of transformation in terms of substitution and the description of transformation as it can be found in the Yuktidīpikā and the YSBh.[a] As in the case of Buddhism, it is taught in these sources that there is a series of different *dharmas* existing one after another (cf. also YSBh 312,4f, on YS III.15: ... *piṇḍaḥ pracyavate ghaṭa upajāyata iti dharmapariṇāmakramaḥ.*). Thus the transformation of the lump of clay into a pot is, again just as in Buddhism, depicted as the destruction of the *dharma* "lump" and the origination of the *dharma* "pot." The problem of the relationship between the Sāṃkhya and Buddhist doctrine is so intricate that it will be very difficult to settle (if this is possible at all) whether the Buddhist conceptualization of change was influenced (and if in which way) by the Sāṃkhya doctrine of transformation (*pariṇāma*). Besides, in other passages the Sāṃkhyas do not refer to this process in terms of destruction and origination, but in terms of manifestation (*āvirbhāva*) and disappearance (*tirobhāva*) which is more apt given that the Sāṃkhyas did not conceive of the *dharmas* as really existing entities that undergo origination and destruction. On the other hand, the point of contact between the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists alluded to here demonstrates at least that the analysis of change in terms of substitution is not contingent upon the issue of momentariness, but may be arrived at independently.

[a] E.g. — YD 49,6f: "For transformation is the cessation of one *dharma* of a persisting substance (*dravya*) and the origination of another one." (*pariṇāmo hi nāmāvasthitasya dravasya dharmāntaranivṛttiḥ dharmānatarapravṛttiś ca.*). Cf. YSBh 292,26f (on YS III.13): *avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāma iti.*

— The *śloka* cited in YD 49,10f and 75,6f: "When the *dharmin* gives up the former *dharma* and assumes a new *dharma* without losing its [intrinsic] nature, then this is called 'transformation.'" (*jahad dharmānataram pūrvam upādatte yadā param/ tattvād apracyuto* dharmī, pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate//* * YD 75,8: *svarūpād apracyuto*; cf. Wezler 1985, p. 24)

— YSBh 292,18f (in the text edition of the Vivaraṇa 254,9-255,4; on YS III.13): "Parting with the phenomenal appearance (*dharma*) in the form of a lump, the substratum (*dharmin*), clay, assumes another phenomenal appearance. In the form of a pot (as the new mode of appearance) it evolves as to its phenomenal appearance (*dharmataḥ*)." (*mṛd dharmī piṇḍākārād dharmād dharmāntaram upasampadyamāno dharmataḥ pariṇāmate ghaṭākāra iti.*)

— Vivaraṇa 259,26-260,9 (on YS III.15): "'The lump re-arises as a pot' means that the clay in the form of a lump becomes a pot. 'The lump re-arises as a pot' is [only] said figuratively [as far as the suggested] non-difference [between lump and pot is concerned]. But [in truth] it is not the case that the *dharma* 'lump' assumes the nature of another *dharma*. By the destruction of the *dharma* 'lump,' another, with respect to it (i.e the lump) antagonistic *dharma* called 'pot' arises." (*piṇḍo ghaṭa upajāyata iti piṇḍarūpā mṛt ghaṭībhavatīty arthaḥ. abhedopacāreṇa piṇḍo ghaṭa upajāyata ity ucyate. na punaḥ piṇḍo dharmo dharmāntarātmatāṃ pratipadyate. piṇḍadharmavimardanena tadvirodhī tadanantaraṃ ghaṭākhyo dharma upajāyate.*)

Cf. also ADV 106,10: "According to the Sāṃkhya, transformation is the abandoning of one quality (*dharma*), which has become the nature of the substratum (*dharmin*), and the origination of [another quality] becoming its nature." (*sāṃkhyasya tv avasthitasya dharmiṇaḥ svātmabhūtasya dharmāntarasyotsargaḥ svātmabhūtasya cotpādaḥ pariṇāma iti.*)

Buddhist spirituality for which it is fundamental that all things are bound to perish and are hence only a source of frustration for those who hope to derive happiness from them. It is, therefore, natural for Buddhists to concentrate on the impermanent aspect of things. In the case of a pot, for instance, what matters to the Buddhist is that the pot as a potential object of attachment will sooner or later get destroyed. Accordingly, it is neglected that the clay out of which the pot is fashioned will continue to persist in the form of potsherds. This bias found its expression on a doctrinal level, where an underlying essence was rejected on the grounds that if it existed at all it would be eternal and thus contradict the law that everything is impermanent. The presupposition that the acceptance of an essence implies its eternity reflects that the Buddhist position was developed in opposition to the stance of the Sāṃkhyas that all phenomena are emanations of one eternal substance. The following passage from the Vi (996c11-14, LVP 1937, p. 137) documents how the Buddhist anti-substantialism, more precisely their stance that qualitative difference implies numeric distinctness, has to be seen in contradistinction to the position of the Sāṃkhyas:

> "The supporters of the doctrine of transformation have this opinion: Milk turns into sour milk, seeds into sprouts, wood into ashes and so on. If one [entity] exists in continuation of another [entity], then this [entity] is the product of transformation of that other [entity], and it is not the case that that other phenomenon (*dharma*) perishes and this *dharma* originates. Therefore, the essence of all *dharmas* persists eternally [according to this doctrine]."

The rejection of a Self (*ātman*), which led to the denial that there is any continuous element underlying the fluctuations of mental activity (cf. § II.A.2.1), may be identified as a further factor underlying the anti-substantialist tendency in Buddhism. For it may be safely assumed that this denial with respect to the mind went hand in hand with a general bias to stress the phenomenal appearance (e.g. as a water pot) at the expense of the underlying essence (e.g. clay) — this all the more so because *ātman* not only means "self," but also is used in the sense of "essence" or "own-being," so that the rejection of an *ātman* may also be understood as the affirmation that phenomena are devoid of an essence (*dharmanairātmya*).

It would go beyond the scope of the present study to examine the development of the anti-substantialist tendency any further. What matters here is that this tendency is not in any way dependent upon the conception of momentariness, but, as an integral part of the development of Buddhism, follows naturally from the character of Buddhist doctrine and spirituality.[373]

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[373] Note that the principle that qualitative difference implies numeric distinctness was such an integral element of the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins that they took great pains to explain the canonical attribution of change to all conditioned entities in such a way that it would not imply their mutability (cf. § I.C.3.2.3 and notably the *śloka* adduced in the AKBh and ADV, cited in n. 117, setting forth that any qualitative change implies substitution). Likewise, in the ŚrBh and Hsien-yang the fifteen forms of transformations affecting sentient beings are not treated as processes involving the modification of a persisting entity, but as the replacement of an old state by a new one (cf. appendix, § 1.5.2.1).

The prominence of the principle that change implies substitution seems to be underlined, furthermore, by a passage in TSi 280a13-15 (cited in n. 264) where the perception of blue is shown to be distinct from that of another colour (lit.: non-blue) on the basis of the principle that the existence of

Therefore, it is feasible that this tendency served as a starting point for the doctrine of momentariness. I contend that this was indeed the case, because once the position has been adopted that properties and entities cannot be distinguished, the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness becomes far more plausible and can basically be reduced to the position that things are not stable, but constantly change their properties.

2.2 I maintain that also the second component of the deduction of momentariness from change, namely the assumption that there is always change, follows naturally from the Buddhist emphasis on the impermanent nature of existence and was not arrived at indirectly by way of the doctrine of momentariness, as could be held. Already in the nikāyas/āgamas it is frequently asserted that all conditioned entities are characterized by transformation (*vipariṇāmin*) and alteration (*anyathābhāvin*), that it is their nature to undergo transformation (*vipariṇāmadhamma*).[374] The transformation of things is stressed as part of the teaching that everything is impermanent. It explicates that things and their states are not stable, that everything is always in flux.[375] In particular, this teaching refers to change for the worse, to decay and ultimately to destruction.

As documented in the ŚrBh and Hsien-yang (cf. appendix, § 1.5) and also in the MSA(Bh),[376] this susceptibility to change was dogmatically elaborated, and various forms

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entities is intrinsically linked up with one particular point of time, so that they cannot exist at two different points of time: "Moreover, the times when one perceives blue and when one perceives non-blue are different. One entity (*dharma*) cannot be associated with two points of time. The entity is joined to the point of time and the point of time to the entity." Though it is not compulsory that the argument derives its plausibility from the principle that a change of property entails substitution, it nevertheless seems that the temporal localization is treated as a property, the change of which implies substitution.

It could be contended that the stance that a change of temporal localization implies numeric difference reflects a mode of viewing that may have underlain the development of the doctrine of momentariness: If the past and future are held to exist (as the Sarvāstivādins did), and if the present is viewed as instantaneous, then one may come to the conclusion that things are past (the portion having existed already), present (the portion existing now) and future (the portion which will come to exist) at the same time. If such a situation is held to be a paradox, one may adopt the stance that they have to be instantaneous so that they are always in their entirety either past, present or future. However, there is to my knowledge no corroborating evidence for such a hypothesis. Note that also Stcherbatsky, who maintains that the reasoning presented here underlies the doctrine of momentariness (Buddhist Logic, vol. I, p. 86f), does not present any material that would substantiate his claim. Hence it may be safely assumed that the position expressed in the TSi was adopted as a consequence of the doctrine of momentariness and not vice versa.

[374] E.g. SN IV 68,2f: *dvayam* (viz. respectively one of the six sense-organs and one of the six sense objects) *calañ ceva vyayañ ca aniccaṃ vipariṇāmi aññathābhāvi.*
AN II.177: *sabbe bhavā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā.*
MN II 73,19f: *appaṃ h' idaṃ jīvitaṃ, āhu dhīrā, asassataṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ.*
MN I 137,21-24: *aham pi kho taṃ bhikkhave pariggahaṃ na samanupassāmi yvāssa pariggaho nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo, sassatisamaṃ tath' eva tiṭṭheya.*

[375] The intrinsic link between transformation and impermanence can be witnessed in the following statement by Āryadeva: "Whatever is subject to change, this is not called 'permanent'." (Catuḥśataka IX.9cd: *gaṅ la rnam par ḥgyur yod pa/ de ni rtag ces byar yod min*).

[376] Cf. the various forms of change referred to in the MSA(Bh) in order to prove the momentariness

of transformation affecting sentient beings and affecting inanimate matter were distinguished. The enumeration of these forms of transformation shows that not only common forms of change between different states but also different forms of destructions (burning, flooding etc.) were envisaged as forms of transformation. This accords with the treatment of macroscopic destructions in terms of transformation as it is advanced by the Yogācāras and Sautrāntikas in their proofs of momentariness in order to defend the independence of destruction upon an external agent.[377]

I contend that the observation and analysis of transformation as it can be witnessed in the ŚrBh, Hsien-yang or MSABh led to the conviction that things are changing at all times. This concerns in particular the reasoning that perceptible changes brought about by ageing presuppose the constant modification of the transformed object. Such a line of thought is so plausible that it will hardly have been developed retrospectively in order to justify the preconceived stance that things change at every moment, but instead will be based on the unprejudiced analysis of the process of ageing, as the most prominent form of transformation. But also the observation of the regular discharge of bodily functions suggests that the body is incessantly evolving. Such an impression is, moreover, corroborated by canonical passages, which affirm that the mind (cf. § II.A.2.2), the living-organ (*jīvitam/jīvitendriya*) or the *āyuḥsaṃskāras* (cf. § I.E.1.5)[378] and even the body are constantly in flux.[379] The rele-

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of sentient beings and external matter (see above).

[377] From the Buddhist perspective, there is no intrinsic difference between the "macroscopic" process of destruction and the "macroscopic" process of transformation. The Buddhists differentiate between utter annihilation (*santānoccheda*) and between what one may term "radical transformation" (*visadṛśasantānotpāda*, e.g. the breaking of a pot).[a] In the latter case, so the Buddhist approach, the object (e.g. a pot) is not annihilated by the eternal agent (e.g. a hammer) but only transformed (e.g. into potsherds). In the former case, the Buddhists argue that the annihilation is a gradual process in the course of which the object gets transformed in such a way that it eventually becomes too weak to reproduce itself (cf. § II.D.2.4). Thus utter annihilation is treated as a form of transformation which only differs from other such processes insofar as its outcome is utter non-existence. The case that something is annihilated at once entirely seems to be largely ignored. To my knowledge, it is attested only with regard to flames and sounds as well as the living organ (if murdered, the series of "life"-entities breaks off from one moment to the next) and not with regard to perceptible things, which are ordinarily conceived of as persisting (cf. § II.D.2.4). Hence my assertion that the Buddhists deal with macroscopic destruction in terms of transformation.

[a] Cf. TSP 156,11 (ad TS 439 and 440): "For there are two kinds of destruction, [namely the destruction] characterized by the severance of the series and [the destruction] characterized by the origination of a dissimilar series (e.g. of potsherds, so in TS 440)." (*dvividho hi vināśaḥ santānocchedarūpo visadṛśasantānotpādalakṣaṇaś ca.*)

[378] E.g. — AN IV 137,18-23: "Just as, oh Brahman, a mountain river going far, flowing swiftly, carrying everything away does not abide for a moment, minute or hour, but [always] moves, flows, streams, so, oh Brahman, is the live of men,[a] like the mountain river, little and trifling." (*seyyathā pi brāhmaṇa nadī pabbateyyā dūraṅgamā sīghasotā hārahārinī, natthi so khaṇo vā layo vā muhutto vā, yaṃ sā āramati, atha kho sā gacchat' eva vattat' eva sandat' eva, evam eva kho brāhmaṇa nadīpabbateyyūpamaṃ* jīvitaṃ manussānaṃ parittaṃ lahukaṃ* ... *PTS: *nadipabbateyyūpamaṃ.*)
— Udānavarga I.15, 32 and 33 (cf. Udānavarga I.6 cited in n. 13): Just as a mountain river moves on, does not turn back, so the life of men moves on and does not turn back (15). Just as the stream of rivers

vance of such passages is confirmed by Saṃghabhadra (cf. the translation of this passage in n. 13), who cites them in order to prove that the doctrine of momentariness accords with the teaching of the Buddha.[380] Besides, as can be witnessed in the argument that psychic changes prompt corporeal changes (cf. § II.B.2.3), the interaction of the body with the constantly fluctuating mind suggested that, as the mind, the body has to be changing at every moment.[381]

Thus, it can be seen that the Buddhists' preoccupation with the changing nature of existence — notably with change that results in destruction — may have led (as I maintain it did) to the position that things and in particular the body change their nature at every moment. That this position is not dependent upon the acceptance of the doctrine of momentariness is also borne out by the fact that, without subscribing to this doctrine, the Sāṃkhyas, too, held that things are changing at every moment (cf. n. 356).[382] Besides, within Buddhism the position that all things are constantly undergoing transformation is also met with outside proofs of momentariness.[383]

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moves on, does not turn back, so by day and by night the life [of man] both when he moves and when he abides [moves on, does not turn back]. (32).[b] What could for those whose life becomes smaller and smaller as nights and days elapse just as in the case of fish in little water, be pleasure? (33). (yathā nadī pārvatīyā *gacchate* na *nivartate/ evam āyur manuṣyāṇāṃ gacchate na nivartate//15// āyur divā ca rātrau ca caratas tiṣṭhatas tathā/ nadīnāṃ vā yathā sroto gacchate na nivartate//32// yeṣāṃ rātridivāpāye hy āyur alpataraṃ bhavet/ alpodake va matsyānāṃ kā nu teṣāṃ ratir bhavet//33//*)

[a] Similar to the *āyuḥsaṃskāras*, the *jīvita* may be understood as the factor determining the length of the life of the sentient being it pertains to (cf. AKBh 43f).

[b] Cf. Theragāthā 452: *carato tiṭṭhato vāpi āsīnasayanassa vā/ upeti carimā ratti, na te kālo pamajjitun ti.*

[379] Saṃghabhadra adduces a *sūtra* which teaches that the body constantly decays and exhausts itself (NA 534c9f cited in n. 13). This citation, which I have not been able to trace in the *nikāyas/āgamas*, shows that the teaching that the living-organ incessantly dwindles and never stands still was per extension applied to the entire person. This is corroborated by Vi 772c23-25 which explains that the Buddha's teaching of the gradual exhaustion of the *āyus* (i.e. the living organ) applies to the five *skandhas* which comprise the body. Cf. also the following verse transmitted in the Udānavarga : *kim anena śarīreṇa sravatā pūtinā sadā/ nityaṃ rogābhibhūtena jarāmaraṇabhīruṇā//* (I.36).

[380] Similarly, in JP 997c4-6 (cf. the explanation in Vi 772b18-23) the Buddha is cited as teaching that the *āyus* gradually dwindles, in order to substantiate the doctrine that the *āyus* (i.e. the life-force) never, not even in the *nirodhasamāpatti* (i.e. the absorption in which all mental activities are suspended), stands still.

[381] If the interpretation advanced in § II.B.2.5 is correct, also the manipulation of external matter by willful acts of concentration *(adhimokṣa)* implies that this manipulated matter is, in accordance with the mind, changing at every moment.

[382] Stcherbatsky (*The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 47) points out that both the Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas taught that things are always changing. Without substantiating this, he claims that on this point the Buddhists were influenced by the Sāṃkhyas. I do not see any compelling reason why the Buddhists should not have arrived at this position independently in the way suggested above. On the other hand, it is certainly possible that the stance of the Sāṃkhyas (or proto-Sāṃkhyas) that things change all the time was a further factor contributing to the adoption of this position by the Buddhists.

[383] That things are always changing is, for instance, presupposed by Vasubandhu (AKBh 77,21) when defending his claim (AKBh 77,21-24 cited in n. 134) that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa* 'change-while-enduring'

2.3 Since it can be shown for both the position that qualitative difference implies numeric distinctness and for the stance that things change all the time that they are not derived from the doctrine of momentariness, but evolve naturally from certain other Buddhist teachings or tendencies, I maintain that the deduction of momentariness from change, as recorded in the proofs presented above, was not devised retrospectively, but faithfully records the constellation that led to the development of the doctrine of momentariness.[384] This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that the deduction of momentariness on the basis of change is prominent in the oldest stratum of texts (but not only there) proving the doctrine of momentariness (i.e. the early Yogācāra texts, notably the ŚrBh and the MSA), and may even be regarded as the oldest transmitted reasoning accounting for the stance that all conditioned factors are momentary. Besides, already in the Vi_2 (translated in n. 196) transformation is understood in terms of the "subtle *anityatā*," that is, in terms of momentariness. The intrinsic link between momentariness and change is also borne out by the fact that Saṃghabhadra considers the canonical passages referring to the ageing of the body as proof of the doctrine of momentariness (cf. n. 13). Moreover, my hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that according to it the momentariness of matter will have been arrived at on the same (or, more precisely, on analogous) grounds as the momentariness of mental entities had been arrived at before. For, as I have tried to demonstrate in chapter II.A, the conviction that all mental entities are momentary is based on the denial of a self (corresponding to the denial of an enduring substance with changing properties) and on the observation of the fluctuation of mental activity (corresponding to the analysis of transformation as occurring at all times).

It is feasible that a particularly poignant experience of the evanescence of the body (or, less likely, of matter in general) may have inspired the concerned yogins in the first place to work out the implications (viz. that corporeal, and by extension also inanimate, matter has to be momentary) of the doctrinal constellation alluded to in the preceding paragraph. In particular, it may have been the observation of the rise and fall of the *skandhas* at every moment (as taught in Vi 840c21-841a11, translated in § II.E.3.2) that influenced the Buddhists to view the constant subjection of the body to change in light of the position that qualitative change entails the substitution of one entity by another (cf. § II.E.4.1). A further factor motivating the "discovery" of the momentariness of matter in the way suggested here may have been the tendency to generalize the momentariness of the mind (cf. § II.B.3). At any rate, there can

(*sthityanyathātva*) of a discrete conditioned entity consists in the qualitative difference (*visadṛśa*) between it and the preceding entity within a series: "Then how [is there qualitative difference, that is, change-while-enduring, when] alike entities arise [one after another]?[a] [Answer:] It is not the case that they (i.e. these entities) are completely without difference." (*yadā tarhi sadṛśā utpadyante. na te nirviśeṣā bhavanti.*)

[a] For this use of *yadā tarhi*, see Schmithausen 1987, n. 1492 and the explanation of this passage in the AKVy.

[384] Note that in the ŚrBh (cf. n. 190) the deduction of momentariness on the basis of change is not so much adduced in order to prove the doctrine of momentariness, but so as to elucidate the process underlying the macroscopic transformations dealt with extensively before.

be no doubt that the conception of the mind as a stream of momentary entities must have paved the way for the stance that everything is momentary.

2.4 For the following reasons, it is likely that, in the way suggested here, first the body (notably the human body, as borne out by the fact that the fourteen kinds of origination of *ādhyātmika saṃskāras* refer, at least primarily, to human beings) and then, in a further step, matter in general came to be regarded as momentary. First of all, Buddhism is concerned with sentient beings and their spiritual welfare, and accordingly it pays little attention to the external world as such. Further, ageing as the most important form of transformation is peculiar to sentient beings, though by extension it can also be applied to inanimate objects (rotting, decay etc.; cf. n. 356). Moreover, considering the development of a foetus into an adult body and the subsequent degeneration of this body, it is in the case of bodily matter, in contrast to most other cases, at least to some extent plausible that qualitative difference implies numeric distinctness. For envisaging the human body over the entire span of its existence, one may naturally come to the conclusion that at different stages in life one deals with completely distinct bodies. Against this background, also the formation of series by causally linked entities becomes plausible, insofar as it will be seen that these distinct bodies are connected causally (the foetus gives rise to the embryo which in turn gives rise to the infant body etc.) and form a conceptual unit (pertaining to the same individual, they constitute "his body"). Furthermore, the direct observation of constant change refers predominantly to sentient beings who continually breathe, use up energy etc. Besides, in the case of the body, its close relationship with the fluctuating mind lends additional weight to the assumption that the body is constantly changing (cf. chapter II.B). That the momentariness of the body was "discovered" in a first step is also suggested by the fact that the arguments proving that the body is constantly subject to change and hence momentary are more numerous than those proving this for external matter (see above). Similarly, in the ŚrBh and Hsien-yang (cf. appendix, § 1.5) the transformation of the external world is dealt with later and less extensively than with the transformation affecting sentient beings. Besides, the perception of momentariness recorded in the Buddhist sources refers frequently specifically to the body.

It may be objected that the observation of the gradual transformation of substances (the so-called processes of maturation), as when pottery is fired or when milk turns into sour milk, may have served as a starting point for the "discovery" that matter is momentary, because the arguments frequently allude to such processes. In these cases, however, the deduction that there is always change requires the additional consideration that the substances in question also change at every moment when the processes in question (e.g. firing) do not take place.[385] Moreover, in order to arrive at a universal rule applying to all forms of matter, it has to be assumed that also those substances which are not at all exposed to such processes change at every moment. On these grounds, it seems little likely that the analysis of the transmutation of milk, of the firing of pottery etc. will on its own have served as a starting

[385] Cf. the differentiation in NyāVārt 824,16f (cited in n. 351) between clay that is being fired (*pacyamāna*) and that is not being fired (*apacyamāna*).

point for the "discovery" that everything is always undergoing change. Rather, it seems that these processes only became prominent in the context of the controversy with the Brahmanical schools where they are frequently envisaged. This is also suggested by the fact that the proof of the momentariness of external matter in the MSA(Bh) (see above) does not allude to such processes.[386]

As for the extension of the momentariness of the body to inanimate matter, this will have followed, in accordance with the drive to generalize properties, from the observation (such as recorded in the ŚrBh and Hsien-yang; cf. appendix, § 1.5.2.2) that similar to the body, inanimate matter, too, is in various ways subject to transformation. In the MSABh it can be witnessed how the momentariness of external matter can be deduced from its subjection to change (see above). As in the case of mental entities, where, as a result of the tendency to generalize properties, the momentariness was also extended to those cases where the evanescence is not evident (e.g. certain meditative states), so in the case of matter also such forms of matter will have come to be regarded as momentary, where no change at all can be observed.[387]

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[386] It has to be conceded, however, that the approach to prove the momentariness separately for the four gross elements and the six sense objects may have prevented the reference to processes of maturation, such as the firing of pottery or the transmutation of milk.

[387] Traces of such an extension can already be witnessed in the *nikāyas* (e.g. AN V.59-64) where it is taught that even excellent beings such as Mahābrahman or the Radiant Gods (*ābhassara*) are affected by transformation (*vipariṇāma*) and alteration (*aññathatta*). The argument in YD 57,13-15 (cf. n. 371) that all impermanent things are momentary, because in the case of flames etc. this is the case, also reflects this tendency. On the other hand, opposition to this generalization is expressed in LAS VI.15-16 (cited in n. 184) where the supporters of the doctrine of momentariness are ridiculed for holding that such unchanging entities as gold or certain spiritual accomplishments should be momentary.

II.D The Deduction of Momentariness from Destruction

1 So far two of the three most prominent types of proof of momentariness have been examined. Whereas I have precluded that the proof on the basis of the presupposed momentariness of the mind reflects the principle doctrinal reasons underlying the development of the doctrine of momentariness, I have affirmed this in the case of the deduction of momentariness from change. Thus I came to advance the hypothesis that the theory of momentariness evolved from the analysis of change in terms of substitution and is based on the stance that things change at all times. It remains to be seen in this chapter whether also the third type of proof, viz. the deduction of momentariness from the non-existence of causes of destruction, reflects doctrinal motives underlying this formative process, and if, in which way. Before addressing this question, I will in the first part of the present chapter pursue the development of this type of proof up to Vasubandhu.

2 **2.1** With the exception of the ŚrBh,[388] a proof based on the non-existence of causes of destruction is adduced in all the early Yogācāra sources known to me that establish the momentariness of all conditioned entities.[389] The oldest proof of this kind can be found in the MSABh (149,27-30 and 150,5-11):

> "Now it may be thought thus: 'It is not the case that having originated [the *saṃskāra*] originates again for which purpose it would require a cause. Rather, having originated it perishes later after some time and not immediately after it has originated.' In that case [the question poses itself] by what it should be destroyed later on. If it should be the very cause of origination, then this is impossible.[390] Why is that? Because of the

[388] Also in ŚrBh 485,11-486,12 it is maintained that conditioned entities undergo destruction on their own accord independent from an external agent. This position is, however, not advanced in order to prove the momentariness, but, it would seem, as part of the conception of momentariness (cf. § II.D.3.2).

[389] In the following Yogācāra sources the deduction of momentariness is in one way or another based on the independence of destruction from an external cause: MSA XVIII.82 (MSABh 149,22- 150,19; excerpts cited in this chapter), Hsien-yang 549a7-549b12 (translated in the appendix, § 2.3), VinSg (P. zi 58a5-b4; excerpts cited in this chapter and in the appendix, § 2.3), AS 41,12f with ASBh 53,5-9 (translated in n. 396); cf. also MAVṬ on MAV III.5cd. Moreover, MSABh 150,21f (translated in n. 538), Hsien-yang 549b15 (=kā 12 cd in the appendix, § 2.4) and possibly also the deduction of momentariness from the gross *anityatā* in the SNS (cf. n. 368) and in the Ślokavārttika (cf. n. 369) are further instances where the proof of momentariness presupposes the non-existence of external causes of destruction. Similarly, in the case of the deduction of the momentariness of earth from its subjection to change (cf. § II.C.1.4), momentariness does not follow because the earth changes at every moment, but because something cannot change (i.e. perish and re-arise) after having persisted "since there are no causes of destruction."

[390] The stance that destruction is caused by origination goes back to the last member of the causal nexus (*pratītyasamutpāda*) according to which old age and death are conditioned by birth (cf. Pr 222,13). In this sense, origination is the cause of destruction, because without prior origination there can be no subsequent destruction. In most sources where it is argued that the cause of origination functions as a cause of destruction,[a] it is precisely on these grounds that this stance is adopted.

contradiction between origination and destruction. For, as in the case of sun and shade, heat and cold, it does not occur that two contradictory [effects] have the same cause. ... If the originated *saṃskāra* endured for some time, would it endure just by itself, [that is,] be capable to endure just by itself, or [would it endure] due to some cause of duration? To start with, it is impossible that it endures by itself. Why that? Because later it does not abide by itself. Or why is it not able to endure any more at the end? Nor is [endurance] possible because of a cause of duration, because [such a cause] does not exist.[391] For no such thing is observed. Now it may be maintained that [the *saṃskāra*] endures also without a cause of duration [simply] because there is [for the time being] no cause of destruction, but that it perishes later when it encounters a cause of destruction, just as darkness [is destroyed] by fire.[392] This [again] is not possible,

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In Vi 105b10-22 (= Vi_2 86a11-21), however, various explanations (notably by Vasumitra) are cited, setting forth how the cause of origination persists after it has brought forth its effect and later becomes causally efficient again, this time destroying the very entity it has produced earlier. This is illustrated by a bandit who first supports a monk when setting off from the monastery and later in the wilderness robs his possessions and mistreats him. Neither this illustration nor the explanations themselves clarify to what kind of causes, in what context, these explanations refer to. They would make sense, however, if they alluded to the so-called processes of maturation where an external agent (e.g. fire) can be considered to be both the cause producing an entity (e.g. the pot fired to a certain extent) and the cause destroying it later (i.e. when the semi-fired pot is replaced by a completely fired pot). In this case, however, an analysis of transformation in terms of substitution would be presupposed. Since no explanation to this effect is made, it is doubtful whether the thesis that the cause of origination destroys the entity it has produced earlier is to be understood against the background of maturation processes in the way suggested here. At any rate, generally the cause of origination is considered as a cause of destruction merely insofar as destruction can only occur if the entity to be destroyed has been produced in the first place.

[a] E.g. Vi 105b4-8, Vi_2 86a6-11 cited in n. 409; Vi 201b3-7, Vi_2 150c7-11; AD 141a, ADV 107,1-6; Pr 222,13-223,3 and 412,12-413,2. Cf. also NA 533c15-18 where it is argued that destruction is caused insofar as it is necessarily preceded by (and in this sense dependent upon) the entity undergoing destruction.

[391] In the Y (Y_T P. zi 222b1-223a2, Y_C 664a8-a27) seven causes of duration are listed, namely 1) the cause of origination, 2) the so-called organ of life (*jīvitendriya*), 3) nutrition (*āhāra*), 4) supra-normal power (*ṛddhi*), 5) the complex of causes and conditions, 6) the projection of karma and 7) the absence of obstruction (cf. n. 393). According to the explication in Y, these factors do not cause the duration of discrete conditioned entities but of the series formed by them. In this way, the Y adapts the teaching of the causes of duration to the doctrine of momentariness. The denial of causes of duration as part of the proof of momentariness, witnessed here in the MSABh, still refers to these causes in their original sense as the factors accounting for the endurance of single entities rather than to the duration of series.

[392] According to this alternative, conditioned entities do not persist because they have an inherent capability to do so — a capability which they would always have and which hence would preclude that they could ever perish. By contrast, they would merely persist because they do not perish until they encounter their cause of destruction. It seems that a position along these lines underlies the teaching in the Y (cf. n. 391) that all those *saṃskāras* that do not obstruct or manipulate the process of reproduction of the series are causes for the duration of the *saṃskāras*, that is, for the uniform reproduction of the series (Y_T P. zi 223a1f [Y_C 664a24-27]: *bar du gcod pa med pa ni ḥdu byed rnams kyi gnas paḥi rgyu bdun pa yin te/ ḥdu byed gaṅ skye ba la gegs mi byed pa daṅ/ skyes paḥi ḥdra baḥi rgyun daṅ mi mthun pa ma yin pa ḥjig paḥi rgyu ma yin pa ni de gnas paḥi rgyu yin paḥi phyir te/*).

because that (= a cause of destruction) does not exist."[393]

In this passage the momentariness is proved by demonstrating that the *saṃskāras* (i.e. conditioned entities) cannot persist at all. This demonstration can be summarized thus:[394] The duration of the *saṃskāras* beyond their origination cannot be effected by a cause, because no such cause exists.[395] Nor could the *saṃskāras* endure on account of their own nature. For, given the immutability of selfsame entities, they would always have to be endowed with that nature and hence persist for ever. Finally their endurance could not result from the absence of a cause of destruction, because no such cause exists. Nor could the cause of origination effect their destruction, for one cause cannot produce two contradictory effects. Since it is thus impossible for the *saṃskāras* to persist beyond origination, they have to be momentary.

2.2 By contrast, in the proof of momentariness in the AS(Bh)[396] and in AKBh 193,5-194,14,[397] (and in later versions of this kind of proof) it follows from the nature of the

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[393] MSABh 149,27-30 and 150,5-11 (on MSA XVIII.81): *athāpy evam iṣyeta: "notpannaṃ punar utpadyate yadarthaṃ hetunā bhavitavyaṃ syād, utpannaṃ tu kālāntareṇa paścān nirudhyate, notpanna-mātram eve"ti. tat paścāt kena nirudhyate? yady utpādahetunaiva, tad ayuktam. kim kāraṇaṃ? utpāda-nirodhayor virodhāt. na hi virodhayos*[a] *tulyo hetur upalabhyate, tadyathā cchāyātapayoḥ śītoṣṇayoś ca. ... yadi cotpannaḥ saṃskāraḥ kālāntaraṃ tiṣṭhet, sa svayam eva vā tiṣṭhet, svayam eva sthātuṃ samarthaḥ, sthitikāraṇena vā kenacit. svayaṃ tāvad avasthānam ayuktaṃ. kiṃ kāraṇaṃ? paścāt svayam asthiteḥ. kena vā so 'nte punaḥ sthātuṃ na samarthaḥ? sthitikāraṇenāpi na yuktaṃ, tasyābhāvāt. na hi tat kiṃcid upalabhyate. athāpi syād "vināpi sthitikāraṇena vināśakāraṇābhāvāt avatiṣṭhate. labdhe tu vināśakāraṇe paścād vinaśyati, agnineva śyāmate"ti. tad ayuktam, tasyābhāvāt.*

[a] *virodhayos* erroneously for *viruddayos*?

[394] Cf. also the remarks in the annotated translation of the corresponding passage in the Hsien-yang (appendix, § 2.3.1).

[395] Also the cause of origination cannot function as a cause of duration, because, as has been established before (MSABh 149,23-25), it cannot function again after it has produced its effect earlier because then it has already exhausted its causal efficiency.

[396] ASBh 53,5-9 (on AS 41,12f): "**And because having originated [everything] perishes on account of its own nature independent of an [external] condition, [also matter should be understood to be momentary].** The destruction of everything that has originated occurs independently of an [external condition] because of the own nature [of the perishing entity] alone. Therefore, destruction being independent of other conditions is necessarily occurring. [The position] that the destruction does not occur as soon as the entity has originated, [but] that it does occur later [is precluded on the grounds that] there is no distinguishing element [that could explain why the entity first does not perish, but later does perish]. Therefore, everything perishing has to perish as soon as it has originated. Thus momentariness is proved." (***utpannasya cānapekṣya pratyayaṃ svarasavināśitām upādāya.*** *sarvasyotpannasya vināśaḥ pratyayam anapekṣya svarasenaiva bhavati. ataḥ pratyayāntaranirapekṣo 'vaśyambhāvī vināśa* <*ḥ.*>[a] *utpannamātrasyaiva bhāvasya* <*vināśo*>[a] *na bhavati, paścād bhavatīti* <*na*>[a] *kiṃcid viśeṣaṇam asti. tasmāt sarveṇa vināśinotpannamātreṇa vinaṣṭavyaṃ*[b] *iti siddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam.*)

[a] All emendations are supported by the Tibetan translation (P. śi 47b8-48a1): *deḥi phyir rkyen gźan la mi bltos par gdon mi za bar ḥjig ste/ dṅos po skyes pa tsam ñid kyis ḥjig pa ma yin la/ phyis ḥjig go źes bya ba ni bye brag cuṅ zad kyaṅ med do//*

[b] Should *vinaṣṭavyam* be read instead of *vinaṣṭam*?

[397] AKBh 193,5-10 (on AK IV.2d): "[The momentariness of everything is established] **because** the

momentary entity to perish spontaneously that this entity vanishes immediately upon origination. Perishing on account of their own nature, so the line of reasoning, they must do so immediately upon their origination because, being endowed with this nature at any time of their existence, there is no difference in their constitution due to which they should not perish at the first moment of their existence but at some later time.[398] In the MSABh, by contrast, the destruction immediately after origination follows from the impossibility of persistence beyond origination. Accordingly, in the AKBh the argumentation focusses on the proof that destruction is not brought about from without, whereas in the MSABh the non-existence of an external cause of destruction only plays a subordinate role in the proof that the *saṃskāras* cannot endure.

2.3 The argumentation in the VinSg[399] as well as in the matching passage in the Hsien-yang

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conditioned entity necessarily **perishes**. For the destruction of things is spontaneous. For which reason? For [only] an effect has a cause, but destruction is non-existence, and what should be effected with respect to non-existence? If this spontaneous destruction of the thing did not occur as soon as it had originated, it would also not occur later because the thing would [then] be [just] the same [as it was earlier] (i.e. it would also then have the nature to persist and not to perish). [Nor could it perish later] after having become different [in the meantime]. [For] it is not possible that one and the same thing becomes different, because one and the same [thing] cannot differ in character from itself." (*saṃskṛtasyāvaśyaṃ vyayāt. ākasmiko hi bhāvānāṃ vināśaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam. kāryasya hi kāraṇaṃ bhavati. vināśaś cābhāvaḥ. yas cābhāvas, tasya kiṃ kartavyam. so 'sāv ākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpanna-mātrasya na syāt, paścād api na syād, bhāvasya tulyatvāt. athānyathībhūtaḥ, na yuktaṃ tasyāivānyathā-tvam. na hi sa eva tasmād vilakṣaṇo yujyate.*)

Cf. NA 533c29- 534a2 (translated in n. 538) where the deduction of momentariness in this way is taken over, but where the argument that destruction is completely without cause is rejected, because it contradicts the position of the Sarvāstivādins that things perish because of the mark of destruction tied to them.

398 Steinkellner maintains in his essay on the development of the *kṣaṇikatvānumāna* (1968/69, p. 365) that in the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti goes beyond the proof of momentariness as it can be found in the AKBh, by linking the destruction with the own-being of the entity, so that the entity is by nature impermanent and therefore necessarily perishes. It seems to me that this position can already be identified in ASBh 53,5-9 (see the citation in n. 396 where it is expressly stated that "destruction, being independent of other conditions, is necessarily occurring" (*pratyayāntaranirapekṣo 'vaśyambhāvī vināśaḥ.*). It is true that Dharmakīrti's link of the destruction with the own-being of the perishing entity is more explicit (Pramāṇavārttika I.193cd [p. 98,6 in the edition by R. Gnoli]: ... *ahetutvād vināśasya svabhāvād anubandhitā*), but I fail to see the essential difference between this formulation and the formulation in ASBh 53,6f that the "destruction of everything that has originated occurs independently of an [external condition] because of the own-nature (*svarasa*, lit.: own-essence) [of the perishing entity] alone" (*sarvasyotpannasya vināśaḥ pratyayam anapekṣya svarasenaiva bhavati.*). At best, it could be argued that *svarasa* is used only idiomatically in the sense of "spontaneously," but there can be little doubt that at least in the formulation *bhaṅguratvād vinaśyante* in AKBh 194,13 the destruction is consciously linked to the nature of the conditioned entities.

399 VinSg (P. zi 58a4-6; D. ẑi 55a5f): "The entire group of material [entities] (*rūpaskandha*) is said to be momentary. Why that? Because it is observed that having originated [things] undergo destruction. And it is not possible that the cause of origination (*utpādakāraṇa*) is the cause of the destruction, because [its] characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) differs [from that of a cause of destruction]. Nor is another cause for the duration of the originated entity than it (i.e. the *utpādakāraṇa*) observed.[a] Therefore, all conditioned

(translated in appendix, § 2.3.1) seems to represent a transitional phase between the older approach to prove that things cannot persist beyond origination and the newer approach to prove that they perish on account of their own nature. Whereas it is the explicit aim to prove that all *saṃskāras* perish spontaneously, it seems that the above mentioned reasoning in the AKBh which excludes a delay in the spontaneous destruction is not presupposed here or, at any rate, is not considered to be sufficient. By contrast, in order to ensure that the spontaneous destruction takes place immediately upon origination, it is also postulated that there are no a causes of duration and that entities may not persist on their own accord — reasons which demonstrate in the MSABh that entities cannot persist beyond origination.

2.4 In the proofs in the Yogācāra literature associated with Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga, the contention that destruction is not caused from without is substantiated by demonstrating that the supposed causes of destruction are in truth causes of transformation. As an early example of this reasoning, VinSg (P. zi 58b6f; D. źi 55a6f) may be cited:

> "It is also not possible to think that fire and so on are the cause for destruction. Why this? Because it is observed that entities such as fire and so on arise and perish together with that *saṃskāra* (i.e. with the entity exposed to them which they supposedly destroy). They merely function as the condition [for that *saṃskāra*] to re-arise differently."[400]

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factors (*saṃskāra*) perish, one should know, on their own account. Hence, the momentariness is established." (*de la gzugs kyi phuṅ po thams cad ni skad cig pa yin par brjod par byaḥo// de ciḥi phyir źe na/ skyes nas ḥijg pa dmigs paḥi phyir ro// skye baḥi rgyu ni ḥjig paḥi rgyu yin par mi ruṅ ste/ mtshan ñid mi ḥdra baḥi phyir ro// skyes pa gnas paḥi rgyu de las gźan pa yaṅ mi dmigs pas deḥi phyir ḥdu byed thams cad ni raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis ḥjig pa yin par rig par bya ste/ deḥi phyir skad cig pa ñid rab tu grub bo//* Sanskrit manuscript (folio 24a7f): *tatra sākalyena rūpaskandaḥ kṣaṇikaḥ vaktavyaḥ/ tat kasya hetoḥ/ utpannasya vināśopalambhataḥ/ na cotpādakāraṇaṃ vināśakāraṇaṃ[/] yujyate vilakṣaṇatvāt/ nā-*(lacuna, 24a8) *<ata-> ḥ svarasavināśaḥ sarvasaṃskārāṇāṃ veditavyaḥ/ ataś ca kṣaṇikatvaprasiddhiḥ/* Chinese translation T 1579 600a19-21).

In comparison with the MSABh and Hsien-yang this argumentation is deficient. Whereas in these sources it is also excluded that there is a cause for destruction or that the entity endures on its own account for some time before perishing, here it is only stated that the cause of origination cannot effect destruction and that there is no cause for the duration beyond origination.

[a] Given the denial of any causes of duration in the corresponding passages in the MSA(Bh) and Hsien-yang, the argument is puzzling at this point. I understand that here the cause of origination qualifies as a cause of duration insofar as the series persists due to the incessant origination of new entities. By asserting that there are no other causes of duration, it is excluded that there are causes that could effect the discrete *saṃskāra* (rather than the series) to exist beyond origination. Alternatively it could be understood that the qualification "other than the cause of origination" should not imply that the cause of origination functions as a cause of duration. This would require a rather forced translation — note that the Tibetan rendering of the missing Sanskrit original (lacuna) is confirmed by the Chinese translation — along the following lines: "Nor is another cause than it (i.e. the *utpādakāraṇa*) observed [that could effect] the duration of the originated entity." According to this interpretation, it would be argued that apart from causes of origination no causes whatsoever exist, so that there are no causes of duration. At any rate, there can be no doubt that it is precluded at this point of the argumentation that discrete conditioned entities persist because of a cause.

[400] VinSg P. zi 58b6f, D. źi 55a6f (Chinese translation T 1579 600a22-25): *me la sogs pa ḥjig paḥi rgyu ñid du rtog pa yaṅ mi ruṅ ṅo// de ciḥi phyir źe na/ me la sogs pa de dag ni ḥdu byed de*[a] *daṅ lhan*

The same line of reasoning can be found in the ŚrBh[401] and in the Hsien-yang (appendix, § 2.3.2). Also in these passages attention is drawn to the fact that the supposedly destroyed entity (e.g. wood) arises and perishes together with the supposed cause of destruction (e.g. fire), rather than being annihilated by it. Because of the entity's exposure to the cause, it undergoes transformation, that is, the new entities arising differ from the preceding ones. Thus the fire etc. does not destroy the wood etc., but manipulates its process of reproduction — in that sense it is a cause of origination and not of destruction — in such a way that instead of the same log of wood a slightly charred log of wood arises. In the Hsien-yang this argumentation is supplemented by the explication that fire and so on cannot cause destruction, because such an effect is incompatible with their established function as the condition for the modified re-origination of the wood. This argument is also advanced by Vasubandhu in the KSi (P. si 158a4-b1, KSi_M 9,1-8) and in the AKBh. In the latter source, Vasubandhu deals extensively with objections (notably by the Vaiśeṣikas) to this reasoning.[402]

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cig tu skye ba daṅ ḥjig par dmigs paḥi phyir te/ de dag ni mi ḥdra ba skye baḥi rkyen byed pa tsam yod par zad do// (= folio 24a8: *agnyādīnāṃ vināśakāraṇatvakalpanā na yujyate/ tat kasya heto<ḥ/> teṣāṃ agnyādīnāṃ tena saṃskāreṇa sahotpādavināśopalabdhitaḥ/ visadṛśotpattipratyayamātratve teṣāṃ asti vyāpāro/*)

[a] P. reads: *ḥdu byed de de daṅ ...*

[401] ŚrBh 486,1-6: *yāni punar etāni vipariṇāmakāraṇāni* (viz. those listed in appendix, § 1.5.2.2), *tāny anyathotpattaye samvarttante; vikṛtāyā utpatteḥ kāraṇībhavanti, na tu vināśasya. tat kasya hetoḥ. sahaiva tena vināśakāraṇena*[a] *vinaṣṭānāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ yasmād visadṛśā pravṛttir upalabhyate, na tu sarveṇa sarvam apravṛttir eva.*

[a] As explicated in the Chinese translation (T 1579 473b13), *vināśakāraṇa* refers to the **supposed** cause of destruction, i.e. fire etc.

[402] Since also the opponent held fire (i.e. the external agent) to be momentary, he could object against this reasoning that the origination and subsequent destruction of the product of burning (*pākaja*, i.e. the specific state of decay — more precisely, the momentary entity that constitutes this state — of the macroscopic object exposed to this agent) are brought about by numerically distinct entities that follow upon each other within the series constituting the fire (i.e. the destructive agent), so that the cause originating the *pākaja*-entity would no longer be identical with the cause destroying it.[a] This is taken into account by Vasubandhu who argues that something cannot be destroyed by an agent that has essentially the same nature as its cause of origination. Vasubandhu adds that at any rate the opponent may not contend that the fire producing the *pākaja*-entity (i.e. the wood burnt to a certain degree) is not numerically identical with the fire destroying it, because he cannot argue along these lines in the case of analogous destructions (e.g. corrosion) where he does not accept the momentariness of the destructive agent:[b]

> AKBh 194,1-9 (on AK IV.3b): "And if the destruction of firewood etc. was caused by the contact with fire etc., this being so, in the case of the more and more progressed origination of the qualities borne from burning (*pākaja*) **the cause [for these qualities] would be [the factor] destroying [them]**, [that is,] precisely [their generative] cause would be [the factor] destroying [them]. How is that? For in [the process of] the origination of progressively more "burnt" [phases], the qualities borne from burning [would] again be destroyed by the same contact with fire, or by a contact of the same kind, by which they were produced [in the first place]. Hence, precisely their [generative] cause or [a cause only] differing [numerically but] not [qualitatively] from [this] cause would be destroying [these qualities]. But it is not possible that the non-existence of these things [is brought about] again by the same [cause] or by a cause of the same kind as their existence is. With respect to differing flames, they (i.e. the opponents) may imagine a difference of cause. But

According to the explanation in ŚrBh 486,1-6 and in the matching passage of MSABh 150,9-14, where it is also argued that the supposed cause of destruction only transforms the object exposed to it, it is decisive for the argumentation that the entity is not destroyed without any residue (i.e. that there exists a product resulting from the transformation of the supposedly annihilated entity). In these sources (ŚrBh 486,6-12, MSABh 150,14-16) and also in the AKBh,[403] it is accordingly shown that also in such cases where the entity is destroyed entirely (e.g. water boiled away by fire), the supposed cause of destruction does not annihilate but only transform the perishing entity. When, for instance, water is boiled away by fire, the water does not vanish at once, but because it is gradually transformed. In this process, fire causes the — at every moment — re-originating water-entity to be feebler than the preceding one (according to Vasubandhu, indirectly, by increasing the potency of the fire element within water). Thereby, so the argumentation, the water's energy becomes more and more reduced until finally there originates a water entity that perishes as all preceding water entities on its

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what would they imagine in the case of the origination of specific products of maturation (*pākaja*)[c] brought about by the contact with a caustic, snow, acid, sun, water or earth?" (*yadi ca kāṣṭhādīnām agnyādisaṃyogahetuko vināśaḥ syād, evaṃ sati pākajānāṃ guṇānāṃ pakvataratamotpattau* ***hetuḥ*** *syāc ca vināśakaḥ (AK IV.3b). hetur eva vināśakaḥ syāt. katham kṛtvā? yato hy*[d] *agnisaṃbandhād*[e] *guṇāḥ pākajā utpannās, tata eva tādṛśād vā punaḥ pakvataratamotpattau teṣāṃ vināśa iti hetur eva teṣāṃ vināśakaḥ syād dhetvaviśiṣṭo vā. na ca yuktam: yata eva yādṛśād vā*[f] *teṣāṃ bhāvas, tata eva tādṛṣād vā*[g] *teṣām punar abhāva iti. jvālāntareṣu ca*[h] *tāvad dhetubhedakalpanāṃ parikalpayeyuḥ.*[i] *kṣārahimaśuktasūryodakabhūmisaṃbandhāt tu pākajaviśeṣotpattau kāṃ kalpanāṃ kalpayeyuḥ.*)

[a] Cf. — NyāVārt 836,6-837,1 (extract from NyāVārt 836,3-837,5 where the above cited passage is refuted): *na hi no ya evāgnisaṃyogaḥ pākajān utpādayati, sa evocchinatti. api tv agnisaṃyogāntaram pūrvarūpādīn*(?)* *ucchinatti samanantarakālān# rūpādīn ārabhate. tatas tāny apy anyas tāny apy anya ity evaṃ janakasya vināśakatvaprasaṅgo nāsti.* (* I conjecture that °*rūpādīn* should be read instead of °*rūpādy*. #I have adopted the alternative reading recorded in the edition by Dvivedin [Delhi 1986, first edition 1887, p. 417, n. 6]).

— Praśastapādabhāṣya 106,23-107,2: *tasmin (=kāryadravye) vinaṣṭe svatantreṣu paramāṇuṣv agnisaṃyogād auṣṇyāpekṣāc chyāmādīnāṃ vināśaḥ. punar anyasmād agnisaṃyogād auṣṇyāpekṣāt pākajā jāyante.* (cf. also Nyāyakandalī 108,7-11)

[b] Instead of this interpretation, which is confirmed by Yaśomitra (AKVy 348,6f), it could also be understood that Vasubandhu here refers to the objection that in the case of burning, successive flames do not necessarily have the same nature insofar as their appearances may vary. This contention would be rejected by Vasubandhu on the grounds that in the case of other agents such as acidic or alkaline substances, snow or sun there are no suchlike qualitative differences that could be referred to.

[c] As can be witnessed here, *pākaja* does not only refer to the products resulting from the exposure to fire, but also to products resulting from similar gradual processes as burning.

[d] Emendation of the faulty reading *ghāsādy* in accordance with the Tibetan translation (P. gu 191b6).

[e] so Shastri and the Tibetan translation (P. 5591 gu 191b6).

[f] so Shastri and the Tibetan translation (P. gu 191b7).

[g] so Shastri and the Tibetan translation (P. gu 191b7).

[h] so AKVy 348,3 and the Tibetan translation (P. gu 191b8).

[i] so Shastri and AKVy 348,3f.

[403] AKBh 194,9-12: *yat tarhy āpaḥ kvathyamānāḥ kṣīyante, kim tatrāgnisaṃyogāḥ kurvanti. tejodhātuṃ prabhāvato vardhayanti yasya prabhāvād apāṃ saṃghātaḥ kṣāmakṣāmo jāyate yāvad atikṣāmatāṃ gato 'nte na punaḥ saṃtānaṃ saṃtanoti. idam atrāgnisaṃyogāḥ kurvanti.*

own account, but in contrast to these is so enfeebled that it does not have the power to generate a successive entity. Thus the water ceases not because it is destroyed by fire, but because its process of reproduction is manipulated in such a way that it eventually stops to perpetuate itself. In this way annihilation is treated as a form of transformation which only differs from other such processes insofar as its outcome is utter non-existence. This analysis corresponds to the process of emancipation where the cessation of existence (at least within *saṃsāra*) results from the gradual transformation of the liberated being. According to this explanation of utter annihilation, the external agent does not cause non-existence, but, as a factor manipulating the process of reproduction, participates in the production of the state immediately preceding non-existence. It is, therefore, vital to this explanation that the annihilation does not occur at once but gradually (at the very least it has to encompass two moments).[404]

By contrast, Vasubandhu's explanation of the function of the supposed cause of destruction can also account for the abrupt annihilation by an external agent.[405] He argues that it cannot be determined by perception whether destruction is caused or not, since it is not really seen that the agent (e.g. fire) destroys the object (e.g. wood). Thus this issue is settled by inference (*anumāna*), more precisely, by the reasoning that destruction does not qualify as an effect (see § II.D.2.6).[406] From this reasoning it follows, so Vasubandhu, that the object vanishes because it stops to reproduce itself, that is, the final entity of the series perishes on its own account, as all other entities do, and due to the exposure to the supposed cause of destruction no successive entity originates. In these cases, the seeming agent of destruction cannot, as in the Yogācāra sources, be said to affect the process of reproduction in such a way that the exposed object reproduces itself either radically changed or weakened. Instead, the stance is taken that the external agent interferes with the object in question by intercepting

[404] This was clearly realized by the Buddhists themselves. Cf. e.g. MSABh 150,15f (*na tu sakṛd evāgnisaṃbandhāt tad-(=ab-)-abhāvaḥ.*) or KSi P. si 158a6f (KSi_M 8,14-16).

[405] It is not certain whether Vasubandhu's explanation is motivated by the wish also to account for sudden annihilation. By contrast, it is also feasible that he only wanted to demonstrate the principle that the supposed cause of destruction only manipulates the process of reproduction and does not destroy discrete entities directly. In the latter case, it will have only followed from the examples chosen by him (viz. the annihilation of flames and sound, which Vasubandhu refers to because in their case also the opponent realizes that they are only seemingly destroyed by the external agent) that his explanation can, in contrast to those explanations advanced in the Yogācāra sources, also account for the complete annihilation from one moment to the next.

[406] AKBh 193,10-17: *"dṛṣṭo vai kāṣṭhādīnām agnyādisaṃyogād vināśaḥ. na ca dṛṣṭād gariṣṭhaṃ pramāṇam astīti. na ca sarvasyākasmiko vināśaḥ."*[a] *kathaṃ tāvat bhavān kāṣṭhādīnām agnyādisaṃyogād vināśaṃ paśyāmīti manyate? "teṣām punar adarśanāt." saṃpradhāryaṃ tāvad etat: kim agnisaṃyogāt kāṣṭhādayo vinaṣṭā ato na dṛśyante, utāho svayaṃ vinaṣṭā anye ca punar notpannā ato na dṛśyante, yathā vāyusaṃyogāt pradīpaḥ pāṇisaṃyogād ghaṇṭāśabda iti. tasmād anumānasādhyo 'yam arthaḥ. "kim punar atrānumānam?" uktaṃ tāvat: akāryatvād abhāvasyeti.* (cf. KSi P. si 158a5f, KSi_M 8,11-14)

[a] The Tibetan translation (P. gu 191a3f: ... *brliṅ baḥi tshad ma yaṅ med pas thams cad kyi ḥjig pa ni rgyu med pa las byuṅ ba ma yin no źe na//*) is at this point more stringent than the transmitted version of the Sanskrit.

its process of re-production altogether. Vasubandhu exemplifies this position by referring to the destructions of flames and sound. While it seems that the blowing wind or the hand (that touches the resounding bell) destroy respectively the flame and the sound, they only obstruct the origination of more flames and sounds, while the last flame and sound vanish on their own accord, as all other earlier flames and sounds do. In a completely different context, when defining the sin of taking life (*prāṇātipāta*), it is similarly explained that the murderer does not kill by destroying the last "life"-entity or the five *skandhas* directly, but by obstructing the origination of a new "life"-entity so that the series of "life"-entities (i.e. *jīvita*, *jīvitendriya* or *āyus* [cf. n. 227] with which the *prāṇa*, i.e. the breath of life, is identified) breaks off.[407] Thus, according to Vasubandhu's explanation, the supposed cause of destruction may not only manipulate the process of reproduction in such a way that the later arising entities differ radically from the preceding entities, but also in such a way that this process is blocked completely.

2.5 In the VinSg (P. zi 58a7-b3, D. źi 55a7-55b3; reproduced in the appendix, § 2.3.3) and in the Hsien-yang (appendix, § 2.3.3) the claim that destruction is not caused is not only substantiated by demonstrating that the supposed causes of destruction are in fact causes of transformation, but also by proving that — contrary to the claim of the Sarvāstivādins and Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas — it is logically impossible that the mark of destruction, an alternative candidate for the cause of destruction (cf. § I.C.3.2.2), may destroy either on its own or in conjunction with external causes and conditions. The reasoning advanced to substantiate this proof is very technical and difficult to follow. It will be examined in the appendix (§ 2.3.3) when the corresponding passage in the Hsien-yang is translated. Vasubandhu does not take up this argumentation in the AKBh — possibly because he has already proved in an earlier chapter (viz. AKBh 79,11-15 cited in n. 113) that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* (this comprises the mark of destruction) are not causally efficient entities. In the KSi (P. si 158b1-4, KSi_M 9,12-20), however he does take up some of arguments found in the matching passages in the VinSg and Hsien-yang, in order to prove that it is impossible that the mark of destruction can cause the annihilation of the entity it characterizes. Mention may also be made of the argumentation in $BoBh_W$ 279,25-280,3 (cited in n. 115) demonstrating that the mark of destruction cannot effect destruction.

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[407] AKBh 243,18-21: *kathaṃ kṣaṇikeṣu skandheṣu prāṇātipāto bhavati. prāṇo nāma vāyuḥ kāyacittasaṃniśrito vartate. tam atipātayati,*[a] *yathā pradīpaṃ nirodhayati ghaṇṭasvanaṃ vā. jīvitendriyaṃ vā prāṇas,*[b] *tan nirodhayati. yady ekasyāpi jīvitakṣaṇasyotpadyamānasyāntarāyaṃ karoti, prāṇātipātāvadyena spṛśyate nānyathā.* (Cf. ADV 157,3-7 and TSi 304b25-c4 where this explanation is also attested.)
AKVy hereon (405,8f): *tam atipātayatīti.*[a] *taṃ prāṇam vināśayatīty arthaḥ. utpannasya svarasanirodhād anāgatasyotpattiṃ pratibadhnan nirodhayatīty ucyate.*

[a] I regard both the reading *abhipātayati* (so Pradhan) and *api pātayati* (so AKVy) as faulty. Cf. CPD, s.v. *atipāteti* where Papañcasūdanī I 187,35 is cited: *pāṇaṃ atipātentīti pāṇātipātī.* The Tibetan translator (P. gu 236b4: *gcod par byed pa*) does not render *abhi*. Note that *ti* and *bhi* in the manuscript are very similar.

[b] The reading *prāṇas* (instead of *prāṇās*) is confirmed by AKVy 405,11.

2.6 Vasubandhu not only perfected the explanation how the supposed causes of destruction (i.e. fire etc.) are to be accounted for, but, in contrast to all previous proofs, also advanced a separate argument proving that destruction cannot by any kind of cause whatsoever be caused. He maintains that destruction cannot be caused, because it is mere non-existence and as such does not qualify as an effect (cf. n. 397 where the passage in question is cited). This argument is characteristic for the Sautrāntikas, whereas it is at odds with the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins according to whom destruction is caused by the mark of destruction.

To my knowledge, this argument is not attested in any of the older Yogācāra sources and was, at least as part of the proof of momentariness, advanced for the first time by Vasubandhu.[408] Already in the Vi, however, the position of the Dārṣṭāntikas that destruction is not caused is reported. This is exemplified by the flight of an arrow or the revolutions of the wheel of a potter which cease on their own account independent of any external conditions.[409]

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[408] Vasubandhu takes great care to refute possible objections against the various aspects of his proof of momentariness. He does not, however, consider any objections to his argument that, as non-existence, destruction does not qualify as an effect. Since in later texts (so already in the NA) this argument was fiercely disputed, it can be inferred from the lack of reference to any objections that the argument was indeed conceived by Vasubandhu or at least brought forward by him for the first time.

It is noteworthy that in the MSABh (notably 150,5-11 cited in n. 393) the non-existence of causes of destruction is not established by any argument other than the explanation why fire etc. do — contrary to appearance — not destroy darkness, water etc. The fact that the very elaborate MSABh does, in contrast to the AKBh, not adduce the powerful argument that destruction does not qualify as an effect raises the question whether the author of the MSABh did not know this argument or whether he choose to ignore it for some reason. In the former case, the Vasubandhu to whom the MSABh is ascribed could hardly be identical with Vasubandhu, the author of the AKBh, unless it were assumed that, contrary to all other evidence, Vasubandhu first commented on the MSA and later composed the AKBh. In the latter case, it could be concluded that external constraints (notably, the task to reproduce traditional explanations) coerced Vasubandhu to behave very differently as a writer when commenting on the MSA and when composing the AKBh. In this case, however, the question would arise as to how much relevance the identity between the Vasubandhu who composed the AKBh and the Vasubandhu who commented on the MSA could still have.

[409] Vi 105a26-b8 (Vi_2 85c24-86a11, LVP 1937, p. 148f):

"Question: As the phenomena *(dharma)* originate because there are causes and conditions, do they also undergo destruction because there are causes and conditions?

The Dārṣṭāntikas make this explanation: The origination depends upon causes and conditions, [but when there is] destruction, then this is not so.[a] As when a man shoots [an arrow], the projection of the arrow requires power, [but when the arrow is] falling, then this is not so (i.e. no power is required). As in the case of a potter's wheel, the turning requires power, [but when the wheel is] halting, then this is not so.

The masters of the Abhidharma treatises *(śāstra)* teach: The origination and destruction of the phenomena *(dharma)* depend each upon causes and conditions, because both origination and destruction are actions.

Question: How are these aforementioned exampes [of the Dārṣṭāntikas] to be explained?

Answer: It is not necessary to explain them at all, because they are not [taken from] the Tripiṭaka. Rather, the vulgar and the noble teaching are different; they may not be treated as equivalent (i.e. the latter may not be understood in analogy to the former). Besides, the arrow and the wheel also fall and stop due to a cause. As for the causes of the falling of the arrow, one says they are the shield,[b] the armor plate, the target and so on. Supposing there is no other cause (i.e. the arrow does not hit anything), then the [causes for the projection of the arrow, i.e.] the stretching of the bow etc. are also the cause for this

2.7 The deduction of momentariness from the spontaneity of destruction as it was developed by Vasubandhu in the AKBh became the prevalent type of proof and dominated the entire controversy between the supporters and opponents of the doctrine of momentariness[410] until the formation of the *sattvānumāna* by Dharmakīrti (i.e. the proof that things are momentary because all existing things are causally efficient and the discharge of this efficiency presupposes the momentariness of the agent). By contrast, the deduction of momentariness from change and from the presupposed momentariness of mental entities gradually lost the importance they still had in the earlier Yogācāra sources. In the AKBh they are even not referred to at all.

§ 3 **3.1** The prominence and antiquity of the type of proof reviewed in this chapter raises the possibility that it reflects at least some of the doctrinal considerations underlying the formative process of the doctrine of momentariness. The proof rests basically on three premises — the additional premises featuring in the MSABh, Hsien-yang and VinSg may, as they indeed are

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(i.e. its falling). If [the arrow] were not shot earlier, how should the arrow fall now? As for the causes of the stopping of the wheel, one says they are the hand, a stick etc. Supposing there is no other cause (i.e. the revolution stops by itself), then what has caused the revolution is also the cause for this (i.e. its cessation). If [the wheel] was not turned earlier, how should it stop now?"

[a] So also Vi 103c18f.

[b] I adopt the variant reading 椎 listed in the Taishō edition.

[410] Already in the AKBh (193,10-191,14, cf. the citation of 194,1-9), the author (i.e. Vasubandhu) does not only confront the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas but also the Vaiśeṣikas and other opponents of the stance that destruction is not caused.[a] It would go beyond the scope of the present study to pursue the elaborate controversy on this point. Suffice it here to mention some of the most important sources. Within the fold of Buddhism, this argument was repudiated by the Sarvāstivādins who hold that the destruction, though independent from an external cause, is effected by the mark of destruction (notably NA 533c9-28, AD kā 141 and ADV hereon, particularly 107,7-108,6); and also by the Mādhyamika Candrakīrti (Pr 173,8-175,2, cf. also 412,12-414,7). Among the considerable number of refutations from the Brahmanical schools, special mention should be made of YD 58,27-59,6 and particularly of Uddyotakara, who refers directly to Vasubandhu's argumentation (Nyāyavārttika on 3.2.14, p. 833,10-837,5). Many of the pertinent points of the controversy recorded in these sources are dealt with in TS 353-384.

[a] One of these opponents argues that the non-existence of a cause of duration (*avasthānahetvabhāva*) qualifies as a cause of destruction. This stance is attributed by Yaśomitra (AKVy 289,6) to a certain Sthavira Vasubandhu. Contrary to such a recent claim as that of Thich Mangiac (The Philosophy of Vasubandhu. Los Angeles 1990 [?], p. 42f), there cannot be the least doubt that this position is **rejected** by the author of the AKBh on the grounds that non-existence cannot be causally efficient. This rejection accords with his contention that non-existence does not qualify as an effect, insofar as being produced and being causally efficient are inseparable properties, one could say two sides of the same coin. Therefore, Yaśomitra's attribution suggests very strongly that he knew at least two Vasubandhus.

The position that the non-existence of a cause of duration functions as a cause of destruction is at odds with the MSABh where the existence of both causes of duration and of destruction is denied categorically. Hence it is likely (though of course not imperative) that the Vasubandhu to whom Yaśomitra alludes, is not the author of the MSABh. Thus, if it was presumed that the author of the MSABh is not identical with the author of the AKBh (cf. n. 408), there could be (at least) three Vasubandhus.

in the ASBh and AKBh, be neglected for the present purposes — namely 1) on the premise that conditioned entities are impermanent, 2) on the premise that they cannot change their nature without losing their identity[411] and 3) on the premise that their destruction cannot be effected by an external agent. If this type of proof reflects the doctrinal constellation that led to the discovery of the doctrine of momentariness, then all these three premises must have been accepted independently from the issue of momentariness as so firmly established principles that even such a contra-intuitive doctrine as the theory of momentariness could have been deduced from them.

The first premise is one of the cardinal Buddhist teachings and as such beyond any doubt. The second premise also underlies the deduction of momentariness from change and follows, as documented above, naturally from the anti-substantialist tendency. In contrast to these two premisses, the derivation of the third premise is problematic. The decisive question which poses itself is whether the stance that things perish spontaneously without requiring an external cause was adopted independently of the pre-conceived momentariness or whether this spontaneity was in the first place deduced from the preconceived momentariness and only later employed to prove the momentariness, so that the type of proof examined here would be retrospectively devised, and could not reflect the original doctrinal reasons for the doctrine of momentariness.

3.2 There are good reasons to presume that the destruction of things only came to be regarded as spontaneous once these things were regarded as momentary. Most importantly, the teaching that destruction is spontaneous only refers to the discrete momentary entities that by their concatenation constitute the macroscopic objects of ordinary experience, and not to these macroscopic objects (pots, wood, bodies etc.) themselves. This follows clearly from the various explanations adduced in order to reconcile the stance that destruction is not brought about from without with the seeming destruction of macroscopic objects by external agents. All these explanations do not deny that **the series as a conceptual unit** (i.e. the macroscopic object) is destroyed (that is, either radically transformed or utterly annihilated) by the external

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[411] That this premise underlies the deduction of momentariness from the spontaneity of destruction is, for instance, clearly expressed in the AKBh (see n. 397) or NA (see n. 538). Cf. also the following extract from the TSP (141,1-4, on TS 384): "This (namely that an enduring entity is modified by the cause of destruction so that is becomes susceptible to destruction) is not correct. Because this very entity does not become different, since difference is characterized by the origination of a new own-being. For [one would have to ask:] This so-called difference, is it a thing distinct from the [modified] entity or is it the very entity itself? To start with, it cannot be identical with the entity, because this entity has arisen [already] before, directly from its own cause.[a] Or [if the difference should] be a distinct thing, in such a case the entity would not be subject to change but would persist in such a way [as always], and hence there would be no difference of this entity." (*tad etad asamyak. na hi sa evānyathā bhavati, svabhāvāntarotpattilakṣaṇatvād anyathātvasya. tathāhi yat tad anyathātvaṃ nāma tat kiṃ bhāvād arthāntaram āhosvid bhāva eva. na tāvad bhāva eva, tasya svahetor eva pūrvaṃ niṣpannatvāt. athārthāntaram, tathā sati bhāvo 'cyutidharmā tathaivāvasthita iti na tasyānyathābhāvaḥ.*)

[a] Given the presupposed identity of entity and transformation, also the transformation should have arisen at the time of origination, which is impossible since in that case the entity would no longer be subject to transformation.

agent — by the blow with the hammer the series of pot-entities is transformed into a series of potsherds-entities, the series of wood-entities turns due to the exposure to fire into a series of soot-, ash(etc.)-entities, and the series of water-entities comes to cease completely due to the fire. By contrast, it is only denied that this agent destroys **the final discrete momentary entity of the series.** Thus these explanations even document that macroscopic destruction is not viewed as independent from an external cause. That the spontaneity of destruction is not based on the analysis of macroscopic destructions is, moreover, documented in the ŚrBh where only the destructions occurring as part of the process of transformation are addressed as destructions (*vināśānityatā*), whereas the macroscopic destructions by fire etc. are treated as forms of transformation (cf. n. 190). Besides, I do not see any plausible explanation how the unprejudiced analysis of macroscopic destruction could have led to the conviction that this destruction cannot be caused by an external agent.[412]

[412] The reasoning that destruction does not qualify as an effect because it is mere non-existence can hardly have led to the conviction that, contrary to appearance, macroscopic destruction is not caused. This is borne out by the fact that the Sarvāstivādins did not accept this reasoning (cf. Saṃghabhadra's refutation of this argument [NA 533c9-28], as well as the aforementioned repudiation in the Vi of the Dārṣṭāntikas' claim that destruction is not caused). By contrast, they held that destruction, though not dependent upon an external agent, is yet caused, namely by the mark of destruction of the concerned entity (cf. appendix, § 2.3.3 where the controversy on this point between the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas in the Hsien-yang and VinSg is dealt with). Thus, the consideration that destruction does not qualify as an effect can, if at all, have led only the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas to the conviction that destruction comes about spontaneously. It is much more likely, however, that the Sarvāstivādins and the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas arrived on the same grounds at the position that destruction is not caused from without. Moreover, nowhere in the early Yogācāra sources is the spontaneity of destruction substantiated by the argument that destruction cannot be caused because as pure non-existence it does not qualify as an effect (cf. n. 408). Besides, it is doubtful, to start with, whether the consideration that destruction is non-existence could have been so compelling that it gave rise to the conviction that, contrary to appearance, macroscopic objects vanish by themselves. All this proves that it must have been on different grounds that the Buddhists originally arrived at the position that destruction is not caused from without.

Alternatively, it could be contended that it was the contemplation of the nature of *anityatā* that led to the position that macroscopic destruction cannot be effected from without. If the impermanence of conditioned entities consisted in the fact that sooner or later they are destroyed by an external agent, the *anityatā* would be reduced to mere susceptibility to destruction. On soteriological grounds, this may have seemed insufficient. For the essential non-satisfactoriness of all conditioned entities (the starting point of all Buddhist endeavours) follows from the fact that they are bound to perish and hence are only sources of frustration. But if their impermanence depended upon external conditions, their non-satisfactoriness would no longer be intrinsic and could even be circumvented by ensuring that the entities are not exposed to conditions leading to their destruction. Thus the conceptualization of *anityatā* as an intrinsic property will have ensured that all conditioned entities perish, no matter what occurs to them. Probably considerations along these lines contributed to the position of the Sarvāstivādins — this is borne out by the identification of the mark of destruction with *anityatā* (cf. n. 81) — that *anityatā* is an intrinsic quality of the conditioned entities that accounts for their destruction.

It is conceivable that this conceptualization of *anityatā* as an intrinsic quality eventually led to, or at least contributed towards, the stance that destruction is not in any way dependent upon external causes. I do not think, however, that this conceptualization of *anityatā* could have been so compelling that this may have happened as long as the envisaged destruction referred to perceptible macroscopic objects that are conceived of as enduring for some time. In support of this contention, reference may be made to the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas. They (and probably also the Sarvāstivādins before they came to accept the

By contrast, if the momentariness of conditioned entities is presupposed, it is perfectly plausible that their destruction is viewed as spontaneous. Since these entities perish automatically as soon as they have originated, it is natural — though by no means imperative[413] — to conceive of their destruction as not depending upon the advent of an external cause. In this context the conceptualization of *anityatā* as the intrinsic quality effecting destruction will have explained — provided the need for such an explanation was felt in the first place — how things come to perish.

The hypothesis that the spontaneity of destruction was gathered from momentariness in this way can be substantiated by the testimony of the ŚrBh (485,11-486,12; 485,11-13 is cited in § II.C.1.1, ŚrBh 486,1-6 is cited in n. 400), where the macroscopic destruction which is seemingly effected by an external cause is explained in terms of transformation, not in order to deduce the momentariness of all conditioned entities, but in order to substantiate the claim that things perish on their own account as entailed by the analysis of change according to the doctrine of momentariness. Likewise, in PG 9cd (cited in n. 181) the teaching that things perish on their own accord does not prove that everything is momentary, but seems to be set forth as part of the conception of momentariness. Also Yaśomitra confirms that the spontaneity of destruction is entailed by momentariness (rather than being based on other grounds) when he specifies that the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas regard the destruction of flames as spontaneous "because they accept their momentariness."[414]

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momentariness of all conditioned entities) took the stance that the destruction of non-momentary entities comes about when the *anityatā* of the conditioned entity in question is united with the fitting external cause (cf. § I.C.3.2.2). Thus, when addressing macroscopic objects they conceptualized *anityatā* as an intrinsic quality effecting destruction without giving up the dependence of destruction upon an external agent. This shows that it is unlikely that the conceptualization of *anityatā* as an intrinsic property can have provided sufficient ground for the stance that macroscopic objects perish independently from an external agent and hence do not persist beyond origination.

[413] The Vaiśeṣikas, for instance, taught that sounds, which they took to be momentary, are obstructed jointly by their cause and their effect, i.e. by the preceding and the subsequent sound.[a] This entailed that the first and last sound of a series are only obstructed by respectively their effect or their cause.[b]

In order to prove the spontaneity of destruction, Vasubandhu refutes the similar stance that within a series the subsequent entity destroys the preceding one. Vasubandhu (AKBh 193,20-24) argues that this is impossible because the two segments do not meet, because the subsequent entity may be weaker than the preceding one and hence not capable of destroying it, and because the destruction of the final segment of the series (this comprises the annihilation of the *skandhas* at the time of final emancipation from *saṃsāra*) remains unaccounted for.

Despite Vasubandhu's refutation, traces of the conception that the succeeding entity destroys the preceding one can also be found in Buddhism. Thus it is taught in Vi 841a14-18 that impermanence implies suffering, because momentary (i.e. impermanent) entities are oppressed by the entities following upon them and in that sense suffering (cf. n. 450). The oppression by the subsequent entity is in the following way (Vi 841a14f) linked to its destruction: "The yogin contemplates that the *skandhas* of the earlier moment within the series of *skandhas* are oppressed by the *skandhas* of the later moment and therefore perish once they have originated."

[a] Praśastapādabhāṣya 287,17f: *śabdaḥ ... kṣaṇikaḥ kāryakāraṇobhayavirodhī ....*

[b] Nyāyakandalī 288,16-18: *ādyaḥ śabdaḥ svakāryeṇa virudhyate. antyaḥ svakāraṇenāpāntyaśabdena virudhyate, antyasya vināśakāraṇasyābhāvāt. madhyavartinas tūbhayathā virudhyante.*

[414] AKVy 346,12-14: *na ca sa vināśo vāyusaṃyogakṛtaḥ. kṣaṇikatvābhyupagamād dhi pra-*

3.3 Though it can be excluded that the analysis of macroscopic destruction gave rise to the position that destruction is not caused, it is yet conceivable that this position was not arrived at by the examination of the destruction of momentary entities. For it is possible that without the presupposed momentariness the analysis of conditioned entities or *dharmas* from an Abhidharmic perspective may have led to the position that they cannot persist beyond origination. The starting point may have been the position (which is documented in the various proofs of momentariness) that if things persist at all, then it must be their intrinsic nature to do so. It may have been felt that this nature must be so intrinsic to the entity that it precludes that the entity can at any other time behave differently. If this position had been adopted radically with all consequence, this may have led to the conviction that even external causes and conditions cannot alter the entity's behaviour. Thus, one may have arrived at the conclusion that things can only undergo destruction because they do not have such an inflexible nature. Following this line of thinking, entities would be endowed with such an inflexible nature if they persisted at all. Hence, the consequence results that the conditioned entities must perish in the moment they originate lest they have such a nature and become eternal.

According to this hypothesis, the starting point for the discovery of momentariness would be the stance that things are either momentary or endowed with such a nature that they always persist. The non-existence of external causes of destruction, by contrast, would only have resulted in a second step as a consequence of the impossibility of external agents to affect the course of existence of such entities that have the nature to persist. Thus the argumentation as it is found in the MSABh and also in the Hsien-yang and VinSg would record the considerations leading to the doctrine of momentariness more accurately — this supports the hypothesis reviewed here — than the later ASBh and AKBh where the emphasis would have shifted somehow.

The reasoning that persistence beyond origination is logically impossible may have derived additional strength from the hypostatization of *anityatā* as an intrinsic quality (cf. n. 413). Such a possibility is confirmed by the MSABh,[415] by the commentary on the MKK attributed to *Piṅgala[416] and by the MPPU (200a22-b5,[417] 222c13-15 cited in §

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dīpasyākasmiko vināśa iṣyate. sa hi utpannapradhvaṃsitatvāt svayaṃ vinaṣṭaḥ pradīpaḥ.

[415] MSABh 150,16-19: "And because the mark [of impermanence] necessarily (i.e. at all times) [qualifies the conditioned], it is not at all possible that something that has originated abides. For the Lord has taught the impermanence of the conditioned as a mark that necessarily qualifies the conditioned. If the [conditioned] did not perish as soon as originated, it would for some time not be endowed with impermanence so that [the unacceptable consequence] would result that the mark of impermanence would not be necessarily [qualifying the conditioned]." (*naiva cotpannasya kasyacid a<va>sthānaṃ yujyate, lakṣaṇaikāntyāt. ekāntikaṃ hy etat saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam uktam bhagavatā, yad uta saṃskṛtasyānityatā. tad yadi notpannamātraṃ vinaśyet, kaṃcit kālam asyānityatā na syād ity anaikāntikam anityatālakṣaṇaṃ prasajyate.*)

[416] Chung-lun (T 1564) 3a17-19: "The present mental states (*citta*) and factors (*caitasika dharma*) do not have any time in which they persist. ... If they did persist, then they would not be conditioned entities. Why is that? Because all conditioned entities are always endowed with the mark of destruction."

I.D.2.4.2). In these sources, it is argued that the conditioned entities always have to be characterized by *anityatā* (in the MPPU by the mark of origination and destruction which amounts to the same thing, since *anityatā* is in this context to be understood in the technical sense as a *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*), lest they stop being conditioned entities. Hence, according to this line of reasoning, they cannot at any time **not** undergo destruction, because this would be incompatible with their characterization by *anityatā*. This argument is not based on the independence of destruction upon external causes, but on the presumption that "to be characterized by *anityatā*" means "to currently undergo destruction" so that there can be no time at which an entity characterized by *anityatā* does not perish, lest it would not always be characterized by *anityatā* and thus stop to be a conditioned entity. Of course, such a pregnant understanding of the characterization by *anityatā* is at odds with the original conception of the mark of destruction as the factor that co-exists with the mark of duration (and/or with the mark of change-while-enduring) and that only becomes causally efficient once it is united with the fitting external conditions (cf. § I.C.3.2.2). Thus the hypostatization of *anityatā* can only have played the role suggested here if at the same time the traditional attribution of the mark of duration (or of the mark of change-while-enduring) were ignored — something quite inconceivable in a Sarvāstivāda context. At any rate, I find it little likely that this pregnant interpretation of *anityatā* could have been so compelling that it alone led to the formation of the doctrine of momentariness. On the other hand, it is plausible that the hypostatization of *anityatā* led additional substance to the stance that it is impossible for impermanent entities to persist beyond origination.

3.4 Irrespective of the role the hypostatization of *anityatā* may have played, the question poses itself whether the reasoning that persistence beyond origination implies eternity precedes the "discovery" of the doctrine of momentariness or whether this reasoning was only developed after things had come to be conceived of as momentary in a first step. Though the textual situation allows for no certainty, I contend that the reasoning does not reflect the principle doctrinal considerations underlying the "discovery" of the doctrine of momentariness.

First of all, this is suggested by the fact that the Sarvāstivādins cannot have arrived at the

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That conditioned entities are at all times of their existence — this includes even their origination — endowed with *anityatā* is already stressed in the MKK (e.g. XXI.4), though without concluding from this that they cannot persist beyond their origination (cf. VII.24).

[417] MPPU 200a22-b4 (MPPU$_L$ 1162f): "[The yogin] should reflect that the mental state (*citta*), being impermanent, is characterized by origination and destruction [and] does not [even] abide for one moment so that it is devoid of any bliss that could be experienced. ... (b1) Since all phenomena are characterized as impermanent (*anitya*), they do not have time to abide. If a *citta* abided for one moment, it would also have to abide for the second moment. It would then abide eternally and be devoid of the mark of destruction (*vināśalakṣaṇa*). As among the three marks of all conditioned dharmas taught by the Buddha,[a] there is the mark of destruction, [the *citta* would], if it was without destruction, not be characterized as a conditioned entity."

[a] I cannot construe 住. Probably the text is corrupt at this point.

doctrine of momentariness on the ground that impermanent entities may not first persist before they undergo destruction, since they themselves taught (and even continued to do so after the adoption of the doctrine of momentariness) that all conditioned entities are qualified by a mark of duration which stabilizes the entity before it perishes. Moreover, as mentioned above, in the Vi, where the momentariness is generally presupposed, it is even the orthodox position that destruction depends upon external causes and conditions (Vi 105a29-b2, Vi_2 86c24-26 cited in n. 409). This suggests that at least the Vaibhāṣikas must have arrived at the conviction that all phenomena are momentary on different grounds.[418] Of course it is conceivable that the doctrine of momentariness was first deduced from the impossibility to persist and later adopted by the Sarvāstivādins on different grounds. It is much more likely, however, that the doctrine of momentariness as it is professed by the Sarvāstivādins rests on essentially the same doctrinal principles as that of other Buddhist schools. By contrast, it would be typical for the doctrinal development if the Yogācāras and Sautrāntikas arrived at the position that persistence beyond origination is impossible by working out the implications of the doctrine of momentariness (cf. § I.C.7). It may be added that for the "discovery" of the momentariness of mental entities, the impossibility to persist was of no avail. By contrast, if the doctrine of momentariness is based on the analysis of change in the way I contend, mental and material entities will have come to be regarded as momentary on essentially the same grounds (see above § II.C.2.3). Besides, I for one find it on the whole difficult to believe that reflections about the nature of existence independent from the notion of momentariness could really have led to the conviction that things cannot persist beyond origination. At any rate, it seems to me much more obvious to deduce the momentariness from the unprejudiced analysis of change as outlined in the preceding chapter. Though I thus preclude that the doctrine of momentariness was introduced because it was thought to be impossible for things to continue to exist after they have originated, I have little doubts that such a line of thinking and, in particular, reflections about the impermanent nature of things, rendered the momentariness of all things more plausible and in this way contributed towards the development and especially towards the establishment of the doctrine of momentariness.

4 As a summary of the findings in the two preceding chapters, the origination of the doctrine of momentariness may be reviewed from a different angle. As can be witnessed in very many proofs — a prominent example is the oldest proof at all, viz. ŚrBh 485,11-13, cited in § II.C.1.1 (cf. n. 347) — the doctrine of momentariness is based on the standpoint that something which is not momentary would have to be *tathaivāvasthita*, which literally means to "persist in that very way." For conditioned entities this persistence is held to be impossible first of all because things are always in flux, incessantly evolve, never stand still, so that it cannot occur that something exists just as it has done before. Therefore, the doctrine of

[418] This is not a decisive argument since the Vi has been compiled over a longer period so that the acceptance of external causes of destruction could be much earlier than the acceptance of momentariness. In my eyes it is unlikely, however, that this postulation can have been so much earlier that in the meantime the stance that destruction occurs spontaneously could have become such an unchallenged principle that on its basis the doctrine of momentariness could have been derived.

momentariness is principally based on the stance that things change all the time. As is borne out by the proofs reviewed in this chapter, it may also have been felt to be impossible that conditioned things are *tathaivāvasthita* because this was taken to entail that they are eternal. In such a case, it will have been presumed that things which are *tathaivāvasthita* could not even undergo destruction if they were exposed to a (hypothetical) cause of destruction. Though I do not preclude that such a line of thought may have been one of the doctrinal factors underlying the development of the doctrine of momentariness, I hold that the main reason for the stance that things are not *tathaivāvasthita* and hence momentary will have been the position that they are permanently in flux. Insofar as both the transformation of things as well as their eventual destruction are expressions of impermanence — as we have seen, often they are not strictly differentiated — and insofar as the stance that things cannot change without losing their identity follows from the anti-substantialist tendency in Buddhism, the doctrine of momentariness can ultimately be traced back to the fundamental Buddhist tenets that everything is impermanent and that there is no eternal Self (*ātman*).

II.E. The Experience of Momentariness

§ 1 **1.1** The arguments adduced in support of the theory of momentariness in the early Yogācāra sources have served in the present study as a starting point for the inquiry into the roots of the doctrine of momentariness. Accordingly, the preceding attempts to single out a possible source for the origin of the theory of momentariness have focused on doctrinal questions. Thus the hypothesis advanced in chapter II.C (viz. that the doctrine of momentariness follows primarily from the analysis of change in terms of substitution and from the stance that things are always changing) presumes that the origins of this doctrine have to be sought in the domain of dogmatic speculation. However, it is well known that in Buddhism many doctrinal tenets do not result from abstract speculation but rather are the outflow of the conceptualization and rationalization of spiritual practice.[419] Therefore, it is conceivable that it was a particular experience within the framework of spiritual practice that caused the development of the theory of momentariness rather than the doctrinal considerations that I have identified above. Since already in the oldest sources documenting the conception that all things are momentary there are passages testifying to the yogic experience of the momentariness of not only mental but also material phenomena, it is worthwhile to examine the relevant textual material available and discuss to what extent it supports such a theory.

1.2 The oldest explicit testimony to the perceptibility of the momentariness of matter known to me can be found in the Vi (in both Hsüan-tsang's and Buddhavarman's translation) so that it may date back to at least the 2nd cent. AD (cf. n. 38). By way of comparison it is related that the yogin first views the gross material elements and the matter derived therefrom, and then proceeds to view matter as atomic and momentary.[420] Such an analysis of matter is also testified in the AKBh with regard to the body where it is reported that the mindful

[419] The idealism of the later Yogācāras, for instance, may have evolved out of the practice to generate and subsequently eliminate images (*pratibimba*) which are to be meditated upon instead of the real objects they represent (cf. § II.E.3.4).

[420] Vi_2 182c22-24: "Or, [it is] as the yogin contemplating the *dharmas*. First he contemplates the four gross elements (*mahābhūta*) and the matter derived [therefrom] (*bhautika*) (cf. AKBh 341,14f in n. 421). Later he contemplates atoms and moments. Again also that Bhadanta['s (i.e. Kātyāyanīputra, the author of Jñānaprasthāna) approach] is thus. As [the yogin first] contemplates the four gross elements (*mahābhūta*) and the matter derived [therefrom] so he (viz. Kātyāyanīputra) first establishes the paragraphs (i.e. the items to which the *mātṛkā* is applied, viz. the three *saṃyojanas* etc. from T 1544 929b10-c3); as [the yogin later] contemplates the entities (*dharma*), which are atoms and moments, so he (viz. Kātyāyanīputra) later makes the applications (i.e. applies the *mātṛkā* to the previously established items [T 1544 929c4ff])."

Vi 237a27f: "As the Yogin first establishes the gross elements and the matter derived [therefrom] and later [contemplates the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*)] on the basis of the differentiation into atoms and moments, so also the Bhadanta [proceeds]."

The latter translation by Hsüan-tsang is not so clear and could also be understood in such a way that the differentiation into atoms and moments is only conceptual and not actually perceived. This may reflect a certain reluctance on his part to accept the perceptibility of the atomic and momentary mode of existence.

observation of the body (*kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*) is perfected, when the body is viewed as atomic and momentary.[421] This in turn is confirmed in the ADV.[422] The perceptibility of moments and atoms is also attested outside the Buddhist tradition.[423]

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[421] AKBh 341,14f (on AK VI.14cd): "He contemplates the body as well as feeling, the mind and the factors [different therefrom] (*dharma*) according to their specific and general characteristics. Their own-nature (*svabhāva*) is their specific characteristic; but their general characteristic is the impermanence of conditioned entities, the unsatisfactoriness of tainted factors [as well as] the emptiness and the not-being-Self (*anātmatā*) of all entities. What now is the own-nature of the body? The gross elements and the matter derived therefrom. ... The application of mindfulness to the body is reportedly (*kila*) perfected when [the yogin] absorbed in meditation views the body as atomic and momentary." (*kāyaṃ svasāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyāṃ parīkṣate. vedanāṃ cittaṃ dharmāṃś ca. svabhāva evaiṣāṃ svalakṣaṇam. sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṃ tu anityatā saṃskṛtānāṃ duḥkhatā sāsravāṇāṃ śūnyatānātmate sarvadharmāṇām. kāyasya punaḥ kaḥ svabhāvaḥ? bhūtabhautikatvam. ... samāhitasya*[a] *kila kāyaṃ paramāṇuśaḥ kṣaṇikataś ca paśyataḥ kāyasmṛtyupasthānaṃ niṣpannaṃ bhavati.*)

[a] Pradhan: *sāmāhitasya.*

[422] ADV 327,1-4: "Taking all four [objects of] the applications of mindfulness together he views them under four aspects, namely as impermanent, as unsatisfactory, as empty and as not a/the Self. Then, futhermore, analyzing the body as a compound of atoms and a continuum of moments, the yogin sees it [dissected] into atoms and moments (cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax* Leiden 1886, §242)." (*tena tu catvāry api smṛtyupasthānāny abhisamasyānityato duḥkhato śūnyato 'nātmataś ceti caturbhir ākāraiḥ praty-avekṣate. tataḥ punar yogī kāyaṃ paramāṇusaṃghātakṣaṇasantānabhedena prabhidya, paramāṇuśaḥ kṣaṇaśaś ca nirīkṣate.*)

[423] In YS III.52 it is said that "From concentration (*saṃyama*) on the moments and the series [constituted] by them knowledge born from discrimination [arises]" (*kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ saṃyamād vivekajaṃ jñānam*). Here, however, the conception of the moment (*kṣaṇa*) and the series (*krama*) are fundamentally different from the one in Buddhism insofar as they are purely temporal categories and do not refer to the existence of momentary entities (cf. n. 215 where the concept of *kṣaṇa* and *krama* as set forth in the explanation by Vyāsa on this sūtra are discussed). Thus the yogin does not perceive momentary atoms but can discern in precisely which moments a given atom was located at a particular spot. Consequently, the knowledge born from the perception of moments does not constitute a particular poignant experience of the impermanence of conditioned existence. It is, by contrast, used in the following way to distinguish between otherwise identical atoms (YS III.53):

> "Because the difference between two equal [entities] cannot be discerned on grounds of their class, their secondary characteristics or their location, there is ascertainment (*pratipatti*) of [the difference between them] by this [knowledge born from discrimination]" (*jātilakṣaṇadeśair anyatānavacchedāt tulyayos tataḥ pratipattiḥ.*).

This is commented upon thus (YSBh p. 387,8-18):

> " ... Two myrobalan fruits are, because they are of the same kind and share the same characteristics, differentiated on account of their different location: 'This one is in front, this one in the back.' But when the myrobalan in front is moved to the spot behind while the cognizant (*jñātṛ*) (who is to tell the two fruits apart) is distracted by something else, then given the identical location the differentiation in the sense 'this one is in front, this one in the back' does not work.[a] But the knowledge of reality must be devoid of doubt. Therefore (*ity ata*), it has been declared that by this there is ascertainment (*pratipatti*), i.e. by the knowledge born from discrimination.
>
> How? The place correlated to the moment of the myrobalan [initially] in the front differs from the place correlated to the moment of the myrobalan [initially] in the rear. And the two myrobalans differ as to the experience of their specific place-moment. But the experience of the different place-moments is said (*iti*) to be the reason for the difference between the two [fruits]. According to this example the master-yogin(?)[b] cognizes the difference between two [atoms] by the realization of the

In all other sources where the perception of momentariness is attested, the perception focuses exclusively on the constant rise and fall of phenomena and does not envisage their spatial fragmentation into atoms. The most explicit testimony to an experience of this kind can be found in the MSABh where it is documented that the yogins envisage the rise and fall of conditioned factors and thereby come to see (*paśyanti*!) their destruction at every moment. It is taught that only because of this vision disgust (*nirvid*) and the subsequent liberation from desire (*virāga*) leading to final emancipation (*vimukti*) are possible.[424] Thereby the

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place correlated to the moment of the atom [initially] in the front, the atom being identical as to kind, characteristic and place — the atom [initially] in the rear not being given at this place [at this time] differs as to its experience of this place because of the difference of the correlated moment (i.e. at which it occupies the place)." (*... dvayor āmalakayor jātilakṣaṇasārūpyād deśabhedo 'nyatvakara "idaṃ pūrvam, idam uttaram" iti. yadā tu pūrvam āmalakam anyavyagrasya jñātur uttaradeśa upāvartyate tadā tulyadeśatve "pūrvam etad, uttaram etad" iti pravibhāgānupapattiḥ. asaṃdigdhena ca tattvajñānena bhavitavyam ity ata idam uktaṃ "tataḥ pratipattir," vivekajajñānād iti. katham. pūrvāmalakasahakṣaṇo deśa uttarāmalakasahakṣaṇād deśād bhinnaḥ. te cāmalake svadeśakṣaṇānubhavabhinne. anyadeśakṣaṇānubhavas tu tayor anyatve hetur iti. etena dṛṣṭāntena paramāṇos tulyajātilakṣaṇadeśasya pūrvaparamāṇudeśasahakṣaṇasākṣātkaraṇād uttarasya paramāṇos taddeśānupapattāv uttarasya taddeśānubhavo bhinnaḥ sahakṣaṇabhedāt tayor īśvarasya yogino 'nyatvapratyayo bhavatīti. ...*)

The differentiation of the two atoms as described here is based on the discernment of the moment at which the given entity is located at the spot in question. It is problematic, however, how the yogin can on these grounds ascertain whether the atom he sees at a given spot is identical with the atom he has located there before or not. For the atom perceived at a later moment will differ from the atom seen earlier as to the moment of its location at the given spot even if it is identical. In the face of this difficulty, it has to be assumed that the yogin's discernment at precisely which moment the atom is located at a given point encompasses also the knowledge at which moments, if at any, the atom was located there before. Irrespective of these difficulties, the passage illustrates that the yogins can discern atoms and determine their existence (i.e. their localisation) from moment to moment.

[a] In the beginning the cognizant sees the fruit A (here the fruit behind) on the spot Z (here: in the rear). When he later sees in Z a fruit identical in kind (*jāti*) and characteristic traits (*lakṣaṇa*) with the fruit A, he has to determine whether this fruit is the fruit A or another fruit (here the fruit which was intially in the front) which has — without him noticing — been moved to Z to replace the fruit A.

[b] The expression "master-yogin" (*īśvara yogin*; lit.: yogin who is God) is to my knowledge not attested elsewhere. Possibly, *īśvarasya* initially supplemented *yogino* as a further subject that is able to discriminate *kṣaṇas* and accordingly was linked to *yogino* by the particle *ca* (= and). In this case *īśvarasya* will have become an attribute of *yogino* after *ca* had been elided for one reason or another.

[424] MSABh 149,27-150,5 (cf. n. 12 where part of the text missing here is cited): "But that the arisen [entity] perishes later after a period of time [and] not immediately after it has arisen ... [is impossible], furthermore, because of the contradiction of destruction after a period of time. Because of the contradiction with what? ... And [because of the contradiction] with the contemplation of the yogins. Because having contemplated the origination and decay of the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*), they see their destruction at every moment. For otherwise even they would not be endowed with aversion [to mundane existence], liberation from desire and emancipation, just as the other [ordinary people] who see destruction [only] at the time of death and so on." (*" ... utpannaṃ tu kālāntareṇa paścān nirudhyate, notpannamātram eve" ti. ... kālāntaranirodhasyaiva ca virodhāt. kena virodhāt? ... manaskāreṇa ca yogināṃ. te hi saṃskārāṇām udayavyayau manasikurvantaḥ pratikṣaṇaṃ teṣāṃ nirodhaṃ paśyanti. anyathā hi teṣām api nirvidvirāgavimuktayo na syur yathānyeṣāṃ maraṇakālādiṣu nirodham pasyatām.*)

Cf. $BoBh_W$ 280,6-11: "And moreover neither aversion (*nirvid*), nor the liberation from desire

experience of momentariness is equated with the realization of *anityatā*. That the vision of the momentary rise and fall, which is referred to in the MSABh, pertains of the contemplation of *anityatā* is also suggested by the sub-commentary (SAVBh P. tsi 163a1f) where Sthiramati specifies that the yogins perceive the momentariness when contemplating the Four Holy Truths, that is, one may add, when contemplating *anityatā* as the first mark (*ākāra*) of the first truth.

As in the MSABh so in most of these sources, the observation of momentariness features as a particularly poignant experience of impermanence (*anityatā*). Thus in the MPPU the contemplation of *anityatā* is said to be perfected — that is, on the level of relative truth — when things are perceived as momentary.[425] Similarly in SAH 909b10-15 it is taught that the application of mindfulness entails that the body (as well as feelings, mental states and mental factors) is viewed as impermanent "because it perishes from moment to moment" (cf. n. 41). Likewise, in the BoBh (278,10-20, 279,6-9; both cited in n. 139) *anityatā* is, on the level of relative truth, contemplated upon by inspecting the momentary mode of existence of the conditioned entities (*saṃskāra*). In another passage in the Vi, the perception of momentariness features in the context of the notions of impermanence (*anityasaṃjñā*) and particularly of death (*maraṇasaṃjñā*), the contemplation of which is expressly stated to be perfected when things are seen to arise and perish in every moment.[426] In the Hsien-yang

(*virāga*) nor emacipation (*vimukti*) would be possible if the noble son or daughter (*kulaputra, kuladuhitṛ*) saw the really given [entities] (*dravyasat*) to exist for all times and the only conceptually existing things (*prajñaptisat*) to be really given due to their own-being. In contrast to this, they (i.e. aversion etc.) are possible for a Bodhisattva who by these [aforementioned] ways (*ākāra*) realizes according to truth (*yathābhūtam*) that all conditioned factors (*saṃskāras*) are impermanent." (*na ca punaḥ kulaputrasya vā kuladuhitur vā sarvakālāstitāṃ ca dravyasatāṃ svabhāvaparinispattiṃ ca prajñaptisatāṃ paśyato nirvid virāgo vimuktiś ca yujyate. ato viparyayeṇa tu yujyate ity ebhir ākārair bodhisattvaḥ sarvasaṃskārā anityā iti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti.*)
See also SN III 19.

[425] MPPU 229b3f and 14-16 (MPPU$_L$ vol. III, 1435f): "Among the Four Truths, the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya*) is the first. Among the four aspects of suffering, the aspect of impermanence (*anityatā*) is the first. Therefore, the Bodhisattva contemplates the notion of impermanence. ... Question: 'Of what kind is the perfect [contemplation of] the notion of impermanence (*anityasaṃjñā*)?' Answer: 'To see the conditioned entities (*saṃskṛtadharma*) arising and perishing in every moment, as dust blown by the wind, as water flowing from the mountain, as flames fading away one after another.'"

MPPU 372b19-24: "Or the Bodhisattva contemplates the impermanence (*anityatā*) of matter (*rūpa*). Also [its] impermanence is twofold: First, the destruction at every moment: all conditioned entities do not abide for more than one moment. Second, entities, insofar as they are chains (*santāna*) [of momentary entities], are called 'impermanent' because they (i.e. these chains, too) are annihilated, as [for instance] in the case of the exhaustion of the life force (*āyus*) of men, or as in the case of plants and trees being burnt by fire, or as in the case of the evaporation of boiling water. When the Bodhisattva has brought forth the thought [of awakening] only recently, he practices the [contemplation of] this [latter one, viz.] the gross impermanence, [i.e.] the cutting of the chain, because [thus] his mind becomes disgusted. When he has practiced for a long time, the Bodhisattva is able to discern the impermanence consisting in the arising and perishing of the phenomena (*dharma*) at every moment."

Cf. also MPPU 229c3f quoted in n. 198.

[426] In Vi 836c-841b *anityatā* is dealt with together with death and eight further notions (*saṃjñā*) to

there is evidence that, as a particular form of *anityatā*, the momentariness is perceived in the context of the the meditational application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*; cf. § II.E.2.1). Furthermore, the perception of momentariness is confirmed in the BCA, where it is asserted that it can be attained to solely by an accomplished yogin but yet pertains to the sphere of ordinary experience (*yogivyavahāra*).[427] However, being of no avail in the context of the

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be contemplated upon. Both the treatment of the notion of impermanence (*anityasaṃjñā*) and of death (*maraṇasaṃjñā*) are based on the conception of momentariness. Thus the concrete object of the notion of death (*maraṇasaṃjñā*) is taught to be "the *anityatā* (here in the technical meaning of a *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*, that is, as the entity causing the destruction of the conditioned factor it is correlated with) of the *skandhas* (i.e. the groups of factors constituting the person) which have arisen together with the very last [moment of the series of the] organ of life (*jīvitendriya*)" (838c1f), that is, in the last moment before death. Similarly, the notion of impermanence (*anityasaṃjñā*) is said to consist in "the contemplation that the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) do not have permanence for one moment" or, if *anityatā* is also here understood in the technical sense as a *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*, in "the contemplation of the *saṃskāras' anityatā* of the moment" (838a18f), that is, of the *anityatā* of any given (i.e. not just the final) entity of the series. If *maraṇasaṃjñā* and *anityasaṃjñā* really both have *anityatā* in the sense of a *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa* as their object, they only differ as to the location of the envisaged *anityatā* within the series.

The difference between *anityasaṃjñā* and *maraṇasaṃjñā* is also dealt with earlier in the Vi. In this context an almost identical position is cited (Vi 838a17-19), where again it does not become clear whether *anityatā* is to be understood literally or instead consistently in the technical sense as *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*. At any rate, it is perfectly clear that the *anityasaṃjñā* is directed towards the destruction occuring at every moment and that the *maraṇasaṃjñā* is at this point only grasped in the conventional sense as referring to the destruction at the end of life, even though it, too, is treated on the basis of the theory of momentariness.

Subsequently, also the notion of death is directed towards the experience of momentariness and it is even said explicitely that the cultivation of it has been accomplished when the momentary rise and fall of conditioned factors is observed (Vi 841a8-11; cf. § II.E.3.2 where this passage is dealt with).

[427] BCA IX.8ab: "The fault [that the Buddha's qualification of the conditioned entities as momentary ($BCAP_V$ p. 181,13f, $BCAP_P$ p. 376,1) cannot pertain to the sphere of conventional truth because on that level momentariness is not perceived] does not apply, because [it is in fact perceived] by the convention[al experience] of yogins. [For] they see [a higher degree of] reality (*tattva*) than common people do." (*na doṣo yogisaṃvṛtyā, lokāt te tattvadarśinaḥ/*).
BCAP hereon ($BCAP_V$ p. 182,8-16; $BCAP_P$ p. 377,12-378,10): "This fault consisting in contradiction with [actual] perception does not apply. Because by the convention[al] (*saṃvṛti*), ordinary (*vyavahāra*) [experience] of the yogins, who have obtained the absorption of the lack of a self in the sense of a person (*pudgalanairātmyasamādhi*), momentariness is experienced. ... Even if momentariness is not experienced by [common people], who only see the immediate, it yet is the object of the ordinary experience of the yogin. ... By contrast to common people who only see the immediate, the yogins see reality, [i.e.] see what is beyond the scope of the ordinary senses. This is the sentence [expressing] the reason: Because they see the reality, therefore they discern momentary [entities](?), the lack of a Self and so on, even though they are not perceived by common people." (*nāyaṃ pratītivirodhalakṣaṇo doṣaḥ. yogināṃ pudgalanairātmyasamādhilābhināṃ yā saṃvṛtir, vyavahāras tayā kṣaṇikatāyā pratīteḥ. ... yadi nāmārvāgdarśanaiḥ kṣaṇikatvaṃ na pratīyate, tathāpi yogivyavahāragocaraḥ. ... lokād arvācīnadarśanāt sakāśāt te yoginas tattvadarśino 'tīndriyadarśinaḥ. hetupadam etat: yasmāt tattvadarśinas te tasmāt kṣaṇika*[a]*-nairātmyādi lokāpratītam api pratipadyante/*)

[a] $BCAP_V$ reads *kṣaṇikatva*°. Since Vaidya adduces no reasons or material for the alteration of the reading of $BCAP_P$, I have not adopted his reading. The Tibetan translation (P. 5273 la 222a3: ... *skad cig maḥi bdag med ñid la sogs pa* ...) seems to be based on the reading *kṣaṇikanairātmyādi*.

passage concerned, neither the nature of the experience of momentariness nor the framework in which it is placed are specified in the BCA.

1.3 The decisive question which poses itself with respect to the experiences of momentariness documented in these sources is whether they came to be conceptualized in terms of momentary existence after this notion had already been developed elsewhere, or whether they represent a type of experience which may have prompted the development of this notion in the first place. In the latter case, it should follow from the structure of the exercise in which the concerned observation of momentariness is embedded how this exercise may have generated a particularly striking experience of the evanescence of the given object and why this experience came, without outside stimulus, to be conceptualized in terms of momentariness.

To be sure, any attempt to reconstruct the development along these lines will always remain highly speculative because we are engaging in hypothetical considerations about the nature of spiritual exercises and the experience made within their framework which are basically not accessible to us and of which we can at best hope to have an approximate idea on the conceptual level. This does not, however, imply that we should refrain from examining the scarce and fragmentary textual sources available to us so as to consider how likely a particular course of development can be made out to be. Even though this will not yield definite results, it is still worthwhile to try in this way to shed as much light on the difficult subject as possible by the means of philology.

§ 2 **2.1** As mentioned above, there is evidence in the Hsien-yang that the momentariness of conditioned entities is experienced within the framework of the application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*). The Hsien-yang affirms that the impermanence of conditioned existence is penetrated by means of *smṛtyupasthāna*. Since this penetration is, depending on the stage of accomplishment, said to encompass *anityatā* in all — or nearly all — its forms, it should also include the momentariness which was enumerated before as one of the forms of *anityatā* (cf. appendix, § 1.2).[428] The Hsien-yang specifies in this context that *smṛtyupasthāna* functions in conjunction with the law of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). This conjunction is illustrated by the quotation of a passage from the Satipaṭṭhānasutta where mindfulness is directed towards the nature of the observed body to originate and perish (Hsien-yang 550c25f; for the wording of the Satipaṭṭhānasutta see n. 433). Thus in the Hsien-yang it is not only specified that the momentariness is penetrated within the general framework of the application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*), but with the quote also a clue is given as to the specific

[428] The knowledge of a Śrāvaka is said (Hsien-yang 550c29-551a2) to comprehend *anityatā* in all its senses with the exception of the highest meaning of *anityatā*, namely eternal non-existence, which is only accessible to the knowledge of a Bodhisattva.

As there are two separate lists of *anityatā* taught in the Hsien-yang, it cannot, strictly speaking, be excluded that the penetration of all meanings of *anityatā* is taught only with reference to the first list of six *anityatās* so that momentariness would not be comprised here. On the other hand, as *anityatā* is even said to be grasped in its highest sense as eternal non-existence, one may safely assume that the more accessible knowledge of momentariness is also included here.

circumstances.

Even though it cannot be excluded that in the Hsien-yang the momentariness is not perceived immediately but only arrived at indirectly,[429] there is enough evidence to document the observation of the body's momentariness within the framework of *smṛtyupasthāna*. As mentioned, already in SAH 909b10-15 it is taught that the objects of *smṛtyupasthāna*, including the body, are viewed as impermanent "because they perish from moment to moment" (cf. n. 41). This is confirmed in the aforementioned passages in the AKBh and ADV, which teach that the application of mindfulness to the body culminates in the perception (*paśyataḥ*!) of its momentary and atomic mode of existence. As mentioned, this experience is also attested in the Vi, though without specification of the precise context in which it is generated.

Furthermore, Buddhaghosa's VisM can be adduced. Though he does not make use of the traditional framework of *smṛtyupasthāna*, he incorporates the mindfulness directed towards the body into the scheme of the ten objects of recollection (*anussati*). Here some of the exercises of the mindfulness on the body (*kāyagatāsati*) and the separately classified mindfulness on breathing (*ānāpānasati*) are practiced so as to generate insight (*vipassanā*) into the impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and selflessness of conditioned existence (VisM VIII.43 and VIII.237, cf. Meier 1978, p. 30). Thus by the application of mindfulness, the level of "the purification by insight [serving as] the path [to liberating insight]" (*paṭipadāñāṇa-dassanavisuddhi*) can be obtained. On this level, there are nine different stages of knowledge to be mastered, of which the first and second stage are of particular relevance as they entail the experience of momentariness. On the stage of knowledge of arising and perishing (*udayabbayānupassanāñāṇa*) — not to be confounded with the reduced (*viz. udayabbayānu-passanaṃ nāma paṭhamataruṇavipassanāñāṇaṃ*) version of the same knowledge on the lower level of the "purification by insight into what constitutes the path and what does not" (*maggāmaggañāṇadassanavisuddhi*) when the ten imperfections (*upakkilesa*) have not yet been overcome (VisM XX.99-104, PTS pp. 631-633) — the illusion of endurance is intercepted by the discernment of the perpetual rise and fall underlying it.[430] After this stage, the concentration is narrowed down by ignoring origination and focussing only on the

[429] Hsien-yang (550c24f) specifies that by *smṛtyupasthāna* the concentrated mind is focused on the object, and that by the law of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) the nature of the object is penetrated. The involvement of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, and particularly the four argumentations specifiying it (551b3-9), suggest its application on the level of discursive thinking so that theoretical considerations may at least supplement, if not prevail over, the mode of direct perception. On the other hand, this does not imply (at least not necessarily) that *anityatā* is grasped here, to the exclusion of direct observation, by analytical thought only.

[430] VisM p. 550,19f and 24f (extract from XXI.3-4; = PTS p. 640): "To start with, the mark of impermanence does not present itself because it is concealed by continuity since the rise and fall is not contemplated upon. ... But when the rise and fall are grasped, the mark of impermanence presents itself in its true form because the continuity is intercepted." (*aniccalakkhaṇaṃ tāva udayabbayānam amanasikārā santatiyā paṭicchannattā na upaṭṭhāti. ... udayabbayaṃ pana pariggahetvā santatiyā vikopitāya aniccalakkhaṇaṃ yāthāvasarasato upaṭṭhāti.*)

constantly occurring destruction.[431] The knowledge thus obtained (*bhaṅgānupassanāñāṇa*) will then entail a particularly striking experience of the evanescence of all conditioned entities.

Buddhaghosa's account is corroborated by MSABh 150,3-5 (cited in n. 424). Here, as in the VisM on the stage of *udayabbayānupassanāñāṇa*, the yogins first "envisage the rise and fall of the conditioned factors (*saṃskārāṇām udayavyayau manasikurvantaḥ*)" (here even the terminology matches) and then — corresponding to the stage of *bhaṅgānupassanāñāṇa* in the VisM — "perceive their destruction at every moment" (*pratikṣaṇaṃ teṣāṃ nirodhaṃ paśyanti*). Furthermore, Buddhaghosa's description can be supplemented by Vi 841a8-10 (adduced in § II.E.3.2), where the perception that the *skandhas* arise and perish in one moment is called the perfection of the viewing of origination and destruction (**udayavyayānupaśyanāsiddhi*). This attainment, which corresponds to the stage of *udayabbayānupassanāñāṇa*, is preceded by the completion of the [preparatory] practice of the viewing of origination and destruction (**udayavyayānupaśyanāprayogasamāpti*), where in accordance with the pattern of the successive reduction of the envisaged time span the *skandhas* are seen to arise and perish within two moments.

2.2 There are good reasons to assume, on the basis of the evidence adduced in the preceding paragraph, that the experience of the momentariness may have originated within the framework of *smṛtyupasthāna* without being induced from outside. In its canonical form the application of mindfulness commences with the observation of the body, then turns to feelings (*vedanā*), thereafter to the mind (*citta*), and finally onto other entities (*dhamma*).[432] While the application of mindfulness was originally limited to the registration of the specific object as it exists presently, it later came to include the contemplation of the impermanent nature of the object (Schmithausen 1976, p. 256; cf. § II.E.2.4). Thus the observed object came to be viewed as being subject to origination (*samudayadhamma*) and to destruction (*vayadhamma*).[433] With regard to feelings and mind[434] (and probably also with regard to the

[431] VisM p. 550,13f (extract from XXI.10): " ... he apprehends neither origination, nor duration, nor occurrence, nor characteristic feature (*nimitta*). His mindfulness is only directed towards decay, disappearance, annihilation, destruction." (*...uppādaṃ vā ṭhitiṃ vā pavattaṃ vā nimittaṃ vā na sampāpuṇāti; khayavayabhedanirodhe yeva sati santiṭṭhati.*).

[432] According to Schmithausen (1976, pp. 247-249), initially only those psychic factors which are conducive or detrimental to spiritual liberation (*dhamma*), namely the five obstructions (*nīvaraṇa*), the six fetters (*saṃyojana*) and the seven factors of awakening (*bhojjhaṅga*) — according to Bronkhorst (1985, p.312) even only these seven factors of awakening — were comprised under "*dhamma*." Later in the cause of the transformation of *smṛtyupasthāna*, however, this was extended to include all entities except those concentrated upon before (Schmithausen 1973: p. 274ff; see e.g. AKBh 341,15).

[433] Satipaṭṭhānasutta (MN 1.10: MN I 59-61 etc.; DN 22: DN II 292, 298f, 302 etc.): *samudayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ (vedanāsu, cittasmiṃ, dhammesu) viharati, vayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati.*

Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the Satipaṭṭhānasutta — there is no difference between his interpretation of the DN and the MN version — understands "*dhamma*" as a causal factor producing respectively origination and destruction. His interpretation is based on SN V 184 (corresponding to Saṃyuktāgāma in Taishō Vol.2 T 99 171a27; quoted in AKBh 343,14-16) where the origination and

destruction of the four objects of *smṛtyupasthāna* are explained by setting forth that the body, feelings, the mind and the psychic factors (*dhamma*) originate respectively due to food (*āhāra*), to contact (*phassa*), to mentality-materiality (*nāmarūpa*) and to mental activity (*manasikāra*) and perish due to the cessation of these causal factors. As is borne out by his treatment in VisM XX.97 and confirmed by the subcommentary (Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathāṭīkā II, p. 387), Buddhaghosa (cf. Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā p. 768, 775f, 777) extends this list by adding for the origination of each object ignorance (*avijjā*), craving (*taṇhā*) and action (*kamma*) as further conditions and supplementing this by the mark of origination (*nibbattilakkhaṇa*) as a further factor. Correspondingly, for the destruction the cessation of ignorance, craving and action as well as the mark of transformation (*vipariṇāmalakkhaṇa*) are added as further factors.

Buddhaghosa follows the account of the stage of "knowledge [consisting in] the observation of origination and destruction" (*udayabbayānupassanāñāṇaṃ*) in the Paṭisambhidāmagga (I 54-57, i.e. chapter I,6). There the rise and fall of the groups of existence (*khandha*) is contemplated upon by observing respectively the mark of orignation and transformation as well as the dependence of their origination and their destruction upon their respective complex of four conditions. In contrast to the other objects of *smṛtyupasthāna*, the body (*karajakāya*), the nasal apertures (*nāsāpuṭa*) and the mind (*citta*) are singled out by Buddhaghosa as origination factors and their cessation as destruction factors with regard to the application of mindfulness to breathing (Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā p. 765; Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathāṭīkā II, p. 381f).

Buddhaghosa's interpretation of *samudaya-* and *vayadhamma* as causal factor of origination and destruction is rather artificial and does not, as far as I can see, accord with the original purport of this passage which I take to refer to the subjection of the object to the process of origination and decay. This is supported by the meaning of *"samudaya/vaya-dhamma"* elsewhere in the nikāyas as for instance in the following phrase *aniccam sukhadukkhavokiṇṇam uppādavayadhammaṃ attānam samanupassamāno* (DN II 67,13, cf. Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā thereon 506,22f; see also Nettipakaraṇa 41,7, SN I 200, SN IV 28, AN I 152 and 299, AN III 54, Vi 394a29-b2). Even the sub-commentary Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathāṭīkā (II, p. 381,25ff) concedes that *"dhamma"* (in *samudayadhamma)* can also be understood in the sense of "being subject to" (*jātidhamma*). Therefore, the passage under discussion of the Satipaṭṭhānasutta will have originally referred to the nature of the observed object to arise and perish. Such an interpretation is not neceessarily at odds with the sūtra (viz. Satipaṭṭhānasaṃyutta, 42) from the SN referred to earlier in this note, because in this sūtra the causal factors are not identified with the "*dhamma*" in "*samudaya*"- and "*vayadhamma.*"

It has to be acknowledged, however, that according to this sūtra the subjection of the observed object to the process of origination and destruction is contemplated upon by taking account of the respective causal factors. I think that this, all the same, does not exclude that the application of mindfulness to this subjection will, at least in the case of the transient feelings and states of mind, have included the actual perception of this process. For such a mode of practicing *smṛtyupasthāna* will be more in accordance with the original spirit of *smṛtyupasthāna* insofar as it will allow for the uninterrupted concentration on the observed object. By the former mode, by contrast, the concentration on the chosen object would be deliberately disrupted by the diversion of the attention to its causes of origination and destruction. Thus the contemplation of, for instance, the body would be interrupted by the observation of mental states such as craving, etc.

That the application of mindfulness to the subjection of the object under the processes of origination and destruction will also have entailed the actual observation of this process is not necessarily at odds with Buddhaghosa's own understanding. For, in his aforementioned account of "the knowledge [consisting in] the observation of origination and destruction" (*udayabbayānupassanāñāṇaṃ*) on the level of "purification by insight into what constitutes the path and what does not" (*maggāmaggañāṇadassanavisuddhi*), which he matches with the passage under discussion from the Satipaṭṭhānasutta, Buddhaghosa mentions (VisM XX.99, PTS p. 632) that the observation of the causal processes underlying origination and destruction involves the "vision of the rise and fall according to moment" (*khaṇato udayabbaya-*

above-mentioned psychic factors), this will from early onwards (i.e. when the obvious transience of mental events had already been conceptualized as the incessantly re-occurring creation and destruction of mental entities; cf. chapter II.A) have included the experience of their, at least from a Buddhist point of view, self-evident momentariness.

Given that the subjection of the observed object to the process of origination and decay will in the case of these objects have included the perception of their actual rise and fall, this mode of perception may have been extended to the body, when its subjection to the process of origination and decay was focused upon.[435] In this way, the body may have come to be experienced as momentary. Considering the formal uniformity of the practice of *smṛtyupasthāna* as borne out by the equivalent wording used with respect to each of the four kinds of objects, it may indeed have been obvious to treat the body in an analogous manner with the other objects of *smṛtyupasthāna*. This all the more so, because this step seems to entail an important advantage, insofar as the observation of the actual process of origination and decay may well have been felt to be more satisfactory than the contemplation of its conditioned nature. For whereas the latter will have to include considerations going beyond mere observation, the former allows for the sustained and unwavering application of mindfulness onto the object of meditation.

Such a hypothesis presupposes that the body can be perceived as constantly arising and perishing when the mindfulness is directed towards it in a corresponding way. This presupposition can be substantiated not only by pointing to the textual evidence already adduced but also by referring to modern accounts of the practice of *smṛtyupasthāna*. Thus, within the Burmese school of *smṛtyupasthāna*, Mahasi Sayadaw describes the spiritual progress made in the context of *smṛtyupasthāna* following Buddhaghosa's delineation of the spiritual path. The attainment of the stage of knowledge of arising and perishing (*udaya-bbayānupassanāñāṇa*)[436] and of the stage of knowledge of destruction (*bhaṅgañāṇa*)[437]

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dassana) insofar as the mark of origination or the mark of transformation, which participate in the origination and destruction of the observed entity, can only be seen at the moment of the origination or of the dissolution of the observed object. This implies that the actual process of origination and destruction undergone by the momentary object of mindfulness is perceived.

[434] It has to be pointed out, however, that the wording of the sūtra still reflects that the mind was once viewed as a single unit. This is brought out by the fact that in the phrase "he abides contemplating the mind as the mind" (*citte cittānupassī viharati*) the singular is used, whereas in the corresponding passage the plural is used with regard to feelings and the psychic factors. Also the differentiation of the mind in terms of its association with desire (*sarāgaṃ cittam*), hatred and so on points to a conception of it as continuous. On the other hand, once the mind had been conceived as a series of incessantly arising and vanishing momentary mental entities, it will have been perceived accordingly when focussed upon within the framework of *smṛtyupasthāna*.

[435] Along these lines, Schmithausen (1973, pp. 178-180) already suggested in an essay on the relationship between spiritual practice and theoretical philosophy that the observation of the body's momentariness may have resulted from the transference of the experience of the, at least according to the Buddhists, self-evident momentariness of mental entities to the body as the first object of *smṛtyupasthāna*.

[436] Visuddhi-ñāṇa-kathā by Mahasi Sayadaw (p. 57,20-26; the authorized translation has been taken

are explicitly set forth in terms of momentariness (cf. Meier 1978, pp. 99-103). Also in modern Singhalese Buddhism the experience of momentariness within the context of *smṛtyupasthāna* is well attested (Nyānaponika: Heart of Buddhist Meditation e.g. p. 63f). Even in the account of a Western layman practicing *smṛtyupasthāna* (Meier 1978, pp. 165-168), a certain type of experience is reported which seems to suggest that the object is perceived as evanescent.[438]

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over from p. 16): "For then, at each act of noticing, he sees: 'The noticed object having arisen, disappears instantly;' and it also becomes clear to him that each object diappears just where it arises; it does not move on to another place. In that way he understands by direct experience how bodily and mental processes arise and break up from moment to moment." (*tadā hi so sallakkhaṇe sallakkhaṇe sallakkhitaṃ ārammaṇaṃ uppajitvā ṭhānaso veti (vayaṃ gacchati) iti passati, taṃ taṃ ārammaṇaṃ tattha tatth' eva veti; natthi tassa desantarasaṅkamanan 'ti pi 'ssa pākaṭaṃ hoti. ten' ev' esa nāmarūpānaṃ khaṇe khaṇe udayabbayaṃ paccakkhato 'va pajānāti.*)
Cf. also Sayadaw 1976, p. 23.

[437] Visuddhi-ñāṇa-kathā by Mahasi Sayadaw (p. 58,36-59,4; the authorized translation has been taken over from p. 17f): "For in each single instance of a rising movement of the abdomen, there are, in fact, numerous physical processes constituting the rising movement, which are seen to dissolve serially. It is like seeing the continuous successive vanishing of a summer mirage moment by moment; or it is like the quick and continuous bursting of bubbles produced in a heavy shower by thick rain drops falling on a water surface; or it is like the quick, successive extinction of oil-lamps or candles, blown out by the wind, as these lights are being offered at a shrine by devotees. Similar to that appears the dissolving and vanishing, moment by moment, of the bodily processes noticed." (*sakiṃ unnamanavāre pi hi anekāni unnatarūpāni paṭipāṭiyā bhijjanākārena upaṭṭhahanti, gimhakāle marīciṃ passantassa tassā khaṇe khaṇe paṭipāṭiyā bhijjanākāro viya ca, thūlaphusitake deve vuṭṭhe udakapiṭṭhiyaṃ patitameghajalabindūhi nibbattabubbulakānaṃ sīghaṃ sīghaṃ vināso viya ca; cetiyassa padīpapūjanakāle vātappahatānaṃ padīpānaṃ sīghaṃ sīghaṃ vijjhāyanaṃ viya ca sallakkhitarūpānaṃ khaṇe khaṇe bhedo khīyanākāro upaṭṭhāti.*)

As mentioned above, on this stage (i.e. *bhaṅgañāṇa*) the destruction of entities is experienced to the exclusion of the phase of origination and endurance. Such an experience seems to involve the breaking down of the common conceptualizing apprehension of the object. This also entails that the momentary mode of existence of the object fades into the background. Yet, the perception of destruction at every moment clearly presupposes the momentariness.

[438] It is interesting to note that in modern accounts there is evidence that the experience of momentariness is also — independent from the contemplation of origination and decay — associated with the observation of bodily movement (*catuririyāpatha*). Thus, Nyānaponika Thera relates (Nyanaponika Thera 1986, p. 64; cf. p. 63) that " ... the posture, too, will afford an opportunity to observe the momentary rise and fall of phenomena, ..." Similarly, Ledi Thera (appendix to the PTS's translation of the Yamaka [II 238]; translated by C.A. Rhys Davids in the Journal of the PTS, 1914, p. 128 in pp. 115-169) derives the momentariness by an analysis of bodily movement. Cutting up the flow of movement into distinct bodily phases or postures he deprives it of its continuity so that only the coming to be and passing away of those phases remains. It is not clear, however, whether we can deduce from this argumentation that the application of mindfulness to the bodily comportment (*īryapatha*) yields according to Ledi Thera a direct experience of momentariness. Cf. also Mahasi Sayadow's account (Visuddhi-ñāna-kathā, p. 58,9-14) that on the level of *bhaṅgañāṇa* only the cessation of bodily phases and not their initial or middle phase are experienced.

More generally, reference may be made to the testimony of a contemporary meditation master in Burma who, describing his spiritual experiences, specifies that they entail the realization "that everything is impermanent, that there is no continuity even from second to second" (Spiro: *Buddhism and Society.*

According to the hypothesis discussed here, the experience of the evanescence of the body will have been conceptualized in terms of momentariness in analogy with the interpretation of the rise and fall of mental events and factors as the constant destruction of old and origination of new entities.[439] In an additional step the acceptance of the momentariness of the body will have been extended to all material entities. Given the Buddhist tendency to generalize such fundamental qualities as the mode of existence, such an extension to cover also inanimate matter will have seemed natural. A first step in this direction will have already been taken within *smṛtyupasthāna* when the observation which is first directed onto the own body *(ajjhattam)* is directed outward towards the body of others *(bahiddhā)*. Thus the theory of the momentariness of all conditioned entities would have originated in the context of *smṛtyupasthāna* by the extension of the momentariness of non-material entities to cover also the body, thereby implying the inclusion of all material entities. Of course, such a process as the transference of the experience of momentariness onto the body and the following doctrinal development will not have been as simple as that. The hypothesis only suggests roughly along which lines the process may have proceeded.

2.3 Insofar as it can explain not only what prompted the experience of the evanescence of the observed object but also why it was conceptualized in terms of momentariness, this hypothesis is convincing. It derives further plausibility from the fact that, according to it, the theory of the momentariness of all conditioned entities will have resulted from the extension of the generally accepted momentariness of mental entities to cover also matter. For it is less drastic, and hence more likely, to derive the momentariness of all conditioned entities by such an extension of the scope rather then by conceiving it from scratch irrespective of the already adopted momentariness of mental entities.

2.4 There are, however, a number of considerations which render this hypothesis less likely. First of all, the textual evidence for it is very thin indeed. The AKBh and the ADV may refer back to the SAH so that all three texts could be traced back to only one common source on which the passage in the Vi possibly draws, too. The testimony of the Hsien-yang is, as mentioned before, equivocal insofar as it is uncertain whether the body's momentariness is actually perceived or only realized conceptually. And on the whole, also within the texts which are likely to have originated after the theory of momentariness had become current, there is precious little evidence for the perception of the body's momentariness within *smṛtyupasthāna*. Thus in the extracts on *smṛtyupasthāna* which Śāntideva adduces in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, there is not one instance of the body being treating in terms of momentariness. If we look, for instance, at the Vīradattaparipṛcchā quoted by Śāntideva in this context, we find that the body is dissected spatially into atoms but not, as one might have expected

A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes. Berkeley 1982, p. 54f).

[439] It has to be conceded, however, that this in itself is hardly sufficient to explain that the experience of the body's evanescence was conceptualized in terms of its momentary existence. Rather, additional considerations and factors must have played an important role at this stage, too.

in the light of the AKBh and ADV, temporally into moments.[440] In the MPPU, which is also of considerable antiquity,[441] *smṛtyupasthāna* is dealt with twice, once from a Hīnayāna (MPPU 198c-202b; $MPPU_L$ pp. 1151-1176) and once form a Mahāyāna (MPPU 203b-204a; $MPPU_L$ pp. 1187-1194) point of view. In both cases the contemplation of the body focuses upon its impure nature, whereas (in the context of *smṛtyupasthāna*) the momentariness is stressed when the mindfulness is diverted towards the mind. From a later period, the subcommentary on the DN may be adduced. Here the formulation of Buddhaghosa's commentary (p. 757,30) that the object is to be viewed as impermanent is only interpreted in terms of momentariness with regard to feelings,[442] mind and other factors (*dhamma*) (Dīganikāya-aṭṭhakathāṭīkā II 376,10f) and not with regard to the body (op. cit. 370,27-371,5).

Besides the deficiency of the textual basis, the hypothesis is further weakened by the following consideration. The exercise of *smṛtyupasthāna* underwent, as Schmithausen (1976) demonstrated (cf. also Bronkhorst 1985), a long process of formation over various stages. Reviewing this process, Schmithausen (1976, p. 265) concluded that the exercise of *smṛtyupasthāna* was earlier restricted to the mere registration of the object focussed upon, when it was employed to sharpen the faculty of awarenes by focussing the concentration on successively more subtle objects (body [*kāya*], feelings [*vedanā*], mental states [*citta*] and

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[440] — Śikṣāsamuccaya (ed. Bendall, 'S-Gravenhage 1957, 1st ed. St.-Petersburg 1897-1902) p. 230,10f: "Also in the Vīradattaparipṛcchā [the application of mindfulness to the body] is set forth, namely: 'This body originates gradually and perishes gradually, it is an accumulation of atoms, ...'" (*Vīradattaparipṛcchāyām apy uktam. yaduta-"ayaṃ kāyo 'nupūrvasamudāgato 'nupūrvavināśo*[a] *paramāṇusamucaya ...*).
— Vīradattaparipṛcchā (not quoted by Śāntideva) (T 331 68a22): "The Bodhisattva views the body as impermanent (*anitya*) because it is its nature (*dharma*) to return to death at the end."

The Vīradattaparipṛccha belongs to the Ratnakūṭa complex of literature. The Sanskrit original is lost but there are translations into the Chinese (T 330 translated into the Chinese sometime between 290 and 306, T 331) as well as into the Tibetan (Peking Vol. 24, zi 200a1-211b3).

[a] Mistaken for *anupūrvavināśī*? Cf. *anupūrvasamudāgato*.

[441] The MPPU must have been compiled before 402 when Kumārajīva commenced his translation into the Chinese and after the composition of the texts it cites, namely the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna (middle of 3rd cent. ?), the Catuḥśatka of Āryadeva (end of 3rd cent. ?) and the Prajñāpāramitāstotra of Rāhulabhadra (3rd cent. ?). Lamotte ($MPPU_L$ p. 1370-1375) suggests that it was compiled in the beginning of the 4th century so that the bulk of the material incorporated will date back to at least the third century. Like Demiéville (J.A. 1950, p. 382), he holds that the author of the the MPPU was a former Sarvāstivādin who converted to the Madhyamaka school and is not to be identified with the author of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Seyfort-Ruegg (1981, p. 32f) points out that the MPPU is unknown to both the Indian and Tibetan traditions and that the material incorporated may partly be of Central Asian or even Chinese origin. I do not think, however, that this seriously impairs the relevance of the materials adduced from the MPPU in the present study. For even if some portions of it have not been composed in India, at least those passages referred to here seem to be firmly embedded within the Indian tradition.

[442] DN-aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā Līnatthavaṇṇanā II 375,29-376,1: "Seeing that those [feelings] only endure for one moment, ... insight into *anityatā* has been accomplished." (*tāsaṃ khaṇamattāvaṭṭhānadassanena aniccatāya ... dassanam vibhāvitaṃ hoti.*)

psychic factors [*dharma*]). Only later the object came to be envisaged in a particular, soteriologically relevant way (usually stressing the negativity of mundane existence), which varied according to what seemed to be most important at a given time and thus reflects much of the doctrinal developments within Buddhism.[443] Given that in the course of time the emphasis within *smṛtyupasthāna* had shifted to the realization of the impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and selflessness of conditioned entities (Schmithausen 1976, p. 256ff), which constitute the first Holy Truth, it is perfectly well possible that the notion of momentariness was adopted from without and incorporated into the exercise of *smṛtyupasthāna* as the adequate understanding of impermanence,[444] or, as the AKBh and the ADV suggest, as an additional tool to dissect the body. That this actually resulted in the direct perception of momentariness could be explained by the particular suitability of *smṛtyupasthāna* to generate experiences of such a kind.[445] In support of such a hypothesis, reference may be made to the perception of the atomic structure of the body as it is reported in the AKBh and (depending thereon) in the ADV) in the context of *smṛtyupasthāna*. Since this viewing of the body as atomic has no doubt been incorporated into the application of mindfulness to the body after matter had come to be conceived of as atomic, it may be presumed that also the perception of momentariness was only introduced retrospectively after the momentariness of the body had been discovered in a different context.

2.5 On the other hand, from the general tendency of *smṛtyupasthāna* to absorb doctrinal elements from without, it cannot be deduced that this line of development will also have to apply in the case of momentariness. By contrast, it is, as argued above, nevertheless feasible that the development of the theory of momentariness originated with the contemplation of the body's subjection to origination and decay. On review of the above considerations, it becomes clear that good arguments can be adduced both in favor and against the hypothesis, but that none of them carries enough weight to settle the issue. On the whole, I think it is well possible that some kind of experience of the evanescence of the body, that is, a particularly poignant and acute experience of its impermanence, may have, along the lines outlined above, been made within *smṛtyupasthāna* even before the theory of momentariness had been conceived. I find it less convincing, however, that such an experience will have generated this theory. To my mind, there is just too little evidence of the perception of momentariness within the framework of *smṛtyupasthāna* to believe that it was a common enough experience to have formed the basis for the origination of a theory so much at odds with the ordinary

[443] Given this characteristic trait of *smṛtyupasthāna* to act as a sponge absorbing and adapting elements from outside, Schmithausen (1976, n. 45) withdrew his hypothesis that the theory of momentariness originated within the context of *smṛtyupasthāna*.

[444] See the textual extracts from the SAH, BoBh, MPPU and Vi adduced above. The soteriological significance attributed to the experience of momentariness in MSABh 150,3-5 (cited in n. 424) can be cited as a further example where the insight into *anityatā* was interpreted in terms of momentariness.

[445] Such a hypothesis leaves the question open whether the new metaphysical assumption of momentariness will have prompted a spiritual experience of a new quality, or whether only the conceptualization of the experience, and not its nature, changed.

perception of the world.

§ 3 **3.1** In some of the sources adduced in § II.E.1.2 (viz. in MPPU 229b3f, BoBh [cf. $BoBh_W$ 277,5-11], MSABh [at least according to the SAVBh; see above]) the experience of momentariness is attested in the context of the contemplation of impermanence within the framework of the Four Holy Truths or the Four Seals of the Doctrine (*dharmoddāna*). Given that within these schemes the Buddhist doctrine is arranged and summarized it is only to be expected that the theory of momentariness was incorporated here even if it had been developed elsewhere as is the case with other doctrines within the fold of Buddhism. This is evinced by the AS and Hsien-yang where the treatment of *anityatā* as part of the Four Holy Truths commences with a dogmatic classification of the various forms of *anityatā*, among them momentariness. Similarly, $BoBh_W$ 277,15-280,11, MSABh 149,7-12 or MAV III 5cd-6ab deal with momentariness as a form of *anityatā* after propounding that the true meaning of *anityatā*, that is from the point of absolute truth, is that of eternal non-existence (cf. § I.D.2.3.1).

This does not preclude, however, the possibility that the contemplation of impermanence, irrespective of the precise context in which it was placed, induced a particularly acute experience of the transience of existence which became eventually conceptualized in terms of momentariness. If such a course of development is to remain more than a purely theoretical possibility, it should become clear how the contemplation of *anityatā* could have engendered the experience of momentariness before the corresponding doctrinal development had taken place.

3.2 In this context attention may be drawn towards a particularly instructive passage in the Vi (840c21-841a11) which, addressing the notion of death (*maraṇasaṃjñā*), teaches how the experience of momentariness can be obtained by narrowing down the span of time over which the arising and disintegration of the groups of factors constituting the person (*skandha*) is observed:

> "[The yogin] contemplates that the *skandhas* (i.e. the groups of factors constituting the person) of one's lifetime arise at the time of conception (*pratisandhi*) [and] perish when old age and death are reached. Now one lifetime has numerous stages [of life] (i.e. infancy, adolescence etc.) in each of which the *skandhas* are different. Setting aside the other [states], he sees the *skandhas* of one state arising earlier and perishing later. Now one stage [of life] has numerous years in each of which the *skandhas* are different. Setting aside the other [years], he sees the *skandhas* of one state arising earlier and perishing later."

Following this pattern, the envisaged period of time is reduced successively from a year to a season, to a month, to a day, to an hour (*muhūrta*), to a minute (*lava*), to a second (*tatkṣaṇa*). The text continues:

> "Now one second (*tatkṣaṇa*) has numerous moments (*kṣaṇa*) in each of which the *skandhas* are different. Because the *kṣaṇas* [within a second] are extremely numerous, there is with regard to them (於中) a successively [more] subtle [summary] contempla-

> tion [of several *kṣaṇas*] (i.e. the number of *kṣaṇas* is gradually reduced over which the rise and fall of the *skandhas* is observed) until the *skandhas* are seen to arise in two and to perish in [the same] two *kṣaṇas*. This is called the completion of the [preparatory] practice of the viewing of origination and destruction (**udayavyayānupaśyanāprayoga-samāpti*). Immediately after this, one is able to see the *skandhas* arise in one and to perish in [the same] one *kṣaṇa*. This is called the perfection of the viewing of origination and destruction (**udayavyayānupaśyanāsiddhi*). At such a time, one says that the notion of death (*maraṇasaṃjñā*) (i.e. its contemplation) has been brought to completion, because the destruction of states is nothing but death."

It can be witnessed here how the contemplation of the rise and fall of the *skandhas* over longer stretches of time leads to the actual observation of this process over shorter stretches, until this process is seen to take place at every moment. That the *skandhas* are really perceived to arise and vanish every moment, and not just envisaged as doing so, is, as far as I can see, borne out by the description that the perception becomes progressively more subtle, and follows in particular from the treatment of this mode of perception as a particular achievement which is conceptualized as the perfection of the viewing of origination and destruction (**udayavyayānupaśyanāsiddhi*). This understanding is corroborated by the VisM (and indirectly by the MSABh, cf. n. 424) where the stage, on which the momentary rise and fall is directly observed, is referred to in almost the same terms (viz. *udayabbayānupassanā-ñāṇa*) as the attainment in the passage cited here.

3.3 As the theory of momentariness is presupposed in the Vi (cf. n. 450), there is no conflict between the content of the generated experience and the doctrinal stance of the yogin. The passage raises the question, however, whether originally this experience came to be induced by this technique as a consequence of the development of the theory of momentariness, that is, whether the technique of successive reduction was specifically applied to generate an experience which would witness to the veracity of a doctrinal tenet adopted for other reasons and thus confirm it, or whether, conversely, the doctrinal development followed suit. For it is by no means imperative that the generation of the experience of the transience of existence by this technique was developed on the basis of the theory of momentariness. Instead, the starting point may have been the spiritually motivated intention to induce a particularly poignant experience of impermanence. For this, the mere contemplation of the eventual termination of life by death may have been felt to be insufficient. Thus it may have been discovered that, for the sake of generating a more acute experience of the impermanence, it was possible to limit the stretch of time over which the origination and destruction is envisaged, irrespective of the objectively given situation. According to this hypothesis, the *skandhas* would have been envisaged as arising at the beginning and perishing at the end of the considered stretch of time, even though they (that is, at least the *rūpaskandha*) were, doctrinally speaking, held, albeit in altered form, to have existed before and to continue to exist afterwards. Thus a technique may have been worked out by which, over any arbitrarily chosen span of time, the rise and fall of the groups of factors constituting the person (*skandha*) could be contemplated upon and which, if applied effectively, could induce a

corresponding experience. In this way the momentariness may have come to be experienced independently from doctrinal presuppositions by gradually reducing the envisaged span of time as documented in the Vi. If such experiences were powerful enough, they may have eventually generated the conviction that they must correspond to truth, i.e. that the object of contemplation is, contrary to ordinary appearance, indeed subject to origination and destruction at every moment. In a further step the momentariness experienced with regard to the body (as one of the *skandhas*) may have been extended to encompass also inanimate matter.

3.4 That such a course of development is not a purely theoretical possibility is borne out by the origination of "illusionism" in Yogācāra Buddhism, which seems to have proceeded along comparable lines (cf. Schmithausen 1973, pp. 163-176). With the intention to overcome the mode in which objects ordinarily present themselves to us and thereby experience the true nature underlying all things *(tathatā)*, the yogins generated the meditative images of real objects. By eliminating these images subsequently, the yogins overcame indirectly also the real objects reproduced by the images (Schmithausen 1973, p. 170, particularly n. 26). Only in a second step the doctrinal implications of this practice, namely that the outer objects should be as much product of the mind as the images it generates,[446] were worked out. Thus it can be witnessed how an experience, induced for the sake of spiritual advancement and initially not in accordance with the underlying presuppositions (here the acceptance of the objective existence of the outer world which the early Yogācāra school still took for granted — albeit with the qualification that their true nature is the *tathatā*)[447] gained so much weight that the doctrine (i.e. "the facts") was adapted to it.

3.5 In support of the hypothesis considered here, it may, furthermore, be pointed out that the technique of successively reducing the envisaged time span is already attested in the canon and, as such, is older than the theory of momentariness. It can be witnessed in the sūtra on the mindfulness of death (*maraṇānusmṛti*; cf. n. 16 where the various versions of this sūtra are listed). Here the stretch of time that a monk who is mindful of death should expect to live — according to the Pāli version with the aspiration to contemplate the Buddha's teaching for this time — is successively reduced until it is taught that the correct way to be mindful of death is not to expect to live beyond the time taken by the present inhaling or exhaling. Though the technique is similar, the purpose seems to differ from the one in the Vi. Rather than driving at the evanescence of existence, it is intended that the monks should learn not to take for granted the continuation of their existence for even a moment. For thus they will not waste their time, but always be mindful of the present, realizing the (almost) unique chances it offers.[448]

[446] This step was preceded by the "realization" that meditative images, which were traditionally considered to be a particular kind of objectively existing matter (cf. n. 313), did not exist apart from the mental act they serve as object (Schmithausen 1973, p. 167).

[447] Cf. Schmithausen 1973, p. 166.

[448] In the version of the sūtra transmitted in MPPU 228b5f, the final instruction given by the Buddha

If my interpretation is correct, the successive reduction of the time span can also be observed in the Markaṭasūtra. First the mind is envisaged as originating anew after the elapse of single nights or days, then after hours, minutes and finally after bare moments.[449]

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in this sūtra is supplemented — that is, in comparison to the Pāli version — by the teaching that "all conditioned entities *(saṃskṛta)* arise and perish from moment to moment" (this supplementation is discussed in § I.A.1.2). On the basis of this, it could be held that the successive reduction of the time span and the preoccupation with the transience of life may in the context of the sūtra have prompted the development of the theory of momentariness. In this case the experience generated here would also be of the transience of existence. In support of such a claim it could be argued that, similarly, the notion of death is in the Vi the starting point for the experience of momentariness.

In my view, however, such a course of development is highly unlikely. For given that it is the intention of the sūtra to impress upon the monks that they should not be slothful in the present, postponing their aspirations into the future, it makes no sense to grasp death in terms of momentariness. For thus death would be replaced by a destruction which entails the automatic and immediate re-origination of the destructed and would thus lose its horror as the irreversible end of life. This would undermine the whole purpose of the exercise insofar as the incentive to seize the present moment as the possibly last chance would be lost. By contrast, it would make sense that the allusion to the momentariness of conditioned existence was added to the sūtra after the impermanence had been radicalized elsewhere. For thus the compiler may have hoped to stress the transient nature of life on which the sūtra draws.

449 Nidānasaṃyukta (p. 116f): "After the elapse of nights and nights and days and days (lit.: after the elapse of these and these nights and days), after the elapse of hours, of minutes, of moments,[a] that which is referred to as 'thinking' (*citta*), as 'mind' (*manas*), as 'consciousness' (*vijñāna*) occurs in many and various forms; arising as another it arises, passing away as another it passes away."[b] (*yat pun<ar> idam ucya<te> c<ittam> i<ti> vā <mana> iti vā vijñānam iti vā, tat teṣāṃ <teṣāṃ> rātridivasānām atyayā<t> kṣaṇalavamuhūrttānā<m a>tyayāt <pravartate> bahunānāprakāram, anyad evotpadyā<na>m u<tpa>dy<ate> a<nyad> e<va nirudhyamānaṃ ni>rudhyate.* All additions by Tripāṭhī).

The Pāli version (SN II 95,6-9; cf. n. 258 where this passage is cited in full) reads: ... *yad idaṃ vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam iti pi, taṃ rattiyā ca divasassa ca aññad eva uppajjati aññaṃ nirujjhati.* (= that which is referred to as 'thought' (*citta*) or also 'mind' (*mano*) or also 'consciousness' (*viññāṇa*), after night and after day arises as another and passes away as another.) Cf. also the translation (NA 534c7-9 cited in n. 13) of an extract of this sūtra which Saṃghabhadra adduces to proof the doctrine of momentariness on the basis of canonical tradition.

Since this passage drives at the impermanence of the mind (for the context, cf. § II.A.2.3.2), *rattiyā ca divasassa ca* is usually taken to mean "by night and by day" lest one mental unit would last an entire night or day. This translation is problematic because the genitive with temporal nouns generally has the meaning "after ... " (cf. von Hinüber 1986, § 247; Spejer, Sanskrit Syntax § 128). Von Hinüber (1986, § 252) discusses the passage under consideration and suggests that here, for once, the genitive may be used in the sense of "in the course of ... ." For all I can see, there is no need to assume such a special meaning here. By contrast, the genitive may be taken in its usual sense yielding "after night and after day." That this is the literal meaning is suggested by the Sanskrit parallel where *rattiyā ca divasassa ca* is matched by *rātridivasānām atyayāt*, which clearly means after "the elapse of nights and days" (cf. CPD, s.v. *accaya* — if it meant "in the course of ... ," as Lamotte [MPPU$_L$ 1166] and others take it to do, one would also have to understand "in the course of moments" which would imply that the moment is temporally extended and that within its span *cittas* originate and perish, which in the given context is clearly impossible). My interpretation is corroborated by Buddhaghosa's efforts to explain that the statement does not imply (as he obviously takes it to do literally) that "one single mental unit (*citta*) is able to endure for one complete night or day."[c]

3.6 To sum up, the hypothesis reviewed here (viz. that the spiritually motivated, but (initially objectively) contra-factual contemplation of the *skandhas* as arising and perishing at every moment gave rise to the conviction that they are indeed momentary) can be strengthened by two considerations: Firstly, the origination of Yogācāra illusionism can serve as an example where the trust in the veracity of a spiritual experience, which was initially not held to accord with reality, was so strong that it led to the re-definition of reality. Secondly, the technique of the successive reduction of the envisaged period of time as applied according to the hypothesis is already testified in the canon and hence older than the doctrine of momentari-

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As for the factual problems resulting if the genitive is taken in its usual sense, they only present themselves in combination with the simile with the monkey which drives at the evanescence of the mind (cf. § II.A.2.3.2). Without the simile, it is plausible that the sūtra only refers to the origination and destruction of the mind after night and after day since this period is for the purposes of the sūtra still sufficiently short to be able to contrast it with the years the body endures. The period may have been chosen because, considering the difference between the wakening and the sleeping state, falling asleep and waking up are particularly well suited to be understood in terms of the replacement of the old mental unit by a new one. Given the discrepancies between the simile and the situation it is meant to illustrate (cf. § II.A.2.3.2), it is indeed likely that the passage originally stood for itself and was only illustrated later by the simile. Thus the phrase *rattiyā ca divasassa ca* will only have become problematic as a result of being illustrated by the simile with the monkey.

It may then have been in response to the problem posed by the incongruity between the simile and the phrasing that the period envisaged was reduced successively until it matched the moment during which the monkey roaming from tree to tree is suspended from a branch. At any rate, this process of successive reduction can clearly be witnessed in the Sanskrit version. It has to be conceded, however, that both MPPU 200b23f, where the sūtra is reproduced, and the Chinese translation of the Saṃyuktāgama (T 99 81c14f) read "at day and at night" (日月夜時). These translations may, however, be based on a misunderstanding of the original import of the passage. The MPPU renders at least the second *atyayāt* after *kṣaṇalavamuhūrttānām* with "having elapsed" (過去) so that the successive reduction of the envisaged period could still be understood, though not commencing with nights and days but with smaller units.

[a] The deviating sequence in the Sanskrit compound (moment, minute, hour) results from the arrangement of the members of *dvandva* compounds according to their length (more precisely their quantities of *morae*).

[b] The enforcement of the finite verb by the corresponding participle has been explained by Geiger (translation of SN II p. 151 n. 2; cf. Nidānasaṃyukta, p. 117 n. 5) as alluding to the regularity with which the concerned action recurs.

[c] Sāratthappakāsinī II 99,27-31: "'After night and after day,' this is said in the sense of succession (*paveṇivasena*), grasping [when contemplating the rise and fall of the *citta*] a smaller succession than the earlier succession (i.e. than the duration of the body with which the mind is contrasted here?).* But a sole mental unit (*citta*) is not capable of enduring for one [complete] night or day. For in one moment taken by the snapping of fingers many hundred and thousands of *koṭis* of mental units (*citta*) arise." (*rattiyā ca divasassa cā ti idaṃ purimapaveṇito parittakaṃ paveṇiṃ gahetvā paveṇivasena vuttaṃ. ekarattiṃ pana ekadivasaṃ vā ekam eva cittaṃ ṭhātuṃ samatthaṃ# nāma n' atthi. ekasmiṃ hi accharākkhaṇe anekaṇi cittakoṭisatasahassāni uppajjanti.*)

* The interpretation of *paveṇi* (roughly "period of time") is problematic. It is also possible that *purimapaveṇi* refers to the conventional (lit. earlier) way of perceiving the mind as enduring for the entire span of a given existence.

The emendation of the reading *samattho* of the PTS edition is confirmed by the Sinhalese edition by Widurupola Piyatissa Maha Thera (Colombo 1927, p. 75,19).

ness.

Apart from the passage in the Vi under consideration here, there is, however, no textual evidence documenting that the momentariness of the body (or other matter) can be experienced by the application of this specific technique. Nor is there, irrespective of the precise mode of generation of such an experience, a sufficient textual basis to assume that the contemplation of impermanence yielded at all such a particularly poignant experience of the evanescence of existence that it would lend itself to the conceptualization in terms of momentariness. Neither the AS nor the MAV make any mention of the perception of the momentary mode of existence when dealing with momentariness as a form of *anityatā*. In ŚrBh 485,7-10 (cited in n. 65) it is even said explicitly that the momentariness which is envisaged as part of the contemplation of *anityatā* is, by contrast to the impermanence that manifests itself by change (*vipariṇāmānityatā*), not perceived directly but has to be deduced. This stance is also taken in the SNS (cf. n. 368) where it is presumed that the momentariness has to be inferred, because in contrast to the macroscopic impermanence it cannot be observed.

If it really was the case that the successive reduction of the envisaged time span had induced the experience of the fall and rise of the *skandhas* at every moment even before the doctrine of momentariness was conceived, it would, therefore, be much more plausible to assume that this experience came to be accepted as according to truth, not because, at least not only because, of the strength of the experience, but because the doctrinal situation had favoured this. In this case, however, the experience of momentariness could no longer be identified as the decisive factor that caused the doctrine of momentariness. Rather, it would have to be conceded that also doctrinal considerations led to the conviction that everything is momentary.

§ 4 **4.1** The examination of the various contexts in which the momentariness is reportedly experienced directly has to remain inconclusive. Given the paucity of pertinent material and considering that we are speculating about the nature of meditative practice and yogic experience of which we can at best have a vague idea, it is impossible to settle whether at all, and if so how a particularly poignant experience of the evanescence of existence was instrumental in the formation of the doctrine of momentariness. It is not certain whether the type of experiences depicted in the above cited sources had already been current before the formation of the doctrine of momentariness. For it is equally feasible that the momentariness of the *saṃskāras* came only to be experienced after doctrinal considerations had led to the conviction that they must be momentary.[450] And even if this latter possibility is precluded,

[450] In § II.E.2.4, reference was made to the tendency to adapt the application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) to new doctrinal developments. This raises the possibility that the application of mindfulness only came to generate an experience of momentariness after the doctrine that all *saṃskāras* are momentary had become current.

Note that the generation of momentariness by the successive reduction of the span of time over which the rise and fall of the *skandhas* is envisaged was probably superimposed upon the contemplation of the notion of death in Vi 840c21-841a11 after the doctrine of momentariness had become current. For the exposition of this technique precedes what is clearly the adaptation of, in all, eight notions (*saṃjñā*)

it has to remain dubious whether such experiences were instrumental in the formation of the doctrine of momentariness at all and if so in precisely which way.

At any rate, the textual evidence testifying to the direct experience of momentariness is on the whole too scanty to provide a sufficient basis for the assumption that the experience of momentariness was a) common enough and b) so striking and, as to its conceptualization, unambiguous that, on its own, it could have given rise to the conviction that all things are momentary. This all the more so considering the aforementioned (§ II.E.3.6) stance taken in the ŚrBh and SNS that momentariness is imperceptible and has to be deduced.[451] The near-impossibility of perceiving the momentariness of conditioned entities is furthermore suggested by the tradition that the measure of the moment is too subtle to be known by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas (cf. Vi 201b28-c6, cited in n. 221).

It is conceivable, however, that such experiences were a, or even the, decisive factor which started the formative process of the doctrine of momentariness off.[452] In particular, the experience of the fall and rise of the body at every moment as it is reportedly generated by the successive reduction of the envisaged time span or by the mindful contemplation of the

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to the theory of momentariness. Thus the notion of death is adapted by arguing that it is entailed by momentariness insofar as the destruction of states is death (Vi 841a10f). Similarly, the notion that impermanence implies suffering is explained by the mechanism with which momentary entities follow upon each other: the destruction within the series entails that the preceding entity is suppressed by the subsequent entity replacing it, and in that sense is suffering (Vi 841a14-18; 841a14f cited in n. 413). Given that the main concern of this passage is then the adaptation of the various *saṃjñās*, including the *maraṇasaṃjñā*, to the theory of momentariness, it is much more likely that the technique generating the experience of momentariness was introduced from without as part of this adaptation process than that the contemplation of the notion of death had already included this technique even before the theory of momentariness had originated. Of course, this does not preclude that in another context the technique of successive reduction was applied to induce an experience of the fall and rise of phenomena at every moment even before they had come to be considered as momentary.

[451] Of course, the ŚrBh and the SNS cannot be interpreted as a testimony that the momentariness cannot be perceived at all. This would not only contradict the textual evidence cited before, but also be an undue limitation of the omniscience of the Buddha. Rather, the ŚrBh and the SNS document that the experience of momentariness was considered to be inaccessible at least to those addressed by their teaching. This accords with the testimony of the BCAP (see n. 427) according to which only those yogins who have obtained to the absorption of the selflessness of persons (*pudgalanairātmyasamādhi*) are capable of perceiving the momentariness of the observed object. That it is very difficult to obtain to this perception is also borne out by Vasubandhu (AKBh 341,14f cited in n. 421), who equates this perception with the perfection of the application of mindfulness to the body (*kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*). Moreover, by the use of "*kila*" Vasubandhu indicates that his information is due to hearsay and that he himself has no direct access to such an experience. In a further passage (AKBh 77,2f), Vasubandhu even argues that the Trilakṣaṇasūtra (cf. § I.A.2.2) cannot refer to momentary entities since their origination and so on are not cognized (according to Yaśomitra, AKVy 174,18f, because of the difficulty to acertain a *kṣaṇa* precisely, *kṣaṇasya duravadhāratvāt*), whereas in the sūtra the origination and so on are depicted as objects of knowledge (*utpādo 'pi prajñāyate*).

[452] In support of this assumption one may point out that the perceptibility of momentariness is already taken for granted in a passage in the Vi (cf. n. 420) and could hence date back to the second century AD and even beyond (cf. n. 38).

body may have prompted the development of the doctrine of momentariness along the lines suggested in chapter II.C. For if the position had already been adopted that there are no abiding substances undergoing change, so that any qualitative change implies the substitution of an old by a new entity (i.e. numeric distinction), in that case the observation that at every moment the body undergoes destruction and a new body arises may have come across as not all that contra-factual. This all the more so because the principle that change implies substitution is more plausible in the case of the body where many changes entail evidently the origination of new and the destruction of old entities (cf. § II.C.2.4). Indeed, if supported by reflections about the evolution of the body and its subsequent decay within one life time — in particular the successive reduction of the envisaged time-span may have invited such reflections — the yogins may well have been driven to the conclusion that the body is changing all the time, and that hence the experience of the constant substitution of the old body by a new one corresponds to reality. Thus, the experience of the body's evanescence could have functioned as a catalyst prompting the yogins to elaborate the doctrinal implications of the stance that things always change and that change entails substitution. This would conform with my assumption (§ II.C.2.4) that first the momentariness of the body was arrived at, and then that of matter in general.

Of course, it cannot be ruled out that the experience of momentariness reported in the above sources was **objectively speaking** of such a nature that it would convince the yogin of the momentariness of existence, even if it was completely at odds with his prior views and not confirmed by suchlike doctrinal considerations. The paucity of textual evidence testifying to such an experience could be explained by the fact that it was only held possible for the expert yogin to attain to it (cf. n. 451). However, even in such a case there must have been (in addition to the reports of these expert yogins) doctrinal reasons that could have convinced the vast majority of those not being able to participate in this experience that the seemingly stable things around us are but made up of distinct points of existence. Now, these reasons are, at least from a philosophical point of view, equally, if not more, relevant for the formation of the theory of momentariness. We can then conclude that it is not convincing to trace the theory of momentariness back mono-causally to an experience of the transient nature of the body (or matter in general).

4.2 To sum up, the examination of the reports testifying to the observation of momentariness confirms the relevance of doctrinal questions for the inquiry into the roots of the doctrine of momentariness. Hence my contention that the doctrine of momentariness is primarily based on the analysis of change in terms of substitution and on the conviction that things are always changing is not challenged by the reported experiences of momentariness. However, the depiction of these experiences (notably in the context of the notion of death) and the fact that most of them focus on the body raises the possibility that they provoked the realization that things are momentary because they evolve all the time. This would supplement my hypothesis, insofar as it would explain how the implication (viz. the momentariness of all *saṃskāras*) of the conception that everything is permanently changing and of the stance that change implies the destruction of the old and the origination of a new entity had come to be

worked out.

Irrespective of the possibility that an acute experience of the transitoriness of existence may have prompted the development of the doctrine of momentariness, there can be little doubt that it will have helped the theory to gain ground that there was yogic testimony to the veracity of a doctrine so difficult to reconcile with ordinary perception. This is evinced by the MSABh where yogic experience is adduced as an argument for momentariness.

Appendix Annotated Translation of the Analysis of *anityatā* (548a2-548c18) and of the Proof of Momentariness (548c18-549b21) in the Fourth Chapter of the Hsien-yang[453]

Introduction (547c29-548a2)

What was said above (viz. 501c15ff) [, namely] "if one wishes to practice correctly the virtues of complete knowledge and so on ... ," refers to the complete knowledge of suffering and so on (i.e. of the Four Noble Truths). What [then] is complete knowledge with regard to suffering? It means that with regard to the truth of suffering one understands completely impermanence (*anityatā*), suffering (*duḥkhatā*), emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and not being a/the Self (*anātmatā*).[454] In this fixed sequence they are now to be established in detail.[455]

§ 1 Analysis of *anityatā* (548a2-c9)

§ 1.1 The nature of *anityatā* (548a2-9)

As for the demonstration of *anityatā*, the nature of *anityatā* and its differentiation are to be elucidated. How [is] the *anityatā*? And of what kind is the differentiation [of *anityatā*]? The stanza (*kārikā*) says:

> By *anitya* are meant the conditioned entities (*saṃskṛta*) because they are endowed with the three marks.
> As fitting,[456] the meanings of *anityatā* are to be known as six- or eight-fold, ... (kā 1)[457]

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[453] In the following translation of the first portion of the fourth chapter of the Hsien-yang, Sanskrit equivalents — they are not confirmed by citations in other sources — are given to facilitate the understanding of my translation. For the sake of convenience, I number the *kārikās* (abbreviated as "kā") translated here (in the Chinese translation, there is no such numbering). I have, furthermore, subdivided the text into paragraphs in order to facilitate orientation and so as to provide points of reference when alluding to a passage from the Hsien-yang. For further explanations of the appendix, cf. the remarks at the end of the introduction.

[454] Cf. MSABh 57,9f: *tatra parijñeyaṃ vastu duḥkhaṃ, parijñeyo 'rthas tasyaivānityaduḥkha-śūnyānātmatā.*

These four objects of the complete knowledge of the truth of suffering are usually referred to as aspects (*ākāra*). In its standard form each of the Four Noble Truths is constituted by four aspects (e.g. MPPU 138a7-10, $MPPU_L$ 641), viz. *duḥkhasatya* by *anitya, duḥkha, śūnya* and *anātman, duḥkhasamudayasatya* by *samudaya, hetu, pratyaya* and *prabhava, duḥkhanirodhasatya* by *nirodha, śānta, praṇīta* and *niḥsaraṇa, mārgasatya* by *mārga, nyāya, pratipad* and *nairyāṇika*.

[455] Suffering is examined in chapter 5, emptiness and not being a/the Self with regard to persons (*pudgalanairātmya*) in chapter 6, and with regard to entities (*dharmanairātmya*) in chapter 7.

[456] It is not clear how exactly "as is fitting" (*yathāyogam*) is to be understood. On the one hand, it may express that according to the circumstances either the list of six or of eight *anityatās* applies. This could, for instance, refer to a meditative context where it may depend upon the specific exercise which of the two lists is to be contemplated upon. Alternatively, *yathāyogam* could signal that not all forms of *anityatā* apply invariably to all conditioned entities, but that, as explicated in § 1.3, certain forms of

The treatise says: As for *anityatā*, this refers to the conditioned entities because they are endowed with three marks of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*), [namely] with the mark of origination as first, with the mark of destruction as second and with the mark of change-while-abiding as third.

§ 1.2 Differentiation of *anityatā* into six and into eight kinds (548a9-17)

And as for the differentiation of the meanings of *anityatā* according to what is fitting, six or eight [kinds] are to be known. Which are the six or eight [meanings of *anityatā*]? The *kārikā* says:

> ... [namely] as [consisting in] not having an own-being, as [consisting in] destruction, as [consisting in] transformation, as [consisting in] separation, as being [immediately] perceived, as coming to be (i.e. as future);
> [and] as [referring to the] moment, as [referring to the] continuum, as [consisting in] illness and so on, as [affecting] the mind, as [affecting] the non-sentient world [and] as [affecting] objects of enjoyment.(kā 2)

The treatise says: As for the six-fold *anityatā*, there is 1) the *anityatā* consisting in not having an own-being (see below), 2) the *anityatā* consisting in destruction (*vināśa*),[458] 3) the *anityatā* consisting in transformation (*vipariṇati*) (see below), 4) the *anityatā* consisting in separation (*viyoga*),[459] 5) the [immediately] perceived *anityatā*,[460] 6) the *anityatā* which

anityatā only refer to certain kinds of entities. However, it is also feasible that *yathāyogam* merely means "respectively" indicating that the forms of *anityatā* listed in kā 2ab make up the list of six and those of kā 2cd the list of eight *anityatās*.

[457] I take it that the second part of kā1 (i.e. kā 1cd) and kā 2 form one sentence syntactically linked by 故 in kā 2d.

[458] Given the testimony of the VinSg[a] and the AS,[b] and considering that the Hsien-yang already accounts for the conception of momentariness by the *anityatā* referring to the moment, it may be assumed that here destruction is, in contrast to the ŚrBh (cf. n. 190), not understood specifically in terms of momentariness.

[a] $VinSg_C$ 586c13: "That all *saṃskāras* perish subsequently after having originated is called the '*anityatā* of destruction.'"

[b] AS (P. li 89a4f): "What is the mark of destruction? It is the destruction of the arisen conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*)." (*rnam par ḥjig paḥi mtshan ñid gaṅ źe na/ gaṅ ḥdu byed skyes pa rnams kyi rnam par ḥjig paḥo//*).

[459] When things neither decay nor perish (ŚrBh: *avipariṇata, avinaṣṭa*), their enjoyment is still at risk because they, or the mastery over them, may get lost. As the ASBh explicates, the reasons for the loss of mastery are to be found in the person of the owner (e.g. one can no longer enjoy mastery over a well assorted library when one turns blind).[a] In contrast to the AS and the VinSg (586c15f, P. zi 24b3), the ŚrBh relates the loss of mastery to the domination over humans, rather than objects.[b]

[a] ASBh 50,12f: "The mark [consisting in separation] is the loss of mastery, [caused by one's] own nature, with regard to things which [continue to] be endowed with that very state [they were endowed with before] (i.e. neither deteriorate nor vanish). Sometimes it (i.e. the mark of separation) is also to be known as the appropriation [of these things] by others." (*viyogalakṣaṇaṃ tadavastheṣv eva vastuṣu svabhāvavaśitvabhraṃśaḥ<.> kvacit paraiḥ svīkaraṇam api veditavyam.*)

[b] ŚrBh 488,13-16: "Earlier someone is the master of others, not a slave, not a serf, not doing work

will come to be.[461]

As for the eight-fold *anityatā*, there is 1) the kind referring to the moment (*kṣaṇa*),[462] 2) the kind relating to the continuum (*santāna*),[463] 3) the kind consisting in illness, 4) the kind consisting in age, 5) the kind consisting in death, 6) the kind affecting the [fluctuating] mind,[464] 7) the kind affecting the [periodically destroyed] insentient world (*bhājana-loka*),[465] 8) the kind affecting the [sooner or later perishing] objects of enjoyment (*bhoga*).[466]

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for others; losing later his mastership and his freedom from slavery, he becomes the slave of others and is deprived of his mastership." (... *tadekatyaḥ pūrvam pareṣāṃ svāmī bhavaty adāsaḥ apreṣyaḥ aparakarmakaraḥ, so 'pareṇa samayena svāmibhāvam adāsabhāvaṃ vihāya pareṣāṃ dāsabhāvam upagacchati svāmibhāvād visaṃyujyate.*)

[460] ASBh 50,14 (almost identical in $VinSg_C$ 586c17f): "The mark [consisting in the *anityatā* being] immediately present is the *anityatā* which is exactly then (i.e. in the immediate present) experienced." (*saṃnihitalakṣaṇaṃ yā*[a] *tadānīm evānubhūyamānānityatā*).
As ŚrBh 489,5-8 specifies, this form of *anityatā* does not refer to instances of *anityatā* not covered by the preceding three forms, but specifies that these three forms of *anityatā* are presently perceived, and not projected into the future as in the case of the next form of *anityatā*, viz. "the *anityatā* which will come to be." Probably, this differentiation between the immediately perceived *anityatā* (e.g. a decaying corpse) and the deliberation that in the future the presently observed fate will inevitably befall oneself had become relevant in the context of the contemplation of decaying corpses as laid down within the framework of the Satipaṭṭhānasutta (DN II 295-297, MN I 58f). The stock phrase in this context "also this body [of mine] has this inherent nature (i.e. as the presently observed body) (*evaṃdhammo*), is going to be thus (*evambhāvī*), is not free from this" (*ayam pi kho kāyo evaṃdhammo, evambhāvī etaṃ anatīto 'ti*) may also explain why the future *anityatā* is in the ŚrBh and AS called *dharmatānityatā* (lit. the *anityatā* of the inherent nature), namely on the basis of the attribute *evaṃdhammo*. This is corroborated by the ŚrBh where a variation of this stock phrase is quoted to specify the content of the contemplation of the *dharmatānityatā*.[b]

[a] Tatia reads *yat*.

[b] ŚrBh 489,4: "Of this inherent nature, destined for such [a fate] in the future are these conditioned factors." (*evaṃdharmāṇa ete saṃskārā anāgāte 'dhvani evaṃbhāgīyā[ḥ]*).

[461] $VinSg_C$ 586c16f: "With regard to the *anityatās* [of destruction, of transformation and of separation] which abide in the future one says 'the *anityatā* which will come to be.'"
This form of *anityatā* is referred to in the ŚrBh and AS as *dharmatānityatā* (lit.: the *anityatā* of the inherent nature). Cf. n. 460.

[462] AS P. li 89a7: "What is [*anityatā*'s] mark with respect to the moment? That the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) do not endure beyond a moment." (*skad cig maḥi mtshan ñid gaṅ źe na/ ḥdu byed rnams skad cig ma las phan chad mi gnas paḥo//*).

[463] Given the explanation in the AS(Bh) (cited in n. 192; cf. the discussion on p. 87f and in n. 199), it may be assumed that the impermanence of the series refers here to the restless and in this sense impermanent mode of existence of the series constituting sentient beings which, until it is liberated from the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*), moves incessantly from one existence to the next. There is no evidence suggesting that, by contrast, the impermanence here refers to the cessation of the series, i.e. to the operation of impermanence as viewed over a span of time. This is also little likely insofar as many of the various other forms of *anityatā* already refer to this form of impermanence.

[464] Cf. the citatation in n. 262 of the treatment of the impermanence characterized by the manifold modes of existence of the mind (*cittacitrākāravṛttilakṣaṇa*) in the AS (P. li 89a8-89b3).

[465] ASBh 50,20-22: "The mark of the dissolution and coming forth of the inanimate world

§ 1.3 Sphere of occurrence of eight different kinds of *anityatā* (part 1) (548a17-19)
Among these [eight kinds], two kinds of *anityatā*, namely that referring to the moment (*kṣaṇa*) and that referring to the continuum (*santāna*), extend to all bases (*āyatana*) (i.e. to corporeal and non-corporeal matter as well as to mental entities). The three *anityatās* consisting in illness and so on inhere in internal (i.e. bodily) matter (*ādhyātmikarūpa*). The *anityatā* affecting the mind only inheres in mental [entities] (*nāman*). The two *anityatās* affecting the insentient world and objects of enjoyment inhere in external (i.e. non-bodily) matter (*bāhyarūpa*).

§ 1.4 Explication of the *anityatā* consisting in not having an own-being
As for the *anityatā* consisting in not having an own-being, it means that because an own-being [of conditioned entities] is for ever (*nitya*) non-existent they are called *anitya*.[467]

(*bhājana[loka]*) consists in the again and again [recurring] destruction and origination of the big earth and so on by fire and so on, that is, by the world-destructions through fire, water and wind which respectively have the property of burning, of flooding and of scorching." (*bhājanasaṃvartavivartalakṣaṇaṃ mahāpṛthivyādīnāṃ agnyādhibhiḥ punaḥ punar vināśa utpāda[ta]ś*[a] *ca agnyambuvāyusaṃvartanībhir dahanakledanaśoṣaṇātmikābhir yathākramam.*)

[a] In contrast to Tatia who emends the text by adding *ta* to *vināśa* thus reading *vināsata utpādataś ca*, I propose to elide *ta* in *utpādataś ca*. Cf. the Tibetan translation *snod ḥjig pa daṅ ḥchags paḥi mtshan ñid ni sa chen po la sogs pa me la sogs pas yaṅ daṅ yaṅ ḥjig pa daṅ ḥbyuṅ ba ste/* (P. śi 46a8, D. li 36a7).

466 ASBh 50,19: "The mark of the thriving and decline of objects of enjoyment (*bhogasaṃpattivipattilakṣaṇa*) is the fact that all worldly riches have a bad end because they don't last for ever." (*bhogasaṃpatti*<*vipatti*>*lakṣaṇaṃ sarvalaukikasamṛddhīnāṃ anātyantikatayā durantatvam.*)

The ASBh refers to *bhogasaṃpatti* in *bhogasaṃpattivipattilakṣaṇa* as "worldly riches" (*laukikasamṛddhi*), and the Tibetan (ASBh P. śi 45b7) translates *loṅs spyod ḥbyor pa* (= wealth/riches). In analogy with "the mark of the dissolution and coming forth of the inanimate world" (*bhājanasaṃvartavivartalakṣaṇaṃ*), I, by contrast, construe *saṃpattivipatti* as a *dvandva*-compound which forms a *tatpuruṣa*-compound with *bhoga*. This accords with ŚrBh 477,19-21 (cited in n. 475) where *saṃpattivipatti* in *saṃpattivipattikṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā* forms a *dvandva*-compound and where *jñatisaṃpatti* and *bhogasaṃpatti* form *tatpuruṣa*-compounds. If this is correct, the form of *anityatā* dealt with here will — this may include the Hsien-yang —, in contrast to the explanation in the ASBh, originally not have referred exclusively to the decay of objects of enjoyment, but will, in accordance with the transformation of thriving and decline in the ŚrBh, also have alluded to the fluctuation between being prosperous and impoverished.

467 ASBh 50,9-11: "'The truth of suffering (here concretely in the sense of all phenomena constituting this truth) is non-eternel (*anitya*)' means the same as [to say] that at all times it (i.e. these phenomena) does not have the nature of a self and a mine, inasmuch as the '*a*' [of '*a-nitya*'] has the force of negation and the word '*nitya*' the meaning 'at all times.'"(...*nāsti sarvadā duḥkhasatyam ā*<*tmā*>*tmīyasvabhāvam iti yo arthaḥ so 'rtho 'nityam duḥkasatyam iti. akārasya pratiṣedhārthatvāt nityaśabdasya ca sarvakālārthatvād iti.*)
Cf. also MSAṬ P. bi 169b6-170a1 cited in n. 157.

§ 1.5 Excursus on the *anityatā* consisting in transformation

§ 1.5.1 *kārikā* (548a21f)
Among the other [forms of *anityatā*], the *anityatā* consisting in transformation is of fifteen kinds.[468] The *kārikā* says:

> Transformation should be known to be differentiated by fifteen kinds, that is to say, [by the transformation] of state etc., because [sentient beings and material objects] are assailed by eight conditions (*pratyaya*). (kā 3)

§ 1.6 Sphere of occurence of the different kinds of *anityatā* (part 2) (only *kārikā*, prose section below) (548a23f)

> The lower realm (*kāmadhātu*) is endowed with all [forms of *anityatā*]; the middle realm (*rūpadhātu*) is devoid of three kinds [of *anityatā*] and is endowed with three sorts of transformation; for the upper realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), additionally the [*anityatā* affecting] the insentient world is excepted (kā 4).

§ 1.5.2 Excursus on the *anityatā* consisting in transformation: commentary(548a25-c1)

§ 1.5.2.1 Fifteen kinds of transformation (548a25-b15)
The treatise says: As for the fifteen kinds of transformation, the transformation of the state up to the transformation of [becoming] utterly invisible and disappearing are meant.
[1] As for the transformation of the stage [of life][469] (ŚrBh: *avasthākṛtā vipariṇāmāni-tyatā*),[470] the dissimilarity between earlier and later, the difference, the transformation [of the

[468] After the first item of the first list of six *anityatās*, namely the *anityatā* of non-existence, has been explicated in the preceding sentence, an excursus about the third item, i.e. the *anityatā* of transformation commences at this point. That the *anityatā* here has, despite the deviation in the Chinese (變異 instead of轉異) and despite the somehow artificial treatment 餘 requires, to be identified with that third form of *anityatā* is — leaving aside the problem of how the *anityatā* of change here should factually differ from the *anityatā* of change enumerated before — suggested by the structure of the Hsien-yang. For if the *anityatā* here was a distinct form in its own rights, why should it not have been enumerated with all the other forms of *anityatā*? More importantly, the identification clearly follows from the ŚrBh. There, five forms of *anityatā* are taught which correspond to the second up to the sixth item of the list of six *anityatās* set forth here (cf. § I.D.3.1). Thus the *anityatā* of change dealt with in the ŚrBh corresponds to the *anityatā* of change enumerated in the Hsien-yang. Given that the treatment of the *anityatā* of change starting at this point in our text matches closely the treatment of the *anityatā* of change in the ŚrBh, "the *anityatā* of change" here in line a20 will be identical with the *anityatā* of change enumerated before.

[469] As will be seen in the following, the various kinds of transformation dealt with in the Hsien-yang refer in accordance with the ŚrBh almost invariably to the change of specific states and not, as such, to the process of transformation underlying this change. Therefore, *avasthā* is here to be understood in the concrete meaning of "stage of life" by which obviously reference is made to ageing.

[470] The treatment of the fifteen kinds of transformation and the eight causes in the Hsien-yang is based, directly or indirectly, on the ŚrBh. The reversal of this relationship can be excluded because the

continuum] from infancy up to old age are meant.[471]

[2] As for the transformation of [surface] appearance (ŚrBh: *varṇakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), it is meant that starting with beautiful complexion, fresh muscles and a body of shining skin eventually there will get to be transformation resulting in ugly complexion, coarse muscles and a body of shrivelled skin.[472]

[3] As for the transformation of shape (ŚrBh: *saṃsthānakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), the change between being fat and emaciated is meant.[473]

[4] As for the transformation of thriving (ŚrBh: *sampattivipattikṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), the

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exposition of the various forms of *anityatā*, of which the treatment of transformation forms part, is clearly older in the ŚrBh than in the Hsien-yang (cf. § I.D.3.1). Because of this dependence upon the ŚrBh, the (sometimes emended) Sanskrit terms for the corresponding transformations in the ŚrBh will be given here. Moreover, the explanations of the different kinds of transformation will be quoted from the ŚrBh in the following. The recurring introductory and closing phrases will be omitted. (For the convenience of the reader, the references given with the quotes will, however, refer also to those portions not quoted). The edition of the Sanskrit text by Shukla is, owing to deficiencies of the Sanskrit manuscript and to mistakes of the editor, so faulty that it requires a complete re-edition. The passages quoted here have been emended on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese translation.

To start with, the passage in the ŚrBh corresponding to the treatment of the transformation of the stage [of life] in the Hsien-yang will be quoted in full, because the other passages in the ŚrBh follow roughly the same pattern (ŚrBh 477,1-7, T 1579 471c2-6, P. wi 217a1-5): *tatrādhyātmikasya vastunaḥ katham avasthākṛt<ā>ṃ vipariṇāma<-anityatā>m*[a] *paryeṣate. ihānenātmano <vā>*[b] *pareṣām vā dahrāvasthām upādāya yāvaj jīrṇāvasthā dṛṣṭā bhavati. tām pūrveṇāparāṃ visadṛśāṃ vyatibhinnāṃ vipariṇatāṃ saṃskārasantatiṃ dṛṣṭvāsyaiva bhavati: "anityā bateme saṃskārā<ḥ>." tathā hy eṣāṃ pratyakṣata eveyaṃ pūrv<e>ṇāparā vikṛtir upalabhyate.*

[a] Addition in accordance with the Tibetan and Chinese translation.

[b] Cf. 477,9, 478,1, 478,7.

[471] The explication by the three terms (i.e. dissimilarity etc.) does not point to factual differences between them. Rather, they all refer to the "change between earlier and later" (*pūrveṇāparā vikṛtiḥ*), the formulation used summarily by the ŚrBh after having explicated this form of transformation by the same three terms.

[472] ŚrBh 477,8-16 (P. wi 217a5-b1, T 1579 471c6-11): °*ihānenātmano vā pareṣām vā yā* (sic.) *pūrvaṃ suvarṇatā succhavitā <paryavadāta>*[a]*tvagvarṇatā <dṛṣṭā bhavati>* °,[b] *paścāc ca durvarṇatāṃ duśchavitāṃ rūkṣavarṇatāṃ ca paśyati, dṛṣṭvā ca punar eva pratyudāvart[t]yāpareṇa samayena tām eva suvarṇatāṃ succhavitāṃ paryavadātatvagvarṇatāṃ ca paśyati.*

Unlike the preceding change of the stage of life, the change of surface appearance is in the ŚrBh not held to be an irreversible process. Though there are reversible changes affecting the skin, such as long term exposure to water or skin diseases, I find it difficult to belief that originally the transformation under consideration here did not allude to the shrivelling of the skin etc. caused by ageing. As for the Hsien-yang, not only here but also in all other cases it refrains from taking over from the ŚrBh the reversal of the addressed change.

[a] so Ms., the parallel passage (478,2f) and the Tibetan translation (D. dzi 180a5 *mdog yoṅs su dag pa*; P. wi 217a6 reads *mdogs*).

[b] The text °...° is accidentically reproduced in 478,1-3. The addition *dṛṣṭā bhavati* is confirmed by 478,3 and by the Tibetan translation (cf. *mthoṅ la* in 217b8 which translates *dṛṣṭā bhavati* from 478,8).

[473] ŚrBh 477,17-19 (P. wi 217b1-4, T 1579 471c11-13): *yathā varṇa ukta, evaṃ kṛśasthūlatayā saṃsthānaṃ veditavyam.*

thriving of [one's] kinsfolk, [one's] wealth as well as of one's discipline (*śīla*), views (i.e. that they become more correct?)[474] etc. is meant. The opposite of this is called the transformation of decline.[475]

[5] As for the transformation of major and minor members [of the body] (ŚrBh: *aṅgapratyaṅga<sākalyavaikalya>kṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*),[476] it is meant that earlier the major and minor members are complete, while later there is change so that they are no longer complete.[477]

[6] As for the transformation because of heat and cold (ŚrBh: *śīt<oṣṇ>akṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*),[478] the change is meant that when it is cold one is huddled together and trembling while when it is hot one stretches out comfortably, perspires much, [the change] that [one time] one longs for cold [and one time] for heat and so on.[479]

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[474] In the present context "views" (*dṛṣṭi*) does not have the bad connotation it usually, though by no means always (cf. *samyagdṛṣṭi*), has.

[475] ŚrBh 477,19-21 (P. wi 217b4-7, T 1579 471c13-18): *sampattis [vipattiś cā][a] tadyathā jñātisampattir vā bhogasampattir vā śīladṛṣṭisampattir vā,[a] etadviparyeṇa vipattiḥ.* The remaining portion of this passage is missing in the Sanskrit manuscript.

Whereas the Tibetan translation merely states that thriving and decline are observed (... *ḥbyor ba daṅ rgud ba ḥdi lta bu dag mthoṅ nas/* ...), the Chinese translation explicates in analogy with the transformation of appearance that the change between prosperity and depravation and vice versa is meant. This, possibly interpretative, translation into the Chinese complies with the general pattern and is also supported by the fact that thriving and decline are taken together to constitute one form of transformation.

The explication given by the Hsien-yang does not accord with the ŚrBh. Whereas the transformation considered here consists according to the ŚrBh (at least as transmitted in the Chinese translation) in the alternation between prosperity and depravation, it is according to the Hsien-yang constituted by the process of thriving or alternatively by the process of decline which implies that the compound *sampattivipattikṛta* is analyzed as *sampattikṛta* and *vipattikṛta*. Besides the break with the general pattern, this interpretation has the disadvantage that one homogenous kind of transformation is split into two distinct transformations which, within the scheme of fifteen transformations, yet have to be treated as constituting one form. Possibly the departure of the Hsien-yang from the usual pattern has to be seen in the light of the version of the ŚrBh as recorded in the Tibetan translation.

[a] *vipattiś cā* has been elided in accordance with the Tibetan translation.

[476] The Sanskrit has been supplemented with the help of the Tibetan (P. wi 217b7f: *yan lag daṅ ñiṅ lag tsaṅ ba daṅ/ ma tshaṅ ba las gyur baḥi ḥgyur baḥi mi rtag pa ñid*). The Chinese accords with the unsupplemented Sanskrit expression.

[477] ŚrBh 478,6-11 (P. wi 217b7-218a3, T 1579 471c18-22): ... *pūrvam avikalāṅga<pratyaṅga>tā[a] dṛṣṭā bhavati; so 'pareṇa samayena vikalatām paśyati, rājato vā corato vā manuṣyato vā amanuṣyato vā* ...

[a] The Sanskrit has been supplemented in accordance with the Tibetan and Chinese.

[478] The Sanskrit has been supplemented with the help of the Chinese and Tibetan translation (P. wi 218b3and7): *graṅ ba daṅ/ dro ba las gyur baḥi ḥgyur paḥi mi rtag pa ñid*). The emendation here is also confirmed by the separate hand adding *śītoṣṇakṛtaḥ* on the manuscript (p. 474,15f).

[479] ŚrBh 479,6-16 (P. wi 218b3-8, T 1579 472a5-11): ... *śītakāle pratyupasthite aviśadakāyaṃ saṃkucitakāyaṃ śītaparyavasthānaparyavasthitam uṣṇābhilāṣaparigataṃ paśyati. uṣṇakāle vā punaḥ pratyupasthite [aviśadakāyaṃ saṃkucitakāyaṃ śītaparyavasthānaparyavasthita][a] viśadagātra<ṃ> prasvinnagātraṃ santaptagātraṃ ucch<u>ṣkava<d>anaṃ[b] tṛṣāparigataṃ śītasaṃsparśābhilāṣiṇaṃ*

[7] As for the transformation because of violence by others (ŚrBh: *paropakramakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), the changes of the body are meant brought about by the kicking and boxing of feet and hands, by the contact with gnats and gadflies,[480] and so on.[481]
[8] As for the transformation because of exhaustion (ŚrBh: *pariśramakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), the changes of bodily fatigue are meant, as caused by running, jumping, climbing, leaping[482] and so on.[483]

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paśyati.
The sixth and eighth transformation in the Hsien-yang are found in the ŚrBh in inversed order.

[a] The lack of the negations which are to be expected and the structure of the passage (*aviśadakāyaṃ* is, for instance, taken up already by *viśadagātraṃ*) leave little doubt that the text in brackets is to be elided as dittographic (note that both time *pratyupasthite* proceeds). Such an elision is supported by the Chinese translation.

[b] Shukla reads *ucchasyavacanaṃ*. The emendation here accords with the Tibetan (P. wi 181a5: *kha skam pa*, D. dzi 181b2: *kha skams pa*) though not with the manuscript. Cf. ŚrBh 483,5 where the reading *ucchuṣka* is attested.

[480] I read 蝱 (i.e. gadfly) with the Chung-hua Ts'ang-ching (中華藏經) edition and with the Zokuzōkyō edition. The corresponding character in the Taishō edition, which I could not identify, appears to be the same character written in a variant way.

[481] ŚrBh 478,17-479,5 (P. wi 218a7-b3, T 1579 471c28-472a5): ... *paropakrameṇa kāyavikṛtiṃ paśyati, tadyathā latābhir vā tāḍitasya kaśābhir vā vaitrair vā varatrābhir vā, tathā vividhair daṃśamaśakasarīsṛpasaṃsparśaiḥ. apareṇa samayena tāṃ vikṛtiṃ na paśyati.*

In the ŚrBh, explicit mention is made only of the change consisting in the disappearance of the injuries brought about by affliction from outside, that is, in transformation due to the process of healing. It is evident, however, that, as in the case of the transformations dealt with before, the preceding change from an unimpaired state to that of impairment (here by violence) is meant to be included. This is not only borne out by the expression used for the transformation under consideration, but also by the fact that according to the Hsien-yang the change consists in the injury of the body.

The fact that in the ŚrBh this substitution of the unimpaired state by that of being injured is not explicitly mentioned may account for the fact that the Hsien-yang does not set forth the transformation here explicitly in terms of the difference of earlier and later states as it does in most other cases.

[482] I have found 躑 only in the meaning of "embarrassed". In the Chinese translation of the ŚrBh this character is used in combination with 跳 to translate *laṃghayato* (i.e. to climb, leap). Hence, I surmise that it has the same meaning here and assume that the Hsien-yang has inverted the sequence *laṃghayato vā abhirohito vā* of the ŚrBh.

[483] ŚrBh 478,12-17 (P. wi 218a3-7, T 1579 471c23-28): ... *<pūrvaṃ>*[a] *śrāntakāyatāṃ klāntakāyatāṃ <paśyati>,*[b] *dhāvato vā plavato vā laṃghayato vā abhirohito vā vividham vā karma drutaṃ kurvataḥ. so 'pareṇa samayena vigataklamaśramatāṃ paśyati.*

As in the case of the preceding transformation because of violence by others, the ŚrBh does not make explicit mention of the change consisting in the fatigue caused by bodily strain, as it is done in the Hsien-yang, but only refers to the recuperation after having been exhausted. The same remarks as made with respect to the preceding transformation (with regard to both the ŚrBh and the Hsien-yang) also apply here.

[a] According to the Tibetan translation, but not according to the Chinese translation, *pūrvam* should be inserted. Given that *apareṇa samayena* is sometimes preceded by *pūrvam* (cf. *aṅgapratyaṅga<sākalyavaikalya>kṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*) and sometimes not (cf. *paropakramakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), it is impossible to determine the exact reading here.

[9] As for the transformation because of the bodily postures (ŚrBh: *īryāpathakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*),[484] the change is meant between hurting and easing that is [effected by] the successive alternation of the four bodily postures (*īryāpathavikalpa*) (i.e. walking, standing, sitting, lying).[485]

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[b] Supplemented in accordance with the Chinese and Tibetan translation.

[484] ŚrBh 479,17-480,2 (P. wi 218b8-219a3, T 1579 472a11-14): *sa punar*[a] *ātmano*[b] *vā pareṣām vā caṃkramasthānaniṣady<ā>śay<a>nair*[c] *īryāpathair anyatamānyatameneryāpathena ātmānam vā param v<opahayamānam>*[d] *paśyati. punas tenaiva[m]*[e] *ekadā anugṛhyamāṇam paśyati.*

[a] The reading *sa punar* is problematic, given that in the parallel sentences the ŚrBh reads *ihāyam* or, in case of a passive construction, *ihānena*. Neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese phraseology deviate from the standard pattern. Therefore, the manucript may be faulty at this point, and *ihāyam* should be read insted of *sa punar*.

[b] I adopt Shukla's suggestion to read *ātmano* instead of *adhyātmam*, because in the parallel passages the text reads invariably *ātmano* (or *ātmānam* or *ātmā*) instead of *adhyātmam*.

[c] Shukla: *°niṣadyaśayānair*

[d] As born out by the construction (cf. following phrase) and as confirmed by the Chinese and the Tibetan (... *gis gnod par mthoṅ la/*) translation, the Sanskrit needs to be supplemented here by *upahayamānam* or an equivalent expression.

[e] The change consists in the fact that the very bodily posture which at one time hurts (e.g. standing for a long time) eases at another time (e.g when standing after having been sitting for too long). Thus *eva* is the better reading (resulting in *tenaivaikadā*) than *evam* which hardly makes sense. This emendation is supported by the Tibetan (... *de dag ñid kyis*...).

[485] It seems that the Hsien-yang refers to the change brought about when the former hurting mode of deportment is exchanged with a new easing mode. By contrast, in the ŚrBh the change consists in the different effects one and the same posture has at different times. While a newly mode of deportment brings relief from the strain of the preceding mode, it in turn will eventually hurt when one has been abiding in it for too long. Similarly (cf. AKBh 330,21), the relief felt when shifting a burden from one shoulder to the other will soon give way to painful sensations due to the strain on the other shoulder.

The explanation of the ŚrBh accords with the AKBh where Vasubandhu argues that even seeming causes of happiness are in reality causes of suffering, because, if exposed to excessively (food, drink) or at the wrong time (cold, heat; cf. the transformation of cold and heat), they effect suffering. Vasubandhu then adds that the same argumentation also applies to bodily deportment, because the specific modes, too, will eventually effect suffering.[a]

As far as I can see, the explanation in the Hsien-yang is deficient insofar as it depicts the newly assumed posture as pleasant without communicating that this posture, too, is ultimately painful. Therefore, it is possible that the translation of Hsien-yang proposed above (because it matches the Chinese wording most closely) does not accord with the Sanskrit original and that Hsien-yang should in the light of ŚrBh be translated instead along the following lines: "As for the transformation because of the bodily posture, the change is meant that [one] alternative from among the four bodily postures, earlier and later respectively hurts and eases."

[a] AKBh 330,14-18: "For which [things] such as drink, food, cold or heat are considered to be causes of happiness, exactly they become causes of suffering when enjoyed too much and when enjoyed at the wrong time. But it is not possible that [a cause of happiness] generates suffering because it intensifies or because unchanged [it functions] at another time. Therefore, they (i.e. the supposed causes of happiness) are from the very beginning causes of suffering and not of happiness. But [only] at the end, when it has augmented, does this suffering [caused by them] become manifest. The [same argument] can also be pronounced with respect to the alternation of the posture." (*ya eva hi kecit pānabhojanaśītoṣṇādaya iṣyante sukhahetavas, ta eva atyupayuktā akālopayuktāś ca*[a] *punar duḥkhahetavaḥ*

[10] As for the transformation because of contact (ŚrBh: *sparśakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), the change of painful, pleasant etc. sensations due to the [corresponding] change in contact conducive to painful, pleasant etc. sensation is meant.[486]

[11] As for the transformation because of defilements (ŚrBh: *saṃkleśakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*),[487] the change is meant of being passionately aroused or of being confused due to both primary and secondary defilements, such as desire, hatred and so on, existing in the mind.[488]

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sampadyante. na ca yuktā sukhahetuvṛddhyā samena vānyasmin kāle duḥkhotpattir, ity ādita eva te duḥkhahetavo na sukhasya. ante tu tad duḥkhaṃ vṛddhim āpannaṃ vyaktim āpadyate. evam īryāpathavikalpe 'pi vaktavyam.)

Cf. AKVy 518,25-27: *evam īryāpathavikalpe 'pi vaktavyam iti "ya eve hi śayanādaya iṣyante sukhahetavas, ta eve"ti sarvaṃ yāvad "vyaktim apadyanta" iti vaktavyam.*

[a] Should *vā* be read instead of *ca*?

[486] ŚrBh 480,3-11 (P. wi 219a3-8, T 1579 472a15-22): *sukhavedanīyena sparśena spṛṣṭaḥ, sukhavedanīyaṃ sparśam pratītyotpannām sukhāṃ vedanāṃ vedayamānaḥ, sukhām vedanāvasthām paricchinatti. yathā sukhavedanāvasthā<m>, evaṃ duḥkhādu<ḥ>khāsukhavedanāvasthām.*[a] *tasya pūrvāparye[ṣa]ṇ[ām]āsāṃ*[b] *vedanānāṃ navanavatā<ṃ> niḥpurāṇapurāṇatām <āy>āpāyikatāṃ*[c] *tāvatkālikatām itvarapratyupasthāyit<ā>m anyathībhāvaṃ dṛṣṭvā ...*

In the Hsien-yang the change consists merely in the qualitative changes of sensations. In the ŚrBh also the numeric changes of qualitative equal sensations is addressed. The three types of sensations are envisaged separately one after another and their transience is contemplated upon.

[a] The manuscript reads *duḥkhāsukhāsukhavedanāvasthām*. The emendation is confirmed by the Chinese and Tibetan translation. Cf. also ŚrBh 476,7 quoted in n. 506.

[b] Cf. *pūrvāparyeṇa* in ŚrBh 480,17 (cited in n. 488).

[c] The emendation is confirmed by the Chinese and the Tibetan translation (*byuṅ nas ḥjig pa*). *āpāyika* would have made no sense in the present context dealing with the evanescence of feelings. In an analogous passage, ŚrBh 424,3f reads (so the manuscript) *āyāpāyika* (but not so ŚrBh 448,15 and 498,9f). Similar to the passage dealt with here, *āyāpāyika* has also been misread as *āpāyika* in MSABh 150,2. Also there the emendation is confirmed by the Tibetan translation (P. phi 255a8-b1). Cf. also the quotation in NA 534c11 (translated in n. 13) which is based on the reading *āyāpāyika* and not on the reading *āpāyika*.

[487] In the ŚrBh the *vipariṇāmānityatā* under consideration here is one time (480,12) referred to as *kleśakṛta* and one time as *saṃkleśakṛta* (480,20). In the Chinese (雜染) and the Tibetan translation (*kun nas ñon moṅs pa*), both times *saṃkleśa* is rendered. Furthermore, the Sanskrit reads *saṃkleśakṛta* (p. 474,16) when enumerating the fifteen forms of transformation for the first time. Therefore, I assume that the characterization of this transformation as *saṃkleśakṛta* is original.

On this basis, it could be held that in the Hsien-yang 染汚 translates *saṃkleśa*. For such a correspondence there is ample evidence (cf. e.g. the index to the MSABh by G. Nagao, Tokyo 1958). Hsüan-tsang, however, seems to translate *saṃkleśa* differently (As mentioned, in the corresponding passage of the ŚrBh, he translates *saṃkleśa* by 雜染; also in his translation of the AKBh [cf. index] he does not once translate *saṃkleśa* by 染汚). Hence, it is possible that in the Sanskrit original of the Hsien-yang the present transformation was referred to as *kleśakṛta* and not as *saṃkleśakṛta* — possibly because in the present context *saṃkleśa* can only refer to the *kleśas* ("defilment") and not to other factors.

[488] ŚrBh 480,12-21 (P. wi 219a8-219b5, T 1579 472a22-b1): *sarāgaṃ cittam utpannaṃ parijānāti, vigatarāgaṃ, sadveṣaṃ, vigatadveṣaṃ, samohaṃ, vigatamohaṃ, anyatamānyatamena vā upakleśenopakliṣṭaṃ cittam "upakliṣṭam" iti parijānāti. anupakliṣṭam vā punar "anupakliṣṭam" iti parijānāti. tasya pūrvāparyeṇaibhiḥ kleśopakleśair avadīrṇavipariṇatāvipariṇatāṃ saṃtatiṃ dṛṣṭvā ...*

[12] As for the transformation because of illness (ŚrBh: *vyādhikṛta vipariṇāmānityatā*), the change regarding the body is meant, namely that earlier it is free from illness and suffering, while later it is tormented by severe illness.[489]

[13] As for the transformation of dying (ŚrBh: *maraṇakṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), the change between earlier and later is meant, namely that earlier [the body] is still endowed with life (*āyus*) while later it is devoid of consciousness.[490]

[14] As for the transformation of [turning] blue etc. (ŚrBh: *vinīlakādikṛtā vipariṇāmānityatā*), the change is meant that after the end of life corporeal matter [turns] blue, becomes putrid, and so on[491] until it is [but] an chain of bones (i.e. a skeleton).[492]

[15] As for the transformation of disappearing [to the extent] of becoming utterly invisible (ŚrBh: *sarveṇa sarvam asaṃprakhyānaparikṣayakṛtā*[493] *vipariṇāmānityatā*), the change is meant that [corporeal matter reduced to] the state of a skeleton burns, breaks up, is scattered so that it becomes in all aspects utterly invisible.[494]

As follows from the ŚrBh, "confusion" (亂) in the Hsien-yang will comprise both hatred (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*). Contrary to the Hsien-yang, the ŚrBh envisages not only the change of becoming passionately aroused (*avadīrṇa*) and of becoming corrupted (*vipariṇata*) by hatred and delusion, but also the reversal of this change.

[489] ŚrBh 480,22-481,12 (P. wi 219b5-220a1, T 1579 472b1-7): *ihānenaikadātmā ca pare ca dṛṣṭ[v]ā bhavanty aroginaḥ sukhino balavantaḥ; so 'pareṇa samayena paśyaty ātmānaṃ vā paraṃ vā ābādhikaṃ duḥkhitaṃ bāḍhaglānaṃ spṛṣṭaṃ śārīrikābhir vedanābhiḥ duḥkhābhir tīvrābhiḥ.*[a] *sa punar apareṇa samayena paśyaty aroginaṃ sukhitaṃ balavantam ...*

[a] The text 481,6-9 has been elided here because it is clearly (cf. the Tibetan and Chinese translation) dittographic.

[490] ŚrBh 481,13-17 (P. wi 220a1-4, T 1579 472b7-11): *ihāyaṃ* <*pūrvaṃ?*>[a] *jīvitaṃ*[b] *paśyati dhriyantaṃ tiṣṭhantaṃ yāpayantam; so 'pareṇa samayena mṛtaṃ kālagataṃ paśyati vijñānaśūnyaṃ kalevaraṃ ...*
The absence of consciousness entails death, insofar as consciousness, as it is understood here, functions as the animating principle.

[a] According to the Tibetan translation *pūrvam* should be inserted. The Chinese translation reads "at the present time" which cannot be the translation of the recurring *iha* since it only occurs here. As before (n. 483), it is impossible to determine the exact reading here.

[b] In accordance with the other attributes, *jīvantaṃ* would be the better reading.

[491] Since the further decomposition of the body after it has disintegrated into a pile of bones is dealt with subsequently, 等 (= "and so on") should, despite its position, refer to the states which the corpse assumes after it has become putrid and before it is reduced to bones.

[492] ŚrBh 481,18-482,1 (P. wi 220a4-8, T 1579 472b11-15): *sa tad eva mṛtakalevaraṃ vinīlakāvastham ekadā paśyati, ekadā vipūyakāvastham evaṃ*[a] *vistareṇa yāva*<*d a*>*sthiśaṃkalikāvastham ...*

[a] As confirmed by the Tibetan and Chinese translation, the reading *enam* of the manuscript must be wrong.

[493] The adverbial qualification *sarveṇa sarvam*, which is missing in the Sanskrit on p. 482,2 (but can be found on p. 474,18), is confirmed by the Tibetan and Chinese translation. Likewise the reading *asaṃprakhyāna* instead of *asaṃkhyāna* is confirmed on p. 474,18.

[494] ŚrBh 482,2-9 (P. wi 220a8-b3, T 1579 472b15-19): *so 'pareṇa samayena tām apy asthiśaṃkalikāvasthāṃ*[a] *na paśyati; sarveṇa sarvaṃ naṣṭā bhavati vidhvastā viśīrṇā sarveṇa sarvaṃ cakṣuṣo*

The most striking feature of the treatment of the various forms of transformation in the ŚrBh is that they do not refer to the processes of transformation as such, but only to the alternation between specific states which result from these processes. In other words, attention is called only to the fact that a particular state is impermanent, because at a later stage it is seen to be replaced by a different state. This is clearly evinced by the fact that, wherever possible, the ŚrBh not only points to the change resulting from a specific process of transformation, but also to the reversal of this change due to the opposite process. In this way, not only the impermanence of the original state, but also of the state resulting from the transformation is addressed. Thus the fluctuation of these states is highlighted. In the case of illness, for instance, attention is not paid to the process of the deterioration of health on account of illness, but to the fact that the state of health is impermanent because sooner or later it is replaced by a state of illness. In this context, it is emphasized that this state, too, is impermanent, because it will be replaced by a state of health once the afflicted person has recovered from the illness. Also in the case of bodily shape, of thriving, of decline and even in the case of surface appearance, not only the replacement of the former positive state (being fat, thriving, having a shining skin) by a negative state (being emaciated, deterioration, having shrivelled skin), but also the subsequent reversal of this replacement is addressed. For factual reasons, no such reversal is admitted in the case of the transformation of the stage of life, of mutilation, of death, of turning blue and so on, of becoming utterly invisible and of disappearing. In the case of transformation due to violence and exhaustion, the initial impairment is not explicitly addressed at all and reference is - rather surprisingly - only made to the change implied by the subsequent recuperation. In the case of the transformations because of cold and heat, because of bodily posture and because of touch and probably also in the case of the transformation because of defilement, the fluctuation between different states is naturally given.

Basically, the Hsien-yang follows this approach of the ŚrBh and likewise emphasizes the alteration of states without referring to the underlying processes themselves. It points, however, only to the replacement of one change by another and does not address the reversal of this replacement. Moreover, it is not as consistent in its treatment as the ŚrBh is. In particular, the transformation relating to thriving and decline is re-interpreted as referring to the process and not to the change of states.

That the ŚrBh and the Hsien-yang emphasize the impermanence of states, rather than the transformation which accounts for this impermanence, reflects the stance that any

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'nābhāsagatā; ...

[a] The emendation of the reading *avasthānaṃ* is only suggested tentatively in accordance with the case ending of *tām*, *naṣṭā* etc. It fits into the context, because here the observation of the decomposition of the corpse is continued. Thus *apareṇa samayena* (i.e. "at another time") should refer to a point of time after the body had been reduced to a pile of bones. The emendation cannot be corroborated by the Tibetan and Chinese translation where the two sentences in the Sanskrit are fused to one sentence, which may be roughly reconstructed along the following lines: *so 'pareṇa samayena tām apy asthiśaṃkalikāvasthāṃ paśyati sarveṇa sarvaṃ naṣṭāṃ vidhvastāṃ viśīrṇāṃ sarveṇa sarvaṃ cakṣuṣo 'nābhāsagatāṃ*. (cf. the Tibetan translation: *des dus gźan gyi tshe na/ rus paḥi keṅ rus kyi* gnas skabs de ñid kyaṅ thams cad kyi thams cad du źigs śiṅ źu ste/ mi snaṅ ba thams cad kyi thams cad du mig sṅar mi snaṅ bar mthoṅ ste/* * So D. dzi 183a2; P. reads *kyis*).

qualitative change implies substitution, because there is no abiding substance that could underlie transformation and account for the identity of the concerned entity before and after change. It follows, moreover, from the context. For both texts deal with the anityatā *entailed by transformation (cf. the recurring term* vipariṇāmānityatā *in the ŚrBh). Thus they focus on the impermanence of those states that are terminated by change, and not on the process of transformation as such. In the ŚrBh this process is envisaged after the treatment of the various forms of transformations. There it is analyzed in terms of momentariness (cf. n. 190).*

§ 1.5.2.2 Eight conditions for transformation (548b16-c1)

And these fifteen kinds of transformations result from the connection with eight conditions. As for the eight conditions, they are 1) being stored [at the same spot] for a long time (*kālaparivāsa*),[495] 2) violence by others (*paropakrama*), 3) waste by being used (*upabhoga*), 4) change of season (*ṛtuvipariṇāma*),[496] 5) being burnt by fire (*agnidāha*), 6) destruction by water (*udakakleda*), 7) scorching by wind (*vāyuśoṣa*), 8) encountering[497] other conditions (*pratyayāntarasamudgama*).[498]

[1] As for being stored [at the same spot] for a long time, it is meant that because of the length of time having passed, material entities (*dharma*) not removed from their original spot decay by themselves.[499]

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495 The Hsien-yang does not accord literally with *kālaparivāsa* (i.e. staying for a [long] time) of the Sanskrit version of the ŚrBh. The deviation may, however, be only due to the Chinese translation and not reflect a difference in the original, since the Chinese translation of the ŚrBh is identical with the Hsien-yang.

496 The Sanskrit term *ṛtuvipariṇāma* taken from the ŚrBh does not match the precise wording in the Hsien-yang.

497 The present condition for transformation is referred to as *pratyayāntarasaṃgati* in 475,2 and as *pratyayāntarsamudgama* in 476,4. I have reproduced the former term because I have found no evidence (Petersburger Wörterbuch, BHSD, MW, AK-Index) that *samud√gam* may mean "to meet," "to be united with."

498 In MSABh 153,25-29 (see n. 367 where this passage is cited) the momentariness of earth (*pṛthivī*) is proved on the basis that it is subject to four kinds of transformation, viz. to the transformation 1) caused by the karma of sentient beings (*karmakṛta*, the quality of the earth depends upon the karma of the sentient beings inhabiting it; cf. SAVBh P. tsi 815a7-b3), 2) caused by violence (*upakramakṛta*) brought about by agriculture, mining etc. (cf. SAVBh P. tsi 185b3f), 3) caused by the elements (*bhūtakṛta*, i.e. by fire, water, wind), 4) caused by the passing of time (*kālakṛta*). As will be seen, three of these four kinds of transformation correspond to five of the eight conditions of transformation espoused here in the Hsien-yang and in the ŚrBh, viz. the second kind corresponds to the second condition, the third kind to the fifth, sixth and seventh condition, the fourth kind to the first condition. According to Sthiramati (SAVBh 185b7f; this is not confirmed by Asvabhāva), the transformation brought about by the passing of time also refers to seasonal change, so that the fourth kind of transformation in the MSABh would correspond to the first and fourth condition in the ŚrBh and Hsien-yang.

499 ŚrBh 475,3-5 (P. wi 216a3f, T 1579 471b10-12): *tatra kālaparivāso nāma yeṣām(?)*[a] *bhāvānāṃ rūpiṇāṃ svasthāne*[b] *'py upanyastakānāṃ kālāntareṇa jarjaratopalabhyate jīrṇatā rūpavikṛtiḥ.*

[a] Possibly, *yathāpi tat* should be read instead of *yeṣām*, or in addition to it. Note that in the Tibetan

[2] As for violence by others, it is meant that there is change between earlier and later (viz. first the subject of change is not impaired, then it is damaged), which is caused and conditioned by various kinds of assaults.[500]

[3] As for decrease by being used, it is meant that the various objects of enjoyment change insofar as, being consumed and employed by each subject disposing [over them], they waste away.[501]

[4] As for the change of season, it is meant that [depending upon whether] in is winter it is cold and there is snow, [or whether] in summer it is hot and there is rain, trees, herbs and grasses either thrive or wither.[502]

[5] As for being burnt by fire, it is meant that when fires breaks out, kingdoms, towns, villages or hamlets are reduced to ashes.[503]

[6] As for destruction by water, it is meant that great [masses of] water overflow villages, towns, dwellings which are all together drowned.[504]

[7] As for scorching by wind, it is meant that when there is a mighty wind whirling and swelling, damp clothes and the wet soil are quickly dried up.[505]

[8] As for encountering other conditions, it is meant that in a person with much desire, at a time when the conditions for hatred are encountered, the outburst (*paryavasthāna*) of desire stops and an outburst of hatred commences. With respect to someone with much hatred or much delusion, the encounter with the conditions for another defilement should be known likewise. With respect to perceptions, the immediate presence of a different object is likewise.[506]

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translation both *yeṣāṃ* and *yathāpi* are rendered.

[b] The Chinese and Tibetan translations render *susthāna*, whereas the Hsien-yang translates *mūlasthāna* which I take in the given context to be equivalent to *svasthāna*.

[500] ŚrBh 475,6-8 (P. wi 216a4f, T 1579 471b12-14): *tatra paropakramo nāma yathāpi tat paro vividhāni rūpāṇi vividhaiḥ praharaṇaiḥ vividhair upakramaviśeṣaiḥ vicitrāṃ vikṛtim āpādayati.*

[501] ŚrBh 475,9-11 (P. wi 216a5f, T 1579 471b14f): *tatropabhogo nāma yathāpi tat pratisvāmino*[a] *vividhaṃ rūpam upabhuṃjānā upabhoga<m a>dhipati<ṃ kṛ>tvā <vi>kṛtim āpādayanti.*

[502] ŚrBh 475,12-16 (P. wi 216a6-8, T 1579 471b15-17): *tatra ṛtuvipariṇāmo nāma tadyathā hemante tṛṣṇauṣadhivanaspatīnāṃ pāṇḍutvaṃ śīrṇatvaṃ prajāyate. grīṣmavarṣāsu punaḥ saṃpūrṇatvaṃ haritatā ca; tathā phalasamṛddhiḥ puṣpasamṛddhiḥ patrasamṛddhiḥ vipattiś ca teṣām eva.*

Cf. Vi 840b24-c17 where, in the context of the notion of death (*maraṇasaṃjñā*), the effect of seasonal change on the vegetation and living beings is explicated.

[503] ŚrBh 475,17f (P. wi 216a8, T 1579 471b17-19): *tatrāgnidāho nāma yathāpi tad agnir mukto grāmanigamarāṣṭrarājadhānīr dahan paraiti .*

[504] ŚrBh 475,19-22 (P. wi 216, T 1579 471b): *tatrodakakleda nāma yathāpi tan mahān udaka-skandhaḥ samudāgato grāmanigamarāṣṭrarājadhāṇī<ḥ>*[a] *plāvayan paraiti.*

[a] I have emended the reading *grāmanigamarājarāṣṭradhāṇī<ḥ>* in accordance with the preceding sentence. This emendation is confirmed by the Tibetan and Chinese translation.

[505] ŚrBh 476,1-3 (P. wi 216b1f, T 1579 471b20f): *tatra vāyuśoṣo nāma yathāpi tan mahatā vāyuskandhenārdrāḥ pṛthivīpradeśā laghu laghv eva śuṣyanti; tathārdrāṇi vastrāṇy*[a] *ārdrāḥ sasyajātayaḥ.*

[a] Shukla reads with the manuscript *vastūny*. The emendation of this reading is confirmed by the Tibetan (*gos*) and Chinese translation, and accords with the Hsien-yang.

[506] ŚrBh 476,4-16 (P. wi 216b2-8, T 1579 471b21-28): *<tatra>*[a] *pratyayāntarasanudgamo nāma*

§ 1.6 (resumed) **Sphere of occurrence of the different kinds of *anityatā*** (commentary) (548c1-4)

The meanings of *anityatā* are all without exception given in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*). In the realm of matter (*rūpadhātu*), [the meanings of *anityatā* are given] with the exception of three kinds of *anityatā*, namely those consisting in illness and in age and that affecting the objects of enjoyment; moreover, [in this sphere only] three kinds of transformations, namely those by touch, by defilement (*kleśa*) and by death are given. With the sole exception of the kind [of *anityatā*] afflicting the insentient world, the meanings of *anityatā* are to be understood for the non-material realm (*arūpadhātu*) in the same way as they are pointed out for the realm of matter (*rūpadhātu*).[507]

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tadyathā sukhavedanīyaṃ sparśaṃ pratītya sukhāṃ vedanāṃ vedayamānasya <*duḥ*>*khavedanīya[ḥ]sparśasamudgamaḥ;*[b] *evaṃ* <*duḥkhavedanīyaṃ sparśaṃ pratītya*>[c] *duḥkhāṃ vedanāṃ vedayamānasya sukhavedanīya[ḥ]sparśasamudgamaḥ;* <*aduḥkhāsukhavedanīyaṃ sparśaṃ pratītya*>[c] *aduḥkhāsukhāṃ vedanāṃ vedayamānasya sukhavedanīyasya vā duḥkhavedanīyasya vā sparśasya samudgamaḥ. tathā raktasya pratighanimittasamudgamaḥ, yasya samudgamād rāgaparyavasthānaṃ ca vigacchati pratighaparyavasthānaṃ cotpadyate; evaṃ dviṣṭasya mūḍhasya visabhāga[ḥ]kleśotpattinimitta[ḥ]samudgamo veditavyaḥ. ta[dya]thā*[d] *cakṣurvijñāne saṃmukhībhūte śabdaviṣayasamudgamaḥ[,] gandharasaspraṣṭavya[ḥ]dharmanimittasamudgamo*<,> *yena viṣayāntareṇa visabhāgāni* <*vi*>*jñāny*[e] *utpadyante.*

In the ŚrBh not only the change of defilements and perceptions, but also the change of feelings is addressed as being brought about by the encounter with new conditions.

[a] Addition confirmed by the Tibetan translation.

[b] Shukla reads with the manuscript *sukhavedanīya*. However, the text deals with the change of feeling on account of changed contact (cf. the transformation because of contact and the subsequent treatment of the defilements here). Hence *duḥkhavedanīya* has to be read. The emendation is confirmed by the Tibetan and Chinese translation.

[c] The text was supplemented according to the Tibetan and Chinese translation. It is conceivable that the supplemented passages were only added to the text by the Chinese and Tibetan translator, and were always missing in the Sanskrit original.

[d] The reading *tadyathā* is confirmed by the manuscript and the Tibetan translation. I have followed the Chinese translator who, as in the preceding sentence (*tathā raktasya* ...), renders *tathā* (and not *tadyathā*).

[e] The manuscript reads *visabhāgāni jñāny*. The addition is confirmed by the Chinese and Tibetan translation.

[507] It is noteworthy that three specific forms of transformation are taught to occur in the realm of matter, which implies that the other forms of transformations are excluded. Thus the occurrence of the third of the six forms of *anityatā*, namely the *anityatā* consisting in transformation is qualified here. It could then be argued that also the other five forms of *anityatā* are considered here but not mentioned explicitly, because they occur in all realms of existence. Obviously, this will indeed be the case for the *anityatā* consisting in the non-existence of an own-being and consisting in destruction. It should also apply to the *anityatā* being experienced immediately and to the *anityatā* to come in the future, because it is difficult to see on which grounds they should be excluded from the higher realms. Furthermore, it can also be maintained for the *anityatā* of separation, insofar as the loss of status and the separation from beloved ones also occur in the non-material realm. On the other hand, the previous qualification to which kind of entities the various forms of *anityatā* extend (appendix, § 1.3) clearly took not account of the six forms of *anityatā*. Therefore, it is not clear whether reference is made here only to the list of eight forms of *anityatā*, or whether the treatment also has in view the list of six *anityatās*.

§ 1.7 Comprehension of the different kinds of *anityatā* by the three characteristics (*trilakṣaṇa*) (548c4-9)

The *kārikā* says:

> The imagined [characteristic] (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*) is impermanent (*anitya*) in the sense of the non-existence of an own-being. The [characteristic of] dependent origination (*paratantralakṣaṇa*) should be known [to be impermanent (*anitya*)] in the sense of the remaining forms of *anityatā*.(kā 5)

The treatise says: The meaning of *anityatā* compised by [the *anityatā* in] the sense of the non-existence of an own-being should be known as subsumed under the imagined characteristic (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*).[508] The remaining meanings of *anityatā* are subsumed under the characteristic of dependent origination (*paratantralakṣaṇa*). Regarding the perfect characteristic (*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*), none of the meanings of *anityatā* applies.
In this way, the various meanings of *anityatā* and their subsumption under the three characteristics have been set forth.

> *The Yogācāras' treatment of* anityatā *on the basis of the trisvabhāva-doctrine has been analyzed in § I.D.2.3*

§ 1.8 *anityatā* and *duḥkhatā* (548c9-18)

Furthermore, as the Lord has declared: "All that is impermanent is unsatisfactory (*duḥkha*)." What is the object [of this teaching]? The *kārikā* says:

> All that is impermanent is unsatisfactory, because it is intermingled with all [kinds of] suffering. When the fool deluded with regard to the true nature (*dharmatā*) encounters [impermanence], he is afflicted by it [because] he does not understand [what is permanent and what impermanent]. (kā 6)

The treatise says: As regards the impermanent that is intermingled with badness (*dauṣṭhulya*),[509] its impermanence [entails that it] is unsatisfactory in the sense of the intrinsic unsatisfactoriness of conditioned factors (*saṃskāraduḥkhatā*), and [that it] is unsatisfactory in the sense of being the basis of unsatisfactoriness due to change (*vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā*) [and of unsatisfactoriness due to suffering (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*)].[510] Hence [the entities constituting]

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[508] By the term *saṃgṛhīta* (i.e. subsumed), the extension of two (or more) different schemes of classification are correlated. Here it is specified that impermanence in the sense of non-existence refers to the imagined characteristic, whereas it refers in all other meanings to conditioned entities insofar as these entities are characterized by being originated in dependence upon other factors.

[509] I adopt the variant reading (i.e. 苦 instead of 若) in the Taishō edition. Cf. the wording of the *kārikā*.

[510] The text only reads *vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā* and does not mention *duḥkhaduḥkatā* as one would expect in this context. I presume that this is due to a scribal error. Such an error may have been prompted by the sequence of three 苦 when translating *vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā-duḥkhaduḥkhatā*. I think it is unlikely that such a scribal error will already have occurred in the Sanskrit original, because, given the coherency

the Truth of the Path (*mārgasatya*; i.e. the factors leading to emancipation) are not unsatisfactory because [impermanence in their case] means impermanence which is not intermingled with the [three] forms of unsatisfactoriness.[511]
The fools, who are deluded with regard to the true nature of *dharmas* (*dharmatā*), cannot discern the meaning of permanence and impermanence and hence are afflicted by having encountered the immediately present impermanence (**prāpta*(?)*saṃnihitānityatayā*).[512]

§ 2 Proof of Momentariness (548c18-549b21)

§ 2.1 Introduction (548c19-24)

Before (548a17) it was said that the *anityatā* of the moment extends to all [bases] (*āyatana*). This form of *anityatā* is in the common world (*loke*) not witnessed by perception.. Therefore, it has to be established. The *kārikā* says:

> Because they (i.e. all *āyatanas*, more precisely the entirety of *saṃskāras* constituting them) are the product of the mind, [because] as soon as having originated they perish on their own account [and because] at the end change can be perceived, they should be known to perish every moment.(kā 7)[513]

Hsüan-tsang's translations usually have, it is improbable that he would have translated the text without emending it.

[511] Those impermanent factors that are intermingled with *dauṣṭhulya* are unsatisfactory (*duḥkha*) for two reasons, namely because of the essential unsatisfactoriness inhering in conditioned entities (*saṃskāraduḥkhatā*) and because they constitute the factual basis for suffering on account of change or due to painfulness. The latter is to be understood in the sense that the entities concerned are not themselves unpleasant (this only applies to very few factors), but form the basis for suffering. In other sources, the *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* is frequently equated with *dauṣṭhulya* without adding that the *saṃskāras* intermingled with *dauṣṭhulya* are also unsatisfactory in this sense.[a] Because the factors constituting the Truth of the Path are not affected by *dauṣṭhulya*, they are, despite their impermanence, not unsatisfactory in any sense. In other words, in the Hsien-yang the basis for the unsatifactoriness of conditioned factors is no longer their impermanence (as it was in the Nikāyas/Āgamas and as it indeed is in the canonic citation serving as a starting point for the present duscussion), but their badness (*dauṣṭhulya*). Thus, it is avoided that even those factors that constitute the emancipation from *saṃsāra* are unsatisfactory (cf. L. Schmithausen: "Zur Buddhistischen Lehre von der dreifachen Leidhaftigkeit." In: *ZDMG* Supplement III,2, 1977, pp. 918-931).

[a] E.g. AS 37,21f (cf. Schmithausen 1987, n. 461), MAVBh 50,9f, Y 26,16f (cf. Schmithausen 1987, n. 469). On the other hand in Y_T P. zi 169a3-5 (Schmithausen 1987, n. 459) it is stated, similarly to the Hsien-yang, that the five *upādānaskandhas* (i.e. the five groups of factors consituting the sentient being to which one clings) are suffering not only in the sense of *samskāraduḥkhatā*, but also in the sense that they form the basis for *duḥkhaduḥkhatā* and *vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā* (cf. also ŚrBh 255,2ff and 490,5ff).

[512] Despite the difference of expression,[a] this form of *anityatā* is clearly identical with the fifth of the list of six *anityatās* enumerated above. As follows from the explanation of this *anityatā* in the ASBh, VinSg and ŚrBh (see n. 460), it refers to the *anityatā* perceived immediately in front of one's eyes.

[a] Note that the rendering of *saṃnihitākāra* in the Chinese translation of the AS(Bh) (T 1605 674c5, T 1606 720a6 and a15f) corresponds to the translation of *saṃnihitānityatā* at this point in the Hsien-yang.

[513] Literally, both *kārikā* and treatise set forth that because the *saṃskāras* are produced by the mind they a) perish on their own account, b) change can be perceived at the end and c) they are momentary.

The treatise says: Because all those conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are the product of the mind, [because] as soon as their own-being (i.e. they themselves) has originated they perish on their own account, [and because] at the end change can be perceived, they should be known to be momentary.

§ 2.2 Proof on the Basis of the Momentariness of the Mind (548c24-549a7)

Whence should one know that all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are the product of the mind (*cittaphala*)? The *kārikā* says:

> [Because of] logical reasoning (*yukti*) [that refers to] the dominance of the impressions (*vāsanā*) in the mind, [that refers to] the power of [the mind abiding in] absorption (*samādhi*) to transform [the *saṃskāras*, and that refers to] the origination of meditative images, as well as because of three forms of Noble Teaching, [all *saṃskāras* should be known to be the product of the mind]. (kā 8)[514]

The treatise says: Due to logical reasoning (*yukti*) and on account of authoritative teaching (*āgama*) it is known by proof that all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) have the nature to be the product of the mind.

As for logical reasoning, [the following] is said: Good and bad factors (*dharma*) impregnate (*vāsayanti*) the mind. By force of the dominance of the impressions (*vāsanā*) in the mind, the *saṃskāras* get to originate. And with those whose mind has been purified by discarding the obstructions to absorption (*samādhi*), all *saṃskāras* change in accordance with [their] mind; [that is,] due to the power of their willful concentration (*adhimokṣa*), [the *saṃskāras*] change in various ways. Moreover, due to the power of the mind [abiding] in absorption (*samādhi*), meditative images (*pratibimba*) originate at will as the object of [this] mind [abiding] in absorption (*samādhi*). This is called the logical reasoning.

As for the Noble Teaching, this refers to three statements of the Noble [Teaching]. As it is said in the sūtra: "The mind leads the world; [the world] is restrained by the power of the mind; having arisen in accordance with the mind, everything continues to exist under its dominance."[515] And it is said [in the sūtra]: "Therefore, oh monks, well concentrated and

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However, in the following it becomes obvious that the Hsien-yang at this point introduces the three main arguments for the momentariness of all *saṃskāras*. The sequence of these arguments is identical in AS 41,8-13 where the proof of momentariness is first based on the dependence of matter upon mind, then on the spontaneity of destruction and thereafter on the subjection of conditioned entities to gradual transformation processes.

[514] For a detailed discussion of this argumentation, as well as for parallels in other Yogācāra texts, see chapter II.B (in particular the table on p. 124), where parts of the text translated at this point have, for convenience sake, been cited already.

[515] This quotation is in verse form. Cf.
— SN I 39,8-11 (Cf. T 99 264a23-27 and T 100 459b11-15):
kenassu nīyati loko// kenassu parikissati//
kissassa ekadhamassa// sabbeva vasam anvagū ti// //
cittena nīyati loko// cittena parikissati//
cittassa ekadhamassa// sabbeva vasam anvagū ti// //

according to the right method you should view the mind" and so on (*iti vistareṇa*).[516] And it is said [in the sūtra]: "Oh monks, you should know that when it is said 'master of the town,' then this is the entire group of consciousness (*vijñānaskandha*) insofar as it is endowed with grasping (*sopadāna*)."[517] This is called the Noble Teaching.

§ 2.3 Proof of the momentariness on the basis of their spontaneous destruction (549a7-b12)

§ 2.3.1 Four arguments adduced (549a7-17)

Question: The reasoning that all those conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) perish on their own account, how is it to be known? Answer: On the grounds of four reasons.
The stanza says:

> Because [1] of the incompatibility of a cause of origination [with destruction], because [2] neither a cause of duration [3] nor of destruction exists [and] because [4] the fault of eternity [would ensue if the *saṃskāras*] abided by themselves, one should know that they perish on their own account. (kā 9)[518]

The explication says: [1] It is not the case that their cause of origination (*utpādahetu*) can destroy the *saṃskāras*, because the two aspects of origination and destruction are mutually exclusive.
[2] Furthermore, there is no cause of duration (*sthitihetu*) causing the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) to abide. If it necessarily had to exist, then eternal duration would result.
[3] Since the *saṃskāras* do not abide, what should be the purpose of a cause for destruction (*vināśahetu*).[519] Moreover, nor can something other (i.e. than the cause of origination) that has the nature to be the cause of destruction be apprehended.
[4] If the *saṃskāras* endured by themselves once they have arisen, the great fault would result

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— AKVy 95,22f: *cittena nīyate lokaś cittena parikṛṣyate/ ekadharmasya cittasya sarvadharmā vaśānugā//* — MSABh 151,6-8 cited in n. 301.

[516] By exhorting the monks to concentrate on the mind, the quotation emphasizes the importance of the mind and thereby implies its pre-eminence over matter.

[517] Cf. SN IV 195,3f: *nagarasāmīti kho bhikkhu viññaṇassetam adhivacanam.*
By this comparison, the superiority of consciousness over the other *skandhas*, notably the *rūpaskandha* (i.e. the group of material factors) is asserted.

[518] Hayashima (1989b, p. 21) takes this argumentation to refer specifically to the doctrine of the marks of conditioned entities (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*). For all I can see, there is no reason to assume here (or, for that matter, in the matching passages in the MSABh and VinSg) that the cause of origination, which is refuted to function as a cause of destruction, should be the mark of origination (*jātilakṣaṇa*). Nor do I find it plausible that the cause of duration and of destruction which are said not to exist should correspond to the mark of duration (*sthitilakṣaṇa*) and to the mark of destruction (*vināśalakṣaṇa*). The possibility that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* functions as the cause of destruction is, by contrast, only refuted further on (appendix, § 2.3.3), while the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* as such are dealt with in a different context towards the end of the fourth chapter (550c15-21 cited in n. 141).

[519] Cf. AKBh 79,2f: *nivṛttakāritrāyāṃ khalv api sthitau te* (= *jarā* and *anityatā*) *cāpi na tiṣṭhataḥ sa cāpi dharma iti kathaṃ kutra vā kāritraṃ kartum utsahiṣyete, kiṃ vā punas tābhyāṃ kartavyam.*

that they should endure for ever.[520]

Because thus there equally (並) ensue faults, if [it is assumed that] there were causes of duration and of destruction or if [it is assumed that the *saṃskāras*] endured by themselves, it has to be known that all *saṃskāras* perish on their own account.[521]

§ 2.3.2 Clarification of the function of supposed causes of destruction

(549a17-25)

The *kārikā* says:

> It is not the case that water, fire or wind destroy, for they originate and perish together [with the things they supposedly destroy]. Having perished in conjunction with those [things], they (i.e. water and so on) [act as] causes for the origination [of those things] as other, transformed [entities].

The treatise says: If [it is objected that] water, fire or wind are causes for destruction, then this does not accord with reason because they originate and perish together [with the things they supposedly destroy]. If that water and so on were causes for destruction, the things rotting, burning or being scorched should not, after the earlier [section of the] continuum [constituting them] has been destroyed, originate again as a changed continuum. Why that? Because it does not accord with reason that the very cause for non-existence functions as the cause for existence. Rather, water, fire or wind function at the time when they perish, together with the things rotting and so on, as the cause that those things originate afterwards in changed form. Besides this capacity, water and so on do not have any other power over those [things].[522]

§ 2.3.3 The mark of destruction ruled out as cause of destruction (549a25-b12)

Further, if it is assumed that the mark of destruction (*vināśalakṣaṇa*) functions as the cause of destruction,[523] does this destroying mark exist simultaneously with the entity (*dharma*)

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[520] As confirmed by the Chung-hua Ts'ang-ching (中華藏經) edition (text 621, vol. 28, 543c13) and the Zokuzōkyō edition (Vol. 21, chapter 14, p. 60b14), the sequence of the characters 則 and 住 has been inverted in the Taishō-edition.

[521] This argumentation is analyzed in § II.D.2, where also the matching passages from the other Yogācāra works (viz. MSABh 149,27-39 and 150,5-11, ASBh 53,5-9 and VinSg P. zi 58a4-6 which corresponds most closely to the Hsien-yang) and from the AKBh (193,5-10) are cited.

[522] Cf. § II.D.2.4 where this line of reasoning as well as the matching passages in the other Yogācāra sources (ŚrBh 486,1-12, MSABh 150,9-16 and VinSg P. zi 58b6f which again corresponds most closely to the Hsien-yang) and in the AKBh (194,1-12) are examined.

[523] In § 2.3.3 the theory is refuted that each impermanent entity is endowed with its own *vināśalakṣaṇa* (lit. mark of destruction) which, as an entity in its own rights, effects the destruction of the entity it is attached to (cf. § I.C.3.2.2). The conception of the *vināśalakṣaṇa* is demonstrated to be inconsistent by establishing three pairs of exhaustive alternatives (viz. to exist together with the entity correlated [or with the effected destruction] or not; to be itself subject to destruction or not [or to have the nature of destruction or not]; to function on its own or not) and by demonstrating for each pair of these alternatives that either way unacceptable consequences ensue. Besides, the *vināśalakṣaṇa* is rejected

to be destroyed or not? If so what is the fault? The stanza says:

> [If they were simultaneous there would be] contradiction [between them]; [if they were not simultaneous there would be] the severance of the continuum.
> [If the supposed mark of destruction had destruction as its own-being,] two marks would result[, and if not,] there would be no mark [at all].
> It is at odds with ordinary observation [that the mark of destruction functions as the cause of destruction].
> [If the mark of destruction effected destruction on its own] the entity (*dharma*) would not exist [whenever the mark of destruction was there]. And [if it effected destruction in dependence upon something else, that] other [thing] would be the cause [of destruction].

The explication says: If that mark of destruction existed simultaneously with the entity (*dharma*) to be destroyed, then this would not be reasonable because there would be the fault of the contradiction [between the existence of the *dharma* and of the corresponding mark of destruction]. Nor would it be reasonable if it did not exist simultaneously, because there would be the fault that the continuum is cut off.[524]

The first pair of alternatives may be taken (as it has been done in the translation proposed here) to envisage the question whether the vināśalakṣaṇa *exists simultaneously with the entity it is attached to or not. According to this interpretation, their simultaneity is ruled*

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on the grounds that it is not observed. The function of the *vināśalakṣaṇa* as a cause of destruction is also refuted in the KSi (P. si 158a2-4 and 158b1-4 =Muroji 7,10 - 8,5 and 9,12-20), in AKBh 79,11-15 (cited in n. 113), in BoBh$_{W}$ 279,25-280,6 (cited in n. 115) and in VinSg P. zi 58a7-b3 (D. źi 55a7-55b3) on which the Hsien-yang is, directly or indirectly, based.

The very terse style in this paragraph, the fact that we are only dealing with a translation and the very technical substance matter make it impossible to reconstruct the cryptic argumentation here with any degree of certainty. In fact, it seems that the text at this point only alludes to arguments (rather than adducing them in their fully elaborated form) and that it is taken for granted that the listener/reader is familiar with them or has access to more detailed explanations.

The translation presented here (more precisely the supplementation by additions in brackets) follows the interpretation favoured by me. Where applicable, alternative possibilities to understand the argumentation will be discussed in the notes. The matching passages in the VinSg are adduced. They are, however, equally terse and elliptic and, therefore, often only of limited help to clarify the argumentation in the Hsien-yang.

[524] Cf. VinSg P. zi 58b7f, D. źi 55a8-b1: "It is also not possible that destruction (i.e. the *vināśalakṣaṇa*) is the cause of destruction. Why that? Because it is not possible that it (i.e. the *vināśalakṣaṇa*) exists simultaneously with that [entity to be destroyed]. Also [if it is held that as soon as] having originated, [the *vināśalakṣaṇa*] destroys the [*dharma* so that they do not co-exist], there still will be the fault that its (i.e. the *dharma*'s) continuum would be cut off."[a] (*ḥjig pa yaṅ ḥjig paḥi rgyur mi ruṅ ṅo// de ciḥi phyir źe na/ de daṅ lhan cig yod par mi ruṅ baḥi phyir ro// skyes nas de ḥjig par byed ces byar yaṅ deḥi rgyun chad par thal bar ḥgyur baḥi phyir ro//* Sanskrit manuscript [folio 24a8-b1]: *na ca vināśo vināśakāraṇaṃ yujyate <·/> tat kasya hetoḥ/ [lacuna, 24b1] XXX-cchedaprasaṅgataḥ/*; cf. the Chinese translation, T 1579 600a25-27).

[a] Cf. the Chinese translation: "If there was destruction [of the *dharma*] at the very time (時) when it (i.e. the *vināśalakṣaṇa*) originates, the fault would result that the continuum would be cut off."

out because they are held to be mutually exclusive. No reason is, however, adduced for their incompatibility. For all I can see, it can best be accounted for if the existence of the vināśalakṣaṇa *entails the non-existence of the correlated entity, because this non-existence is its effect. In this case, the underlying premises would be that there can be no time at which the* vināśalakṣaṇa *exists without being causally efficient (i.e. that it destroys as soon as it has originated), and that an entity can only be said to be causally efficient at a specific time, if at that time the effect is present, too (for this premise, cf. Oetke 1990).*[525]

Such a reconstruction is strengthened by an argument later in this passage which also requires the assumption that the effect exists at the time its cause discharges its function. By this later argument it is refuted that the mere presence of the vināśalakṣaṇa *could suffice to bring about destruction, because in that case whenever the* vināśalakṣaṇa *existed the correlated entity would have to be non-existent. As will be seen, this argument is factually identical with the argument here, that is, according to the presently proposed reconstruction. The arguments only differ insofar as here the simultaneity is refuted, while it is presupposed that the* vināśalakṣaṇa *discharges its function as soon as it originates, whereas in the later argument this intrinsic link between existence and function is refuted, while the simultaneity is presupposed.*[526]

The second alternative (i.e. not to exist simultaneously) is repudiated on the grounds that it entails the cutting of the santāna *(i.e. the flow of causally connected entities which is*

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[525] The incompatibility between the *vināśalakṣaṇa* and the correlated entity could also follow from the equation of the *vināśalakṣaṇa* with the destruction of the *dharma*, an equation which accords with the position of the Sautrāntikas (cf. AKBh 77,23 *bhūtvābhāvo vyayaḥ*; AKVy 346,21f *vināśaḥ ... abhāvasvabhāvatvāt*) and the Yogācāras (cf. $BoBh_W$ 278,18-20, $BoBh_D$189,7f: *tasmāj jātikṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ tasyaivotpannasya saṃskārakṣaṇasya yaḥ svabhāvavināśaḥ, sa vyaya iti paśyati.*) who held the *vināśalakṣaṇa* to be nothing but the very destruction of the correlated entity. The argumentation here should, however, not require the acceptance of this equation since this would entail unwanted circularity insofar as the opponent's stance, namely that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* is a distinct entity effecting destruction and not destruction itself, would be dismissed from the outset.

[526] The argument here could also be construed in such a way that the existence of the causally active *vināśalakṣaṇa* would not need to entail the complete non-existence of the correlated entity. 俱有 may be identified to translate *sahabhū* (cf. Index to the AKBh) which means to arise together and often entails that also beyond origination the existence of the correlated entities coincides completely. Such an interpretation of 俱有 is supported by the Chinese translation of the VinSg (T 1579 600a26) where the corresponding passage reads 俱生. Thus the simultaneity of the first alternative can be specified as complete coincidence or, if only the meaning "to co-arise" is accepted, at least as entailing joint origination. The point of the argument could then be that the *dharma* cannot originate together with its mark of destruction, because origination and destruction cannot occur simultaneously, since they are contradictory activities. In other words, the unacceptable consequence would not be that the correlated entity could not exist at all when the *vināśalakṣaṇa* is present, but that it would be subject to destruction, as it undergoes origination. Thus it would not be presupposed that the existence of the cause entails the existence of the effect, but that the process of destruction sets in when the *vināśalakṣaṇa* originates. Though the latter premise is less problematic, this alternative reconstruction of the argument is less convincing than the former suggestion which is matched by the aforementioned later argument and accords closer with the wording " ... because there would be the fault of contradiction."

ordinarily perceived as one persisting thing), which implies that the destroyed object vanishes completely, an implication clearly contradicted by the observation that things are not destroyed without residue but are only transformed. For instance, wood when burnt by fire does not vanish altogether but is merely transformed into charcoal, soot, ash etc. According to this interpretation, the argument would match the one adduced against seemingly destructive agents, such as fire and so on, which do not qualify as causes of destruction because the supposedly destroyed entity continues to exist in transformed manner.

The problem poses itself why the santāna *should be cut of under the terms of the second alternative. Possibly, this can be accounted for thus.*[527] *If the* vināśalakṣaṇa *exists after the entity it is attached to (i.e. under the terms of the second alternative) then the segments of the* santāna *can no longer be contiguous as required for their causal linkage.*[528] *In other words the* santāna *would be cut of because the destroyed entity would be separated from further segments of the chain by its* vināśalakṣaṇa *stepping in between it and the succeeding entity.*[529]

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[527] Alternatively, it could be held that the argument is a general objection against the *vināśalakṣaṇa's* function as a cause of destruction which follows from the presupposed definition (on the basis of which it is also refuted that fire etc. is a cause of destruction) of this cause as an agent bringing about the complete disappearance of the entity concerned. In support of such a definition it could be urged, for instance, that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* has to annihilate the respective object completely because it would not be essentially different from the mark of ageing (*jarālakṣaṇa*) if it continued to exist in some way. In this case, the second alternative (i.e. the *vināśalakṣaṇa* and the entity to be destroyed are not simultaneous) would be rejected because it still entailed the fault of utter destruction which, though not mentioned, also applied before under the terms of the first alternative. Such a reconstruction is, however, little satisfactory insofar as it cannot account for the obvious counter-argument, namely that the *santāna* is not cut off at all, because, when the *vināśalakṣaṇa* annihilates the correlated entity, a new entity arises immediately afterwards so that there is continuity on account of this succeeding entity.

[528] Such an interpretation seems to be confirmed by the wording of the alternative envisaged in the parallel passage in the VinSg (particularly in the Chinese translation, cf n. 524) which seems to envisage the *vināśalakṣaṇa* as a factor that, by its origination, drives the *dharma* out of existence.

[529] The entire interpretation proposed here is based on the understanding that the first pair of alternatives scrutinizes the temporal relationship between the *vināśalakṣaṇa* on one side, and the *dharma* to be destroyed on the other side. It is, however, also possible to understand that the argument refers to the *vināśalakṣaṇa* and its effect, i.e. the destruction. In that case, 所滅法 is to be understood as "*dharma* insofar as (i.e. at the time) it is destroyed" (alternatively, it could be argued that Hsüan-tsang has not understood the argument correctly and that hence the Chinese translation at this point is not to be trusted.). If such an approach was adopted, the simultaneity of *vināśalakṣaṇa* and destruction could be ruled out, because thus the cause would no longer precede the effect as the conception of causality underlying here would require — a conception which would be diametrically opposed to the one underlying the argumentation according to the reconstruction suggested above, namely that the effect has to be present when the cause is active. Alternatively, the simultaneity could be precluded because it entails that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* exists after and not, as the repudiated theory has it, together with the correlated entity.

As for the non-simultaneity, the severation of the series could, as Oetke proposes (personal communication), result in the following way: Cause and effect would be non-simultaneous in the sense that the former exists at some time while the latter never exists at all. This relationship would then be inadmissable because it would entail the severation of the causal connection between cause and effect.

As follows from the variety of conflicting interpretations envisaged here, it is impossible to reconstruct with certainty the currently examined argumentation in the Hsien-yang. The parallel passage in the VinSg is just as cryptic as the passage in the Hsien-yang, and cannot help to settle the interpretative uncertainties. By contrast, it is, as far as I can see, open to the same conflicting interpretations as the Hsien-yang is. If anything, it only confirms the impossibility to arrive at a secured understanding.

Further, [if][530] this cause of destruction (i.e. the mark of destruction) destroyed the entity (*dharma*) [it is attached to], would its nature (i.e. the nature of the cause, that is, the cause itself) [in this case] be [subject to] destruction or would its nature not be [subject to] destruction? If its nature were [subject to] destruction, then it would ensue that one entity (*dharma*) had two marks of destruction. If its nature were not [subject to] destruction, then there should be no mark of destruction [at all]. Because there are thus faults [either way], it is not reasonable [that the mark of destruction causes destruction].[531]

On this interpretation, 相續 may render an expressing like *prabandha* (rather than *santāna*) that does not refer to the continuum of entities (*santāna*) to which the correlated entity belongs, but to the causal linkage between the *vināśalakṣaṇa* and its effect.

Though it is impossible to rule out that the Hsien-yang is to be understood in this way, this interpretation has serious drawbacks, so that preference has been given to the interpretation proposed above. Among other things, the interpretation considered here does not match the wording " ... because there would be the fault of contradiction" well. Moreover, if Oetke's proposal is accepted why the non-simultaneity is impossible, then the two alternatives (viz. simultaneity and non-simultaneity) would no longer be exhaustive, as they are made out to be, insofar as other forms of non-simultaneity than the one underlying according to his proposal would be left unconsidered.

[530] In accordance with the parallel sentence in 549b8, I take the first part of the sentence here to be conditional.

[531] Cf. VinSg P. zi 58b8-59a1, D. źi 55b1f: "If the [mark of] destruction has as the own-being merely the destruction [of the concerned entity], it cannot be the cause of destruction. But should this destruction have some other own-being, then this is not possible because no mark of destruction is observed as an entity distinct [from the destruction itself]." (*ḥjig pa de la ḥjig pa tsam gyi ṅo bo ñid yin na ni ḥjig paḥi rgyu yin par mi ruṅ ṅo// ḥon te ḥjig pa de ṅo bo ñid gźan pa kho na źig yin na ni/ des na ḥjig paḥi mtshan ñid don gźan du gyur ba de mi dmigs pas mi ruṅ ṅo//* Sanskrit manuscript: folio 24b1): *vinaṣṭimātrasvābhāvye cāsya vināśasya vināśahetutvam na yujyate/ athānyasvabhāva eva vināśas, tena tad arthāntarabhūtaṃ vināśakāraṇaṃ*[a] *nopalabhyate iti na yujyate/*)

It is not specified why the mark of destruction cannot function as a cause of destruction if it has the nature of destruction. The following interpretation must, therefore, remain hypothetical. If the mark of destruction has as the nature the destruction of the qualified entity, then it cannot be the cause of that destruction because there would be no difference between the cause and its effect, as required for a causal relationship. Alternatively, it could be held that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* would not have a distinct own-being if it merely had the nature of destruction, and, therefore, could not effect destruction, because causal efficiency requires the possession of an own-being. This, however, would hardly make a good argument, because it would be precluded from the outset that causal efficiency could inhere in entities that do not have a nature distinct from destruction.

[a] My translation follows the Tibetan and Chinese version both of which render *vināśalakṣaṇa* rather than *vināśakāraṇa*. If the reading of the Sanskrit manuscript was adopted, the argument could, as suggested by the next argument brought forward in the Hsien-yang, run as in the following translation: " ... then this is not possible, because [beside the *vināśalakṣaṇa*] a cause of destruction as a distinct entity

My translation of the again cryptic argumentation is based on the following understanding: As the cause of destruction, the vināśalakṣaṇa *is considered to be an entity in its own rights. This raises the question whether it, too, is impermanent or not. In the former case it, too, would, under the terms of the theory refuted here, need to be destroyed by a* vināśalakṣaṇa. *This, however, would entail that each* saṃskāra *would be endowed with two* vināśalakṣaṇas, *one destroying the entity itself and one destroying the* vināśalakṣaṇa *which effects that destruction. This consequence in itself is in accordance with the theory refuted here which (at least in the form taught by the Sarvāstivādins and Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas) accounts for the destruction of the* vināśalakṣaṇa *precisely by maintaining that it in turn is also endowed by a* vināśalakṣaṇa *(cf. § I.C.2.2). Therefore, the argumentation should be understood as hinting at an infinite regress (the second* vināśalakṣaṇa *in turn requires a further* vināśalakṣaṇa *for its destruction and so on) of which it only explicates the first step. Even if interpreted in this way, the argument is still incomplete insofar as it does not take into account that, according to the theory refuted here, the secondary* vināśalakṣaṇa *is in turn destroyed by the very* vināśalakṣaṇa *which it destroys so that no infinite regress entails. Probably, this solution will have been rejected on the grounds that reciprocal destruction is impossible.*[532]

That the vināśalakṣaṇa *is not subject to destruction is equally impossible. For it exists, according to the repudiated theory, only in conjunction with the entity it is attached to. Therefore, it cannot continue to exist once it has destroyed this entity. Given this impossibility to persist for ever, there could be no* vināśalakṣaṇas *at all if they had to be permanent. This reconstruction is unsatisfactory insofar as the basis on which the second alternative is repudiated, namely the intrinsic bond between* vināśalakṣaṇa *and correlated entity, is not mentioned at all.*

The reconstruction proposed here does not accord with the parallel passage in the VinSg where the alternatives considered are — as is clearly borne out by the Sanskrit original — not whether the nature of the vināśalakṣaṇa *is* ***subject to*** *destruction but whether it is* ***constituted by*** *destruction or not. In fact also* 體是滅 *in the Hsien-yang, which has been rendered as "its nature is [subject to] destruction," may equally (if not more naturally) be understood as "its nature is destruction." In the VinSg it is argued that the* vināśalakṣaṇa *cannot effect destruction if it only has destruction as its nature, and that conversely, if it did have a different nature enabling it to effect destruction, it would have to be perceived as a distinct entity which is not the case. The latter argument could be applied to the Hsien-yang so that the* vināśalakṣaṇa *would need to have destruction as its nature lest it would no longer be different from an ordinary cause of destruction. It is more difficult to see, however, on precisely which grounds the former alternative, namely that the nature of the* vināśalakṣaṇa *is destruction, should be precluded. The text suggests that such an alternative is unacceptable because it entails that the principal entity would be characterized by two destructions, namely by its own destruction and by its mark of*

(e.g. fire) would not be (as it actually is) observed [because it will have been replaced by the *vināśalakṣaṇa* becoming the external cause of destruction]."

[532] If the reconstruction of the argumentation proposed here is correct, it corroborates my impression that the text only alludes to arguments and takes it for granted that this allusion suffices for the fully elaborated argument to be recalled.

destruction — as the cause of the former entity it is a distinct entity in its own right — which under the terms of the hypothesis would have the nature of destruction. Thus the hypostatization of the vināśalakṣaṇa *as an entity would be dismissed on the grounds that it leads to a duplication of destructions. However, if reconstructed along these lines, the argument becomes deficient. For, instead of proving the position of the Sarvāstivādins (and Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas) to be incoherent, it dismisses from the outset their very theory, namely that the mark of destruction is indeed a distinct entity from the destruction itself. Given this serious drawback, I deem it more likely that the Hsien-yang is, in accordance with the reconstruction outlined above, to be understood differently than the VinSg. On the other hand, it has to be conceded that this reconstruction, too, entails some problems and cannot satisfy entirely either. Given the brevity of the text and the technical nature of the argumentation, it is in my eyes impossible to settle wich of the two interpretations offered here is correct.*

And because it contradicts the character of common perception, one should not maintain that the [mark of] destruction is the cause of destruction. For which reason? Because in the world it is commonly observed that a distinct entity with an own-being is the cause of destruction, [while] it is not observed that an entity "destruction" (滅法) is the cause for destruction.[533]

And if a *dharma* "destruction" were the cause of destruction, would it destroy the *dharma* when it alone is present or would it depend again upon another thing [for effecting destruction]? Both these kind of causes are faulty. If destruction destroyed the *dharma* when it alone is present, then at such a time when the destruction is present the *dharma* would have to be completely non-existent. If it depended again upon another thing, then it should be the other thing that functions as the cause of destruction [and] there would be no need to assume that the "destruction" functions as the cause of destruction.[534]

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[533] In the VinSg the same argument is advanced specifically to refute the possibility that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* should have an own-being different from destruction (cf. n. 531). By contrast, in the Hsien-yang the argument is, contrary to the other arguments, not directed against one of two exhaustive alternatives. Rather, it supplements the argumentation insofar as it points out that the examined theory is not only inconsistent on the theoretical level but also contradicted by perception.

[534] Cf. VinSg P. zi 58b1-3, D. źi 55b2f: "If it is assumed that the 'destruction' (i.e. the *vināśalakṣaṇa*) destroyed jointly with fire and so on, then this is impossible because in that case it would no longer hold good that flames etc., [as well as] mind and mental factors perish on their own account. If it is held that their capability to effect this [destruction] differs in each case,[a] then this is impossible because [such a] difference [in their efficacy] is not observed.
If it is [alternatively] assumed that the two [factors] had the capability to destroy [each] one part (*ekadeśa*) [of the entity to be destroyed], then this is impossible because it would follow that both had the capacity to destroy both parts [on their own] or that [collectively] they did not have the capacity to destroy both parts." (*gal te me la sogs pa daṅ ḥjig pa bsdoṅs te ḥjig par byed do źes rtog na ni/ des na mar me la sogs pa daṅ sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba rnams raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis ḥjig go źes bya ba mi ḥthad par mi ruṅ ṅo// gal te de skye ba*[b] *la nus pa gźan daṅ gźan yod par rtog na ni des na bye brag mi dmigs pas mi ruṅ ṅo// gal te gñi gas phyogs gcig ḥjig par nus so źes rtog na*[c] *ni/ des na gñi gas cha gñi ga ḥjig par nus paḥam/ cha gñi ga ḥjig par mi nus par thal bar ḥgyur bas mi ruṅ ste/* Sanskrit manuscript folio 24b1f: *sacet punar agnyādisahāyo vināśo vināśayatīti kalpanā kriyate, tena pradīpādīnā(ṃ?) cittacaita*

... (lacuna, 24b2) ... *<na yujya>te/ sacet punar anyonyasāmarthyaṃ tajjanane kalpyate, tena viśeṣo <no>palabhyata (viśeṣa upa° ?) iti na yujyate/ sacet punar dvayor ekadeśavināśasāmarthyaṃ kalpyate, tenobhayor ubhayāṃśavināśa<na>sāmarthyaṃ vā ubhayāṃśāvināśanasāmarthyaṃ vā prasajyata iti na yujyate/* Chinese translation T 1579 600b1-7)

It is particularly difficult to understand the reasoning repudiating the possibility that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* functions jointly with an external cause. My interpretative translation is based on the following reconstruction of the argumentation which is only brought forward tentatively. To start with, such a possibility is rejected because it would entail the contra-factual consequence that also the destruction of such entities as flames, sound, and thoughts would have to depend upon an external agent. This argument is also brought forward elsewhere and is not problematic. In a further step — here the interpretative difficulties set in — it is shown that regardless of this consequence the mutual functioning of the *vināśalakṣaṇa* and the external agent is also in itself inconsistent. For it is neither possible that their capacity to destroy differs qualitatively — such a difference would have to be reflected in the destruction which is not the case — nor that they each destroy one part of the entity. Hence there is no basis for the assumption that they destroy jointly. The possibility that they each destroy one part seems to be rejected on the ground that if they have the capacity to destroy one part they must also have the capacity to destroy the other part, and, conversely, if they do not have the capacity to destroy that other part, they can neither have the capacity to destroy the first part. This line of reasoning seems to be based on the preceding denial of a qualitative difference in the functioning of the two kind of causes. For without such a differentiation, it is difficult to see why their effect should differ spatially.

Alternatively, there is the following — as far as I can see, less satisfactory — possibility to reconstruct the reasoning succeeding upon the argument that macroscopic objects cannot be destroyed both by a *vināśalakṣaṇa* and an external cause of destruction because then the destruction of flames etc. would also have to depend upon the advent of an external cause: That fire etc. are destroyed by their *vināśalakṣaṇa* alone is defended by the opponent on the basis that the mode of functioning of the *vināśalakṣaṇa* differs when it destroys fire etc. from when it destroys ordinary macroscopic objects. This argument is rejected on the grounds that no difference in the functioning of the *vināśalakṣaṇa* can be observed, destruction being one regardless of the destroyed entity. In the following the hypothetical stance (to my knowledge not taken by any school) would be rejected that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* destroys entities such as fire, whereas macroscopic objects are destroyed by external causes of destruction alone. Against this stance it would be argued that if the *vināśalakṣaṇa* — the same holds good for external cause — had the power to destroy at all, then it should have this power regardless of the entity to be destroyed. Conversely, if it did not have this power with respect to some entities, then it could not have this power at all. This argument is, however, deficient insofar as it dismisses the reviewed option (viz. that some entities are destroyed by an external agent and some by a *vināśalakṣaṇa*) from the outset, presupposing as it does that the power to destroy must either hold good invariably for all conditioned entities or for none. This reconstruction of the argument would call for the following translation:

> "... If it is held that the capability [of the *vināśalakṣaṇa*] to effect this [destruction] is different in each case (i.e. in the case of flames etc. and in the case of ordinary macroscopic objects), then [this] is not reasonable either because no difference is observed. If it was [alternatively] assumed that the two [kinds of *vināśahetus*, viz. the *vināśalakṣaṇa* and the external agent] had the capability to destroy each one part (of the total of things to be destroyed, viz. respectively flames etc. on the one hand and ordinary macroscopic objects on the other) then this is impossible because it would follow that they either both had the capacity to destroy both parts [on their own] or that they both did not have the capacity to destroy both parts."

[a] For this translation of *anyonya* cf. BHSD (s.v. *anyonya*) and the rendering of *anyonya* in the Tibetan and Chinese translation.

[b] In contrast to the Tibetan translation which reads *skye ba* instead of *skyed pa*, I understand that *janana* is used transitively.

The last pair of alternatives demonstrates that the conception of the vināśalakṣaṇa *is inconsistent insofar as the exhaustive alternatives, viz. to function on its own or in dependence upon another agent, are both faulty. The refutation of the former alternative may be reconstructed as follows: If the* vināśalakṣaṇa *does not depend upon another agent, it must discharge its function as soon as it originates. This is taken to imply that whenever the* vināśalakṣaṇa *exists the correlated entity must be completely non-existent — probably because it was held to be impossible to attribute causal efficacy to an entity at a specific point of time without the effect then being already present. That the correlated entity will always be completely non-existent when the* vināśalakṣaṇa *is present entails that it can never arise on the first place if it is, as is obviously the case here, understood to arise jointly with the* vināśalakṣaṇa. *As already mentioned, according to this reconstruction the argument here is factually identical with the earlier argument (that is according to the reconstruction proposed there) that* vināśalakṣaṇa *and correlated entity cannot be simultaneous because their existence is incompatible.*[535]

As for the position that the vināśalakṣaṇa *operates in dependence upon another cause, it is clearly repudiated on the grounds that in this case the external cause upon which the* vināśalakṣaṇa *depends will be the true cause of destruction and not the* vināśalakṣaṇa. *The same argument is also advanced by Vasubandhu in the AKBh (cf. n. 113). Apart from refuting the possibility that the* vināśalakṣaṇa *operates jointly with an external cause, this argumentation also links up with the preceding argument in the sense that it excludes the possibility that this preceding argument is rejected by the opponent on the grounds that the observation of destruction by an external cause such as fire does not contradict the assumption of the* vināśalakṣaṇa *because it is held to operate jointly with such an external cause.*

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[c] P. *rton na ni/.*

[535] The argumentation here can also be analyzed differently, namely as a specific refutation of the differentiation between the mechanism of destruction in case of material and mental entities which was upheld by the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas. In this case, the two alternatives would not be envisaged because they are exhaustive, but because they correspond to the position of the Vātsīputrīyas-Saṃmatīyas that mental entities are destroyed by their *vināśalakṣaṇa* alone, whereas in the case of material entities the *vināśalakṣaṇa* operates in conjunction with an external cause (cf. § I.C.3.2.2).

According to this interpretation, it would be unacceptable that there should be no time at which the *vināśalakṣaṇa* exists without destroying the entity it belongs to, because in case of material entities the *vināśalakṣaṇa* is, in contrast to mental entities, held to exist alongside with the correlated entity without discharging its function until it meets an external cause of destruction such as fire which activates it. This interpretation accords with the matching passage in the VinSg and can also be substantiated by the KSi (P. si 158b1f, KSi_M 9,12-14) where in a similar context the Vātsīputrīyas are attacked on the grounds that the differentiation between the mechanism of destruction in the case of mental entities and in the case of material entities is incoherent. On the other hand, such an interpretation is problematic because it entails that the very position which is to be refuted, namely that the *vināśalakṣaṇa* operates differently in case of momentary and non-momentary entities, is simply not accepted from the outset when it is taken as a matter of fact that the implications of the independent operation of the *vināśalakṣaṇa* in case of mental entities (i.e. that there can be no time at which *vināśalakṣaṇa* and correlated entity exist side by side) also apply to material entities. Moreover, the pattern of the argumentation would be disrupted insofar as the two alternatives would no longer, as before, be envisaged because they are factually exhaustive but because they are entailed by the refuted doctrinal position. Given these drawbacks, the earlier reconstruction outlined above seems preferable.

§ 2.4 Proof of Momentariness on the basis of Change and Final Destruction[536]

(549b12-21)

Further, how should one understand that all entities (*dharma*) are momentary because at the end change is perceived[537]? The stanza says:

> It is not the case that bodies, milk, forests and so on are at the beginning without change.
> Nor is it the case that at the beginning they do not perish but at the very end they then do so.(kā 12)

The explication says: In the case of all internal and external *dharmas* (i.e. entities constituting sentient beings and the insentient world) such as bodies, milk, forests and so on, at the very end change can be observed. Therefore, it is not possible that at an earlier time their own-being is free of change. Nor is it the case that at the beginning they are devoid of destruction but at the very end they then perish, because there is no reason for [such] a difference [in their behaviour].[538] In this way all conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) should be known to

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[536] Note that according to the hypothesis advanced in this study (cf. particularly § II.D.4), the deduction of momentariness from change and from final destruction, as they are jointly presented here and in the parallel passage in the MSABh (150,20-28; cited in n. 350 and in n. 538), reflect of all proofs most accurately the origins of the doctrine of momentariness.

[537] Here the Hsien-yang refers back to kā 7c (appendix, § 2.1) where this argument was brought forward for the first time.

[538] Cf. MSABh 150,21f (see n. 350 where the passage introducing the following citation, as well as the immediately subsequent argumentation on the basis of the final manifestation of change are adduced): "Because of destruction [it is known that recognition is based on similarity and not on identity]. For of something persisting in the same way [as it has always done], there could be no destruction at the end, because [at] no [later time] would it be different from [the way it was in] the first moment. Therefore, it is ascertained that this [thing] now is not that very [thing which has been seen earlier and is supposedly recognized now]." (*nirodhataḥ. na hi tathaivāvasthitasyānte nirodhaḥ syād ādikṣaṇanirviśiṣṭatvāt. tasmān na tat tad evety avadhāryate.*)

Sthiramati's interpretation of this argument (SAVBh P. tsi 167b5-7) accords with the explanation given in the Hsien-yang, namely that the perceptible destruction of things is only possible if it is assumed that all the time before they have also perished. For otherwise, so the argument runs, they should have the nature to persist at the time of their perceptible destruction, because — a change of property is precluded — they will have been endowed with this nature all the time before. Given this nature, they could never perish so that there would be no macroscopic destructions.

As confirmed by NA 533c29-534a2,[a] this argumentation presupposes that there are no causes of destruction that could effect the destruction of the by nature persisting entity. Thus, it may be understood as a variant of the proof that discrete *saṃskāras* cannot endure beyond origination, which in both sources (MSABh 149,27-30 and 150,5-11 cited in n. 393, Hsien-yang, appendix § 2.3.1) precedes the argument presently examined. From this earlier proof the present argument differs by its perspective, insofar as its starting point is "the destruction at the end," i.e. not the destruction of the discrete *saṃskāra* as in the earlier proof, but of the series formed by these entities. This starting point accords with the (both in the Hsien-yang and MSA) immediately preceding deduction of momentariness from change. Both arguments form a unit and probably allude to the corrosion brought about by time and to the subsequent destruction. This will refer in particular to sentient beings, the idea being that neither their decay in old age nor their subsequent death can be accounted for, if it is not assumed that they have been undergoing destructions at every single moment before.

change [and hence] undergo destruction at every moment because if they did not change earlier they would [contrary to observation] not change later [either],[539] and because if they did not undergo destruction earlier they would not perish later [either]. Thereby the issue that the *dharmas* are moment[ary] has been settled.

Considering that on this analysis the present argument is essentially identical with the earlier demonstration that things cannot persist beyond origination, it could have been held alternatively that the argument originally supplemented the (in both texts) immediately preceding deduction of momentariness from change in such a way that the destruction at the end is a further sign from which it can be inferred that the entity in question has been changing all the time before. For, given that destruction is analyzed in terms of transformation, it is, as argued in n. 377 and in § II.D.2.4, possible to look at the final destruction as the result of a process of transformation that requires constant modification at every moment. Given the textual testimony of the NA,[a] as well as the explanation of the argument in the Hsien-yang and SAVBh, such an interpretation is, however, hardly possible here.

[a] NA 533c29-534a2 (translated in LVP 1937, p. 150): "The destruction of present phenomena (*dharma*) does not depend upon an adventitious cause. Because it does no depend upon an adventitious cause, they (i.e. the *dharmas*) undergo destruction as soon as they have originated. If they did not undergo destruction right in the beginning, then also later they should be so (i.e. persisting), because earlier and later the principal cause (i.e. the phenomena's nature or, more precisely, their mark of destruction) is the same. Since one observes that [phenomena] eventually undergo destruction, one knows that [already] before they undergo destruction at every moment."

[539] Hayashima (1989b, p. 13) understands that this argument referring to the final manifestation of change supplements the deduction of momentariness from the non-existence of a cause of destruction. This deduction is only stringent if it is excluded that things do not persist for ever. This exclusion is according to Hayashima effected here by pointing out that things can eventually be observed to have undergone change which precludes that they persist for ever uniformly.

I do not see any reason to assume that the reasoning here should, as Hayashima contests, not constitute an independent argument, as it does in the all other sources (cf. § II.C.1) where it is brought forward. As for the gap it is meant to close in the deduction of momentariness from the non-existence of a cause of destruction, it may be safely assumed that, just like in the other cases where this argument is advanced, it went without saying that the *saṃskāras* may not persist for ever, simply because they were held to be impermanent.

於能生相續是增上。命根一種於相續住是增上，五受根於染污是增上，信等八根於清淨是增上。此中顯示根善巧自體及彼障斷勝利。是名根善巧。云何諦善巧。頌曰

二自性苦故　合故不應理
由無因有因　及五種譬喻
如是隨覺故　應知諦善巧
隨覺未曾見　未受義因緣

論曰。由能善觀我於染淨二法非順道理名諦善巧。何等爲二。謂自性苦故。與苦合故。云何自性苦故。謂若我自性是苦者。爲無因爲有因。若無因者。常應染污。若有因者。應先清淨後方染污。故不順理。云何與苦合故。謂引五喻皆不順理。何以故。若言苦與我合者。不應如兩木共合。有不攝出離性過故。亦非如有情與木共合。有出離過故。亦非如火與薪共合。有性壞過故。亦非如衣與染色共合。於我體上如白淨色少分亦不可得故。亦非如心心法合。何以故。心是能取與此同緣一境等可名相應。於我無此義故。不順道理。又由觀見未曾見義及彼因緣。又復觀見未曾受義及彼因緣。名諦善巧。謂從昔來未曾了見苦集二諦及彼因緣。從昔已來未曾了見。未曾經受滅道兩諦及彼因緣。此中顯示出世智自體及彼障斷勝利。是名諦善巧。頌曰

當知諸善巧　差別二十三
異攝論爲先　後最極清淨

論曰。應知蘊等善巧差別復有二十三種。謂異攝論善巧。聞所生智善巧。思所生智善巧。修所生智善巧。順決擇分智善巧。見道智善巧。修道智善巧。究竟道智善巧。練根智善巧。發神通智善巧。不善清淨世俗智善巧。善清淨世俗智善巧。勝義智善巧。不善清淨相有分別智善巧。善清淨相有分別智善巧。善清淨相無分別智善巧。成所作前行智善巧。成所作智善巧。成所作後智善巧。聲聞智善巧。獨覺智善巧。菩薩智善巧。最極清淨智善巧。此中異攝論善巧復有二種。一種種攝善巧。二種種論善巧

種種攝善巧者有十一種。所謂界攝乃至更互攝。界攝者。謂諸蘊等自種子所攝。相攝者。謂諸蘊等自相共相所攝。種類攝者。謂諸蘊等遍自種類所攝。分位攝者。謂諸蘊等順樂受等分位所攝。不相離攝者。謂諸蘊等由一法攝一切蘊等。以彼眷屬不相離故。時攝者。謂諸蘊等過去未來現在各別相攝。方攝者。謂諸蘊等依方而轉。若依此方所生卽此方所攝。全攝者。謂諸蘊等具足五十八十二等所攝。一分攝者。謂諸蘊等各別少分所攝。勝義攝者。謂諸蘊等眞如相所攝。更互攝者。謂諸蘊等更互相攝

種種論善巧者。謂於蘊等種種問答方便善巧。如以一行爲。問應以順前句順後句四句無事句。答如有。問言若有界攝卽有相攝[1]耶。設有相攝復有界攝耶。且應依眼以四句。答或有界攝無相攝　謂生有色界不得眼。設得[2]已失。若諸異生生無色界。或有相攝無界攝。謂阿羅漢最後眼。或有界攝亦有相攝。謂除上所說餘有眼位。或有無界攝亦無相攝。謂阿羅漢眼壞失者。生無色界。已見諦者。及已入無餘般涅槃界。如於眼如是分別。於餘一切隨其所應當廣分別。如以界攝對相攝。如是以界攝對餘攝。展轉一行應廣分別。如是以餘攝對餘攝除前前對後後。皆應以一行道理如其所應當廣分別。復次若法蘊所攝此法界所攝耶。設法界所攝此法蘊所攝耶。此應以順前句答。若法蘊所攝此法亦界所攝。或法界所攝非蘊所攝。謂無爲法。如以蘊對界如是以蘊乃至對諦應依二行道理廣辯相攝。如蘊對餘如是以界對處等乃至以根對諦應廣分別

此中不善清淨世俗智善巧者。卽是順決擇分智善巧。善清淨世俗智善巧者。卽是出世後得世間智善巧。勝義智善巧者。卽是見道智善巧。如是三種卽是不善清淨相有分別智善巧。善清淨相有分別智善巧。善清淨相無分別智善巧。如是[3]三種卽是成所作前行智善巧。成所作智善巧。成所作後智善巧。又前三種差別者。未斷煩惱生非煩惱對治。已斷煩惱生非煩惱對治。已斷煩惱生是煩惱對治差別故。中三種差別者。卽此三種由有分別無分別世俗勝義智性差別故。後三種差別者。謂卽此三種顯示斷前行智性正斷道智性彼後時智性差別故。如是九智依相續。補特伽羅差別復建立四種應知

[4]顯揚聖教論成無常品第四

復次如先所說。若欲正修行遍知等功德者。

[1]耶＝邪㊂下同 [2]已＝以[illegible] [3]三＝二[illegible] [4]〔顯揚聖教論〕－[illegible]

謂遍知苦等。云何於苦遍知。謂於苦諦遍知無常苦空無我。今隨次第應廣成立。此中成無常者。謂應顯示無常體性及無常差別。云何無常。何等差別。頌曰

無常謂有爲　三相相應故
無常義如應　六八種應知

論曰。無常性者。謂有爲法與三有爲相共相應故。一生相。二滅相。三住異相。又無常義差別者。如其所應或六或八應知。何等六八。頌曰

無性壞轉異　別離得當有
剎那續病等　心器受用故

論曰。六種無常者。一無性無常。二失壞無常。三轉異無常。四別離無常。五得無常。六當有無常。八種無常者。一剎那門。二相續門。三病門。四老門。五死門。六心門。七器門。八受用門。此中剎那相續二種無常遍一切處。病等三無常在於內色。心無常唯在於名。器受用二無常在於外色。此中無性無常者。謂性常無故。名曰無常。餘變異無常有十五種。頌曰

變異應當知　十五種差別
所謂分位等　八緣所逼故
下界具一切　中界離三門
具三種變異　上界復除器

論曰。十五種變異者。謂分位變異。乃至一切種不現盡變異。分位變異者。謂從嬰兒位乃至老時前後不相似各別變異。顯變異者。謂從妙色鮮肌潤澤膚體乃至變爲惡色麁肌枯槁膚體。形變異者。謂❶肥瘦等變異。興盛變異者。謂眷屬資財及戒見等興盛。與此相違❷名衰退變。異支節變異者。謂先具諸支節後變爲不具。寒熱變異者。謂於寒時蹉蹋戰慄。熱則舒適流汗希求冷煖等變異。他所損害變異者。謂手足疏搏蚊虻觸等。身體變異。疲倦變異者。謂因走跳騰躑等。身勞變異。威儀變異者。謂四威儀前後易脫損益變異。觸對變異者。謂由順苦樂等觸變異故苦樂等受變異。染污變異者。謂心所有貪瞋等大小兩惑燒亂變異。病等變異者。謂先無病苦後爲重疾所逼身體變異。死變異者。謂先有壽命後空無識前後變異。青瘀等變異者。謂命終後身色青瘀脹爛乃至骨❸鎖等變異。一切種不現盡變異者。謂骨*鎖位燒壞離散彼一切種都無所見變異

又此十五種變異由與八緣相應。八緣者。一積時貯畜。二他所損害。三受用❹虧減。四時節推謝。五火所燒。六水所壞。七風所燥。八異緣合。積時貯畜者。謂經時久故。有色之法不離本處自然朽敗。他所損害者。謂由他種種逼惱因緣前後變異。受用*虧減者。謂於種種所受用物爲各別主宰之所食用損減變異。時節推謝者。謂冬時寒雪夏日暑雨。叢林藥草或盛或衰。火所燒者。謂大火縱逸國城聚落悉爲灰燼。水所壞者。謂大水漂漫閈里邑居並隨淪沒。風所燥者。謂大風飄鼓潤衣濕地速令乾❺曝。異緣合者。謂多貪者與瞋緣合時貪纏止息發起瞋纏。如是多瞋多癡者與餘煩惱緣合應知亦爾。如是諸識異境現前亦爾。復次是無常義於欲界中一切具有。於色界中除病老受用三門無常。又有觸染死三種變異。如色界所說諸無常義。當知無色界亦爾。唯除器門。頌曰

無性義無常　遍計之所執
所餘無常義　依他起應知

論曰。無性義所攝無常義。當知遍計所執相攝。餘無常義依他起相攝。圓成實相中無無常義。如是已顯無常義差別及三相所攝。又如世尊說。諸無常者皆悉是苦。有何意耶。頌曰

諸無常皆苦　染苦所雜故
迷法性愚夫　得爲害不覺

論曰。由麁重❻若所雜無常。此無常性是行苦故苦。及由變壞苦所依止故苦。是故道諦非苦。以非苦相所雜無常義故。於此法性迷惑愚夫。不能了達常無常義。又爲已得現前無常之所惱害。前說剎那無常遍行一切。此無常義非世間現證故應成立。頌曰

由彼心果故　生已自然滅
後變異可得　念念滅應知

論曰。彼一切行是心果故。其性纔生離滅因緣自然滅壞。又復後時變異可得。當知諸行皆剎那滅。云何應知諸行是心果耶。頌曰

心熏習增上　定轉變自在
影像生道理　及三種聖教

論曰。由道理及聖教證知諸行是心果性。道理者。謂善不善法熏習於心。由心習氣增上力故諸行得生。又脫定障心清淨者。一切諸

❶肥＝肌㊂㊅　❷〔名〕－㊂，名＝多㊅　❸鎖＝璅㊂㊅㊆*　❹虧＝虧㊆*　❺曝＝曝㊂㊇　❻若＝苦㊅㊆

行隨心轉變。由彼意解自在力故種種轉變。又由定心自在力故。隨其所欲定心境界影像而生。是名道理。聖教者。謂三種聖言。如經中說。心將引世間心力所防護隨心生起已自在皆隨轉。又說。是故苾芻。應善專精如正道理觀察於心。乃至廣說。又說。苾芻當知。言城主者。卽是一切有取識蘊。是名聖教。問彼諸行自然滅壞道理。云何應知。答由四種因緣。頌曰

生因相違故　無住滅兩因
自然住常過　當知任運滅

論曰。非彼生因能滅諸行。生滅兩種互相違故。又無住因令諸行住。若必有者應成常住。行既不住何用滅因。又餘滅因性不可得。若行生已自然住者。彼應常則住成大過。如是有住滅因及自然住並有過故。當知諸行任運壞滅。頌曰

非水火風滅　以俱起滅故
彼相應滅已　餘變異生因

論曰。若水火風是滅因者。不應道理。由俱生滅故。若彼水等是滅因者。爛燒燥物不應前相續滅已復變異相續生。何以故。卽無體因爲有體因。不應理故。然水火風與爛等物相應滅時。能爲彼物後變生因。除此功能。水等於彼更無餘力。復次若執滅相爲滅因者。此能滅相與所滅法爲俱時有爲不俱耶。若爾何過。頌曰

相違相續斷　二相成無相
違世間現見　無法及餘因

論曰。彼能滅相與所滅法。若言俱有者不應道理。有相違過故。若言不俱亦不應理。有彼相續斷過失故。又此滅因能滅法者。爲體是滅爲體非滅。若體是滅卽應一法有二滅相。若體非滅應無滅相。有如是過故不應理。又違世間現見相故。不應執滅是滅壞因。何以故。世間共見餘有體法是滅壞因。不見滅法是滅因故。又若滅法是滅因者。爲唯有滅卽能滅法爲更待餘事耶。此兩種因俱有過失。若唯有滅卽能滅法者。若時有滅。爾時法體畢竟應無。若更待餘事者。應卽餘事爲滅壞因。不應計滅爲滅壞因。復次云何應知。後變異可得故諸法剎那滅。頌曰

非身乳林等　先無有變異
亦非初不壞　最後時方滅

論曰。一切世間身乳林等內外諸法。於最後時變異可得。是故先時體無變易。不應道理。又非先時無有滅壞。最後方滅無異因故。如是先不變異後不變故。先無滅壞後不滅故。當知諸行念念變滅。是故彼法剎那義❶成。如是成立無常性已。一切外道邪分別所計我自在自性極微覺等常住之法皆不成立。云何我常不得成立。頌曰

位思煩惱分　非常變異故
此若無變異　受作脫非理

論曰。由所計我有苦樂等位善惡等思貪瞋等煩惱時分差別。是故無常。所以者何。此所計我由樂等故。有少變異者不應是常。若都不變不應計爲受者作者及解脫者。彼法有無我無別故。復次亦無自在體性常住能生世間。何以故。頌曰

功能無有故　攝不攝相違
有用及無用　爲因成過失

論曰。所計自在生世功能無有因緣自然有者。何若此自在無有功能出生世間。所以者汝何不許一切世間無因自有。若此功能業爲因者。何不信受一切世間以業爲因。若此功能以求方便爲因生者。何不信受一切世間以自功力爲因得生。又若自在世間所攝❷墮在世間而言能生一切世間。是則道理相違。若此自在非世間攝。是則解脫解脫之法能生世間。不應道理。又若自在須有用故諸生世間離生世間用不成者。是則自在。於此須用無有自在自成過失。若此自在雖生世間無所須者。不應化生一切世間。或此自在有如❸顚狂愚夫之過。又此自在生世間者。爲唯自在爲因生諸世間。爲亦更待其餘因耶。若唯自在體爲因者。如自在體本來常有世間亦爾。不應更生。若亦少待其餘因者。此所待因若無有因。一切世間亦應如是。若有餘因世間亦爾。從餘因生何須自在。故立自在有多過失。復次執有自性常住爲因。不應道理。何以故。頌曰

自性變異相　有無不應理
無差別無常　有差別五失
無相亦無因　非自性恒變
先無有變異　我應常解脫

論曰。若計自性是常則應非變異因。所以者

❶成＋（義）㊁㊂ ❷隨＝墮㊂ ❸顚＝癲㊁㊂㊃

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AD: *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*. Ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna 1959 (TSWS vol. IV).

ADV: Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti on the Abhidharmadīpa: see AD.

AK: Abhidharmakośa: see AKBh.

AK_P: Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, traduit et annoté, Paris-Louvain 1923-1931.

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AkṣM: Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra. Peking-Kanjur 842. T 397 and 403. Tibetan Text edited and translated by J. Braarvig (Oslo 1988).

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AN: Aṅguttaranikāya.

[1] In general, I do not list those works to which I only refer once. In their cases, the bibliographic data is provided on the spot. Unless specified otherwise, I have used for the Pāli-texts the editions of the PTS.

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ASBh: Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (Buddhasiṃha or Jinaputra; cf. LS 1987, n. 775). Ed. N. Tatia, Patna 1976 (TSWS vol. 17).

BCA: Bodhicaryāvatāra (Śāntideva): see BCAP.

$BCAP_P$: Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā (Prajñākaramati). Ed. LVP, Calcutta 1901-1914.

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kā: *kārikā* (i.e. "stanza").

KSi: Karmasiddhi (Vasubandhu): Peking-Tanjur 5563. Edited by É. Lamotte in: *MCB* IV, 1935-1936, pp. 151-205.

KSi_M: Karmasiddhi (Vasubandhu). Ed. G. Muroji, Kyoto 1985.

Kv: Kathāvatthu.

Kv-a: Kathāvatthu-ppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā.

LAS: Laṅkāvatārasūtra. Ed. Bunyiu Nanjio, Kyoto 1923.

LVP: Louis de La Vallée Poussin.

MAV: Madhyāntavibhāga ("Maitreya"): see MAVBh .

MAVBh: Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Vasubandhu). Ed. G. M. Nagao, Tokyo 1964.

MAVṬ: Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā (Sthiramati). Ed. S. Yamaguchi, Nagoya 1934 (repr. Tokyo 1966).

MCB: Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, Brussels.

MKK: (Mūla-)Madhyamaka-kārikā (Nāgārjuna).

MN: Majjhimanikāya.

MPPU: Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa (T 1509).

$MPPU_L$: French translation of MPPU by É. Lamotte (*Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*). vol I pp. 1-620; vol. II pp. 621-1118; vol. III pp., 1119-1733; vol. IV pp. 1734-2162; vol. V pp. 2163-2451, Louvain 1944sg.

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NSBh: Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (Vātsyāyana): *Nyāyadarśanam: Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Ed. by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Delhi 1985 (1st ed. in Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. 18 and 19, 1936-1944).

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SAVBh: (Mahāyāna)-Sutrālaṅkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya (Sthiramati): Peking-Tanjur 5531.

SBhC: Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (T 2031, T 2032, T 2033; Peking-Tanjur 5638; unless specified otherwise, all references are to the translation by Hsüan-tsang, viz. T 2031)

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TS: Tattvasaṅgraha (Śāntarakṣita). Ed. Embar Krishnamacharya, Baroda 1984. (Reprint of the first edition 1926, Gaekward's Oriental Series XXX. XXXI). The chapter on momentariness has been edited and translated by K.N. Chatterjee (*Tattvasaṃgraha, Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā*), Calcutta 1988.

TSi: *Tattvasiddhi (Harivarman): T 1646.

TSP: Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (Kamalaśīla): see TS.

TSWS: Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series (Patna).

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Vi_2: Vibhāṣā, Chinese translation by Buddhavarman.

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VinSg: Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī Section of the Yogācārabhūmi. Citations refer to the Tibetan translation of the Yogācārabhūmi (viz. Peking-Tanjur: 5539) and to the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang (viz. T 1579). Occasionally reference has also been made to the Sanskrit manuscript recently discovered by Matsuda Kazunobu.

VisM: Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa). Ed. by H.C. Warren and revised by Dh. Kosambi, Cambridge, Mass. 1950 (Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 41).

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Y_T: Tibetan translation of Y: Peking-Tanjur 5536-5543.

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Indices

Topical Index[1]

[1] Rather than preparing mechanically a word index, I have decided to compile a topical index. I have only included those occurrences of a word or a term which I considered to be of some significance. As for the key terms of this study such as *anityatā* and momentariness, I have tried to specify the context of each occurrence. For all errors which may have slipped into the index I beg for the readers' indulgence.

Index of Indian Authors, Masters and Schools

[2] In the notes 408 and 410 I have touched upon the "Vasubandhu problem," that is the question of how many Vasubandhus there are in the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika tradition.

Index of Modern Authors

Index of Texts with Index Locorum[3]

[3] In this index I do not only refer to the passages which are quoted in the present study but also to the passages which are discussed without being quoted — in order to distinguish, only in the former case the references are printed in bold numbers. Moreover, I have listed the page numbers on which I refer to a text in general rather than to a specific passage thereof. These page numbers are bold when they refer to the treatment of the literary history of a text.

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